The Bureaucratic Perils of Presidentialism: Political Impediments to Good Governance in Latin America

Abstract

In the face of poorly performing bureaucracies, public management specialists and policy experts have been quick to suggest administrative reforms. Yet, since governance lies at the nexus of politics and administration, reforms limited to the administrative dimension are likely to fall short without concomitant political change. This essay argues that in contemporary Latin America, certain political-institutional arrangements or institutional traits are more likely to produce (in)effective governance than others. Specifically, Latin American presidentialism creates several “perils” for governance, including: the rigidity and short time horizons of presidentialism; multipartyism under presidentialism; weakly institutionalized party systems and non-programmatic parties; an imbalance of power between strong presidents and weak legislatures; the plebiscitarian nature of presidentialism; and democratic backsliding and the centralization of power in the presidency. These institutional traits incentivize patronage, promote myopic policymaking, and weaken bureaucratic autonomy. To illustrate how they manifest themselves in public policy, the paper uses evidence from the region’s responses to the Covid-19 pandemic, then concludes by suggesting political reforms that may help to improve governance in the region.