Story Of Justice Research Articles

Theories of Justice and Street-Level Discretion<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1"><sup>1</sup></xref>

As we continue our study of policy implementation we are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of exploring the frameworks through which public administrators view the world. Visions of social justice may be an important part of those frameworks. This article explores the principles of justice held by two groups of street-level bureaucrats and the overt relationship between those principles and their actions. Street-level bureaucrats are the final implementors of public policy. Their jobs are inherently discretionary and the actions they take (or fail to take) affect people in significant ways. As such this is an important group on which to focus. Do street-level bureaucrats exercise their discretion in order to produce what they believe to be just outcomes? Are there differences from one organizational arena to the next? This article explores these questions through an analysis of stories of justice and injustice told by two groups of street-level bureaucrats, schoolteachers and employees of the California Employment Development Department. These two groups work in very different organizational contexts with different cultural attitudes toward the use of discretion. My claim is that an organization's culture of discretion either enhances or inhibits the ability of street-level bureaucrats to orchestrate outcomes that are compatible with their visions of justice, thereby determining the significance of exploring street-level bureaucrats'justice judgments as we study the implementation process.

Chief Justice Taney and the Shadow of Dred Scott

Chief Justice Taney and the Shadow of Dred Scott Robert L. Stern Editor’s Note: This article was originally published as a book review in the Arizona Law Review in 1975. The Taney Period has been probably the least known period in our national judicial history. It was the time in which the controversy over slaRoger Brooke Taney, fifth Chief Justice of the United States, succeeded John Marshall and served as Chief Justice from 1836-1864. very came to affect a large part of the Supreme Court’s work, even in seemingly unrelated areas, culminating in the thunderbolt of Dred Scott v. Sandford.1 That decision sappedthe Court’s pres­ tige and authority, at least in the North, until after the Civil War. The opinion in the Dred Scott Case, written by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, put ChiefJustice Taney into disrepute during the next century of Supreme Court history. Two excellentbook-lengthbiographicalworks about Chief Justice Taney have been published: RogerB. Taney, 1935, bythe late Carl B. Swisher, and The Taney Period, 1836-64, also by Profes­ sor Swisher, in Volume V, 1974, of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History ofthe Supreme Court of the United States, edited by Professor Paul A. Freund. Those works will enable a reader to appraisethe contributionofChiefJustice Taney to the Court andthe nation. Creditformuch ofthe data in this article goes to Professor Swisher, whose writings, as I have stated in my review of his book on The Taney Period, are a magnificent contributionto American history, notjustto legal history. The Justices of the Taney Period Ifmodem lawyers areasked-andI have asked a number of them—whether they can identify members ofthe Court during the middle third of the lastcentury, the almostuniform answeris “no” 40 JOURNAL 1992 as to all except Taney himselfand Justice Story. Story, who sat from 1812 to 1845 and who is betterknown fortreatises on a numberofsubjects on which he lectured at the Harvard Law School than for his judicial opinions, was a holdover from the Marshall regime. Few recall or have ever heard of Justices Smith Thompson, John McLean, HenryBaldwin, James M. Wayne, Philip P. Barbour, John Catron, John McKinley, Peter V. Daniel, SamuelNelson, Levi Woodbury, Rob­ ert Grier, Benjamin R. Curtis, John A. Campbell, and Nathan Clifford. The four Lincoln appoin­ tees in 1862 and 1863—Swayne, Davis, Miller, and Field—are primarily associatedwith the postCivil War period during which Miller and Field, in particular, played prominent though different roles. It is not surprising to learn that Supreme Court appointments during those years reflected the policies of the presidents. All but one of the Justices appointed during the pre-1862 Taney period were chosen by Democratic presidents beginning with Jackson. Since the Justices spent the major portion of their time trying cases on circuit, it was obviously reasonable to assign This log shows the mileage the Justices on the Taney Court traveled between Circuit assignments and the Court. Justices to the areas in which they lived. Thus, appointments were largelytreated as belonging to a particular circuit, and Congress, which was also controlled by the Democrats, determined the geo­ graphical boundaries of the circuits. Perhaps because of this, five of the nine circuits2 were composed of slave states, the eleven states that seceded and the border states, and were filled by Justices from Maryland, Vir­ ginia, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee. In­ deed, Congress was slow to create any circuits for the newer states west of Ohio. And except for Justice Curtis of Massachusetts, appointed by Whig President Fillmore in 1851, even those appointed from the Northern circuits were cho­ sen largely because of their known sympathy with Southern positions. Thus, after Story’s death, only Justice McLean from Ohio, appointed by Jackson in 1830 before the slavery issue came to the fore, and Justice Curtis, who served from 1851 to 1857, repre­ sented even a moderateNorthern viewpoint. This changed, of course, with Lincoln’s four appoint­ ments in 1862 and 1863 and his selection ofChief Justice Chase as Taney’s successor in 1864. It was doubtless not by happenstance that the first president from the Midwest appointed Justices from Ohio (Swayne and Chase), Iowa (Miller), Illinois (Davis), and California (Field). Samuel Miller, who...

