Kantian Notion Research Articles

Resolving the Paradox of Phenomenology through Kant's Aesthetics: Between Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze

ABSTRACTCommentators have claimed that the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze converge upon a spatial field of sensation which is prior to representation. This essay will contest these readings by showing that, for Deleuze, the pre-representational spatial field of intensity is fundamentally split from thought. This “gap” between sensation and thought is, for Deleuze, fundamentally temporal, in that thought is continually open and passive to being violated and transformed by the sensible and the sensible is continually being pushed beyond itself by a certain kind of thought. This violent exchange across the gap between thought and sensibility is found, by Deleuze, in Kant's notion of the aesthetic idea. On the contrary, for Merleau-Ponty, Kant's aesthetics imply a non-conceptual “ground” shared by both thought and sensibility. By contrasting these two readings of Kant's aesthetics, this paper reveals the basic divergence between the philosophies of Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty.

Thinking with Kant “beyond” Kant

In the following essay, I attempt to reactualize some of Kant’s most fundamental conceptions of a state’s sovereignty and the legitimacy of the cosmopolitan order. To this end, I provide what appears as a viable solution to Kant’s “sovereignty dilemma”; that is, the reconciliation between state sovereignty and the international enforceability of laws. I consider that a key component of the overall Kantian cosmopolitan project is the role played by the transcendental notion of an “originally united will” in its validation of constituencies. I emphasize the view that for Kant state-citizens are also, as he says, “citizens of the world” (Weltbürger) or “citizens of the earth” (Erdbürger). I argue, furthermore, that a state’s sovereignty must comply with a number of different constitutional wholes. I then proceed by confronting the Kantian notion of a general united will with the Habermasian conception of “double sovereignty.” I conclude by suggesting a fusion/synthesis between the two views, one which would require endorsing the idea of cosmopolitan constitutionalism as a meta-framework for interpreting the legitimacy of member states’ compliance with policy indications of transnational constituencies.

La figura del "tirso" come exemplum dell'opera d'arte. Riflessioni sul nesso arte-immaginazione in Baudelaire

This paper aims to show how the Baudelaire’s prose poem The Thyrsus, in Paris Spleen, constitues the exemplary exhibition of the idea of art itself and of its ontological and epistemological statute, according to the theoretical Baudelairian perspective. From this point of view, the paper highlights two features playing a decisive role in aesthetical terms: on the one hand, the Baudelairian image of the “thyrsus” presents itself as an authentic “short-circuit” of the Apollonian logos and the Dionysian pathos (according to Nietzsche’s lexicon); on the other hand, the same image of the thyrsus is conceivable as a sort of “symbol” (or as a sort of “equivalent”) of that instance of creativity closely related to the Kantian notion of “free schematism”. Thus, the figure of the thyrsus exhibits in an exemplary way – showing it “in action” and putting it in front of our eyes – the same utopian instance of “liberation of the possible” that, again under the Baudelairian perspective, belongs to the faculty of imagination.

¿Es necesario un giro aretaico de la teoría de la argumentación jurídica?

La actual teoría de la argumentación jurídica tiene como base epistemológica la ética discursiva de Habermas y, en última instancia, la noción kantiana de la racionalidad práctica. Dicho paradigma se basa en una razón fría, que aspira a ser neutral, imparcial, universal y descontextualizada. Este enfoque abandona cuestiones centrales para la argumentación, tales como el carácter de la persona oradora, las emociones del auditorio o la persuasión producida por los elementos estéticos. Por eso, frente al paradigma habermasiano, las llamadas «éticas de la virtud» podrían dar lugar a un nuevo punto de vista de la teoría de la argumentación que se preocupe por los auditorios reales desde una noción de la racionalidad más humana, hermanada con la emoción y la biografía.

¿Tiene arraigo en el cerebro la libertad?

