Kant's Distinction Research Articles

Large Language Models, Agency, and Why Speech Acts are Beyond Them (For Now) – A Kantian-Cum-Pragmatist Case

This article sets in with the question whether current or foreseeable transformer-based large language models (LLMs), such as the ones powering OpenAI’s ChatGPT, could be language users in a way comparable to humans. It answers the question negatively, presenting the following argument. Apart from niche uses, to use language means to act. But LLMs are unable to act because they lack intentions. This, in turn, is because they are the wrong kind of being: agents with intentions need to be autonomous organisms while LLMs are heteronomous mechanisms. To conclude, the article argues, based on structural aspects of transformer-based LLMs, that these LLMs have taken a first step away from mechanistic artificiality to autonomous self-constitution, which means that these models are (slowly) moving into a direction that someday might result in non-human, but equally non-artificial agents, thus subverting the time-honored Kantian distinction between organism and mechanism.

The cosmological ideas in Kant's critical philosophy: Their unique status and twofold regulative use

AbstractKant's theory of the regulative use of ideas of reason has been clarified considerably in recent scholarship. Little attention has been paid, however, to the question of whether the three classes of transcendental ideas—psychological, cosmological, and theological—may differ with regard to their regulative use. This article argues that there is a fundamental difference between the classes of ideas in this respect and that an examination of this heterogeneity can provide much‐needed insight into Kant's account of the utility of the cosmological ideas. First, I set out Kant's distinction between the cosmological ideas and their psychological and theological counterparts. Second, I clarify the two distinct regulative uses of each cosmological idea. I argue that the two opposed sides of the cosmological antinomies provide two different heuristic functions, aligned with the theoretical and practical interests of reason.

Einbildungskraft (Imagination)

Einbildungskraft (imagination) is a multifaceted mental faculty in Goethe’s theoretical writings and poetic works that is non-systematic and rich in aporias. At work in both cognitive processes and artistic production, it becomes a defining concept in Goethe’s creative understanding of natural and aesthetic processes. Einbildungskraft serves as a faculty that presides over nature, the human mind, and the arts as a source of interdisciplinary knowledge. As a pre-noetic power, moreover, it also manifests the poietic force of language. By creatively expanding the Kantian distinction between the productive and reproductive imagination, Goethe theorizes a third kind of Einbildungskraft at work in poetic language with an internal law (Gesetzlichkeit) that “circumspectively surveys” the inner and outer worlds. As a kind of analogical thinking, this “umsichtige Einbildungskraft” (surveying imagination) participates in cognitive processes by actively elaborating thought, affect, vision, and memory. And as an artistic power, it mirrors in metaphorical language the organic forces of nature, which share the same principles of human life: synthesis, expansion, and transformation. According to Goethe, Einbildungskraft is the faculty responsible for shaping perceptual inputs, affects, memories, and mental images into artistic and verbal forms, thereby reconfiguring all the fragmented pieces of existence into an organic system that represents reality in its ontological essence.

Faith and Freedom: Contexts, Choices, and Crises in Religious Commitments

Faith and Freedom: Contexts, Choices, and Crises in Religious Commitments

Did the Ancient Greeks Know the Difference between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments? Discussion of a Question Posed in the Aetas Kantiana

In a 1793 essay, J. Ch. Schwab claimed that Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments was already known to the Megarian philosopher Stilpo. Schwab's essay was criticised as early as 1794 by J. F. Ch. Gräffe. In a 1789 essay, J. A. Eberhard had also denied the originality of Kant's division of judgments and made certain indications suggesting that Aristotle was aware of the distinction. In this paper, I propose a fresh examination of why Schwab is wrong to attribute knowledge of Kant's division of judgments to Stilpo – a second look which, however, does not disregard Gräffe's contributions to the discussion. Second, I argue that, in a precise sense, Kant's division of judgments is indeed original, but that the analytic – synthetic distinction was nevertheless in a sense known to Aristotle. The assessment of these alleged precedents sheds light no only on the novelty of Kant's philosophical project but also on what may be called the "the paradox of the discovery of an evident philosophical distinction".

