Khalifa Haftar Research Articles

The UAE's Foreign Policy Drivers

AbstractA small state with big ambitions, the United Arab Emirates has become a major player in the Middle East region, especially since the Arab Spring. It played a major role in weakening the Muslim Brotherhood by supporting rulers like Abdel Fattah al‐Sisi of Egypt and would‐be leaders such as General Khalifa Haftar of Libya. Abu Dhabi was the critical player behind the blockade of Qatar in 2017, and it has taken a leading role in the normalization of Syrian President Bashar al‐Assad. This article employs a range of theoretical perspectives, including structural realism and liberalism, to explain the UAE's foreign policy and behavior. It argues that there are at least four major drivers: combating political Islam, containing Iran, dominating regional ports and waterways, and increasing economic prosperity.

Ten Years After Benghazi: Getting Past Groundhog Day

Ten years after the attacks in Benghazi that killed US Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans, Libya is again on the brink of a civil war. The attacks sapped the United States’ willingness to engage on Libya, leaving room for external actors to pursue their own agendas in the country. Four problematic narratives emerged, including one from former president Barack Obama himself, who declared that ‘failing to plan for the day after’ the intervention in Libya was the worst mistake of his presidency. Despite American reluctance to deeply engage in addressing Libya’s political and security disorder, the Biden administration could take several practical steps to help bring stability to a potentially prosperous country. These include limiting foreign interference and sanctioning one of Libya’s most polarising actors, Khalifa Haftar.

France in Search of a Foothold in Post-Gaddafi Libya

Historically, Libya was not part of the French sphere of interest and influence, the core of which was traditionally Francophone Africa. Since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, security issues in the countries of the Sahara - Sahel region have become particularly important for France. The article is preceded by a brief historical account of Franco-Libyan relations up to and after the fall of the Gaddafi regime, when the situation within and along the Libyan borders deteriorated and became a matter of growing concern in France and internationally. The relevance and novelty of this study lie the examination of the French attitude towards the Libyan crisis in close conjunction with the need for forceful counter-terrorism actions and security measures in the Sahelю The aim is to analyse the evolving situation in the region, identifying the motivation for and the nature of France's actions in and around Libya, as well as in the context of a future post-conflict settlement. In writing the article, the author relied on historical-genetic and historical-analytical methods, drawing on national and international monographs, articles published in academic periodicals, and official documents of international organisations. He concludes that France had limited resources and capacity to stabilise Libya. He argues that the involuntary reliance on Khalifa Haftar as a fulcrum for security in southern Libya, the border areas, and for reducing the projection of the terrorist threat into the Sahara-Sahel region was unwarranted. It is also demonstrated that France has critically underestimated the potential of other influential parties to the current Libyan crisis, which, in the circumstances, has reduced its ability to influence the intra-Libyan and regional balance of power.

