Abstract

Over the past two decades the use of referenda has spread throughout Latin America, and 39 referenda have taken place since 1990. For some observers, referenda can improve accountability, promote participation, and reduce corruption. For others, given the strong tradition of Latin American presidentialism, referenda can be manipulated by populist presidents attempting to bypass unpopular representative institutions such as congresses or to bolster their popularity. This article provides a more nuanced view of referenda, arguing that presidents cannot always manipulate referenda to increase their power. The effect of referenda on executive power varies depending on the scope of the referenda, that is, whether they aim at institutional change or, alternatively, at policy change. Moreover, the agenda-setting process and the role of political parties in referenda campaigns also mediate the effect of referenda on executive power. Although referenda do not necessarily enhance executive power, the risks of presidential manipulation are strong, and thus referenda should be carried out taking sufficient precautions.

Full Text
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