Korea Alliance Research Articles

Nuclear chess on the Korean Peninsula: analysing North Korea’s “second mission” and strategic implications

ABSTRACT This article examines North Korea's evolving nuclear strategy and its implications for regional security. We analyse that North Korea’s first mission, to counter-deter the US nuclear extended deterrence for South Korea by its minimal deterrence strategy, is to be achieved. Then, the article highlights the recent shift in North Korea's nuclear doctrine, as evidenced by Kim Jong-un's statement on the “second mission” beyond deterrence. Focusing on Pyongyang's two nuclear missions, the article first evaluates the current nuclear balance between the US nuclear-extended deterrence to South Korea and North Korea's nuclear forces, shedding light on the risks of deterrence failure. The second mission, framed as reunification through nuclear warfighting, is also examined, including North Korea’s recent strategic manoeuvres, aggressive rhetoric, and large-scale military provocations. We lastly provide potential scenarios of North Korean nuclear attacks and propose policy implications for the US-South Korea Alliance to prevent the escalation of a nuclear conflict.

Redefining Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Strategic Shift towards Global Leadership

This paper explores South Korea’s evolving foreign policy under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, highlighting its shift from a traditional middle power to a “Global Pivotal State” (GPS). The study examines the key drivers behind this transformation, particularly the enhanced U.S.-South Korea alliance, which has allowed South Korea to increase its regional and global influence. Through an analysis of the "Global Pivotal State" policy, the paper delves into how South Korea seeks to expand its leadership role in multilateral diplomacy, focusing on areas such as security, democracy, and climate change. Additionally, the study emphasizes South Korea’s efforts to strengthen bilateral relations, especially with the U.S., Japan, and Europe, while expanding its diplomatic reach to new regions such as the Indo-Pacific. By leveraging its strengths in green growth, technology, and official development assistance (ODA), South Korea aims to secure leadership in key global issues. Ultimately, the Yoon administration’s vision reflects South Korea's ambition to redefine its role in the international order, positioning itself as an influential actor in global governance.

The carrot and the stick: China's wedging against South Korea during the US–China competition

ABSTRACT In the midst of an intensifying US–China competition, China has adopted various policies to deal with the expanding US-led security network encircling it. As one endeavour, China has implemented a wedge strategy to weaken the US-led security coalition. This study focuses on one case of China's wedging against South Korea to disturb the US-South Korea alliance. This wedging strategy against the Park Geun-hye Administration was composed of two distinct approaches: a reward-based general wedging to prevent South Korea from tilting toward the US, and a coercion-based issue-specific wedging to divide them primarily by disturbing the deployment of THAAD in Korea.

The Trend of China-ROK Strategic Cooperation and China's Response under the Competition Pattern between China and the US

Since the Biden administration came to power, the United States has pursued the policy of alliance first, and the alliance between the US and South Korea has been further strengthened. Under the competition pattern between China and the United States, South Korea is facing increasing pressure to choose sides, and there are challenges in the strategic cooperation between China and South Korea. However, based on the close economic ties between China and South Korea, the advantages of the progressive camp in the National Assembly and the long-held pragmatic diplomatic tradition of South Korea, the impetus and possibility of maintaining the stable development of China-ROK strategic cooperation still exist. China should do its best to ease the asymmetric dilemma between the US-South Korea alliance and China-South Korea relations, promote the establishment of a security mechanism in Northeast Asia, and maintain regional security and stability.

Unravelling the US-ROK Alliance: Decoding North Korea’s Strategy within the Six-Party Talks

Alliance formation is a calculated decision by parties to determine and affect the outcome of negotiations. Its success depends on several factors, most notably alliance members’ cohesion and convergence of common interests, objectives, and tactics. The focus here is on the United States and South Korea’s alliance during the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear programme. Despite early progress in the alliance’s favour, the internal cohesion of the US-South Korea alliance was disrupted due to divergent interests, approaches, and positions regarding North Korea. This research provides a comprehensive analysis of the US-ROK alliance’s impact on the Six-Party Talks. While previous studies have explored the negotiations, little attention has been given to the alliance’s role and how it evolved over time, especially in the context of North Korea’s manipulation and its consequences on negotiation outcomes. We assess the success of the alliance and its impact on the negotiation process, considering factors such as cohesion, common interests, objectives, and tactics. Our study adopts a qualitative research approach, utilising an extensive review of relevant literature, official documents, historical records, and primary sources from the Six-Party Talks. The findings underscore the importance of robust and well-coordinated alliances in addressing critical global security challenges. To achieve lasting success in future negotiations, it is imperative for allied parties to forge a shared understanding and strategic convergence in dealing with adversaries like North Korea. Moreover, this research calls for a re-evaluation of alliance dynamics and tactics to strengthen the collective resolve in pursuing international peace and security.

