Kantian Tradition Research Articles

Plotinus’ concept of ‘We’ and Its Relation to the Kantian Tradition

Hailed as an innovative concept in antiquity, Plotinus’ concept of the ‘we’ occupies a nuanced and somewhat elusive systematic position. On the one hand, it locates itself in the realm of the soul rather than the intellect; at the same time, however, it manifests a self-conscious dimension typically ascribed to the intellect rather than the soul. This paper attempts to resolve this ambiguity by interpreting the ‘we’ as a potential of self-consciousness, which explains why the ‘we’ can become similar to, but not identical with, the actual self-consciousness of the intellect. The proposed definition not only brings clarity to the seemingly paradoxical formulations surrounding the ‘we’ in Plotinus’ philosophy but also sheds light on the allegories that Plotinus employs. Moreover, my analysis highlights the similarity between the Plotinian ‘we’ and the characterizations of the self within the Kantian tradition. Drawing on Cassirer’s dichotomy between concepts of substance and concepts of function, and Kant’s assertion that the ‘I think’ represents a potentiality rather than an actuality of self-consciousness, this study attempts to provide a conceptual bridge between the Plotinian and Kantian frameworks.

Autonomy and Habit

Abstract An enduring puzzle for theorists of autonomy in the broadly Kantian tradition is how to theorize failures of practical reason. If norms of practical rationality are supposed to be constitutive of agency itself, how can failures to live up them nonetheless be understood as expressions of that agency? Hegelian diagnoses of these difficulties typically emphasize the dichotomies that structure Kantian theories of autonomy, between activity and passivity, reason and nature, norm and desire. They seek to flesh out an alternative that preserves a recognisably post-Kantian notion of autonomy whilst understanding freedom as something that essentially comes in degrees, insisting that self-determination always involves elements of other-determination, and stressing how free subjectivity is inseparable from socio-historically and institutionally bounded character-formation. This article contributes to articulating a Hegelian corrective to Kantian theories of autonomy by beginning to explain the role of habit in Hegel's conception of agency. Building on recent work on Hegel's metaphysics of expression, it shows how he allows us to see conative responses to the world as integral to character development and thus as expressive of free agency, rather than as interruptions to the proper functioning of practical reason. On Hegel's account, the expressive behaviour of mature, reflective agents is grounded in a pre-intentional, affective dimension of subjectivity and presupposes processes of habituation, which he locates at the level of the human ‘soul’. Habit, far from being ‘lifeless, contingent and particular’, is the means by which agents come to make objective contents their own. Understanding the role of habit in Hegel's system is integral to allowing an alternative conceptualization of autonomy to come into view, one on which rational agents express themselves through their affective and emotional responses, rather than merely being a contingent site of those responses.

Individualistic Versus Relational Ethics – A Contestable Concept for (African) Philosophy

AbstractThaddeus Metz, in his book “A Relational Moral Theory” compares the relational African view to Western theories of right action with a focus on Kant (respective contemporary Kantianism) and Utilitarianism. In focussing on the opposition between a relational and an individualistic view, Metz questions the interpretation of basic normative assumptions that are guiding central Western moral and political institutions. He particularly focusses on Kantian and Utilitarian approaches to which he ascribes substantive moral assumptions in terms of utility respective autonomy. In this paper, we reconstruct Metz’s position on the opposition between a relational and an individualistic view on ethics. We then investigate whether his relational conceptualisation is a convincing reconstruction of African views and question his take on Western positions, focussing in particular on views around individual rights and communality as presented in the Kantian tradition. We highlight the value of ubuntu in intercultural discourse to foster ethical and moral reasoning in a holistic way and conclude that any reflection on ethics necessarily involves an understanding of our common human nature, which is at the core of philosophical anthropology.

Moral worth

AbstractThe concept of moral worth, of being creditworthy for doing the right thing, is often seen as essential feature of a moral theory. It forces us to provide a clear account of the relationship between moral motivation and moral action, raising important questions about the demands that morality makes of us. Work on moral worth has a long lineage, especially in Kantian scholarship. Recent years, however, have seen a more focused interest in the nature of moral worth outside of the Kantian tradition. Indeed, part of this interest stems from a rejection of an orthodox Kantian understanding of what moral worth is. In this article, I chart prominent reasons for rejecting the orthodoxy, and distinguish between two rival camps that have emerged: Right Reasons Accounts and Rightness Accounts. I delineate some of the demands that these accounts must meet, and end by discussing a potential way forward that has emerged via hybrid views and goal‐based views that attempt to utilise the most promising features of each.

