Labour Voters Research Articles

Political voting in the United Kingdom 2019 general election and risk of living with obesity in a nationally representative sample

BackgroundLimited evidence from the United States suggests that county/state rates of people with obesity are positively associated with voting for the Republican Party presidential candidate, although this question has not yet been studied at the individual level, and/or outside of the United States, where the health and political systems are very different in other countries.ObjectivesUsing individual level data, assess differences in rates of people with obesity according to political voting in the United Kingdom 2019 general election, and examine whether people living in constituencies won by Members of Parliament (MPs) from the Conservative Party were more likely to be living with obesity than those living in constituencies won by MPs from other parties.MethodsData was obtained by the Ipsos KnowledgePanel where panellists are recruited via a random probability unclustered address-based sampling method. 4000/14,016 panellists were randomly invited to provide data on socio-demographics, health outcomes, voting behaviour and height/weight.Results2668/4000 (67%) of invitees provided data, 95/2668 (3.5%) were not eligible to vote, with the remaining 2573 (96.5%) included. Conservative Party voters were more likely to be living with obesity than those who voted Labour (OR:1.42 95% CI (1.01–1.99)) or Liberal Democrats (1.54 95% CI (1.00–2.37)). Conservative Party voters on average had significantly higher BMI scores than those voting Labour and Liberal Democrats; BMI mean difference 0.88 points (95% CI: 0.16–1.61) between Conservative and Labour voters, and 1.04 points (95% CI: 0.07–2.02) between Conservatives and Liberal Democrats voters. There was no evidence participants living in constituencies won by Conservative MPs were more likely to be living with obesity than constituencies won by other party MPs.ConclusionGovernments and public health agencies may need to focus on the political affiliation of the public when developing strategies to reduce the number of people with obesity.

“Realignment”, “Dealignment”, or “Deviation”? Classifying the 2022 Australian Federal Election

The 2022 Australian federal election saw a record high vote for minor parties and independent candidates and record‐low levels of voter identification with the major parties. Scholars have since described the 2022 election as both a “dealigning” and a “realigning” event. Such descriptions are useful commencement points but not definitive. In determining a more accurate classification, this article offers three arguments: first, that younger and female voters swung heavily against the Coalition indeed suggests a “dealigning” election, albeit merely the most recent in a long process of “dealignment”; second, that the election hinged disproportionately on the short‐term factor of Prime Minister Scott Morrison's unpopular leadership suggests the poll was also a “deviating” event; and, third, it is impossible to classify the 2022 election as genuinely “realigning” until subsequent elections confirm the propensity of former Labor and Liberal Party voters to re‐elect Greens and “Teal” candidates.

Cross-partisan discussions reduced political polarization between UK voters, but less so when they disagreed

Can brief, unmoderated cross-partisan discussions reduce political polarization, even when partisans disagree on the issue under discussion? This article reports results from an experiment that matched 582 UK Labour and Conservative party voters for a ten-minute, unmoderated chat discussion about a contentious issue in a wait-list control design. Issue disagreement between discussing partisans randomly varied, and was visible throughout the discussion. Results show that after the discussion, out-partisan sympathy and willingness to have cross-partisan discussions increased. There was no statistically significant effect on opinions. The effect on sympathy was lower when partisans’ issue opinions were further apart. Treatment effects correlate with reported experiences of perspective-getting, inclusion in the discussion, commonality and reduced misperceptions. Conservative respondents about to discuss immigration softened their views just prior to the discussion.

‘A state of almost surreal vice versa’: the devolution referendums in Wales, 1979 and 1997

ABSTRACT Referendums in 1979 and 1997 asked if an elected Assembly should be created in Wales to oversee some government responsibilities. The proportion of voters supporting devolution grew from 20.3% in 1979 to 50.3% in 1997. Growth was concentrated within Welsh identifying Labour voters, but the literature lacks a multicausal explanation of this shift. This article compares the circumstances surrounding both referendums to make two arguments. One is that three factors reversed: the dominant industrial role of the UK state receded under Conservative Governments to prompt deindustrialisation; the growing profile of Wales-specific governance structures exposed their control by Conservative politicians lacking a direct electoral mandate; and, voters were more positive towards Labour in 1997 than 1979. The other is that these factors impacted most on Welsh identifying Labour voters clustered in deindustrialising areas, who no longer trusted the UK state to represent their interests. Their class-based political identity evolved to include a greater sense of Welshness, increasing their support for devolution when offered by a trusted Labour Government. This sequence was prompted and sustained by deindustrialisation, echoing Tomlinson’s arguments that it undercut political assumptions and structures to provide the best underpinning narrative for late twentieth-century Britain.