North Korea in 2022

North Korea’s 2022 was largely a continuation of the political/economic, military, and diplomatic dynamic from 2020–21, but with different accents. Given the path dependence of military/nuclear modernization, domestic political/economic structural constraints, and the geostrategic situation in East Asia, 2023 in North Korea is likely to continue these same trends. Two big questions loom. (1) How will North Korea open up from COVID border closures, which might make better economic performance possible? (2) How will North Korea manage inter-Korean relations, and is the Korean Peninsula headed for a situation in which the security dilemma of a long-term deterrence relationship between the US–South Korea alliance and North Korea spills over into kinetic conflict?

The US and South Korea: The Trouble with Nuclear Assurance

As US officials have grown more anxious about the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence, they have placed renewed emphasis on nuclear-assurance measures. The hope is that closer exercises and consultations can reassure allies, strengthen deterrence postures and reduce the risk that an ally could pursue their own nuclear weapons. However, recent developments in the US–South Korea alliance suggest that nuclear assurance is not only ineffective at reassuring Seoul but may also be fuelling proliferation risks. By raising the salience of nuclear weapons within the alliance, nuclear assurance reinforces the fiction that South Korea’s defence depends on nuclear use. Misunderstanding the risks and potential of nuclear assurance has fuelled calls for a South Korean nuclear-weapons programme and obstructed the alliance’s ability to adapt and improve its deterrence posture.

How fear of entrapment shapes South Korean public opinion on conflicts with North Korea under US extended deterrence

ABSTRACT The nuclear crises in 1994 and 2017 between the United States and North Korea introduced South Korea to the fear of becoming entrapped in unwanted wars on the Korean Peninsula. To understand how the fear of entrapment shapes a client state’s strategic judgments toward the use of force by a patron state under extended deterrence, we designed novel experiments on pre- and post-strike approval of military operations by combining war-game scenarios and survey experiments. In the pre-strike-approval experiment, we examined how the decision-making mechanism for military planning and operations, the type of weapon systems, and the expected casualties shape South Korean public opinion on the use of US military strikes against North Korea. In the post-strike-approval experiment, we provided South Koreans with outcomes of military strikes and examined how US unilateral military strikes against North Korea would change public attitudes toward the US–South Korea alliance. We found that the fear of US unilateral use of force and consequent entrapment in unwanted wars substantially decreased South Korean public approval of the military strikes against North Korea. We also found that US unilateral military strikes against North Korea, regardless of their success or failure, would severely harm the US–South Korea alliance.

Modern Challenges of Economic Cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the United States

For the past 20 years, South Korea has successfully balanced between its main trading partners, the US and China. However, with the new president’s accession to power in March 2022, the Republic of Korea has become more and more committed to the US strategic alliance, while not losing interest in trade with China. Washington seeks to use various economic instruments to get the maximum benefit from the alliance with Seoul. The declared areas of strategic partnership within the framework of the US-South Korea alliance are facing a number of challenges provoked by the US protectionist policy and Washington's desire to maintain influence in key areas. The Republic of Korea is trying to secure comfortable conditions for cooperation, but at the same time, it is gradually adapting to new American requirements. South Korea, like the United States, is striving for leadership in the high-tech market and is currently competing rather than working as a team. Thus, in the future, with continued pressure from Washington, companies in the Republic of Korea may lose their competitive advantages in world markets, and even become completely dependent on the United States. These tendencies lead to the strengthening of the opinion in South Korean society that deep economic integration with America may not be in the national interests of the Republic of Korea. In the article, the author analyzes the existing challenges in the economic relations between the Republic of Korea and the United States in 2022. In addition, challenges are predicted that can have a greater impact on US-South Korean foreign trade relations in the foreseeable future.

The Russia–South Korea Relationship after Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and Implications for the U.S.-ROK Alliance

executive summary: This essay examines the potential for shifts in Russia's strategy toward the Korean Peninsula in light of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and South Korea's reaction. main argumentFor nearly 30 years, Russia has pursued a strategy of "diplomatic equidistance" toward the Korean Peninsula. By striving to maintain relatively balanced ties with both North and South Korea, the Kremlin has attempted to preserve a degree of influence on its eastern periphery in Northeast Asia, which is largely dominated by the U.S. and China. Pyongyang's and Seoul's respective responses to Russia's military aggression in Eastern Europe, however, have opened the possibility that Moscow could shift toward a strategy that favors North Korea over South Korea. policy implications• Should Russia decide to pursue closer ties with North Korea at a time when Russia–South Korea relations have cooled, the Kremlin may find that supporting the North could increase its influence in Northeast Asia as well as present a challenge to the U.S. Nevertheless, Moscow would also risk losing the limited influence on the Korean Peninsula it has acquired as a result of its equidistance strategy. • South Korea faces a period of uncertainty in relations with Russia since the invasion of Ukraine. While it is unlikely that Moscow and Seoul will enact the economic cooperation that they had previously envisioned, South Korea may hope to salvage ties with Russia to improve the balance on the Korean Peninsula. Yet with increased fears that North Korea–Russia relations may strengthen, South Korea has reason to be skeptical of cooperation. • The U.S. will need to be prepared for several possible developments in terms of Russia's standing on the Korean Peninsula. Should South Korea elect to try to preserve cooperation with Russia, this may cause a further rift in the U.S.–South Korea alliance. If Moscow doubles down on its relationship with Pyongyang, Seoul and Washington will need to be prepared to jointly address such a development with implications for the Northeast Asian subregion and Russia-U.S. ties.

