LAME DUCK THEORY CALLED INTO QUESTION

Abstract

Many studies of state politics hold that a governor's success in his or her dealings with the state's legislature is at its height during the executive's initial legislative session and then decreases as the final year approaches. The purpose of this paper is to examine the validity of this generally accepted assumption. This work tests the hypothesis that governors serving out the concluding year of their term are lame ducks. An analysis of the legislative passage and amendment rates of two governors of Virginia, Gerald Baliles (1986–1989) and L. Douglas Wilder (1990–1993), during their first and last years reveals that lame duck theory is suspect. Both of the executives achieved first and last year passage and amendment percentages which were more congruous than one might expect. Other variables besides Governors Baliles' and Wilder's time in office affected their ability to gain the passage of their legislative proposals.