Reflections on Habermas’s discourse ethics

In this article Habermas’s discourse ethics is critically interpreted. The article starts with a brief intellectual biography of Habermas (section 1), showing that his life and work has always had a strong ethical and political dimension – leading to the concept of discourse ethics. Next, it is indicated how Habermas’s work in the 1970s culminated via four steps in his major philosophical work – the Theory of Communicative Action (section 2) published in 1981. In the next two sections Habermas Theory of Communicative Action is applied to ethics and morality in the form of his discourse ethics – the heart of this contribution (section 3). In this process the following four aspects of Habermas’s discourse ethics are discussed: Its qualified Kantian deontological dimension, as well as its universalist, cognitivist, and formalist dimensions. In the following section (4) the discussion of discourse ethics is shifted to Habermas’s theory of law, deliberative politics, and democracy which is a further application of ideas developed in his Theory of Communicative Action. The contribution then ends with some critical remarks on Habermas discourse ethics and sketch of law and politics (section 5) Three arguments are presented in this regard. First, Habermas argument is judged to be too closely related to abstract rationality. Secondly the distinction that Habermas makes between morality and ethics is critically investigated. Finally, the Habermasian use of justification in his argument is critically compared with the concept of application. These points of criticism, though, indicate that the debate on Habermas’s discourse ethics is ongoing.Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: This article deals with the concept of discourse ethics (in the Kantian tradition of ethics) as developed firstly by Karel Otto Apel and later refined by Jurgen Habermas for his own purposes. The line of argumentation developed here has significant relevance for philosophy, moral theory, law, and theology. Discourse ethics can be considered as a contemporary version of Kantian deontological ethics after the linguistic turn.

Character Education : Developing Moral Identity through Narrativity and Reflection

In the debate on character education, broadly speaking, it is necessary to distinguish two sets of thoughts: the Aristotelian tradition and the Kantian tradition. These two perspectives have great merits but also have their limitations. Educational approaches referring to these perspectives are often based on a very fragile relationship: in the first case, between habit and behaviour, and the second case, between cognition and behaviour. According to Blasi, moral action does not depend only on reasoning or on virtuous habits, but it depends on the organization of the self and on a person’s identity. This paper argues that the integration of the perspective of identity into the theory of character education can point to further development of both theory and educational practices. To address this issue, the author explores the significant role of narrativity in the development of moral identity, drawing on the philosophical perspectives of Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur. The central thesis is that developing a sense of moral identity and moral character is deeply intertwined with the ability to reflect on one’s own life narrative. From this perspective, the author argues that in order to “self­‑regulate one’s life” in the MacIntyrean sense and to “re‑configure the emplotment of one’s life story” as suggested by Ricoeur, individuals must engage in a continuous process of reflection, including a critical examination of their moral values and life experiences. The implications of this narrative and reflexive approach for educational practices are discussed, with a focus on how educators can facilitate identity formation and moral development.

Elvesztette-e méltóságát a koncentrációs táborok muzulmánja? Giorgio Agamben méltóságról, puszta életről és immanenciáról

In our analysis we focus on the Agambenian concept of human dignity against the background of the Kantian moral tradition. Our goal is to explore the connection between dignity and biopolitics in Agamben’s thinking through his concept of bare life as an absolute immanence, in the Deleuzian sense of indeterminacy, indiscernibility, undecidabilty. As for the philosophical context we draw attention to the Sartrean conception of lived experience in The Family Idiot, in addition to the well-known Foucauldian and Deleuzian roots of Agamben’s philosophy, and the early phenomenology of consciousness in The Transcendence of the Ego (with a focus on the impersonal transcendental field and the pre-reflexive consciousness).

