Truth Judgments Research Articles

Monetary incentives do not reduce the repetition-induced truth effect

People rate and judge repeated information more true than novel information. This truth-by-repetition effect is of relevance for explaining belief in fake news, conspiracy theories, or misinformation effects. To ascertain whether increased motivation could reduce this effect, we tested the influence of monetary incentives on participants’ truth judgments. We used a standard truth paradigm, consisting of a presentation and judgment phase with factually true and false information, and incentivized every truth judgment. Monetary incentives may influence truth judgments in two ways. First, participants may rely more on relevant knowledge, leading to better discrimination between true and false statements. Second, participants may rely less on repetition, leading to a lower bias to respond “true.” We tested these predictions in a preregistered and high-powered experiment. However, incentives did not influence the percentage of “true” judgments or correct responses in general, despite participants’ longer response times in the incentivized conditions and evidence for knowledge about the statements. Our findings show that even monetary consequences do not protect against the truth-by-repetition effect, further substantiating its robustness and relevance and highlighting its potential hazardous effects when used in purposeful misinformation.

Negative or Negated, Thus True? An Investigation of Concept Valence and Semantic Negation as Drivers of Framing Effects in Judgments of Truth

The negativity bias in judgments of truth holds that content-wise identical statements are more likely to be judged as true when presented in a negative compared to positive concept frame. This article investigates the mechanisms underlying this concept frame effect by differentiating concept valence (something good versus bad) and semantic negation (grammatical operator) throughout five studies. We found some evidence that concept valence and semantic negation work in tandem to produce the concept frame, yet negation seems to be the more stable driver. Moreover, we found that negation exerts its impact on perceived truth by increasing the realm of possible states in which a specific statement can be true. Together, the present findings extend knowledge of the negativity bias in truth judgments by providing a more fine-grained picture of “negativity” and an explanation for why negation might be especially effective in increasing truth judgments.

Judging fast and slow: The truth effect does not increase under time-pressure conditions

AbstractDue to the information overload in today’s digital age, people may sometimes feel pressured to process and judge information especially fast. In three experiments, we examined whether time pressure increases the repetition-based truth effect — the tendency to judge repeatedly encountered statements more likely as “true” than novel statements. Based on the Heuristic-Systematic Model, a dual-process model in the field of persuasion research, we expected that time pressure would boost the truth effect by increasing reliance on processing fluency as a presumably heuristic cue for truth, and by decreasing knowledge retrieval as a presumably slow and systematic process that determines truth judgments. However, contrary to our expectation, time pressure did not moderate the truth effect. Importantly, this was the case for difficult statements, for which most people lack prior knowledge, as well as for easy statements, for which most people hold relevant knowledge. Overall, the findings clearly speak against the conception of fast, fluency-based truth judgments versus slow, knowledge-based truth judgments. In contrast, the results are compatible with a referential theory of the truth effect that does not distinguish between different types of truth judgments. Instead, it assumes that truth judgments rely on the coherence of localized networks in people’s semantic memory, formed by both repetition and prior knowledge.

“Printed follyes”: Mountebanks and the Performance of Ambivalence within the Archive

This article analyzes the ability of archival resources to make the especially transient and unstable performances of early modern mountebanks accessible and meaningful for performance studies research. Because mountebanks were itinerant performers and medical practitioners whose multiple roles challenged regulatory authorities and generated few lasting records, this article argues that mountebank performances may be best recovered and accessed by approaching the available archival materials not as records of fact, but of function. Documents like handbills associated with mountebanks were, after all, functional, inviting their readers to witness performances and test medical services. Self-authored documents like bills as well as representational and fictional texts replicate and reenact performative strategies attributed to mountebanks, namely, the cultivation of ambivalent rhetoric and compulsion to independent judgment of truth.

Truth feels easy: Knowing information is true enhances experienced processing fluency

Information is more likely believed to be true when it feels easy rather than difficult to process. An ecological learning explanation for this fluency-truth effect implicitly or explicitly presumes that truth and fluency are positively associated. Specifically, true information may be easier to process than false information and individuals may reverse this link in their truth judgments. The current research investigates the important but so far untested precondition of the learning explanation for the fluency-truth effect. In particular, five experiments (total N = 712) test whether participants experience information known to be true as easier to process than information known to be false. Participants in Experiment 1a judged true statements easier to read than false statements. Experiment 1b was a preregistered direct replication with a large sample and again found increased legibility for true statements—importantly, however, this was not the case for statements for which the truth status was unknown. Experiment 1b thereby shows that it is not the actual truth or falsehood of information but the believed truth or falsehood that is associated with processing fluency. In Experiment 2, true calculations were rated as easier to read than false calculations. Participants in Experiment 3 judged it easier to listen to calculations generally known to be true than to calculations generally known to be false. Experiment 4 shows an effect of truth on processing fluency independent of statement familiarity. Discussion centers on the current explanation for the fluency-truth effect and the validity of processing fluency as a cue in truth judgments.

