Karzai Government Research Articles

Pak-Afghan Relations: A Case of Taliban Regime Past and Present

In 1996, Afghanistan saw the establishment of the Taliban government, which emerged as a radical Islamist regime following a period of civil war and instability in the country. The regime received recognition from only a few countries, including Pakistan, while the rest of the international community largely rejected their rule. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations entered a complex and often contentious phase. The United States invasion of Afghanistan to oust the Taliban regime and dismantle Al-Qaeda had a profound impact on the region. Pakistan, which had previously supported the Taliban, had to recalibrate its policies as it joined the U.S.-led War on Terror. While Pakistan officially became a U.S. ally in the fight against terrorism, suspicions persisted on both sides. Afghanistan accused Pakistan of supporting militant elements within its territory, while Pakistan expressed concerns about Indian influence in Afghanistan. These tensions have had far-reaching consequences, contributing to instability in both countries and complicating efforts to achieve lasting peace in Afghanistan. Pak-Afghan relations during Hamid Karzai's government (2001-2014) were marked by cautious cooperation and a degree of diplomatic engagement. Pakistan officially recognized the Karzai administration, but underlying tensions persisted due to Afghan allegations of Pakistani support for insurgent groups. In contrast, during the Taliban government's rule in the 1990s and their return to power in 2021, Pakistan had recognized and provided significant support to the Taliban. This research analyzes the relations between Pak-Afghan past and present.

From Stalemate towards Settlement: Afghan Peace Process

United States and Taliban’s complicated relations date back to 9/11, when Taliban had provided refuge to alleged attackers of the terrific attacks. After that, series of atrocities committed by both sides and then finally in 2013, an effort was made to have informal presence of Taliban in Qatar, but the idea rejected by Karzai government. After that, two meetings were held in Urumqi and Murree, these meeting were between the representatives of Afghan government and Taliban, United States attended the meeting as an observer. The peace process halted after the news of death of Mullah Omar just the day before second round of Murree progress, because his death triggered uncertainty in the peace process. The peace process was renewed in 2018 when United States shared table with Taliban, the peace process was moving relatively smooth until the recent meeting which was scheduled in Qatar on 9th and 10th January 2019. It was canceled by Taliban leaders over the disagreement on the agenda of that meeting. Taliban have some demands, including the withdrawal of foreign troops, release of Taliban prisoners, change of constitution, to remove the name of Taliban leaders from UNSC list and the permission to have political presence in Qatar. United States now wants to get rid of Afghanistan and to make the peace process Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, to which Taliban are reluctant. The continued efforts of US and the current uncertain situation are apparently leading to no possible consensus among the adversaries in near future. It seems that this continued uncertainty will ultimately lead to chaos in Afghanistan, because of diversity and war-prone nature of the country.

Failure of the Current Anti-Corruption Strategy in Afghanistan

Corruption has come to the forefront in Afghanistan as the United States tries to balance efforts to back anticorruption strategies while maintaining a positive relationship with the Karzai government. Stalled corruption cases suggest corruption in Afghanistan is systemic and not limited to a particular governing body or official. It is clear that corruption exists in both the upper and lower echelons of Afghan society, and will continue to exist until the U.S.-backed anticorruption teams are accepted by the Afghan government. The strengthening of key institutions continues to be the recommended international model. As demonstrated in the United States, the integration and overlap of these institutions offers an effective means of combating corruption. These mechanisms, however, have been ineffective in a number of south-central Asia countries. Afghanistan’s unique history and clan structure may provide some rational for these failures. Two socioeconomic models, the principal-agent model and collective action theory, offer perspectives on how Afghanistan’s history and clan structure is inhibiting the implementation of traditional anticorruption tools. A strong clan history that loathes outsiders and rewards clan loyalties will not yield to strong U.S. anticorruption mechanisms. The Afghan drug trade offers a glimpse into the patron-client relationships that clans rely on, and demonstrates how the Taliban provide a network of resources to assist the drug mafias and transnational criminal organizations. A strong-arm approach to corruption, like that embraced by the Obama administration, will probably not succeed for a number of years. Before these regulatory mechanisms can work, the clans must be convinced of the credibility of these mechanisms.