Kantian Motives in Work of Ludwig Wittgenstein

It is proved that the basic framework of the premises and reasoning of Wittgenstein's “Tractatus Logico-philosophicus” corresponds quite well to the transcendental method (as formulated by H. Cohen). Whereas Kant’s philosophy proceeds from the fact of existence of mathematics and mathematised natural science and investigates their conditions of possibility, Wittgenstein proceeds from the fact that propositions of language describe reality and reveals the conditions of possibility of such descriptions. Kant, answering the question about the conditions of possibility of the named sciences, comes to the idea of the transcendental subject and the distinction between the world of phenomena and the thing in itself. Wittgenstein's investigation of the conditions of possibility that the world is described by propositions leads to the assertion that both the world and language are together in logical space. The latter constitutes the a priori and transcendental condition of the possibility that language “reaches out” to reality. For both the theories - in the “Critique of Pure Reason” and in the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” - the idea of the boundary is important. In the “Critique of Pure Reason” it is the boundary of possible experience and cognition, while in the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” it is the boundary of what can be thought and expressed by meaningful propositions. Related to the different definitions of the boundary is the difference in the treatment of mathematised natural science. For “The Critique of Pure Reason” was created in the era of unconditional acceptance of Newtonian mechanics. And the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” was created at the time of the crisis of the Newtonian paradigm and its replacement by other notions of time and space. However, the idea of boundary, which is present in both doctrines, determines closeness in the attitude towards metaphysics between the author of “The Critique of Pure Reason” and the author of “The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”. The study also shows that Wittgenstein did not follow logicism in his philosophy of mathematics. For him, both mathematical objects and propositions of logic are constructions. The conviction about the constructive character of mathematical and logical objects shows an affinity with the Kantian tradition in the philosophy of mathematics.

Understanding First: A Psychoanalytic Take on Self-Constitution

Abstract: In this paper, we criticize what we dub the “pruning view” of self-constitution, championed widely by philosophers, mainly though not exclusively in the Kantian tradition, and instead defend an alternative view inspired by psychoanalysis. We argue that normative assessment comes much too early on the pruning view, so early that it interferes with achieving deeper self-understanding that can produce lasting change. On the proposal we advocate, self-constitution must begin with a non-moralizing attempt to truly understand why one has undesirable and unwanted propensities. We call this the “understanding first” principle. Only after deeper self-understanding has been achieved are attempts to liberate oneself from unwanted elements likely to succeed.

Attention, Affect, and Aesthetic Experience

The article suggests a conceptualization of the interrelationship between attention, affect, and aesthetic experience. It supplements classical aesthetic theory by integrating knowledge from neurophysiology, developmental psychology, and psychoanalysis. Furthermore, the article proposes a distinction between a variety of types of affect that are discussed with a view to their potential contribution to elaborating the concept of aesthetic experience in the Kantian tradition and to reflecting different qualities of attention.

The African Novel of Ideas: Philosophy and Individualism in the Age of Global Writing

The African Novel of Ideas: Philosophy and Individualism in the Age of Global Writing

Grid Locks

This article is based on a painting by Los Angeles-based Black artist Mark Bradford, On a Clear Day, I Can Usually See All the Way to Watts (2001), which was exhibited at SFMOMA in an installation that juxtaposed it to a series of drawings by abstract artist Agnes Martin, Untitled (Study for ‘On a Clear Day'), <https://www.sfmoma.org/exhibition/on-a-clear-day/> (2019–2020). In an extended reading of abstraction and its social implications and of Bradford's engagement with abstract traditions, the article explores the material traces of impurity in his contemporary non-representative visual art. In particular, it focuses on hair as complex sign of impurity, concealment, animality, decay, aesthetic beauty, etc, and of the ways in which its incorporation, materially and metonymically, in the painting disturbs the clarity of the white aesthetic gaze. The article thus considers how the material practices of certain, broadly speaking, postcolonial artists, but in particular the Black ion exemplified by Bradford’s work, challenge the Kantian aesthetic tradition that has dominated the visual arts even in a post-Kantian artistic realm.

Wittgenstein's idealism

The following contribution aims at presenting a reading of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as a kind of idealism within the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition. The goal is to argue that Wittgenstein’s position shares substantial theoretical and methodological grounds with Hegel’sidealism. The main concepts pertaining to the later Wittgenstein’s position are analyzed and understood as a form of idealism. After defending the reading against anti-idealist interpretations we argue that the kind of idealism presented clashes with central tenets of the Kantian position.These points of departure are then shown to cover in substantial manner the same kind of criticism Hegel raised against Kant. In the last section, an interpretation of central concepts of the Hegelian position is offered in order to dissolve any fundamental incompatibility with Wittgenstein’s idealism.