Biography as Dramatic Monologue: Henry James, W. W. Story, and the Alternative Vision

T HE only major work by Henry James that has not been reprinted is his biography of an American sculptor, William Wetmore Story and His Friends: From Letters, Diaries and Recollections (1903). Neither a critical nor a financial failure when it first appeared, the book has since been dismissed by even the most ardent Jacobites as a regrettable expenditure of the Master's talent on a longforgotten figure in the history of nineteeth-century American art. The interest the biography is able to generate centers on its skill in developing a trifling subject into a work of art. Story himself, as James took pains to make clear, was merely the point of origin for a Jamesian expansion of consciousness which spreads far from its nominal center to encompass a generation of American expatriates in Italy. William Wetmore Story, the son of Justice Joseph Story of the United States Supreme Court, was, like his father, a brilliant scholar of the law, and he published a number of important works which went through several editions. When Justice Story died in 1846, his son wrote his biography. Since the younger Story had already tried his hand at sculpture, as well as other arts, he was also commissioned to design a memorial statue of Justice Story, completed in 1855, for Mount Auburn Cemetery. He first visited Rome in 1848, studied sculpture, and returned to Boston in 1851. After two more trips to Rome, he settled there permanently in 1856. Following a long and successful career as a sculptor, poet, and essayist, he died in Italy in 1895.

Justice Story, Slavery, and the Natural Law Foundations of American Constitutionalism

Justice Joseph Story proclaimed his opinion for the Supreme Court in Prigg v. Pennsylvania to be a triumph of freedom.' The Court's decision in that 1842 case held unconstitutional a Pennsylvania law opposed by slaveholders because the statute interposed procedural barriers to the recapture of escaped slaves. Few commentators have shared Story's assessment of his opinion, and in recent years several prominent scholars have criticized Story's treatment of the slavery question on both ethical and jurisprudential grounds. This comment proposes to rehabilitate Justice Story's opinion in Prigg. In particular, the comment aims to show that proper attention to the natural law foundations of Story's thought provides a coherent and insightful account of the slavery problem and the American response to that problem. In so doing, the comment provides reasons to believe both that modern critics have misunderstood Story's thought and that Story's ideas may deserve the attention of the ongoing debate over the meaning and significance of natural law.2 Section I describes the facts and background of Prigg,

Distributive justice in children: Its relationship to immanent justice and egocentrism

This study investigated the relationship between distributive justice, immanent justice and egocentrism in children. Twenty‐one preschoolers and 24 second graders completed the Distributive Justice Scale, responded to immanent justice stories, and participated in an adaptation of Piaget's mountain task. Results indicated a significant correlation between immanent justice and egocentrism. Second graders were found to be less egocentric and reflected less immanent justice than preschoolers. Results were discussed in terms of current theory and research on moral development in children.

The Pardoning of “Tokyo Rose”: A Report on the Restoration of American Citizenship to Iva Ikuko Toguri

On 19 July 1977, on his last full day in office, President Gerald R. Ford signed a full and unconditional pardon for Iva Ikuko Toguri d'Aquino, wiping the record clean. It was the first time in United States history that such a pardon had been granted in a treason conviction.The detailed account of Iva Toguri's experience in Japan and of the trial are contained in the booklet Iva Toguri (d'Aquino): Victim of a Legend, published by the Japanese American Citizens League's Committee for Iva Toguri (1975). For this reason, these details are not repeated in this present paper. Rather this report deals with the events leading to and the people involved in obtaining a presidential pardon for Iva Toguri.This report is also a story which chronicles the indomitable loyalty of a young woman who maintained her love for the United States in the face of incredible pressures. It is a story of justice denied in a trial in which the government's witnesses were ordered to perjure themselves. It is a story of the faith that sustained Iva Toguri despite a quarter century of harassment and persecution. Finally, it is a story of decent and fair-minded people who belatedly became aware of their culpability in neglecting her when she needed help, and set out finally on the almost impossible mission of vindicating her.Few know all the details of this story. I learned many of them through involvement in the campaign to obtain a presidential pardon for Mrs. d'Aquino. This presentation is a condensation of an earlier report (October 1977).There are many lessons to be gained from experience such as this, but only if the review is completely honest and candid. This I have attempted to do.