Peace versus Justice: A False Dichotomy? Mapping Tensions and Complementarities between Conflict Resolution and Human Rights Advocacy in Afghanistan

 In the aftermath of a conflict, peace and justice are often seen to be in direct tension. Demands for justice and legal accountability can be an obstacle to peace, since peace accords may involve compromises with war criminals and human rights perpetrators. The peace versus justice debate therefore translates into a conceptual struggle between conflict resolution and human rights advocacy. In Afghanistan, peace and conflict are often seen as inherently conflicting. Justice, it is often argued, must wait until security has been established. Rather than punishing the perpetrators of past war crimes, the Karzai government has accommodated some of the most notorious warlords, by appointing them to some government positions. While it was long thought that this would have a stabilizing effect, this paper argues that the policy of relying on Afghanistan's warlords-cum-politicians has failed to bring lasting security, peace and stability to the country. This paper presents a brief foray into the field of peace and transitional justice in a fragmented 21st century Afghanistan.

Putin’s Predicament: Russia and Afghanistan after 2014

Russian press commentary during 2013 indicates that Moscow is fearful that the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan at the end of 2014 will only have negative implications for Russian security interests. Russian observers do not believe that Afghan government forces can effectively deal with a resurgent Taliban, do not see Afghanistan's current president (Hamid Karzai) as an effective leader, and do not believe that the 2014 Afghan presidential elections will lead to anything but political infighting that will only benefit the Taliban.Russian commentators seem convinced that once ISAF withdraws, the Taliban will sooner or later reassert control over most (if not all) of Afghanistan. And once the Taliban does this (or even before), it will immediately act to support jihadist groups seeking to bring about the downfall of the post-Soviet Central Asian governments and replace them with radical Islamist ones that are hostile to Russia. Further, Russian commentators blame this state of affairs squarely on the United States for not having defeated the Taliban once and for all. But while some view the resurgence of the Taliban as being the result of U.S. incompetence, others believe that this is what Washington wants in order to weaken Russia.1So what can Moscow do to prevent these negative consequences resulting from ISAF's departure? Russian commentators are certainly not advocating that ISAF be replaced by Russian, Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), or Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) forces. The negative experience of the 1979-89 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has not been forgotten in Moscow, which does not want to repeat that experience. What Russian commentators are discussing is reintroducing a Russian military presence along the Tajik-Afghan border. But despite what they see as the obvious benefits of Russian protection for Tajikistan, Russian observers see its president, Emomali Rakhmon, as demanding concessions that are unacceptable to Moscow in exchange for his cooperation.2 Similarly, Uzbek president Islam Karimov is seen as being suspicious that the true purpose of a Russian (or even CSTO or SCO) troop presence would not be to defend Uzbekistan against the Taliban but to overthrow him.3Moscow, of course, will have options in post-ISAF Afghanistan (even if Russian commentators do not see them yet). Just as the Najibullah government remained in office for over three years after the completion of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the post-Karzai government may prove more resilient than is currently anticipated. If so, Russia-along with other nations-can improve the Karzai government's prospects for survival by providing it with arms and possibly advisers.In addition, even if the United States and its Western allies completely depart from Afghanistan, there are other states in the region that share Russia's interest in preventing the Taliban from regaining control over Afghanistan or, if it does, from destabilizing neighboring countries. The Central Asian republics obviously share these interests with Russia, though their capacity to act in Afghanistan is limited. Iran and India are also opposed to the resurgence of the Taliban, and their capacities to act are far greater.From 1996 to the U.S.-led intervention just after September 11, Iran and Russia both worked to help the Northern Alliance prevent the radical Sunni Taliban (which was hostile to Shia Iran as well as to Russia) from overrunning all Afghanistan. With the Taliban so closely allied to India's archrival Pakistan, New Delhi too was unhappy to see it come to power back in 1996. Without the ISAF presence in Afghanistan serving to protect Iranian and Indian security interests vis-a-vis the Taliban and Pakistan, both Iran and India may have a strong incentive to work with Russia against them.Regarding China, Russian commentators are not pleased about how closely Beijing cooperates with Pakistan or with its seeming indifference to the Taliban. …