Demokratyzacja – ideał moralny polityki kulturalnej. Filozoficzna rewizja ‘Społecznej krytyki władzy sądzenia’ P. Bourdieu

Democratization has become the unknowingly accepted moral ideal of cultural policy. It is more or less consciously based on Pierre Bourdieu’s postulate to abolish the Kantian distinction between pure and barbaric taste. A closer analysis of theoretical assumptions and cultural practice shows that the ideal expressed and applied in this form is internally contradictory, and it certainly cannot be universally applied in all areas of culture. The correct articulation of the ideal of democratization cannot be based on negating the Kantian aesthetics, but, on the contrary, requires its rehabilitation in the direction that was set, among others, by Herbert Marcuse. The article presents non-dogmatic arguments for maintaining the elitist nature of the activities of legitimate institutions of artistic culture. If democratization is to constitute a real (i.e. consistent with its concept) moral ideal, then the autonomy of high culture works in its favor.

Heteronomi som forutsetning for autonomi

In his major works in ethics, Immanuel Kant (1724—1804) does not pay much attention to the question how humans become moral. The main tasks for Kant in these works are to establish the moral law and discuss its application. However, in his minor works in ethics and pedagogy he draws our attention to the question mentioned and claims that humans first become moral when they get 16 years old. Before we reach this age, our will (Willkür) is able to choose, that means prioritize, between rationality (the moral law) and sensitivity (inclinations), but our will (Wille) lacks the capacity to impose the moral law on ourselves. To evolve in this regard so that our will becomes fully moral and autonomous, we need moral restrictions from other people with more moral experience. The relevant Kantian distinction in this regard is the distinction Kant draws between persons and moral actors in the wake of his formula of the categorical imperative called the formula of humanity. According to this distinction, a person needs to be educated heteronomously in order to reach the level of moral actor and become autonomous. Constraint is therefore a necessary condition for self-constraint.

Bergson and the Kantian Concept of Intensive Magnitude

ABSTRACT Bergson’s critique of intensive magnitude in Time and Free Will mainly targets Kant’s “Anticipations of Perception”, in which the Kantian distinction between matter and form is lowered. Bergson praises precisely this distinction for safeguarding sensation as something extra-intellectual. As the concept of intensity is the main tool of neo-Kantian intellectualism, in which the whole of reality is determined by the intellect, younger Bergson forcefully rejects intensive magnitude. However, his relation towards Kant changes. In Creative Evolution, Bergson proposes a genetic correction to Kantianism in which the distinction between matter and form is weakened. By comparing Bergson’s theory with the genetic Kantianism of Salomon Maïmon, who heavily relies on the concept of intensity, I argue that the concept fits his later project of renewing the Kantian theory. I thus demonstrate how the critique of intensive magnitude merely belongs to a provisional stage of Bergson’s relation to Kant.

A PLURALIST INTERPRETATION OF THOMAS KUHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION

espanolEs habitual encontrar en la bibliografia filosofica en torno a la figura de Thomas Kuhn la atribucion a este autor de una concepcion filosofica renida con el realismo (cientifico), y en especial una posicion de tipo idealista que hunde sus raices en la distincion kantiana entre “mundo-en-si mismo” y “mundo de las apariencias”. En este articulo defiendo que la concepcion filosofica de Kuhn admite una interpretacion pluralista que encaja mejor con su filosofia de la ciencia general. Ademas, esta interpretacion pluralista de la posicion filosofica de Kuhn tambien permite ofrecer una explicacion alternativa del fenomeno de la inconmensurabilidad, cuya caracteristica central estaria representada por la disparidad taxonomica y ontologica que existe entre especialidades cientificas rivales o sucesivas. EnglishIt is commonplace in philosophical literature to attribute to Thomas Kuhn a philosophical view at odds with (scientific) realism, especially an idealist position rooted in the Kantian distinction between “world-in-itself” and “world of appearances”. In this paper I will argue that Kuhn’s philosophical view is amenable to a pluralist interpretation that fits better into his general philosophy of science. In addition, this pluralist approach to Kuhn’s philosophical position also provides an alternative view on incommensurability, whose central feature is represented by the taxonomical and ontological disparity that exists between rival or successive scientific specialties.