Free Men All: The Personal Liberty Laws of the North, 1780-1861 (review)

366CIVIL WAR history formidable array of footnotes which buttress the text shows familiarity with a wide range of more recent scholarly writing. Emma Lou Thornbrough Butler University Free Men All: The Personal Liberty Laws of the North, 1780-1861. By Thomas D. Morris. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. Pp. xii, 253. $12.50.) Historians are familiar enough with the manner in which the conventional wisdom of one generation becomes the oppressive burden of later ones. This is especially true if such "wisdom" is enshrined in a nation's organic law, like the American Constitution. The founding fathers displayed such remarkable foresight in so many parts of the Constitution that it comes as a shock to realize how deficient in that quality they actually were when they wrote the clauses dealing with slavery. Consider the fugitive slave clause which prohibited state-imposed barriers to the rendition of slaves who had fled bondage. Might it not have been anticipated that the states, then in the process of freeing their slaves, would face an almost impossible task in attempting to reconcile the legitimate claims of slaveholders with the obvious need to prevent the wanton kidnapping of free Negroes? Despite slaveholders' cavils to the contrary, the first laws adopted by the free states, generally designated "personal liberty laws," represented in the main conscientious efforts to effect such reconciliation. But the central problem, as Thomas Morris makes clear in this thorough and generally lucid account of the evolution of these laws, was that free states necessarily presumed a person to be free until proven otherwise in court, preferably before a jury. By contrast was the slave state's presumptive classification of any black as a slave until the completion of the legal process in which a jury trial was as out of place as an abolitionist at a planter's dining table. Additional complications arose out of the vaguely-defined boundaries between federal and state jurisdictions within which the fugitive slave law must be enforced and opposing claims adjudicated. Could the free states enact laws aimed at testing the legitimacy of a slaveholder 's claim to his property? Emphatically not was the response of Justice Story in 1842 in the Supreme Court's landmark ruling, Prigg v. Pennsylvania. The fundamental right of recaption, i.e., the recovery of the slaveholder's property by his own efforts anywhere in the federal union, had been guaranteed by the Constitution. Otherwise, said Story, slaveholders would not have agreed to join the Union. State boundaries were henceforth meaningless so far as runaway slaves were concerned , and the harsh fugitive slave law of 1850, under which citizens of free states could involuntarily be made into slave catchers, was but a logical extension of the Prigg decision. book reviews367 Morris has focused on the efforts within the five states of New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Wisconsin to employ various common law guarantees, as well as positive law, to protect free Negroes against enslavement. Through the several stages of the escalating sectional conflict, we find the familiar story of the moderates, trapped between their earnest wish to abide by federal law and Supreme Court judgments and a growing antislavery constituency whose extreme spokesmen were demanding that the personal liberty laws actually be used to liberate slaves. As with other aspects of the sectional conflict, in the end there was no room for maneuver. The passage and attempted enforcement of the fugitive slave law of 1850 succeeded only in creating several celebrated cases and enlarging the antislavery constituency ; it delivered up virtually no runaways to slaveholders. Following Lincoln's election, a movement at compromise briefly surfaced during which conservative Northerners sought, unsuccessfully, the repeal of the personal liberty laws as a propitiatory offering to Southerners. At that point, however, those who controlled the South's destiny had no interest in compromise. Morris' research has been prodigious and the product here represents as comprehensive a treatment of such a subject as one is apt to find. But we might as well face it: debates, laws, judicial rulings, and writs do not comprise the subject matter an average reader can take in large doses, and obviously many historians, either for...

Justice Story and the Modern Corporation— A Closing Circle?

Justice Story and the Modern Corporation— A Closing Circle? Get access Gerald T. Dunne Gerald T. Dunne Professor of Law *Washington University School of Law Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar American Journal of Legal History, Volume 17, Issue 3, July 1973, Pages 262–270, https://doi.org/10.2307/845145 Published: 01 July 1973

Upgrading Court Organization and Administration: A Small Blueprint for a Big Job

| USTICE ... is the great interest of man on earth.' Thus spoke JDaniel Webster, wisely and well, at the funeral of Mr. Justice Story. In a closely related sense, Lord Bryce, English statesman, scholar and historian, has maintained that the American court system and its operation constitutes the backbone of American democracy and the American way of life.2 These statements probably would be considered reasonably accurate by most people today. In any event, it is certainly safe to state that our courts and their operation are indeed of the utmost importance to Americans of all walks of life. Nevertheless, there is a strange paradox. In most of our states the courts and their procedures have, like Topsy, just growed. Too little time and effort have been devoted to analyzing and evaluating our courts and their day-to-day handling of an almost infinite variety of judicial business. Too little time and effort on a continuing, broad-scale basis have been devoted to remedying defects and inadequacies in court structure, organization and administration.