Afghanistan Beyond 2014: The Search for Security in the Heart of Asia

On November 26, 2013, National Security Advisor Susan Rice left Kabul in frustration as President Hamid Karzai refused to compromise in negotiations over a bilateral security agreement that would govern U.S. military forces remaining in Afghanistan following the conclusion in late 2014 of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. President Karzai's intransigence-several senior Afghan political leaders and advisers had urged him to reach an accommodation on the agreement-was likely due to a misreading of the appetite within the United States for continuing to provide high levels of support for Afghanistan, despite the shortcomings of the Karzai government and its episodic intemperate outbursts toward Washington. Stephen Biddle likened the situation to a game of chicken, in which each side expected the other to swerve at the last minute to avoid a damaging collision.1The U.S.-Afghan negotiations over a security agreement in the fall and winter of 2013-14, still ongoing as this roundtable went to press, have taken place against a growing chorus of voices assessing the impact of the long Afghanistan campaign on U.S. national security interests in the heart of Asia. These analyses range from discussions about how a decade-long focus on counterinsurgency operations has affected U.S. military readiness to critical assessments of the costs and benefits of the ISAF mission and whether the United States should cut its losses and seek a definitive departure from the region.2A prevailing assumption in many of these assessments is that the United States is likely to shift its focus away from the region toward other security challenges in Asia, such as China's increasing assertiveness in the East and South China seas or the threat of instability in or provocations from North Korea. In this Asia Policy roundtable, Xenia Dormandy and Michael Keating review the history of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan and argue persuasively that other issues in the Asia-Pacific will most likely capture Washington's attention following the conclusion of the ISAF operation in 2014. Certainly there are many within the U.S. policy community who seem to agree with the notion that providing billions of dollars a year to Afghanistan, perhaps for another decade or more, is no longer feasible.In the event that the United States does pull back, other powers will continue to vie for strategic influence in the region, and the outcome of that competition could have significant implications for broader U.S. objectives in Asia. The purpose of this roundtable, which comprises nine national and regional assessments, is to examine the range of strategic interests and priorities that Afghanistan's neighbors and other regional powers possess. Developed fully in the pages that follow, these interests can be grouped into three broad categories.The first is the search for security, and in particular the desire to prevent a resurgence of the Taliban for fear that Afghanistan will once again provide refuge to terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. This motivation, of course, first drove the U.S. intervention in 2001, and it remains a key concern for U.S. national security managers. Security is also a primary motivation for leaders in Russia, as Mark Katz points out; in the front-line states of Central Asia (namely, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan), which Kathleen Collins argues are preparing for a coming Afghan spillover of conflict, refugees, Islamist extremism, and drug trafficking; and in Iran, which, as Sumitha Narayanan Kutty notes, backed the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance during the civil war of the 1990s and was one of the earliest supporters of the U.S.-led intervention. China, too, has significant concerns about Islamism, which Beijing views as a key driver of the ethnic and religious tensions it is struggling to contain in Xinjiang. 3A second category revolves around economic interests and the protection of investments that have been or are being made in major energy, natural resources, and transportation projects in Afghanistan. …

Visiting Afghan Scholars’ and Students’ Insights on Afghanistan’s Future

The Karzai government's former Finance Minister, Ashraf Ghani is currently the leading 2014 presidential candidate among Afghan students. This is one of the findings of a survey of 13 legal scholars and judges of a visiting delegation and 47 students attending Malaysian universities. The survey was conducted in the greater Kuala Lumpur area by the International Institute for Advanced Studies Malaysia earlier this year. The government lawyers surveyed were all university-educated men, mainly 30 to 50 years old. 69 per cent put their first language as Dari/Persian and 31per cent as Pashto. The great majority indicated affiliation with Sunni Islam followed by Reformist Islam. All but two indicated that Shi'a Muslims were well treated in Afghanistan. Their overall assessment of the Karzai government was that its performance was only average to poor. The major issues that will need to be addressed by the new government to be elected in 2014 were seen to be education, employment and job creation, and achieving national unity. Rule of law, strong military and police forces, and the provision of a basic infrastructure were also important. To the question Should Islam be the only foundation for laws in Afghanistan or can codified secular laws or Pashtunwali customary principles be used? 54 per cent replied that Islam and other principles could be used, while 31 per cent stated only Islam should be used. A clear majority preferred an Islamic state to the present constitutional framework. A majority preferred the election of provincial governors rather than as at present, their appointment by President Karzai.

Pakistan's Afghan epiphany

Has Pakistan really shifted its policy towards neighbouring Afghanistan and, if so, what lies behind the change? Reports of a policy reversal in Islamabad surfaced in November 2012, when Pakistan agreed to release around a dozen Afghan Taliban members who, it was hoped, would play a role in a negotiated peace with Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government.