Unusual uses and experiences are good for feeling insightful, but not for problem solving: contributions of schizotypy, divergent thinking, and fluid reasoning, to insight moments

ABSTRACT The current paper investigates the individual differences underlying the ability to solve classic and contemporary insight problems along the subjective phenomenology of insight in the solution of these problems. We investigate fluid reasoning, divergent thinking and schizotypy. Experiments 1–3 (total N = 434) investigated the association between schizotypy, divergent thinking, reasoning abilities, and participants’ tendencies to report feelings associated with insight (e.g. aha experience) in the solution of classic insight, classic non-insight problems, and compound remote associates. We found that both positive schizotypy (particularly the subscale Unusual Experiences) and originality (uncommon responses in a creativity task) were positive predictors of aha experiences, though not of problem solving. These results highlight important individual differences in the tendency to perceive meaning in problem solving and the implications for our metacognitive judgments of truth in our problem-solving processes.

The Trajectory of Truth: A Longitudinal Study of the Illusory Truth Effect.

Repeated statements are rated as subjectively truer than comparable new statements, even though repetition alone provides no new, probative information (the illusory truth effect). Contrary to some theoretical predictions, the illusory truth effect seems to be similar in magnitude for repetitions occurring after minutes or weeks. This Registered Report describes a longitudinal investigation of the illusory truth effect (n = 608, n = 567 analysed) in which we systematically manipulated intersession interval (immediately, one day, one week, and one month) in order to test whether the illusory truth effect is immune to time. Both our hypotheses were supported: We observed an illusory truth effect at all four intervals (overall effect: χ2(1) = 169.91; Mrepeated = 4.52, Mnew = 4.14; H1), with the effect diminishing as delay increased (H2). False information repeated over short timescales might have a greater effect on truth judgements than repetitions over longer timescales. Researchers should consider the implications of the choice of intersession interval when designing future illusory truth effect research.

Linguistic meanings as cognitive instructions.

Natural languages like English connect pronunciations with meanings. Linguistic pronunciations can be described in ways that relate them to our motor system (e.g., to the movement of our lips and tongue). But how do linguistic meanings relate to our nonlinguistic cognitive systems? As a case study, we defend an explicit proposal about the meaning of most by comparing it to the closely related more: whereas more expresses a comparison between two independent subsets, most expresses a subset-superset comparison. Six experiments with adults and children demonstrate that these subtle differences between their meanings influence how participants organize and interrogate their visual world. In otherwise identical situations, changing the word from most to more affects preferences for picture-sentence matching (experiments 1-2), scene creation (experiments 3-4), memory for visual features (experiment 5), and accuracy on speeded truth judgments (experiment 6). These effects support the idea that the meanings of more and most are mental representations that provide detailed instructions to conceptual systems.

More is easier? Testing the role of fluency in the more-credible effect

AbstractPeople are more likely to endorse statements of the form "A is more than B" than those of the form "B is less than A", even though the ordinal relationship being described is identical in both cases -– a result I dub the "more-credible" effect. This paper reports 9 experiments (totalN= 5643) that probe the generality and basis for this effect. Studies 1–4 replicate the effect for comparative statements relating to environmental change and sustainable behaviours, finding that it is robust to changes in participant population, experimental design, response formats and data analysis strategy. However, it does not generalize to all stimulus sets. Studies 5–9 test the proposition that the effect is based on the greater ease of processing "more than" statements. I find no meaningful effect of warning people not to base their judgments on the fluency of the sentences (Studies 5 and 6), but do find associations between comparative language, credibility, and processing time: when the more-credible effect manifests, the more-than statements are read more quickly than the less-than statements, and this difference partly mediates the effect of comparative on agreement with the statements; in contrast, for a set of comparisons for which changes in the more/less framing did not affect truth judgments, there was no meaningful difference in the time taken to read the more- and less-than versions of the statements. Taken together, these results highlight the importance of comparative language in shaping the credibility of important socio-political messages, and provide some limited support for the idea that the effect of language choice is partly due to differences in how easily the statements can be processed -– although other mechanisms are also likely to be at work.