El artículo se propone, en primer lugar, ofrecer un nuevo concepto de naturaleza humana, más allá de la metafísica tradicional y de la interpretación naturalista de las actuales neurociencias, superando así la unilateral apropiación cientificista del concepto de naturaleza humana y defendiendo una biohermenéutica, que cuenta con la pluralidad de perspectivas para comprender la realidad humana, como en el dualismo epistémico habermasiano. En segundo lugar, se indaga si en el cerebro tiene arraigo la libertad en el sentido de «libre albedrío» y de «autonomía», teniendo en cuenta la posición de acreditados neurólogos y el estudio de las disposiciones naturales en la concepción kantiana de la autonomía moral.

Korsgaard on Self-Constitution

Christine Korsgaard claims that Kantian moral law means the law of self-constitution and that unless we fully understand what self-constitution means in Kant, we cannot comprehend Kantian morality. Korsgaard’s idea of self-constitution is based on the idea that the unity of an action and the unity of an agent are not detachable. In this paper, I will examine Korsgaard’s Kantian notion of the self, and, correspondingly, her idea of a good action. However, in doing so, I will claim that her account of the self begins from an assumption, that is the mind is transparent, in other words, we are completely aware of our desires, motives and inclinations.

The phenomenology of respect: with special attention to Kant, Scheler, and Confucianism

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I focus on analyzing the manifestation and significance of respect. I first illustrate the two (or three) meanings of jing 敬 and their connection in Confucian classical texts, which is helpful to understand the Confucian phenomenology of respect. The two (or three) meanings are (1) seriousness as a mind-state and (2) respect (and attention) as an intentional feeling. After clarifying this point, I undertake a phenomenological analysis of respect, in order to show that respect helps one to achieve moral pursuit. This analysis takes the Kantian notion of respect as a starting point but further is accomplished by the phenomenology of value and feeling. The respect for duties and affairs, the respect for personhood and dignity, and the respect for the worthy with merit motivate one to take moral actions. For example, respect contributes in taking one’s duties seriously, appreciating human beings’ spiritual values and good tendencies even when they have not been actualized, supporting the worthy to play a role (offering them important positions), and emulating the worthy to make a contribution and serve others. In Subsequently, I clarify how respect helps one to achieve religious pursuit in one form of Christianity, in light of Max Scheler’s discussion on humility and reverence. Through revering God one respects others; through serving God and participating in God’s humble spirit one serves others. I elucidate the Confucian classics’ discussions on religious experience, in order to show how respect helps one to achieve religious pursuit in one form of Confucianism, and how it is similar and different from Max Scheler’s clarification. The concrete relation between respect and li 禮 in the Confucian tradition will be treated in another work.

Critique of Calculation: Labour, Productivity, Limits, and Love in Lars von Trier’s Dogville

Abstract: I argue in this article that Lars von Trier’s Dogville (2003) is a film that prolongs a philosophical tradition of critique of reification. Making use of Marx and Lukács’s work, I highlight the concept of calculation for analyzing the story of the protagonist, Grace, as a tale of exploitation based on mechanisms of labour exchange. My aim, however, is not only to describe this process in terms of Dogville’s storyline, but to ontologically characterize the cinematographic language and devices of the film as a visual allegory of the problem of calculation in contemporary capitalism. By making transparent the “limits” of everything (Dogville’s architecture, the exchange rates in Grace’s labour-power, and the limits of the film’s diegesis, for instance), von Trier creates in Dogville what I call “calculative cinema.” Following the Kantian notion of “critique,” I propose that Dogville explores the limits of the mechanisms of calculation in cinematic terms.

Formale Anschauung

Abstract Kant’s distinction between “form of intuition” and “formal intuition” in the Critique of Pure Reason is a crucial one. It highlights the fact that, even while the manifold of sensible intuition is given to us, the forms of space and time are, in themselves, a product of our understanding. The way Kant introduces “formal intuition” is, of course, highly problematic, but it nevertheless stimulated the post-Kantian debates, with subsequent authors following him in one direction or the other. Setting out from Kant’s notion of formal intuition, this paper advances the thesis that the question of whether space and time as such can be derived from our understanding is at the core of the debates that make up much of post-Kantian philosophy. Examining an argument between Jacobi and Hegel, it goes on to argue that the Kantian notion of formal intuition is closely connected to our very understanding of being a subject in time.