Security and Peace in Afghanistan: Before and After 2014

The military campaign of the forces of the United States, NATO and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) increases distance between the Afghan opposition, the Karzai government, and the international forces in Afghanistan. Along with this, the failure of the Karzai government to provide security and protect Afghans against the insurgency, provide basic public services, support day-to-day economic activities, and institute urgently needed programs that can provide tangible economic and social results, reduces chances for any foreseeable stability and peace. To overcome these challenges and enable the Afghans to live in peace, security, and prosperity, the invading forces must agree to negotiate with the resistance, towards political compromise and a negotiated settlement, with complete withdrawal of their forces from Afghanistan. Leaving behind even a small contingency of troops would in effect mean the continuation of war. Once negotiations have taken place and agreements have been reached, the United Nations Security Council should mandate the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to send their troops as monitors and peacekeepers to Afghanistan.

Security and Peace in Afghanistan : Before and after 2014

The military campaign of the forces of the United States, NATO and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) increases distance between the Afghan opposition, the Karzai government, and the international forces in Afghanistan. Along with this, the failure of the Karzai government to provide security and protect Afghans against the insurgency, provide basic public services, support day-to-day economic activities, and institute urgently needed programs that can provide tangible economic and social results, reduces chances for any foreseeable stability and peace. To overcome these challenges and enable the Afghans to live in peace, security, and prosperity, the invading forces must agree to negotiate with the resistance, towards political compromise and a negotiated settlement, with complete withdrawal of their forces from Afghanistan. Leaving behind even a small contingency of troops would in effect mean the continuation of war. Once negotiations have taken place and agreements have been reached, the United Nations Security Council should mandate the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to send their troops as monitors and peacekeepers to Afghanistan.

Seoul and Nanking, Baghdad and Kabul: A Response to Timothy Brook and Michael Shin

I begin my rejoinder to Timothy Brook and Michael Shin by reiterating the important question with which Brook ends his piece. “[W]hen Hamid Karzai's government falls in Afghanistan, or Nouri al-Maliki's does in Iraq, who then will be the nation's heroes and who the collaborators?” Questions such as this and other present-day conundrums (including the choices I make living in a national security state) were certainly on my mind when I began thinking about collaboration during the Second World War and particularly within the Japanese empire. The line between then and now is direct and short for me. Timothy Brook himself has been the target of an internet smear campaign assailing his work on Chinese collaboration for purportedly preparing an alibi for American mischief in Iraq and Afghanistan. Paramount among my own thoughts was always: what would I do, were I faced with the choices a Yi Kwang-su, a Liang Hongzhi or a Wang Jingwei was? It seems an irresistible reflex to me that we place ourselves in the position of those in the past who wagered and lost, and rehearse their calculations as our own: judgment of their decisions is as inevitable as it is necessary. The question is not if we will judge—to refuse risks our claims to moral agency—it is how. Timothy Brook, whether he once declined or now hesitates, indeed does make ethical judgments (he is on the record, for example, against advocating “collaboration as a morally positive or politically advisable course” [2008]), and indeed he should. That we have not come to similar conclusions only points to our missing consensus on a moral calculus, and not to the lack of an imperative to possess one.

