Leibniz’s credentials as one of early modern philosophy’s pre-eminent natural philosophers have long been acknowledged by scholars of this period. Typically, however, pride of place has been accorded to his views on space, time, motion, optics, the nature of matter, and the formal and mathematical sciences, with scant attention having been paid to his views on what we would classify as the biological sciences. This in spite of the fact that Leibniz’s universe is one populated by an infinite plurality of animate substances. This probing collection of essays paints a fuller picture of Leibniz’s natural philosophy by exploring various facets of his views on natural machines and organisms. On the view defended throughout this book, biology, far from being at the periphery of his thought, ‘‘constitutes the true foundational science’’ for Leibniz (2). Along the way, the authors address several issues of fundamental importance to Leibniz’s philosophy, including questions about the reality of corporeal substances, the place of teleological explanations in the sciences, and the nature of perceptual representation. The following review examines only some of this volume’s many fine essays. Central to Leibniz’s philosophy of biology is the distinction between natural and artificial machines. As a number of authors in this book note, this distinction is often explicated in terms of the kind of complexity involved in each machine: both kinds of machines have infinitely parts, but it is only natural machines that have as their parts other natural machines that are themselves constituted by still other natural machines, ad infinitum. An equally important difference is that natural machines have a kind of unity that artificial machines lack. In his contribution to this volume, Ohad Nachtomy concludes that the unity of natural machines makes them different in kind, not degree, from artificial machines, with the former counting as substances and the latter only as aggregates. Given that both kinds of machines have infinitely parts, how can Leibniz account for the unity enjoyed by natural but not artificial
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