The U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea Alliance as part of the Joe Biden Administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy

The article outlines the strategy of the Joe Biden administration to develop cooperation with Japan and the Republic of Korea within the framework of a trilateral alliance and emphasizes the role of Seoul, without whose participation complex interaction is unlikely.

The Geopolitics of Public Memory: The Challenge and Promise of Transnational Comfort Women Activism

Japan conscripted a disputed number of “comfort women” to sexually service their soldiers in occupied territories during World War II. In the aftermath of war, this apparatus was ignored by international diplomacy, and few survivors related their experiences as sex slaves. However, during the early 1990s, sexual crimes against women achieved international attention, emboldened by and emboldening silence breakers whose personal experiences were both affirmed and negated by competing global stakeholders. Activists seeking recognition of and reparations for crimes against survivors of Japan’s comfort women system have since deployed memorials to contest Japan’s position that comfort women were sex workers. These memorials materially instantiate the conflicted interpretations of the scope and severity of Japan’s war crimes, whose undecidability signifies ruptures in the contemporary symbolic order of the United States, Japan, and South Korea alliance. This project examines how online audiences construct the meanings of the highly contested 2017 San Francisco memorial.

The US–South Korea alliance: How the patron benefits from the protégé

Since the end of World War II, the US military has continuously deployed troops to South Korea. The alliance works as an asymmetrical alliance, where the US is a patron and South Korea is a protégé. While it is argued that this deployment has significant political, economic, and military effects on South Korea and the region, few studies have examined how the presence of US forces there enhances US military and economic power as well as national security interests. In this paper, we examine the costs and benefits of the US–South Korea alliance, specifically focusing on US troop deployment on the Korean Peninsula. In particular, we argue that the US military alliance with South Korea has significant benefits to both partners, but particularly for the sake of US national security interests. In this sense, the protégé state provides significant benefits to the patron state. We discuss the strategic importance of South Korea in US foreign policy in the region and emphasize the benefits of the US–South Korea alliance at the various levels.

Южная Корея и американская стратегия свободной и открытой Индо-Пасифики

The advancement and promoting by the United States of its concept of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) has shaped many of political discussions in Asian countries in recent years. The Republic of Korea is no exception. From this perspective, the article reviews the basic aspects of the evolution of South Korea’s foreign policy course as well as new priorities in that area which have been forged with the advent of President Moon Jae-in administration. The paper shows that the complex fluctuations of the South Korea’s external policy have been defined by the need to maintain the focus on the United States, on one side, and desire to nurture strategic partnership with China, on the other side. However, finding the right balance in that political equation has been significantly complicated due to the growing confrontation between the two global powers. Special attention is given to the role and place of South Korea in the U. S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. The article examines the main directions, some of the outcomes and the prospects of cooperation between Washington and Seoul aimed at harmonizing their regional strategies in view of the factors facilitating those interactions as well as those hampering them. President Trump highlighted that the United States – the Republic of Korea alliance remains a linchpin for security, stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. However, the dialogue between the two partners has not revealed the willingness of South Korea to collaborate with the United States on that theme beyond a narrow framework of purely economic coordination. Particularly, South Korea has consistently rejected the attempts of its ally to involve the country into the activities of Quad for fear of a possible adverse effect for the Korea–China relationships. All of those questions are examined in the article in linkage with a number of bilateral problems prevailing in the ROK–USA alliance which have complicated the collaboration between the two countries on regional issues in recent times.

Condition and the ways of development of the USA and the Republic of Korea alliance at the present stage

This article examines the current state and ways of development of the alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea after the Joseph Biden administration came to power. During the summit held in Washington on May 21, 2021, the key positions of the two countries on the formation of a joint policy in the future were announced. There were areas and regions that had not previously appeared on the joint foreign policy agenda, which means fundamental changes in the understanding of the alliance’s future. Consequently, the author of the article analyzes the reasons why the Moon Jae-in administration could change its course in foreign policy, Washington's goals for reforming the alliance and the changes that the alliance of the United States and South Korea will undergo.