Toward a More Effective Solidarity

Toward a More Effective Solidarity Prachi Patankar (bio) In her visit to the United States in the spring of 2011, the former Afghan parliamentarian Malalai Joya said about the U.S.-NATO occupation of Afghanistan, "We want the end of this brutal war, this occupation, as soon as possible. During these ten years, tens of thousands of civilians have been killed, most of them innocent women, children and men" (Joya 2011). In the ten years since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the U.S. and NATO have invaded Afghanistan with the aim of eradicating Al Qaeda. Since then, the continued occupation has been justified under the pretext of liberating Afghan women from the Taliban. For much of Afghanistan's modern history, it has been ravaged by wars fought between various empires. In the past three decades, the liberation of Afghan women from fundamentalists has been used as justification for invading the country. Prior to which, the reasons coalesced around liberation from communists. Like most Afghans, Malalai Joya has known only a continuously war-torn and occupied Afghanistan. The Soviet Union invaded the country in 1979, just months after she was born. Afghanistan became another battleground for the Soviet Union and the United States in the geopolitics of global supremacy. By the time of the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, almost two million Afghans had been killed and five million had become refugees. Joya spent almost sixteen years living in refugee camps in Iran and Pakistan. During the Taliban regime, she returned to Afghanistan and started teaching in secret girls' schools. She later helped establish a free medical clinic and an orphanage in her home province of Farah. In 2003, Joya became well known after her fierce speech at the loya jirga constitutional assembly in Kabul, where she stood up and denounced [End Page 282] her country's powerful warlords and fundamentalists, who by now had the backing of the United States government. At age twenty-seven, in September 2009, Joya became the youngest person elected to Afghanistan's new parliament. In the course of her campaign, she found tremendous support from people who saw her as their representative—a voice against corruption, poverty, violence, and exploitation of women. In her memoir A Woman Among Warlords (2009), Joya writes, "The support I received in the election campaign proved that the inequality between men and women was not some kind of permanent part of Afghan culture—things could be changed for the better" (119). As a member of parliament, Joya continued to speak out about the crimes of the warlords. Many of her efforts, however, are frustrated by the United States-backed regime of Hamid Karzai, which has passed and maintained misogynist laws exacerbating the widespread abuse of women's rights by the Taliban. Ann Jones, author of War Is Not Over When It's Over, writes, "Among most Afghans, especially the nearly eighty percent who live in rural areas, the effect of the American military presence has been to replicate for women the confinement they suffered under the Taliban" (2010). While in parliament (September 2005-May 2007), Joya refused to ignore the demands of the people she represented. During this time, many suggested that she take a more moderate and polite tone in her criticisms of the warlords and their policies. Reflecting on this in her book, she defends her stance: "Political dealing and compromise may be a good choice with opponents who believe in democratic values, but those who only know the language of the gun regard any compromise as a weakness" (Joya 2009, 151). Two years later, as a consequence of her persistent criticism of warlords and the occupation, she was suspended from the National Assembly. Since then Joya has remained an outspoken critic of the Karzai government as well as of the Taliban and warlords. Her passionate voice has found an audience all over the world, including in the United States. On the eve of her departure for a nationwide speaking tour in March 2011, the U.S. government abruptly denied Joya a visa. Thousands around the country immediately petitioned the U.S. State Department in protest, asserting that the American people had the right to hear Joya voice...

Reclaiming Afghanistan

Reclaiming Afghanistan

Testing Obama's Withdrawal Timeline Hypothesis in Afghanistan

The Obama Administration argued that a publicly announced withdrawal timeline would help further U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) objectives in Afghanistan by incentivizing better behavior from the Karzai government and the Afghan people. In this article, I test the “Obama timeline hypothesis” to determine whether it is likely to produce the positive change that the Administration claims. By utilizing a mix of consistent historical predictors, deductive logic based on contemporary COIN theory, and currently available evidence, I conclude that the withdrawal timeline has not produced, and likely will not produce, these results and that, on the whole, it has likely engendered perverse incentives that run contrary to America’s COIN objectives. More broadly, the Afghan case should make U.S. policymakers deeply skeptical of assertions that withdrawal timelines can serve as an effective policy tool for changing the behaviors of key regional actors.

Implications of NATO Presence in Afghanistan: The Internal Dimensions

There is a common consensus about the argument that the events of September 11, 2001 changed the world completely. However, there is a wide disparity of views when it comes to initiations of the event, its analysis and the chain of consequences of this event. Somehow or the other, the greatest impact of what we usually refer to as 9/11 was and is on Afghanistan. A lot has been written about the global and regional implications of 9/11, but there is very little work available that revolves around the event on Afghanistan itself. Therefore, in this paper we will try to seek out the effects of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan on its internal dynamics.The study will start off with the events that led to 9/11 seeking out if it was unexpected or inevitable. The study will try to find if the NATO attack on Afghanistan would have gone ahead even if the attack on the Twin Towers and Pentagon had not taken place. It will then analyze the perceptions that were spontaneous and that were manipulated to justify the presence of international forces in Afghanistan. The paper will discern the reasons for a widespread participation of different countries in the US-led invasion, and also the reasons of why some other countries opted to stay out of this attack.The major part of the paper will focus on the impact that NATO presence had on the internal affairs and conditions of Afghanistan. It will try to search the political impacts, including the coming of Karzai government, the level of acceptance, the opposition within and without of Afghan parliament, the legitimacy and the strength of current political structure. The paper will try to find out all the pros and cons of the presence of economically supreme forces inside Afghanistan; for example the effect on poppy cultivation, imports and exports, smuggling and economic infrastructure. The changes that the presence of NATO forces has brought in the Afghan social structure and fabric are also an important field of our interest. The changes in social norms that have been a direct orindirect result of foreign presence will also be studied. It will also try to and look for the challenges and opportunities for the law and order situation and Afghanistan's national army, as foreign forces can have assisting and modernizing as well marginalizing and destructive effects on local army because of their high technological superiority. The final part of the paper will search for the future possibilities that the situation in Afghanistan offers. However, the focus will be limited to only three factors: The possibilities that lie ahead for the foreign forces, the possible alliances that may emerge, and the perils that a possible Civil War may lead to. In conclusion the paper will sum up the findings and spell out possible answers of theresearch questions in the light of its findings.