The Animacy of Stone: A Whiteheadian Perspective

Abstract This article undertakes a critical analysis of the adoption of process metaphysics in the field of archaeology and anthropology for the explanation of animism. The field of “new animism” has adopted process metaphysics in order to counter the nineteenth-century definition of animism as epistemological projection toward animism as ontological condition. This shift from epistemology to ontology has the danger of equating animism with process metaphysics as such. By examining the category of propositional judgment within Whitehead’s metaphysics, I argue that the condition of animism emerges through a judgment of truth, which is aesthetic. It is through Whitehead’s integration of propositional judgment within his metaphysical system that one can understand that an ontological approach toward animism is not necessarily opposed to a reflective type of experience.

Ga\u1e45ge\u015ba on Epistemic Luck

This essay explores a problem for Nyāya epistemologists. It concerns the notion of pramā. Roughly speaking, a pramā is a conscious mental event of knowledge-acquisition, i.e., a conscious experience or thought in undergoing which an agent learns or comes to know something. Call any event of this sort a knowledge-event. The problem is this. On the one hand, many Naiyāyikas accept what I will call the Nyāya Definition of Knowledge, the view that a conscious experience or thought is a knowledge-event just in case it is true and non-recollective. On the other hand, they are also committed to what I shall call Nyāya Infallibilism, the thesis that every knowledge-event is produced by causes that couldn’t have given rise to an error. These two commitments seem to conflict with each other in cases of epistemic luck, i.e., cases where an agent arrives a true judgement accidentally or as a matter of luck. While the Nyāya Definition of Knowledge seems to predict that these judgements are knowledge-events, Nyāya Infallibilism seems to entail that they aren’t. In this essay, I show that Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, the 14th century Naiyāyika, solves this problem by adopting what I call epistemic localism, the view that upstream causal factors play no epistemically significant role in the production of knowledge.

James M. Buchanan on “the relatively absolute absolutes” and “truth judgments” in politics

Perhaps the most important element of James Buchanan’s contribution to constitutional economics is his differentiation between pre- and post-constitutional levels of decision-making. At first glance, a tension may appear between those two levels of analysis. In one, the rules by which we live are up for debate, allowing us to exercise our creative and imaginative capabilities in constitutional construction. In the other, the rules are viewed as fixed, and we are left simply to treat them as constraints. This paper explores three key elements of Buchanan’s thought that allow him to navigate successfully between the two levels. The first is the importance of “the relatively absolute absolute”, a concept learned from his mentor, Frank Knight. The second is Buchanan’s approach to “truth judgments” in politics, and their status in our political discussions. Third, we draw on Buchanan’s insights in his 1959 paper “Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy” to show how political economists should participate in this decision-making process—not as expert philosopher-kings, but as co-equals with their fellow citizens. Finally, we illustrate Buchanan’s system of thought in action by presenting two case studies: Virginia education policy in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, and the 1928 Supreme Court ruling in Miller v. Schoene.

Mnemonic Techniques and Lie Detection: Accuracy of Truth and Deception Judgments in Repeated Accounts

This study was an examination into whether the use of memory-enhancing techniques (mnemonics) in interviews can be helpful to distinguish truth tellers from liars. In the previous study (Izotovas et al., 2018), it was found that when mnemonic techniques were used in the interview immediately after the event, truth-tellers reported more details than liars in those immediate interviews and again after a delay. Moreover, truth-tellers, but not liars, showed patterns of reporting indicative of genuine memory decay.
 In the current experiment, participants (n = 92) were asked to read the repeated statements reported by participants in the Izotovas et al.’s (2018) study and decide whether the statements they read were truthful or deceptive. One group of participants (informed condition) received information about the findings of the previous study before reading the statement. The other group received no information before reading the statement (uninformed condition). After participants made veracity judgements, they were asked an open-ended question asking what factors influenced their credibility decision. Although truthful statements were judged more accurately in the informed condition (65.2%) than in the uninformed condition (47.8%), this difference was not significant. In both conditions deceptive statements were detected at chance level (52.2%). Participants who relied on the self-reported diagnostic verbal cues to deceit were not more accurate than participants who self-reported unreliable cues. This could happen because only the minority of participants (27.4%) in both conditions based their decisions on diagnostic cues to truth/deceit.

Truth Distortion: A Process to Explain Polarization over Unsubstantiated Claims Related to COVID-19

Knowing what to believe in the context of COVID-19 is challenging. Conflicting narratives from an array of prominent sources make distinguishing what is true and false difficult. This research examines how a preference for a source of information influences one's truth judgments about controversial COVID-related statements. An early positive or negative evaluation of a public figure causes individuals to distort their truth judgments in the same direction as their preference. Interestingly, this truth distortion tends to increase linearly with a series of repeated controversial statements. Namely, most people tend to maintain their early preference and increasingly distort their evaluation of truth to make it fit the narrative of the source. Overall, this research provides insights into the process by which polarization occurs; that is, it demonstrates how people come to strongly believe in unsubstantiated claims over time, while others come to strongly reject the same information.

