Lame Ducks Research Articles

“Willing enthusiasts” or “lame ducks”? Issues in teacher professional development policy in England and Wales 1910–1975

Though there is a well-established body of research in the field of teacher professional development, it is characterised by a real dearth of any detailed historical analysis. This paper seeks to address this gap, by offering a new historical analysis of a case study of the evolution of organised teacher professional development in England and Wales during the twentieth century. Its approach is hoped to open up the wider debate and to contribute to a fuller understanding of the basis for those questions and dilemmas about teacher professional development that have long exercised teachers, professional educators and policy-makers – questions which turn on fundamental issues of priorities and purpose, funding, scale of teacher engagement, control and reach. The paper is in three main parts. Firstly, the scope of the case study is outlined with key stages in the evolution of teacher professional development in England and Wales identified. Secondly, four themes from the data which characterised this evolution are discussed. These include the restricted engagement of teachers relative to the whole teacher population; limited funding; the highly centralised control over provision for teacher professional development through Her Majesty’s Inspectorate (HMI); and a highly selective and restrictive access to provision by teachers. It is argued that these key characteristics helped to shape a particular culture and ideology of teacher professional development which was dependent on a select cadre of elite teachers for the dissemination and modelling of what was regarded as good practice, so as to improve their colleagues’ performance – the elite excelled while the majority needed to be saved from mediocrity. The particular ideology underlying this model is conceptualised as one of ‘excellence and salvation’. Finally, it is argued that the key issues identified in this story (the restricted engagement of teachers; limited funding; highly centralised control; and ideologies of excellence) raise important generic questions for the field of teacher professional development more widely as well as framing future historical analysis of teacher professional development.

Regime Change Cascades: What We Have Learned from the 1848 Revolutions to the 2011 Arab Uprisings

Works on the 1848 revolutions, 1989 collapse of European communism, 1998–2005 postcommunist color revolutions, and 2011 Arab uprisings frequently cross-reference each other, implying what is called here the concept of a “regime change cascade.” Research on these “Big Four” events shows that cascading can occur in protest calling for regime change as well as revolution in the name of regime change, but these rarely lead to actual regime change. Regime change cascades can occur through demonstration effects and active mediation, although common external causes and contemporaneous domestic triggers can cause events outwardly resembling them. Regime change cascades tend to occur where (a) there exists a common frame of political reference, (b) unpopular leaderships are becoming lame ducks; (c) elites lack other focal points for coordinated defection, and (d) structural conditions supporting a new regime type are in place. Cascading to hybrid regimes or autocracy may be more likely than cascading to democracy.

Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence

Elected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final period to provide such effort. We evaluate this hypothesis using a simple OLG public good experiment, the central treatment being whether exit prizes are permitted. We find that a significantly higher number of subjects in their final period contribute when exit prizes are permitted. However, this result does not originate from use of trigger strategies. More likely explanations include gift-exchange and focal-point effects.

Tobacco Politics and Electoral Accountability in the United States

This article investigates whether reputation-building strategies may guide US governors’ state cigarette tax choices and whether the federal cigarette tax influences such behavior. Using 1975–2000 data, we find evidence indicating that governors are prone to engage in reputation building, in particular in states with relatively important agricultural tobacco production. Moreover, lame ducks are more prone to raise the state cigarette tax the lower the federal tax.

Lame Ducks and Coercive Diplomacy

The literature on “audience costs” in International Relations suggests that a democratic leader’s electoral accountability lends him or her a significant advantage in crisis-bargaining situations. But if elections are the primary source of a democratic leader’s accountability, a democracy’s advantage in crisis situations should disappear when its leader is no longer eligible for reelection. Accordingly, this article asks whether “lame-duck” presidents, those who are constitutionally prohibited from reelection, are systematically less effective than their reelectable counterparts in crisis-bargaining situations. Using a data set of all post–World War II militarized interstate disputes initiated by presidential democracies, the author tests several hypotheses regarding lame-duck crisis behavior derived from Fearon’s bargaining model. The findings generally support the audience costs model. Observed patterns of threat reciprocation and crisis hostility are consistent with Fearon’s predictions. Crisis outcomes, however, do not appear to be affected by a democratic leader’s lame-duck status.

Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable

Divided government is not only the outcome of moderate voters’ electoral decision to balance party ideology in government, but a more general reaction of voters to a systematic control problem. Voters realize that term limited executives (i.e., “lame ducks”) cannot be held accountable due to the missing re-election incentives. By dividing government control voters force a lame duck to compromise on policies with an opposing legislature and restrict his ability to extract rents. Based on US state data I present empirical evidence showing that the probability of divided government is 9 to 15 percent higher when governors are lame ducks.