Italy, the second Libyan war, and the Frontex Irini Operation

In 2011, Libya plunged into a civil war after the outbreak of the Arab Spring, a revolutionary movement characterized by massive civil protests which tried to build democratic societies in the Middle East and North Africa and put to an end the old repressive political regimes. After several months of civil war and bombings over Libya, longtime Muamar Ghaddafi’s dictatorial regime fell. Although the U.S. did not directly intervene in Libya, it supported the overthrow of Ghadafi through the intervention of NATO, providing aerial support and airstrikes for the opposition force (it also established a no-fly zone over Libya, authorized by the United Nations). In 2014, contested parliamentary elections led to the formation of two rival political power centers — one in the east, based in Tobruk and backed by military commander Khalifa Haftar, and another in the west of the country, an UN-supported administration in the capital of Tripoli. Each side was supported by a variety of militias and foreign powers, who competed for influence and oil resources, raising fears that oil-rich Libya could become the theater of a regional conflict. In April 2019, Haftar and his forces, backed by Russia (the Russian military contractors of the Wagner Group), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates launched an offensive to capture the capital. His campaign collapsed after Turkey and Qatar offered their military support to the Tripoli government with hundreds of Turkish troops and thousands of Syrian mercenaries, belonging to the Free Syrian Army. The outbreak of violence in Libya in April 2019 severely affected the institutional reunification and stability of the country. Warning that the situation in Libya could become "a second Syria", with a new large wave of refugees directed towards the EU, Germany offered to call a peace conference for the conflicting sides, held on 19th January 2020 under the auspices of the United Nations. The aim was to stop the military support for the civil war parties and uphold an existing UN arms embargo, re-launching the peace process for a political settlement, after nine months of fighting over the capital. Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI was launched by the European Union on 31 March 2020, as part of the European Union's contribution to the Berlin conference. The core task of the Operation is the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya through aerial, satellite, and maritime assets, an embargo that had been decided in 2016 by the United Nations Security Council Resolution. This ongoing mission replaced the Sophia Operation, which had been in place for five years, combating the organized crime and trafficking of migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. In June 2016, the European Council decided to extend Sophia’s mandate until July 2017, adding two supporting tasks: training the Libyan coastguards and contributing to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya. This paper attempts to analyze the response of the European Union to the Libyan crisis by launching the Irini operation, a military-naval Joint force, setting out to secure the Berlin Conference’s commitments. Finally, we try to explain if Italy which seems to have preferred to stay on the sidelines, succeeded in reinserting itself into the Libyan equation, a significant diplomatic area for the Chigi Palace.

The impact of the constitutional amendments on Algeria?s position towards the Libyan

The article seeks to provide a scientific and critical reading on Algerian diplomatic behavior towards the ongoing Libyan crisis between the government of Tripoli and the military officer Khalifa Haftar, and their supporters from regional and international powers, especially with the suggestion to send the Algerian army out of its borders for deliberation. With systematic analysis of the data related to Algerian diplomatic activity through documented statements and statistics, the researcher has reached several conclusions. The most important of these is that Algeria is seeking political solutions, intensifying diplomatic efforts rather of military solutions and security approaches. Also taking a single distance from all parties, including international forces, which are intervening or seeking to intervene in Libya; public references in direct or indirect ways to the proposal to send an Algerian military force outside its borders with the consent of the United Nations, which constitutes proactive behavior against future military problems and is not exclusively linked to Libya's crisis.

Social Cleavages and Armed Group Consolidation: The Case of Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces

In Libya’s fragmented military landscape, Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces stands out as the only armed group that concentrated power over entire regions. The interplay of relative power and social cleavages conditioned Haftar’s choices of consolidation strategies. As Haftar grew stronger, he progressively moved from cooperative and competitive approaches toward coercion. Social cleavages wrought by conflict – as opposed to seemingly objective group boundaries – contributed to shaping Haftar’s choices between coercive and cooperative strategies. The significance of these cleavages depended on how violence had shaped local social cohesion and armed groups’ links with communities.

Honest Broker or Status-Seeker: Russia’s Policy in Libya

ABSTRACT This paper examines Russia’s actions in Libya in the context of its pursuit of great power status. Drawing on a theoretical framework of Social Identity Theory, which had been developed and popularized in IR by the scholars Larson and Shevchenko, the article argues that Russia’s Libya policy consists of two strategies. First, it pursues social creativity through versatile diplomacy, which has positioned it as an invaluable mediator. Moreover, Russia relies also on social competition by supporting Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. While these strategies raised Russia’s profile, the ultimate success of status-seeking strategies depends on the recognition by the higher-status holders.

Russia is Back to the Balancing Game

This research mainly aims to show the balancing game of Russia in Syria and Libya after the Arab Spring. Recently Russia has increased its influence in Syria and Libya by its own capabilities and alliances with regional and local actors. Thus, it sought to consolidate its strength and balance its rivals, predominantly the US, in the international system. After the Arab Spring, Russia deployed its military muscle to Syria to protect its traditional ally the Bashar al-Assad regime, and restrain the US from solely dominating the region. Its attempts achieved to ensure the regime’s survival and balance the US in the country. Later, it sought to expand its sphere of influence and balance the rivals in Libya. It primarily used its own capabilities and alliance relations with the Khalifa Haftar group, the UAE, and Egypt. Russia’s growing presence in Libya inevitably affected the regional competition and balance of power among the states. However, the clashes among the militias supported by the external powers escalated in the fragmented country. Eventually, the UN-recognized GNA consolidated its power against the Khalifa Haftar forces and seized the control of northwest Libya, but an unstable environment still prevails in the country.

