How fear of entrapment shapes South Korean public opinion on conflicts with North Korea under US extended deterrence

Abstract

ABSTRACT The nuclear crises in 1994 and 2017 between the United States and North Korea introduced South Korea to the fear of becoming entrapped in unwanted wars on the Korean Peninsula. To understand how the fear of entrapment shapes a client state’s strategic judgments toward the use of force by a patron state under extended deterrence, we designed novel experiments on pre- and post-strike approval of military operations by combining war-game scenarios and survey experiments. In the pre-strike-approval experiment, we examined how the decision-making mechanism for military planning and operations, the type of weapon systems, and the expected casualties shape South Korean public opinion on the use of US military strikes against North Korea. In the post-strike-approval experiment, we provided South Koreans with outcomes of military strikes and examined how US unilateral military strikes against North Korea would change public attitudes toward the US–South Korea alliance. We found that the fear of US unilateral use of force and consequent entrapment in unwanted wars substantially decreased South Korean public approval of the military strikes against North Korea. We also found that US unilateral military strikes against North Korea, regardless of their success or failure, would severely harm the US–South Korea alliance.