Foreign Policy Votes and Presidential Support in Congress

This paper explores the role of foreign policy votes on presidential support in Congress. We postulate that a selection effect is inherent in this topic. Failing to consider that certain factors will influence whether a president takes a position on an issue in the first place can yield misleading results. For instance, presidents might not take positions during lame duck years or when their popularity is low. They might be more willing to take positions on international votes, votes requiring super majorities, or those that take place during a honeymoon period. In turn, this decision regarding position-taking can bias the outcome. We also capture the relationship between Congress and public opinion in our models as it is important to consider that the Congress is listening to its constituents as well. If the public identifies international problems as the most important to the nation, Congress might be more willing to vote in favor of the president on international votes. Testing key vote data from 1953 to 2003 for each chamber, we show that presidents are more likely to take positions if the vote is international, if the public identifies the “most important problems” as international ones, and if the vote requires a super majority for passage. They are less likely to take positions if they are up for reelection and are lame ducks. In turn, international votes, the percentage of the public identifying international problems as the most important, and the size of the president's majority have positive effects on presidential support. These findings are obscured if selection is not taken into account.

Do term limits affect fiscal policy choices?

According to reputational models of Political Economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We use a dynamic panel data estimation strategy to test this hypothesis in a sample of 52 countries over the period 1977–2000, using social and welfare spending and surplus as policy variables. We are unable to find significant differences between the fiscal policies of term-limited chief executives and other types of government, while when we look at presidential systems only, lame ducks appear to be more likely to cut public spending. This contrasts with previous empirical results based on US states and international data.

Can Exit Prizes Induce Lame Ducks to Shirk Less? Experimental Evidence

Elected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final period to provide such effort. We evaluate this hypothesis using a simple OLG public good experiment, the central treatment being whether exit prizes are permitted. We find that a significantly higher number of subjects in their final period contribute when exit prizes are permitted. However, this result does not originate from use of trigger strategies. More likely explanations include gift-exchange and focal-point effects.

The Evil Eye (għajn) in Malta: Grappling with Skinner’s pigeons and rehabilitating lame ducks1

In this paper, I construct a plea for superstition and examine the ways in which contemporary scholars use the term to denote irrational belief. ‘Superstition’ has, throughout history, been used as a derogatory term denoting inferior and dangerous beliefs. Examining the process whereby people continue to believe that which they deem irrational, I adopt a reflexive and phenomenological approach. Focussing on the evil eye (għajn) in Malta and the Mediterranean, I redefine ‘superstition’ as the product of an intrasubjective antinomy between orthodoxy and its subversion.

Lame Ducks or Fierce Creatures? - The Role of Oligodendrocytes in Multiple Sclerosis

In the pathogenesis of multiple sclerosis (MS), oligodendrocytes and its myelin sheaths are thought to be the primary target of destruction. The mechanism leading to oligodendrocyte injury and demyelination is still elusive. Oligodendrocytes are maintaining up to 50 internodes of myelin, which is an extraordinary metabolic demand. This makes them one of the most vulnerable cell types in the central nervous system (CNS), and even small insults can lead to oligodendrocyte impairment, demyelination, and axonal dysfunction. For this reason, oligodendrocytes are viewed as more or less the "lame ducks" of the CNS who can easily become victims. However, recent data demonstrate that this perception possibly needs to be revised. The latest data suggest that oligodendrocytes may also act as "fierce creatures," influencing the surrounding cells in many ways to preserve its own, as well as their function, allowing sustained functionality of the CNS upon an attack. In this review, the concept of "reactive or activated oligodendrocyte" is introduced, describing alterations in oligodendrocytes which are either protective mechanisms allowing survival in otherwise lethal environment or influence and possibly modulate the ongoing inflammation. Although "harnessed", oligodendrocytes might actively modulate and shape their environment and be part of the immune privilege of the brain.

Can Entrenched Lame Ducks Be Optimal? An Economic Model of Leadership and Organizational Change

Assume leaders cannot coerce followers: eective leaders can make changes because other people want to follow them, while ineective lead- ers are unable to make changes because others will tacitly resist. Assume followers and leaders share the same objectives for successful change, but leaders have a limited tenure while followers are long lived. This time pressure for the leader can lead to outcomes in which lame ducks are un- able to attract support towards the end of their tenure. We show that entrenchment, as opposed to early removal of lame ducks, can be optimal because it creates better incentives ex ante. We also consider heterogene- ity in the underlying talent of leaders. If good leaders are those with a higher chance of forming a plan, there is a trade oinvolving the bene…ts of sacking inactive leaders, but in our speci…cation it remains true that entrenchment is optimal.

Lame Ducks and Legislators

Lame Ducks and Legislators

Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela

Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela

Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela.

This bold and comprehensive reassessment of democracy in Venezuela explains why one of the oldest and most admired democracies in Latin America became fragile after more than three decades of apparent stability.

Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela.Michael Coppedge

<i>Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela.</i>Michael Coppedge

LAME DUCK THEORY CALLED INTO QUESTION

Many studies of state politics hold that a governor's success in his or her dealings with the state's legislature is at its height during the executive's initial legislative session and then decreases as the final year approaches. The purpose of this paper is to examine the validity of this generally accepted assumption. This work tests the hypothesis that governors serving out the concluding year of their term are lame ducks. An analysis of the legislative passage and amendment rates of two governors of Virginia, Gerald Baliles (1986–1989) and L. Douglas Wilder (1990–1993), during their first and last years reveals that lame duck theory is suspect. Both of the executives achieved first and last year passage and amendment percentages which were more congruous than one might expect. Other variables besides Governors Baliles' and Wilder's time in office affected their ability to gain the passage of their legislative proposals.

Venezuela falters

Venezuela Falters Anibal Romero (bio) Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela. By Michael Coppedge. Stanford University Press, 1994. 241 pp. Democracy for the Privileged: Crisis and Transition in Venezuela. By Richard S. Hillman. Lynne Rienner, 1994. 198 pp. Venezuela’s democratic regime has grown old and tired. After three decades of international and domestic popularity, it now faces a fate as sad as that experienced by veteran sopranos, whose voices inexorably decline, but who never seem to know when to stop trying to sing the heroine’s role. From the late 1950s until well into the 1980s, Venezuela was widely celebrated as one of the most stable democracies in Latin America; then, suddenly, and precisely when the poor old lady was attempting to take on new and even more flamboyant roles by adopting far-reaching institutional and economic reforms, radical criticism erupted. Two schools of thought can be distinguished: 1) the newly arrived critics, who know about the soprano’s great moments only through old recordings, but never personally experienced the excitement of the supposedly legendary performances, and find it difficult to say something nice about the anachronistic heroine; and 2) the old-hands-in-the-business crowd, those who always saw that behind the colorful makeup and scenery there lurked ugliness, that the show was much too expensive to run, and that debts, mismanagement, and moral corruption were efficiently doing the work of destruction. For the first group of critics, disappointment with Venezuelan democracy is a spur for theoretical [End Page 168] innovation and recommendations on how to overhaul the show. For the old hands, however, disappointment is just the long-awaited confirmation of past suspicions, and possibly the prologue to more setbacks to come. The new critics yearn to see a renovated heroine rising from her grave; others, less optimistic, know that Venezuelan democracy never actually fit the exalted role attributed to it by some. They realize that the best that can be expected in the coming months and years is mediocre and lackluster performance leavened by the hope that the present democradura does not degenerate into outright dictatorship. The authors of the books under review belong broadly to the first group, the “new critics,” but there are differences between them. Both studies offer interesting observations about a phenomenon of democratic deconsolidation that quite probably still has a few surprises in store for us. Coppedge’s book is a solid piece of scholarly work that offers valuable new insights about the inner workings of Acción Democrática, Venezuela’s predominant political party. It is obvious to this reader that Coppedge finds it hard to accept the manifest flaws and limitations of Venezuelan democracy. He places excessive weight on purely institutional factors, such as partidocracia or “partyarchy”—defined as a “pathological kind of political control” (p. 2)—and presidentialism, and pays insufficient attention to economic and cultural factors that, I believe, must be taken into account in any attempt to explain what has happened to the regime established in 1958. Hillman’s book, though markedly less theoretically ambitious than Coppedge’s volume and written in a more journalistic style, provides a less institutionally centered assessment of what went wrong in Venezuela. One wonders if Coppedge demands too much from Venezuelan democracy. He argues that “in Venezuela there is great freedom of expression in the media and on the street,” but adds that “in order to have a truly effective voice, one must be able to organize; the freedoms must be complete” (p. 159). The existence of a plurality of organizations, including strong party organizations, has been one of the distinguishing features of Venezuelan democracy. In Coppedge’s view, however, these parties are largely to blame for the ills now affecting the democratic regime. In Venezuela, he writes, “political parties interfere with the requirements of polyarchy” (freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, free and fair elections, and so on) in such a way that “Venezuela is probably the most extreme case” of partyarchy to be found among all the world’s pluralistic polities (p. 2). Coppedge’s characterization of Venezuelan democracy, as it was until the 1992 attempted coups d’état...

Strong parties and lame ducks: presidential partyarchy and factionalism in Venezuela

Strong parties and lame ducks: presidential partyarchy and factionalism in Venezuela

INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND OUTCOME NEGATIVITY ON VICTIMS AND SURVIVORS OF JOB LOSS.

Three studies respectively explored the interactive effects of procedural justice and outcome negativity on the victims of job layoffs, on survivors, and on lame ducks, employees who knew they woul...