Autonomy and Habit

Abstract

Abstract An enduring puzzle for theorists of autonomy in the broadly Kantian tradition is how to theorize failures of practical reason. If norms of practical rationality are supposed to be constitutive of agency itself, how can failures to live up them nonetheless be understood as expressions of that agency? Hegelian diagnoses of these difficulties typically emphasize the dichotomies that structure Kantian theories of autonomy, between activity and passivity, reason and nature, norm and desire. They seek to flesh out an alternative that preserves a recognisably post-Kantian notion of autonomy whilst understanding freedom as something that essentially comes in degrees, insisting that self-determination always involves elements of other-determination, and stressing how free subjectivity is inseparable from socio-historically and institutionally bounded character-formation. This article contributes to articulating a Hegelian corrective to Kantian theories of autonomy by beginning to explain the role of habit in Hegel's conception of agency. Building on recent work on Hegel's metaphysics of expression, it shows how he allows us to see conative responses to the world as integral to character development and thus as expressive of free agency, rather than as interruptions to the proper functioning of practical reason. On Hegel's account, the expressive behaviour of mature, reflective agents is grounded in a pre-intentional, affective dimension of subjectivity and presupposes processes of habituation, which he locates at the level of the human ‘soul’. Habit, far from being ‘lifeless, contingent and particular’, is the means by which agents come to make objective contents their own. Understanding the role of habit in Hegel's system is integral to allowing an alternative conceptualization of autonomy to come into view, one on which rational agents express themselves through their affective and emotional responses, rather than merely being a contingent site of those responses.