Cassirer and Kant on the Unity of Space and the Role of Imagination

Abstract The focus of this paper is Cassirer’s Neo-Kantian reading of Kant’s conception of unity of space. Cassirer’s neo-Kantian reading is largely in conformity with the mainstream of intellectualist Kant-scholars, which is unsurprising, given his own intellectualist view of space and perception and his rejection of the existence of a ‘merely sensory consciousness’ as a ‘formless mass of impression’. I argue against Cassirer’s reading by relying on a Kantian distinction first recognized by Heinrich Rickert, a neo-Kantian from the Southwest school, between Kenntnis (roughly knowledge by acquaintance) and Erkenntnis (roughly propositional knowledge). Correspondingly, I claim that concepts and categories are conditions for Erkenntnis of objects as such, namely for thinking of and apprehending the pre-existing unity as an object, rather than for the ‘constitution’ of this very unity.

The Problem of Reality and Modal Ontology

Abstract The problem of the relation and difference between things and objects is one of the most decisive issues for the conception of the real. These words are usually used interchangeably – and not only in their everyday usage. There are some contemporary philosophical positions that consider almost “everything” as an object; on the other hand, there are proponents of a strict separation of objects and things. How did it happen that the concept of thing (res) and object (obiectum) not only began to theoretically “compete” with each other but also sometimes came to represent differently conceived realities, and even occasionally came to represent an identical conception of reality? This article, on the one hand, discusses the philosophical strategies that reveal the difference between objects and things and enable such a conception of reality which takes into account the Kantian distinction between Realität and Wirklichkeit. On the other, it reconstructs Giorgio Agamben’s project of modal ontology. Agamben’s take on the question What is real? is oriented toward the modus of being and could be traced back to the recognition of the difference between objects and things as well as the “restoration of the life of things themselves.”

Communicative and Participatory Reason. A critical reading of Kant's Distinction between the public use and the private use of Reason

In this paper I shall analyze Kant's distinction between the public use and the private use of reason, as formulated in What is Enlightenment?-, in relation to the characteristics that Kant attributes to the faculty of reason in several of his main philosophical works. I will try to show that such a radical distinction between both uses of reason turns out to be rather problematic, since -as we shall see- the restrictions imposed on reason in its private use may affect its public use as well. In effect, if we take into account the essential communicative and participative character of reason, the impossibility of a free use of critical reason in certain professional contexts may substantially restrict our possibilities of making a free public use of reason. The examination of the specific features that Kant marks as essential features of reason will allow us to conclude that the restrictions imposed on reason in its private use would restrict our chances of participating in public argumentations. To think “in community with others” (WDO, AA 08, 144) involves the capacity to express our thoughts publicly. And this involvement in a participatory (equitable) and communicative process of public argumentation obviously demands certain political and juridical conditions.

The Problem of Priority in the Invention of Scientific Journals

The article is devoted to the discussion on priority in the invention of scientific journal. In the first part of the article, the author makes a critical analysis of the arguments in the discussion, explicating some contradictions. In the second part, he develops his own approach claiming that the solution lies in the correct definition of the social demand which has impulsed the search for new tools of scientific communication. The author argues that, because of the universality of the socio-economic processes, this demand was common for the early Modern European sciences in general. The author shows that the first scientific journals (Philosophical Transactions, Journal des scavans) have appeared in the atmosphere of competition for the invention of new forms of scientific communication. He argues that Kantian distinction of the public and private application of reason seems to be helpful for better understanding of this process.