Mr. Justice Story and the American Law of Banking

Mr. Justice Story and the American Law of Banking

The Influence of Mr. Justice Story on American Patent Law

IT IS OFTEN SAID that Story was one of the architects of American patent law and it would therefore be interesting to know his view about the patent system, and preferably to know it in detail. He has however left no comprehensive patent theory. Aside from two scores of opinions which he rendered between 1813 and 1845, relating to specific patent cases, he seems to have written only one other significant statement on patents: in 1818 he issued a paper entitled Note on the Patent Laws. This is one of his anonymous publications. It is only a brief collection of headnotes. However it provides us at least with an outline of Story's ideas with respect to the questions of validity of patents. It also provides us with a convenient starting point for our review.' The statute then said that a valid patent could be taken out by one who had invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements therein, not known or used before the application. 2 Story was uninhibited in interpreting words into and out of this statute. His Note and his cases can be summarized by saying that according to him, qualification was needed for

The Changing Views of Justice Story on the Construction of Patents

The Changing Views of Justice Story on the Construction of Patents

A Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Story Enacted as Law within Thirty-Six Days

A Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Story Enacted as Law within Thirty-Six Days

An Autobiographical Sketch by John Marshall, Written at the Request of Joseph Story and now Printed for the First Time From the Original Manuscript preserved at the William L. Clements Library, together with a Letter from Chief Justice Marshall to Justice Story relating Thereto

An Autobiographical Sketch by John Marshall, Written at the Request of Joseph Story and now Printed for the First Time From the Original Manuscript preserved at the William L. Clements Library, together with a Letter from Chief Justice Marshall to Justice Story relating Thereto

<italic>An Autobiographical Sketch by John Marshall, written at the Request of Joseph Story and now printed for the First Time from the Original Manuscript preserved at the William L. Clements Library, together with a Letter from Chief Justice Marshall to Justice Story relating Thereto</italic>. Edited by <sc>John Stokes Adams</sc>. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1937. Pp. xxiii, 48. $2.00.)

Journal Article An Autobiographical Sketch by John Marshall, written at the Request of Joseph Story and now printed for the First Time from the Original Manuscript preserved at the William L. Clements Library, together with a Letter from Chief Justice Marshall to Justice Story relating Thereto. Edited by John Stokes Adams. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1937. Pp. xxiii, 48. $2.00.) Get access An Autobiographical Sketch by John Marshall, written at the Request of Joseph Story and now printed for the First Time from the Original Manuscript preserved at the William L. Clements Library, together with a Letter from Chief Justice Marshall to Justice Story relating Thereto. Edited by Adams John Stokes. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1937. Pp. xxiii, 48. $2.00.) Edward S. Corwin Edward S. Corwin Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 44, Issue 4, July 1939, Pages 927–928, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/44.4.927 Published: 01 July 1939

An Autobiographical Sketch of John Marshall: Written at the Request of Joseph Story and Now Printed for the First Time from the Original Manuscript Preserved at the William L. Clements Library, Together with a Letter from Chief-Justice Marshall to Justice Story in Relation Thereto

An Autobiographical Sketch of John Marshall: Written at the Request of Joseph Story and Now Printed for the First Time from the Original Manuscript Preserved at the William L. Clements Library, Together with a Letter from Chief-Justice Marshall to Justice Story in Relation Thereto

An Autobiographical Sketch by John Marshall, Written at the Request of Joseph Story and Now Printed for the First Time from the Original Manuscript Preserved at the William L. Clements Library, Together with a Letter from Chief Justice Marshall to Justice Story Relating Thereto

An Autobiographical Sketch by John Marshall, Written at the Request of Joseph Story and Now Printed for the First Time from the Original Manuscript Preserved at the William L. Clements Library, Together with a Letter from Chief Justice Marshall to Justice Story Relating Thereto

The Understandings of International Law

“The preamble of a statute,” says Justice Story, “is a key to open the mind of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and the objects which are to be accomplished by the provisions of the statute.”