Look to Denmark or not? An experimental study of the Social Democrats’ strategic choices

Social Democratic parties struggle to maintain their strong electoral position, as political competition has shifted from the traditional left-right dimension to the cultural dimension. This has led to a debate on what would be the most viable electoral strategy for these parties in terms of adjusting their policies. Some propose a “New Left” policy platform that combines social investment and progressive cultural policies; others an “Old Left” policy platform that combines traditional redistribution policies and social-conservative cultural policies. We conducted a survey experiment to test the effects of these two platforms on support for the Norwegian Labour party. Our results show that the New Left platform is more popular among current Labour voters and voters from competing left-wing parties, and the two policy platforms are equally popular among the total electorate.

Support in the Polls for an Indigenous Constitutional Voice: How Broad, How Strong, How Vulnerable?

ABSTRACTFollowing the prime minister’s announcement, in May 2022, that Australians would be asked to decide whether to have an Indigenous Voice to Parliament inscribed in the Constitution, a large number of polls sought to measure the breadth and strength of support for a constitutionally enshrined Voice. Some also sought to measure the appeals that might make support for a Voice either more attractive or more vulnerable. This article shows that support for a constitutional amendment, while broad, was not strong: that while majorities were in favour of change—nationally and in most states—there was no majority strongly committed to change, and the majority in favour of constitutional change was declining. It shows that while most Labor voters and the Greens supported the change, Coalition supporters increasingly did not. And it shows which considerations appeared to resonate with respondents and which did not. In the course of documenting and analysing these findings, this article offers a critique of the polls: the wording and sequencing of some of the questions, some of the response options, and the questions not asked.

Class, Ethnicity, Age or Education: What Characteristics Determine Citizens' Sense of Political Commonality?

AbstractWe know from election studies which demographic characteristics best predict vote choice, but we know far less about how citizens perceive their similarity to one another in terms of these characteristics. Previous research suggests that such perceptions may be crucial for the politicization of social identities and the emergence of political identities. I present results from a novel measurement strategy where respondents are presented with the profiles of two fellow citizens, including several demographic attributes. Respondents are asked which of the two they perceive themselves to have more in common with in terms of politics. Respondents' implicit trade-off of different demographic similarities allows me to measure the relative strength of their perceived political similarities. I find an important role for shared ethnicity, noticeably surpassing shared social class, age and education. Finally, I find that shared ethnicity receives substantially more weight among 2017 Conservative and 2016 Leave voters than among Labour and Remain voters.

The Formation of British Attitudes towards the Common Market: 1957–72

AbstractThis paper uses an extensive collection of historical surveys that have only recently been made available to researchers to examine the formation of British attitudes towards the then European Economic Community. It demonstrates that – up until 1967 – the demographic predictors of support for UK membership were unstable. Thereafter, coinciding with the second UK application, these attitudes started to stabilise and harden, with support becoming highest among men, the youngest age cohorts, the middle class and those with greater education. The renewed politicization of the issue in 1967 also coincided with Labour voters becoming significantly more likely to support membership. Following the change in the parties' positions, Labour voters subsequently become substantially less supportive than Conversative voters. The paper thus supports existing analyses on the role of elite cues, while providing new, robust evidence of the change in demographic associations over this formative period.

Climate change: Will the parties unite or divide?

Climate change: Will the parties unite or divide?