A Study on Economic Cooperation between Korea and Pacific Alliance

A Study on Economic Cooperation between Korea and Pacific Alliance

Russia–South Korea Relations and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy

executive summary: This essay analyzes Russia–South Korea relations in the context of Russia-U.S. great-power tensions and the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. main argumentAs part of its Indo-Pacific strategy, the U.S. considers Russia to be a “revitalized malign actor.” Given that the U.S. alliance with South Korea is critical for the strategy, the Russia–South Korea strategic partnership affects broader Russia-U.S. great-power competition. Moscow’s pursuit of increased influence in East Asia, combined with Seoul’s middle-power foreign policy, has created a situation where Russia and South Korea have reached a degree of policy alignment that contrasts with U.S. policies, such as those regarding North Korea. Although this alignment has not created a situation in which South Korea will be forced to balance between Russia and the U.S. in the same way that it must navigate the China-U.S. rivalry, it nevertheless potentially poses complications for the relationship between South Korea and the U.S. policy implications• The Korean Peninsula is one of the Indo-Pacific strategy’s geographic areas where Russia-U.S. great-power tensions have notably manifested. This has the potential to expand friction between Moscow and Washington—originating primarily in Europe—into the Indo-Pacific region. • South Korea’s economic prowess and Moscow’s desire for sound ties with Seoul for the purposes of economic development have promoted a situation in which South Korea enjoys considerable leverage in its ties with Russia, thus mitigating Seoul’s vulnerability to Moscow in terms of great-power tensions between Russia and the U.S. • If Moscow and Seoul increase their economic collaboration, policy alignment between Russia and South Korea that includes economic cooperation with North Korea could place stress on the U.S.–South Korea alliance, particularly because of the economic-security nexus built into South Korea–Russia relations.

Alliances Adrift: Is This the End of America's Asian Alliances?

Alliances Adrift: Is This the End of America's Asian Alliances?

To Double Down or Decouple? North Korea and China as Challenges to the U.S.‐South Korea Alliance

This article argues that both North Korea's nuclear weapons and Chinese attempts at wedge‐driving between South Korea and the United States represent threats to degrade and perhaps decouple the U.S.‐South Korea alliance. These will intensify regardless of the outcome of current diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula. This puts at risk a component of the San Francisco System that has served as a pillar for Northeast Asian regional security for almost seven decades. We assess what the potential problems will be for the U.S.‐South Korea alliance as they emanate from these two policy challenges, and what actions policymakers in both Washington and Seoul can prioritize in order to modify or neutralize them.

The South Korea–US Alliance under the North Korean Nuclear Threat: A Reluctant Return to the “Autonomy–Security Trade‐Off”

This paper aims to examine the US–South Korea alliance from the perspective of the “Autonomy–Security Trade‐off” (AST) model, which was introduced by Michael F. Altfeld in the 1980s. This model could be a useful tool to ascertain the minimum conditions for the implementation of the US nuclear umbrella, which is a life‐and‐death issue for South Korea (ROK) given the serious North Korean nuclear threat. For this purpose, this paper introduces the key concept of the model and applies it to the ROK‐US alliance, analyzing the controversy over the deployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) to South Korea as a case study. The analysis found that South Korea started its alliance with the United States based on the AST model. However, South Korea became reluctant in yielding its autonomy to the United States in the 1990s, and initiated “balanced diplomacy” between the United States and China and the reclaiming of the Operational Control Authority (OPCON) from the commander of the ROK‐US Combined Forces Command (CFC), a US General, in the 2000s. It delayed the deployment of the US THAAD for 3 years only because China opposed the deployment even after North Korea had succeeded to develop its nuclear weapons. However, South Korea had to return to the original AST model, albeit reluctantly, because of the emergence of a more serious North Korean nuclear threat, including hydrogen bombs. It did not try, with any great effort, to improve its relationship with China, and reduced the scope of OPCON by appointing a South Korean General as the Command of the CFC, allowing the deployment of the THAAD. Now that North Korea has the potential capabilities to strike the US mainland, South Korea cannot afford to be reluctant in yielding its autonomy to the United States. In this context, South Korea should not pursue its balanced diplomacy between the United States and China any longer. To the contrary, it should participate in the United States’ Indo‐Pacific strategy. It may also need to stop its pursuit of appointing its general as the Commander of the CFC until North Korea gives up its nuclear weapons. It should also become more willing to increase its cost‐sharing with the United States. In conclusion, South Korea should try to accept the recommendations from the AST model as long as its needs the US nuclear umbrella and wants to protect its people from the North Korean nuclear threat.