Kant'ın Grenze ve Schranke Ayrımı Yoluyla Felsefenin Yapısı Hakkında Bir Soruşturma

In this paper, via Kant’s understanding of Grenze (boundary) and Schranke (limit) it is proposed that these concepts offer an appropriate distinction for describing the structure of philosophical thought. In this respect, it is claimed that the Grenze and Schranke distinction gives efficient answers to the philosophy of philosophy (metaphilosophy) debates. For instance, concerning “what is philosophy?” many answers have been given such as “philosophy means being on the road”, “philosophy is to reveal what kind of things exist ”, “philosophy is the activity of clarifying thoughts”, “ philosophy is a quest for the problems of the world” and so on. Thus, it is suggested that Grenze and Schranke distinction should hold all these answers. Likewise, many questions such as “what is philosophy for?”, “how should philosophy be done?”, “how do philosophical questions arise?” can be clarified by mentioning the boundaries and limits. As will be understood, all the questions mentioned above are about determining the scope of philosophical activity. The scope is dual. The first scope is the limitation area in which all discussions are put. The second scope is the boundaries area. This is the horizon that provides the philosopher's conceptual equipment. It is this field in which the philosopher exposes his or her own utilities, by which he or she determines and organizes, and what kind of things he or she is interested in. Thus, the distinctions of philosophical thoughts can be established through modifying limits and drawing new boundaries. In this context, Kant's distinction between Grenze and Schranke is remarkable in terms of determining the field of knowable and the field of thinkable. Kant allegorizes the knowable field to an island and the thinkable field to a sea that includes the island. The island can be known with its boundaries and the sea can be thought with limitations. This distinction also shows the field of philosophical fictions and metaphysics, and explains the vastness of thinking in the face of knowing. However, the field where Kant claims to be able to think only with his limitations has been arranged as a field that can be known by the followers such as Hegel. Behind this variation is the introduction of new limitations instead of Kant's. Thus, boundary and limit are concepts that need to be emphasized in order to understand the structure of the philosophy activity.

On Finding Yourself in a State of Nature

I defend the right to an abortion at any stage of pregnancy by drawing on a Kantian account of consent and innate right. I examine how pregnant women are positioned in moral and legal debates about abortion, and develop a Kanitan account of bodily autonomy in order to pregnant women’s epistemic authority over the experience of pregnancy. Second, I show how Kant's distinction between innate and private right offers an excellent legal framework for embodied rights, including abortion and sexual consent, and I draw on the legal definition of sexual consent in order to show how abortion discourse undermines women's innate right. I then explore Kant’s treatment of the infanticidal mother, and draw out the parallels between this case and contemporary abortion rights in order to develop a distinctly Kantian framework of reproductive rights in non-ideal conditions. Finally, I explore the implications of this non-ideal approach for contemporary abortion discourse, arguing that debates about the legality of abortion should more broadly engage the barbaric conditions of reproductive injustice.

A Kantian Account of Emotions as Feelings1

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to extract from Kant's writings an account of the nature of the emotions and their function – and to do so despite the fact that Kant neither uses the term ‘emotion’ nor offers a systematic treatment of it. Kant's position, as I interpret it, challenges the contemporary trends that define emotions in terms of other mental states and defines them instead first and foremost as ‘feelings’. Although Kant's views on the nature of feelings have drawn surprisingly little attention, I argue that the faculty of feeling has the distinct role of making us aware of the way our faculties relate to each other and to the world. As I show, feelings are affective appraisals of our activity, and as such they play an indispensable orientational function in the Kantian mind. After spelling out Kant's distinction between feeling and desire (§2), I turn to the distinction between feeling and cognition (§3) and show that while feelings are non-cognitive states, they have a form of derived-intentionality. §4 argues that what feelings are about, in this derived sense, is our relationship to ourselves and the world: they function as affective appraisals of the state of our agency. §5 shows that this function is necessary to the activity of the mind insofar as it is orientational. Finally, §6 discusses the examples of epistemic pleasure and moral contentment and argues that they manifest the conditions of cognitive and moral agency respectively.