Understanding Ambivalent Sexism and its Relationship with Electoral Choice in Britain

AbstractWe investigate the prevalence and correlates of sexism in the British political context, using a measure of ambivalent sexism that distinguishes between hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes. Drawing on original data from two nationally representative online surveys, we find that more than half of the population hold some sexist attitudes and that these are predicted by gender, education, religiosity and authoritarian values. We demonstrate that the most significant division in sexist attitudes within the British electorate falls along political rather than gender lines, with men and women expressing more similar views about sexism than either Conservative and Labour voters, or Leave and Remain supporters. We also find that endorsing hostile sexism is associated with voting Conservative in the 2019 general election, even after controlling for sociodemographic characteristics and political values. Our findings reveal that sexism is important for political competition in contexts where gender is not obviously salient.

From Property-Owning Democracy to Generation Rent? Analysing Theresa May’s Housing Rhetoric from the Perspective of the Discourse Historical Approach

Since the 1920s, British Conservatives pursued the concept of property‑owning democracy, with home ownership viewed as a guarantor of social stability and personal autonomy. However, recent increases in housing costs have made the “British Dream” of home‑ownership more elusive than ever, with renting becoming a lifelong prospect for large swathes of people. Using the Discourse Historical Approach, a method falling within Critical Discourse Analysis, the article analyzes the 2019 housing speech by Prime Minister Theresa May to ascertain whether the changing situation has been reflected in the Conservatives’ housing rhetoric, traditionally driven by a property‑owning ethos. Examining May’s argumentation and language use, it concludes that May’s proclaimed commitment to renewed council house construction represents both a long‑overdue acknowledgement of the housing affordability crisis and a pre‑election strategy to win Labour voters.

Pandemic and Partisan Polarisation: Voter Evaluation of UK Government Handling During Covid-19.

What is the effect of pandemics on partisan perceptions of government competence? Taking the case of Covid‐19 in the UK, we explore how voters’ assessments of the government’s handling of the economy and health were affected by four events: the first UK Covid‐19 death; the national lockdown; Boris Johnson’s hospitalisation; and Cummings’ scandal. Using a large representative weekly survey in the last year totalling over around 30’000 respondents, our results show that Labour voters had the worst assessments of government handling. The first death deteriorated perceptions of government handling of health among both Labour and Conservative voters, while Boris Johnson’s hospitalisation improved perceptions among most voters. Lockdown improved the perception of health handling but at the cost of more negative perceptions of its handling of the economy. The Cummings scandal had a negative effect on perceptions of government handling of economy but surprisingly improved perceptions of its handling of health.

Labour and the Patriot Game

AbstractThe Labour Party has recently been advised to showcase its patriotism and let the electorate know it is proud to be British. This is never bad advice for a mainstream political party with designs on power and certainly Labour in the past has enjoyed electoral success when its redistributionist policies have sprung, at least in part, from an obvious love of country. There's a certain urgency, too, in the suggestion, since the Corbyn leadership convinced many former Labour voters that the party was careless about a British identity and perhaps even hostile to British interests. Nevertheless, it would be foolish for Keir Starmer's Labour Party to enter into a destructive competition with the Tories to see who looks better with the national flag. For reasons which the article explores, there are strict limits beyond which a social democratic party would not care to go in such a contest. But this ought not matter. Voters do not want to see Labour leaders telling them how patriotic they are. They are content to be shown. This article surveys the history and looks at some possibilities inherent in Labour and the patriot game.

Introduction: Corbynism and its Aftermath

Introduction: Corbynism and its Aftermath

Labour's post‐Brexit electoral strategy

Labour's <scp>post‐Brexit</scp> electoral strategy

British Public Opinion Towards the Vietnam War and UK-US Relations During the 1964-70 Labour Governments

The historiography of the 1964-70 Wilson governments has provided in depth analysis of the Vietnam War within the context of transatlantic relations, while other studies have examined the anti-war movement within British society. But there has been relatively little focus on British public opinion towards the Vietnam War and UK-US relations in the 1960s. To address this gap in scholarship, this article undertakes secondary analysis of opinion poll datasets covering the period 1960-69. It provides new insights into the patterning of public opinion. First, it finds that views supportive of the US war effort and of British government policy were more prevalent amongst men, younger people, and Conservative Party voters. Second, critical appraisals of Wilson as prime minister were not linked with a tendency to hold more negative views of the Vietnam War, either within the general public or Labour voters in particular. Third, a strongly favourable climate of opinion towards broader transatlantic relations deteriorated to some extent in the mid-to-late-1960s, and this shift occurred across societal groups, including supporters of the main parties. Growing opposition to the Vietnam War may have contributed to this shift.