An Ethics of Unseen Consequences: Rabbi Nahman of Bratslav's Sefer Ha‐Middot

ABSTRACTThis essay is a close examination of one of Nahman of Bratslav's early and largely unexamined texts, Sefer ha‐Middot. The question it addresses is whether one can call this a study of “ethics” or, in Jewish nomenclature, musar, a work that seeks to cultivate human behaviors and describe ethical formation. In addition, it asks whether Sefer ha‐Middot can be called a text of “virtue ethics” given its focus on virtues and their enactment. The essay argues that Nahman's peculiar metaphysical notion that all mitzvot are inextricably intertwined prevents any analysis of behavioral causality severing his “ethics” from any Aristotelian or Kantian tradition and brings him closer to Alasdair MacIntyre's notion of ethics as tied to traditional norms. And even with MacIntyre, the comparison is quite limited. Discussing “faith,” the “zaddik,” and “money,” the essay explores Nahman's view of how these and other virtues are cultivated and achieved.

Foucault and the “Noble Sciences”

“Noble sciences” was a term sometimes used by Michel Foucault to refer mostly to Mathematics and Physics (and, to a lesser extent, Chemistry). This article explores this notion, based on Dits et écrits, understanding that there is a strong connection between this term and a reflection on “enlightenment”, or Aufklärung. But how has this heritage unfolded in our days? We will discuss this theme, advancing to the text “La vie: l’experience et la science”, where another important associated question will appear: how to understand what can give Philosophy “dignity” amid the extension of that Kantian tradition?

Précis: Concern, Respect, and Cooperation

Précis: <i>Concern, Respect, and Cooperation</i>

The Trouble with Literature

The Trouble with Literature

Abolish the World as We Know It: Notes for a Praxis of Phenomenology Beyond Critique

The world as we know it is structured by intersecting forms of systemic violence. It might seem obvious that this violence calls for critique. But this essay experiments with another, more radical possibility inspired by Denise Ferreira da Silva’s Black feminist poethics and by abolitionist refusals of critique as an end in itself and a substitute for collective action. To what extent might phenomenology, even in its most critical form, be so deeply invested in the Kantian tradition of transcendental critique that it confirms the logic of the world as we know it? And how, if at all, might a praxis of phenomenology beyond critique imagine and affirm a poethical world in which entanglement, indeterminacy, and simultaneity generate virtual possibilities for being, knowing, and doing beyond and against racial violence?

Metamorphosis from exalted person to cultural symbol: A case study of the GOAT in tennis

In this article, we suggest that our semiotic understanding of embodiment could be expanded to include a socially exalted individual, who embodies a symbol. To illustrate this argument, we draw on an ongoing research project that examines fandom rhetoric and debates around the ‘Greatest of all time’ or the GOAT symbol in Tennis. Grounding Bakhtin’s tri-distinctions of identity, I-for-myself, I-for-other and other-for-me, in a Kantian hermeneutic tradition, we perform a theoretically informed analysis of the GOAT debate. None of the three tri-components exists in isolation; rather, they interact in a reflexive dialogue which continually shapes and re-shapes individual consciousness and experiences of embodiment. We apply a ‘romanticism aesthetic activity’ analytical framework to the tri-distinctions of identity, that consists of ‘creative’ and ‘critical’ rhetoric, within which we found genres of ‘myth’, ‘art’ and ‘science’. Each genre functions through disparate means to exalt or metamorphise an individual (our focus is on Roger Federer) into a cultural symbol, and that the symbolic form of GOAT reflexively organises the emotional field and identities for those fans deeply invested in it. This article contributes to the current cultural psychological literature on understanding the mediation of people to symbols in a new digital age.

Back to the Golden Age: Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity and Twenty‐First Century Philosophy

AbstractIn this paper, I try to outline what I take to be Naming and Necessity's fundamental legacy to my generation and those that follow, and the new perspectives it has opened up for twenty‐first century philosophy. The discussion is subdivided into three sections, concerning respectively philosophy of language, metaphysics, and metaphilosophy. The general unifying theme is that Naming and Necessity is helping philosophy to recover a Golden Age, by freeing it from the strictures coming from the empiricist and Kantian traditions and reconnecting it to the world and the objects that populate it. Because of this, in the concluding paragraph I tentatively suggest that Kripke's philosophy may be seen as a sui generis form of naturalism.