Communicative and Participatory Reason. A critical reading of Kant's Distinction between the public use and the private use of Reason

Abstract

In this paper I shall analyze Kant's distinction between the public use and the private use of reason, as formulated in What is Enlightenment?-, in relation to the characteristics that Kant attributes to the faculty of reason in several of his main philosophical works. I will try to show that such a radical distinction between both uses of reason turns out to be rather problematic, since -as we shall see- the restrictions imposed on reason in its private use may affect its public use as well. In effect, if we take into account the essential communicative and participative character of reason, the impossibility of a free use of critical reason in certain professional contexts may substantially restrict our possibilities of making a free public use of reason. The examination of the specific features that Kant marks as essential features of reason will allow us to conclude that the restrictions imposed on reason in its private use would restrict our chances of participating in public argumentations. To think “in community with others” (WDO, AA 08, 144) involves the capacity to express our thoughts publicly. And this involvement in a participatory (equitable) and communicative process of public argumentation obviously demands certain political and juridical conditions.