Kant's retributivism and the death penalty

The paper deals with Kant's notion of punishment in general, as well as one specific form of punishment, namely, the death penalty. In the first part of the article we will exmine, Kant's views on punishment as well as an extent to which it is retributive. According to Kant's view, offenders should be punished exclusively for having committed an offense (retribution), and proportionally to the crime commited (ius talionis). In recent literature, there are interpretations that indicate Kant's criminal theory is not completely retributive, but rather combined, so that it contains elements of retribution and intimation. If we clearly outline the goal, justification and extent of punishment, the purpose and justification of forming the state (time and punishment), we will make sure that these interpretations are incorrect. The paper shows that Kant retribution determines the goal and justification of punishment, that the reason and justification of the state (and punishment) is the achievement of justice, that is, the preservation of individual freedoms of citizens on an equal footing, while the control of crime should be understood as the achievement of this goal. Also, one needs to bear in mind the distinction between the factual and the normative level - Kant claims that a person should be punished exclusively for having committed the offense, although her punishment simultaneously intimidates or deters the offense of another citizens, which is a factual claim. The theory of punishment prescribes the goal and justification of punishment, which falls within the normative domain, and in Kant?s opinion, it is fundamentally retributive. It is also necessary to take into account another distinction that Kant introduces, which is the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal spheres of existence. Justice is a noumen or an idea, that the state pursues to achieve, while it is realized or made into a phenomenon when the state applies laws and penalties in a particular community. Intimidation or control of crime is part of the realization of justice in the empirical world. The second part deals with Kant's affirmation of the death penalty, objections to this affirmation, and ultimately, an alternative to this punishment is proposed. The alternative to the death penalty stems from incoherence in the application of the ius talionis principle. That could be one Kantian approach to punishment. A lifetime imprisonment argument avoids the objection of irreversibility of punishment (the argument from the irrevocability of the death penalty) and is in line with the basic principles of Kant's ethics.

What If All Value Were Conferred?

I argue that the claim that all value is conferred is incompatible with the view that the capacity to set ends is unconditionally valuable. While this objection has beenmade, I offer a rebuttal and then a counterexample to the rebuttal. I also argue that, if all value were conferred, then the Kantian notion that moral wrongness consists in a practical contradiction is undermined.

Communicability Without Communication: Kant and Proust on Aesthetic Pleasure

This essay places Kant and Proust in dialogue around the question of aesthetic pleasure. It focuses upon two obscure and largely neglected instances of spectatorship staged in A la recherche du temps perdu in order to highlight an oscillation within our experience of the beautiful. This oscillation pertains to the possibility and impossibility of sharing one’s pleasures with others. When Kant separated the judgment of taste from the cognitive, practical, and moral domains of human experience, he also made it difficult to communicate much, if at all, about instances of art and beauty. This gives rise to a structure within the aesthetic experience that I call “communicability without communication.” Through an analysis of aesthetic spectatorship in A la recherche , I show how, despite its insistence upon the universality of aesthetic judgments, the Kantian notion of the aesthetic is haunted by the threat of solipsism. With Kant and Proust, I develop an original theoretical account of the ways in which works of art sustain our longing for community, while nevertheless frustrating those desires.