Real estate politicians in India

This article uses as its entry point the empirical phenomenon of what we call ‘real estate politicians’ in India; that is, politicians whose main source of wealth is real estate. We argue that the rise of real estate politicians is situated within deeper processes of ‘labour voter contradictions’ in low-wage democratic societies of the global south. On the one hand, countries like India largely compete in the global economy based on their cheaper labour costs, but on the other hand, the condition of electoral democracy makes it imperative for politicians to meet the consumption, including housing, needs of their low-wage but electorally mobilised labour voters. As real estate politicians mediate the negotiated access of unorganised and surplus workers to informal land and unauthorised housing, the delinking of housing struggles from labour struggles leaves processes of capitalist agglomeration unchecked. This, we argue, blunts the potential of land struggles to emerge as sites of radical labour politics.

Preaching to the converted? Who attended the Camborne, Cornwall Corbyn rally in August 2017?

The political party rally was reinvented by Jeremy Corbyn. Despite retaining the rally as an election campaign strategy, Labour calamitously lost the 2019 general election. Did something go wrong with this strategy? This paper analyses the results of a survey of participants in a Corbyn rally in Camborne, Cornwall in 2017, close to two marginal constituencies. It finds that very few participants were not already dedicated Labour voters. The paper warns of the danger of advertising these rallies only through closed mobilisation channels. For improved efficacy, rallies in marginal constituencies might more widely advertise using open channels to a broader range of people.

The influence of politics and labelling on New Zealanders’ attitudes towards animal agriculture emissions policy

ABSTRACT New Zealand’s primary strategy for tackling greenhouse gas emissions is the emissions trading scheme, which puts a price on emissions from all major industries – except animal agriculture. In the decade since the scheme was introduced, conversations about including emissions from animal agriculture have been shrouded in controversy, with a levy on such emissions dubbed a ‘fart tax’. Across two independent samples of New Zealanders, we examined whether support for a charge on farm emissions differed depending on how the charge was framed. We showed that participants were more supportive of including farm emissions in the existing scheme than supporting a ‘fart tax’, and also that the description of the policy that most closely aligned with the Labour Party’s original proposal for the charge (a levy on the agricultural sector to fund research into low carbon farming practices) garnered the most support. Across both samples, support also varied by political affiliation, with support highest among Green voters, followed by Labour voters, and National voters generally opposing the charge, regardless of framing. Frames did not interact with political affiliation in the expected way, suggesting that ‘fart tax’ referencing reaches across the political divide in undermining support for this policy.

Was Brexit really about Europe ?

Much of the debate about Brexit, during the referendum and afterwards, was not obviously about Europe at all. There were perhaps five general themes that shaped the argument : (i) The impact of austerity after the 2008 credit crash, the fall in real wages and welfare cuts. This particularly influenced Labour voters. (ii) Disaffection with the union of the United Kingdom, especially in Scotland.(iii) Discontent with party politics. The traditional two-party polarization and been in decline from the early 1970s. (iv) Immigration. Heavy migration from Eastern Europe from 2004 onwards had an emotional impact in old industrial areas which had little or no immigration at all.(iv) Britain’s post-imperial destiny, especially the decline of its great-power status since 1940. Some dreamed of a Joseph-Chamberlain-type ‘anglophone’ bloc, or reviving Churchillian greatness. But European ‘control’ seemingly blocked the way.Thus Britain’s strengths seemed to lie elsewhere – in its soft power, culturally and intellectually. But this suggested new social division, elitism based not on class but on education. It followed new attacks on established institutions, the constitution, the judges, the BBC, the churches, perhaps in time even the monarchy. The Olympic Games of 2012 inspired internal solidarity, including emphases on British rights of protest and women. That spirit must be revived to regenerate the European idea.