Understanding the Conflict in Libya: Strategic Options and Pathways

The conflict in Libya is a product of controversial and complex developmental issues; events in local politics have been influenced strongly and propelled by factors that are both exogenous and endogenous. On April 4, 2019, General Khalifa Haftar ordered the Libyan National Army to launch an offensive and subdue Tripoli. This triggered the Government of National Accord (GNA) to mobilise its armed forces and react accordingly, bringing to a standstill the political process that was underway. The attack occurred a couple of days prior to the National Conference scheduled for April 14–16, which was to be facilitated by the United Nations (UN). Since then, re-engagement efforts have been made by several international, regional, and national actors to forge a cessation-of-hostilities agreement for the resumption of political dialogue. The hostility, mainly concentrated in the southern part of Tripoli, has caused several civilian fatalities and casualties and seriously damaged infrastructure for civilians. The Libyan conflict has heightened forced displacements and humanitarian needs, impeding access to health care, food, and other basic services. A desktop study and literature review were conducted to explore and understand these conflict dynamics. It was revealed that, contrary to pervasive misconceptions, the forces hostile to Haftar are predominantly volunteers and not institutionalised militias. Islamists, who are political elements, form a negligible part of these forces, with well-known criminals active on the two conflicting sides, though essentially more prevalent in Haftar’s forces. Strategic options and pathways for Libya and the African Union (AU) are recommended for ending the conflict.

The UAE’s Disruptive Policy in Libya

In the last decade, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as a leading counter-revolutionary force in the Middle East. Feeling the heat of change in the region, the small, oil-rich Gulf country adopted an aggressive foreign policy that defined the UAE as a disruptive force that aims to reverse the fledgling democratic trend in the Middle East. After succeeding in Egypt in 2013, Abu Dhabi decided to support field marshal and warlord Khalifa Haftar in Libya to overthrow the UN-recognized government in Tripoli, take over power, and control Libya by force. To that end, the UAE offered massive military, financial, and diplomatic support to Haftar. In this context, the present paper aims to discuss the UAE’s interventions in Libya in terms of their nature, extent, motives, goals and repercussions. It highlights the UAE’s efforts to weave regional and international alliances to support Haftar and tries to answer the questions why Abu Dhabi has been able to act with impunity in Libya despite being the top foreign player fueling the war there for many years, and whether it will be able to achieve its goals and continue its interventions in the oil-rich North African country or not.

Turkey’s Position in the Libyan Crisis

This paper discusses Turkey’s relations with Libya, especially after the latest ground-breaking and rapid developments that took place in Libya such as Khalifa Haftar’s attempt to invade Tripoli, the signing of two memoranda of understanding between Turkey and the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the dramatic change in the military situation of the country. It argues that Turkey’s military support changed the positions of many domestic and external actors in Libya by tilting the balance of power in favor of the GNA.

Military Intervention and Changing Balance of Power in Libya

Libya has sunk into chaos since Muammar Gaddafi was deposed by a Western-led military intervention in 2011. Since then, the Libyan crisis has escalated into an internationalised armed conflict, and a major power struggle between Turkey, Qatar, Italy, and Russia, Egypt, France, and the United Arab Emirates. In the last few years, General Khalifa Haftar has become Libya’s most prominent military commander, who is now ruling the eastern part of the country, as the head of the Libyan National Army. His military offensive, launched in April 2019, to capture the capital Tripoli forced Turkey to help the UN-backed Government of National Accord to avoid defeat. But Haftar too received additional military support, especially from Abu Dhabi and Moscow. This escalated the conflict even further, spurring Ankara for another, this time more consequential intervention, which was able to change the local balance of power, so diplomatic efforts and the peace process could get another chance.