The Strategic Failures of al Qaeda

In the ebb and flow of the war against extremist--jihadi--Islam, al Qaeda and its allies have endured a significant number of major losses. (1) They were defeated in Egypt, Algeria, and the Balkans in the 1980s and 1990s. Although jihadi groups remain a significant residual threat in Iraq, the consensus of the Iraqi populace is evidently that they have no place in that nation's future. Their attempted uprising in Saudi Arabia has been crushed. Al Qaeda and the Taliban were routed from Afghanistan in 2001, and if the Taliban have gained in strength in recent years it has been due far more to the weakness of the Karzai government than to anything al Qaeda has done. There are a variety of factors that contributed to these defeats. A central reason is the strategy and tactics used by al Qaeda in particular and the jihadis in general, and the view of the world on which that strategy and tactics are based. The extremists' entire worldview has been based on misguided or fanciful assumptions that have little or no basis in actual fact. Some of these assumptions are unique to al Qaeda, some to radical Islam (a movement that goes far beyond al Qaeda and the jihadis), and--ominously--many are common within the Arab and Muslim worlds. The bottom-line is that, while at the tactical level al Qaeda and the jihadis may sometimes be astute, even brilliant, at the strategic level they are so badly misinformed as to be almost delusional. The significance of this lack of comprehension is threefold: (1) It has led to major errors in strategy and tactics that have led al Qaeda and the jihadis to multiple defeats and disasters; (2) it points to strategic principles that can contribute to the defeat and ultimate eradication of al Qaeda; and (3) since there is no reason to believe that al Qaeda will be the last of its ilk, the next jihadi group may learn enough from the present mistakes to be even more dangerous and more successful. Five Critical Mistakes Five critical mistakes are apparent, each of which had a significant strategic impact. Some were mistakes by al Qaeda in particular, while the rest have been mistakes by al Qaeda and the jihadis in general. * Misreading the situation in the Middle East and the role of the United States. * Misreading the weakness of the United States. * Expanding the war and bringing in additional enemies. * Alienating the local populace. * Indifference to Muslim casualties. Misreading the Situation A central mistake of al Qaeda has been choosing the United States, the Far Enemy, as its primary enemy and target, and its related decision to wage offensive jihad against the United States on American soil. These decisions were the result of other and previous mistakes. In recent decades, a variety of jihadi groups, many of which, such as Ayman al Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad, eventually merged with al Qaeda, have staged uprisings in various Sunni Muslim nations with the proclaimed intention of replacing existing governments with theocracies that will rule according to the extremists' interpretation of sharia (Muslim religious law). (2) All of these uprisings failed. Al Qaeda and the survivors of those jihads largely refused to recognize or admit that these failures were due to their mistakes, the result of some combination of miscalculating popular support for the uprisings, use of tactics that alienated local popular opinion, and because the local governments--most prominently the Egyptian and Algerian--were effective or brutal enough in their countermeasures to defeat them. Instead, the jihadis looked for somebody else to blame. They chose to blame the United States, asserting that governments in the Arab world were placed in power, are kept in power, and are subservient to the United States, and if America were forced to withdraw its support, those governments would collapse. This conclusion has little to do with reality and shows a profound and willful disregard of the reason for their failures and a lack of understanding of their own governments and the situation in the region in general. …