Ética y racionalidad práctica

<p class='p1'>En este artículo se hace una defensa de la tesis según la cual hay un vínculo conceptual, aunque no obvio, es decir, no analítico, entre racionalidad moral y racionalidad práctica. Ese vínculo puede verse si se atiende al componente normativo que hay en la llamada racionalidad instrumental, pero también si se acepta la conveniencia de tender un puente entre las que podrían llamarse “fuentes eudemonista y utilitarista de la normatividad” y la noción kantiana de persona como fin en sí mismo, toda vez que a las personas se les ha de adscribir, esencialmente, predicados corporales.</p>

On the Meaning of Eudemonic Arguments for a Deep Anthropocentric Environmental Ethics

There are three broad categories of values in environmental ethics: instrumental, inherent moral, and eudemonistic. While instrumental values refer to ways humans are reliant on nature, inherent moral values give natural beings direct moral standing. Eudemonic values can pave the way to a “deep” anthropo-related approach. The article substantiates this claim in six steps. First, it criticizes the dichotomy between instrumental and inherent values. Second, eudemonic values are grounded in the phenomenological concept of experience. It is argued that experiences must be articulated through language. Third, eudemonic values are traced back to Goethean and Romantic traditions. Fourth, the scope of eudemonic values is opened. Fifth, the paradigm example of experiencing natural beauty is presented. Sixth, the gap between phenomenology, eudemonic values, and morals is addressed. In respect to morals, eudemonic values refer to Immanuel Kant's notion of “humanity within personhood.”

Teacher as an anonymous moral agent of universal good: discussion on the role of teacher in the short story ‘The Morning Clouds’ by Yasunari Kawabata

This paper investigates the philosophical applicability of the Kantian notion of teacher to interpret the short story, The Morning Clouds by Yasunari Kawabata. Though the role of teacher has broadly been discussed in various pedagogical contexts, in a postmodern time like today the teacher’s role as a moral guide is often discouraged and his/her intervention is reduced to a facilitator, while his/her existence is often believed to be duplicated by a computer. However, the teacher is still treated as an entity of reference and role model, because s/he is believed to be capable of transmitting the message of ‘universal good’ and implanting moral values in students; the future of any society. A moral agent as ‘a rational and free being who is capable of acting with reference to right and wrong’ is perceived through the social role of a teacher who guides students to a final moral destination. Such action must be based on a ‘priori’, a Kantian social essential created in the human mind for universal good, as an act of faith for the preservation of ultimate human values. Teacher as a personal identity may be of little importance as far as a ‘priori’ functions as a signifier in students’ minds, but the teacher’s obligation to the moral entity and exemplification seems the most important aspect since students, especially when they grow into adulthood, take him/herself as a role model. Therefore, as a teacher, one should place him/herself beyond personal interests because of the unconditional and universal responsibility towards ‘the other’ (his/her pupils). In this respect, this paper examines how the teacher in the short story, The Morning Clouds, sets a unique example as to how a teacher should act before students as an idealised moral guide, and attempts to justify the legitimacy of teacher as a universal moral guide who could design the destiny of future generation.

Neuroscience and Whitehead I: Neuro-ecological Model of Brain

Neuroscience has made enormous progress in understanding the brain and its various neuro-sensory and neuro-cognitive functions. However, despite all progress, the model of the brain as well as its ontological characterization remain unclear. The aim in this first paper is the discussion of an empirically plausible model of the brain with the subsequent claim of a neuro-ecological model. Whitehead claimed that he inversed or reversed the Kantian notion of the subject by putting it back into the ecological context of the world, the so-called reformist subjectivist principle. Based on empirical evidence about the experience-dependence of the brain’s spontaneous activity, I argue for an analogous inversion or reversion with regard to the model of brain: empirical evidence is well compatible with a neuro-ecological model which extends beyond and integrates both Humean neuro-sensory and Kantian neuro-cognitive models. I conclude that a neuro-ecological and process-based model of brain and its relationship to the world may offer a novel model of brain that carries major ontological implications as they shall be discussed in the second paper.