Strange Bedfellows: Why France's Emmanuel Macron and his autocratic friends are attempting to impose another strongman in the MENA Region

France has lately edged ever closer to a number of autocracies in Africa and the Middle East. Notably, in the name of combating “Islamic terrorism” –which it links to “political Islam”– it has actively supported Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. While actively allying with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and Saudi Arabia; it has aggressively confronted Turkey and undermined the internationally recognized Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA). In doing so, France finds itself in the same camp as Russian and Janjaweed mercenaries. Since France, in theory, supports the GNA and since Turkey has been sheltering millions of refugees that otherwise would flood Europe, this hostility is hard to comprehend. The present commentary will seek to examine the premises of this policy and what may be behind its actions

Can Libya survive as a single State?

Ever since the Qadhafi regime collapsed in late October 2011, the survival of the Libyan state has been opened to increasing question. The causes are manifold; the collapse of the Libyan army in the wake of the NATO-led attacks, the hostility of Britain and France, the roles played by the Gulf states, Turkey and Egypt, and the growth of extremism against the background of the privatised violence of the militias have all contributed towards its impending collapse. Nonetheless, apart from the unifying role played by country’s central bank and national oil company, pressure for preserving the unitary state has been driven by two players from diametrically opposed positions; the United Nations which seeks a new constitution and nationwide elections and the leader of the major militia coalition in the country, Khalifa Haftar, based in Benghazi and now seeking to extend his autocratic control over Tripolitania too. Now Libya is being dragged into a proxy war, involving the UAE and Egypt as opposed to Qatar and Turkey and the regional level and, more globally, Russia, the United States, France and Italy. The ultimate victim, however, could well be the Libyan state!

A nemzetközi jelenlét Líbiában 2011-től napjainkig

Great powers (the United States, Russia, China), European leading powers (France, Italy, Germany) and regional powers (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey) have been using different hard and soft foreign policy tools in the civil war-torn Libya in order to pursue their own interests. The ongoing offensive launched by Khalifa Haftar in April 2019 complicates further the Libyan political landscape; it will also affect the influence and relations within Libya of the above mentioned powers. Their interests remain unchanged; however, the foreign policy tools used by the international actors can harden, which compounds further the stabilisation of Libya.

Role of Tribes in Current Libyan Conflict

The article explores tribal aspect of Libyan policy. Cases of Warfalla and Tuareg tribal groups show an important role of tribal entities in modern Libya. In focus are activity of Social Council of Warfalla Tribes as an influential political actor with its own armed force and successful fight of Tuareg militias over control of huge El Sharara oilfield as well as their confrontation with Tubu tribal militias. The main sources for the research are information from such Internet-journals as Reuters, The Economist, Al-Monitor, The Libya Observer, etc. as well as reports from expert groups such as Country of Origin Information (COI) and Global Security. The research led to the conclusion that tribal political actors play an independent role in the process of civil confrontation in Libya. By the manipulation of loyalties and maneuvering among official political actors they protect their own kind of “hidden sovereignty” over territories and resources. Main political leaders of the country, Khalifa Haftar and Fayez al-Sarraj, are actually dependent on complicated mosaic of tribal interests which determines changing loyalties of tribal actors. At the same time tribal actors often have links over the borders of the state. Tuareg are fine example of this phenomenon, while Tuareg tribal militias are allied with armed tribal movements of their kinsmen in Mali and Niger. The case of Social Council of Warfalla Tribes appears to be very helpful example. The institutions of governance as well as network of alliances developed by tribal actors in fact create a spontaneous institutional alternative to a project of centralized nation-state in Libya. Representatives of these unofficial non-state institutions work in different social spheres on a grassroots level.

High noon for Libya’s Potemkin government

Strongman Khalifa Haftar is challenging Libya's internationally recognised but weak Government of National Accord for effective control of the country. While France has brokered a ceasefire and a new peace initiative, Haftar has substantial outside support from Egypt and the UAE, and the eventual political dispensation will probably turn on further military developments.