Afghanistan on the Edge of a Political Abyss

Ten years into the war on terror, the Karzai government and its international backers, namely the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), continue to face bleak prospects in Afghanistan. The country suffers from political uncertainty and instability, with a resurgent Taliban movement in control of vast swaths of territory. This article argues that five key factors have interacted inauspiciously to contribute to this situation—the mosaic nature of the Afghan society, an inappropriate political system which has subsequently led to poor governance, the flawed US and NATO political and military strat-egies, the prominence of Afghanistan’s narcotics trade and a number of counter-systemic actors, chief among them being the Taliban. A change of US policy by placing a greater emphasis on reform, reconstruction and containment is needed if Afghanistan is to have a chance of getting out of its current deteriorating cycle of violence and bloodshed.

In the graveyard of empires: America's war in Afghanistan

After the swift defeat of the Taliban in 2001, American optimism has steadily evaporated in the face of mounting violence; a new of a thousand cuts has now brought the country to its knees. In the Graveyard of Empires is a political history of Afghanistan in the Age of Terror from 2001 to 2009, exploring the fundamental tragedy of America's longest war since Vietnam. After a brief survey of the great empires in Afghanistan-the campaigns of Alexander the Great, the British in the era of Kipling, and the late Soviet Union-Seth G. Jones examines the central question of our own war: how did an insurgency develop? Following the September 11 attacks, the United States successfully overthrew the Taliban regime. It established security throughout the country-killing, capturing, or scattering most of al Qa'ida's senior operatives-and Afghanistan finally began to emerge from more than two decades of struggle and conflict. But Jones argues that as early as 2001 planning for the Iraq War siphoned off resources and talented personnel, undermining the gains that had been made. After eight years, he says, the United States has managed to push al Qa'ida's headquarters about one hundred miles across the border into Pakistan, the distance from New York to Philadelphia. While observing the tense and often adversarial relationship between NATO allies in the Coalition, Jones-who has distinguished himself at RAND and was recently named by Esquire as one of the Best and Brightest young policy experts-introduces us to key figures on both sides of the war. Harnessing important new research and integrating thousands of declassified government documents, Jones then analyzes the insurgency from a historical and structural point of view, showing how a rising drug trade, poor security forces, and pervasive corruption undermined the Karzai government, while Americans abandoned a successful strategy, failed to provide the necessary support, and allowed a growing sanctuary for insurgents in Pakistan to catalyze the Taliban resurgence. Examining what has worked thus far-and what has not-this serious and important book underscores the challenges we face in stabilizing the country and explains where we went wrong and what we must do if the United States is to avoid the disastrous fate that has befallen many of the great world powers to enter the region.

Resurgence of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan: How and why?

On the same day (1 May 2003) that President Bush declared ‘mission accomplished’ in Iraq; in an announcement considered as ‘marking a major victory in America's ongoing war on terror’ by the Fox News, his Secretary of Defence declared that ‘the major combat activity’ had ended in Afghanistan. More than 5 years later, however, victory in Afghanistan seems as elusive as in Iraq. The Taliban have re-emerged as a formidable fighting force and are going from strength to strength, despite the involvement of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and more than quadruple increase in the number of foreign troops. What went wrong and how were the Taliban able to survive and pose a serious challenge to the United States and NATO? The aim of this paper is to provide an outline of the important factors for the rise of insurgency, from the initial mistakes made to the interference by Pakistan; weaknesses of the Karzai government and its national army and police; the question of legitimacy and offences to traditional and religious values and beliefs; and finally the Allied Forces and NATO troops becoming part of the problem, incapable of solving it.

References to Islam and Women in the Afghan Constitution

AbstractThis paper is presented in three parts and several sections. The first part consists of a stocktaking of recent developments and dynamics that have engaged President Hamid Karzai's government ever since he came to power in December 2001. A mixed picture is presented which draws attention to many problems that have impeded reconstruction efforts in the country. Some positive developments have also occurred including, for example, the introduction of a new constitution, presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as resumption of schooling for children that by mid-2006 had numbered four million throughout the country. An overview of the previous constitutions and a brief historical perspective attempt to show how leadership flaws and internal differences in the royal household plunged Afghanistan into a succession of coups, foreign invasions, and catastrophic consequences for its people. Are there any lessons to be learnt? The second part of this essay focuses on a review and analysis of the 2004 constitution with special reference to Islam, and the last part takes a similar approach to women's rights.