Finite Agents, Sublime Feelings: Response to Hanauer

Tom Hanauer's thoughtful discussion of my article “The Pleasures of Contra-purposiveness: Kant, the Sublime, and Being Human” (2014) puts pressure on two important issues concerning the affective phenomenology of the sublime. My aim in that article was to present an analysis of the sublime that does not suffer from the problems identified by Jane Forsey in “Is a Theory of the Sublime Possible?” (2007). I argued that Kant's notion of reflective judgment can help with this task, because it allows us to capture the experience of failure that characterizes the sublime without committing us to ontologically transcendent items. In a significant departure from Kant, however, my account does not require references to our moral vocation to explain the pleasure we take in the sublime; the pleasure comes from getting the right measure of our agency. For Hanauer, trouble for my analysis comes both from the discursive presentation of the sublime, its focus on judgment, and from the removal of references to our moral vocation.

Managing research projects: the rhetoric of judgment as a source of creativity

Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to present new aspects of the tension between creativity and productivity and improve the understanding on how research can be developed in very restricted environments, such as the context of an organization managed using the methods of Project Management. And more generally, it introduces the rhetoric of judgment as a fundamental aspect involved in the development and specification of projects.Design/methodology/approach– The theoretical approach is based on the phenomenological theory of human intentional action developed by Alfred Schutz, in which the notion of mental project is more flexible than that of project management. In it the concepts of subaction and repeated action are considered a combination of similar actions already performed. The Kantian notion of judgment is introduced to outline self-persuasion as a fundamental source of creativity.Findings– The introduction of an extended notion of project and routine involving judgment expands the rational, generic and technical notion of project management. And the rhetorical aspect of judgment, at the individual level, establishes the possibility to deliver unexpected outcomes that are considered creative.Originality/value– The proposed notions of project and routines mediated through the rhetoric of judgment present theoretical and practical progress in the subject of managing projects.

HEIDEGGER’S READINGS OF KANT: APPROPRIATION OF TIME AND SPACE THROUGH UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORICITY OF DA-SEIN AS BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

Heidegger’s reading of Kant is deciphered to have illuminated his own project concerning the basic question of Ontology, Time, Space and History [Temporality, Spatiality and Historicity] embodying the novel description of Human reality in terms of Mit-Dasein and Mit-welt [Subjectivity with the public face]. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason led Heidegger develop his own project of Existential Phenomenology contrary to Husserilian Phenomenology. We will discuss the Kantian Heidegger following the two main issues: one, Heidegger appreciates Kant on his identifying and exploring the difference of ontic/ontological. Two, Kant prioritizes time over space. Heidegger would explore the subject of ontic/ontological difference in the sense that ontic knowledge is the knowledge of particular beings, whereas ontological knowledge is described as the a priori condition inferring the ontic knowledge. In this sense ontological knowledge pertains to question of being rather than beings. This is how Heidegger’s Kant interpretation would differ from the Neo-Kantianism of Marburg School which argued that Critique of Pure Reason is a work of epistemology. In contrast to this position, Heidegger held that Critique is a unique work of transcendental philosophy; it is theory of ontological knowledge but not ontic knowledge. Ontic knowledge of beings must conform to Being of beings [ontological foundation]. Heidegger holds that this should be Kant’s “Copernican Revolution”. However, Heidegger would appropriate the Kantian notion of time in the form of temporality of Dasein. Being manifests itself on beings through Being-there [Human reality] who purely understands Being. For Heidegger, temporality of Dasein is the foundation of ontological knowledge indeed.

Providencia y cosmopolitismo. Elementos estoicos en la filosofía política de Kant

This paper aims to show in the first instance that the notion of providence that Kant uses in works such as Perpetual Peace and Ideas for a universal History with a cosmopolitan Purpose corresponds in some central aspects to the Stoic idea of providence. Secondly, it will be argued that it is in this context in which it is possible to assess the Kantian notion of cosmopolitanism correctly. Finally, this paper suggests that this way of philosophically confronting the problems of history and politics provides an answer to the systematicity constraint, which according to Kant is required by reason itself. indeed, this very idea of system is linked to a good extent to Stoic philosophy.