Божественный закон или категорический императив: о кру­зианских истоках кантовской морали

The ethics of Kant and the ethics of Crusius are strikingly similar. This is manifested in a whole range of principles and concepts. Crusius’ moral teaching hinges on the rigorous moral law which has to be obeyed absolutely, and which makes it different from other prescriptions that are binding only to a relative degree. This is very close to the Kantian distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Another salient feature of Crusius’ moral teaching is the stress laid on the sphere of internal motives. It is the inner motive that determines the morality of an act, rather than the external form of the act. These and some other features of Crusius’ ethics suggest a possible influence of Crusius on Kant. The possibility of such influence has repeatedly come under close scrutiny. The first works devoted to this problem date to the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Pointers to the possibility of such influence are semantic and structural similarities of the two thinkers’ systems. Besides, it is an unchallengeable fact that Kant was fairly familiar with the main theses of Crusian philosophy. Some scholars proceed from the study of Kantian vocabulary. Some of the terms Kant uses, especially in his early works which later formed the basis of his ethical teaching in the critical period, can be traced to the terms of Crusian philosophy. However, an alternative view is that Kant was primarily influenced by Wolffian philosophy (mainly through Baumgarten), while the direct influence of Crusius remains unproven. I examine both points of view and propose my own solution to the problem.

Unconscious reasons: Habermas, Foucault, and psychoanalysis

The Habermas–Foucault debate, despite the excellent commentary it has generated, has the standing of an ‘unfinished project’ precisely because it occasions the interrogation of the fundamental categories of modernity, and because the lingering sense of anxiety, which continues to remain after arguments and counter-arguments, demands new interpretations. Here, I advance the claim that what gives Habermas’s criticisms of Foucault’s histories and theoretical formulations their bite is the categorial distinction he maintains between facts and rights, and by extension, between causes and reasons. The Kantian distinction between de jure (in principle) validity and de facto (factual) effectivity underwrites the categorial distinction between both ‘norms/facts’ and ‘reasons/causes’ conceptual pairs, which distinction, in turn, is reinforced by a picture of the natural world as matter in motion and human agency as self-determination. I want to claim that Foucault’s work enacts a critique of Habermas not by evading the problem of justification but by undermining the very distinctions Habermas needs to maintain the universal and necessary status of communicative rationality. Drawing on Jonathan Lear’s discussion of reasons and causes in relation to the unconscious, I claim that psychoanalytic discourse helps us make intelligible a type of reflection—such as one finds in Foucault’s historiography—that is at once “critical and empirical.” Moreover, the realization that the distinction between causes and reasons may not be categorial and exhaustive shows how Habermas’s insistence on the contrary leads to one particular kind of misrecognition of our practices.

Anarchic Reflection and the Crisis of Krisis: Working with Artaud

This article begins by arguing that the ‘madness’ of Antonin Artaud is either fetishised or resisted, depending on the disciplinary angle from which one works. It proposes an alternative approach to the study of Artaud, which might avoid such pitfalls by reading Artaud’s work as performative philosophy or a philosophy of performance. The approach is defined by the principle of ‘working with’, rather than working on, a literary or philosophical figure. The second part of the article works, or philosophises, with Artaud, reading his work on the ‘Theatre of Cruelty’ alongside Immanuel Kant’s work on judgment from the third Critique. It explores the Kantian distinction between determining and reflective judgment, extending reflective judgment into what I call anarchic reflection. To do so, the article elucidates the conceptual relation between actuality, entropy, an-archy, cruelty and sublimity, defining anarchic reflection as an unintentional and/or intentional crisis of the judgment or krisis (κρίσις) of Form that opens the possibility of its transformation.

Nietzsche and The Birth of Tragedy

<i>Nietzsche and</i> The Birth of Tragedy