The Animacy of Stone

This article undertakes a critical analysis of the adoption of process metaphysics in the field of archaeology and anthropology for the explanation of animism. The field of "new animism" has adopted process metaphysics in order to counter the nineteenth-century definition of animism as epistemological projection toward animism as ontological condition. This shift from epistemology to ontology has the danger of equating animism with process metaphysics as such. By examining the category ofpropositional judgment within Whitehead's metaphysics, I argue that the condition of animism emerges through a judgment of truth, which is aesthetic. It is through Whitehead's integration of propositional judgment within his metaphysical system that one can understand that an ontological approach toward animism is not necessarily opposed to a refiective type of experience.

Historical Realization in Godard’s Histoire(s) Du Cinéma

Based on a bold equation of cinema with history, Jean-Luc Godard’s essay-film Histoire(s) du Cinéma (1988–1998) provokes new thoughts about what historical understanding involves and how cinematic revelation can happen. This paper discusses how Histoire(s) engages conventional standards of historical understanding while also taking us into uncharted depths of historical realization, examining the undeniable historical evidence presented in the film (mainly documenting the content of Hollywood and European films along thematically suggestive lines), undismissable insights into relations among historical data, and possibly valid judgments of historical truth (notably that cinema failed in its essential mission by not filming the Holocaust). Reaching for non-obvious connections, Godard risks misleading decontextualization of his materials. But by stocking our minds with pertinent film selections, new treatments of those images, and various writers’ musings he draws us into his quest for a practically decisive realization of the significance of the recent history of our civilization.

Парадокс научного прогресса в эволюционном измерении

The article proposes a solution to the paradox of scientific progress, formulated by Max Weber. Science formulates true and objective judgments, and only this distinguishes it from the world of value judgments, ideology, religion, art. On the other hand, the “lifespan of truths” is extremely small and any statement about scientific progress looks unconvincing just in comparison with the pro­gress of value discourses, where each stage of development (style or work of art), if not replaced by the “best” at least they retain or even increase their value over the centuries. A way out of this paradox, according to the authors, can be offered by a socio-evolutionary interpretation of science, where the “criterion” of a better (or more grounded) theory is viewed as “fitness”, as the ability to respond to the challenge of the external environment, to which the best theory adapts bet­ter, and as a consequence is selected. The article is devoted to the problems that the biologically based general theory of evolution is facing today when it is ex­trapolated to the problem of scientific progress. The question is investigated in what sense scientific theories can be interpreted as replacing each other and competing with each other by analogy with organic formations (genotypes, phe­notypes, populations); what the external environment of scientific communica­tion is and what institutions are responsible for the selection of the best theories; about the extent to which the autonomous mechanisms of scientific evolution are differentiated, namely, the mechanisms of random variation, natural selection and stabilization of newly acquired traits. The authors analyze the solutions to these problems in the concepts of causal individuation of the scientific theories of David Hull, the concept of semantic individuation of Stephen Gould’s theory, and the possibilities of reconciliation and synthesis of these evolutionary ap­proaches in the system-communicative theory of evolution by Niklas Luhmann.

The voices of the “patota”. Memories, forgetfulness and silences of the members of a task force in the Judgment for the Truth of Bahía Blanca, Argentina (1999)

This article examines public statements made in the Trial for the Truth of Bahia Blanca, Argentina, by four former members of a task force called the “Grouping Troops”. It seeks to account for the ways in which the members of this group referred to their participation in operations that culminated with dead and missing persons and inquire about how they explained their actions in the repression; on the other hand, it seeks to investigate how the participation of these military in the Truth Judgment influenced the construction of a social representation about the figure of the repressor. We worked with a qualitative methodology focused on the analysis of the statements provided in the courtroom by the former members of the Troops Association and their circulation in different newspapers of local and national scope.

Does the inclusive disjunction really mean the conjunction of possibilities?

There is an ongoing dispute in the psychology of reasoning about how people interpret disjunctions, p or q. In the original mental models theory (MMT1) people interpret p or q as the disjunction of three possibilities (possibly p¬q, or possibly ¬pq, or possibly pq, where “¬” = not). p or q is true if one disjunct is actually true. In a recent revision of mental models theory (MMT2), people interpret p or q as a conjunction of the three possibilities, and they treat it as true only if each is possible and ¬p¬q is impossible. Two experiments investigated possibility and truth judgments about disjunctions given sets consisting of one or more of the four cases (p¬q, ¬pq, pq, and ¬p¬q). The results showed that in both possibility and truth judgments, participants' interpretations of disjunctions were only consistent with MMT1. Inclusive disjunctions imply the disjunction of the three possibilities, and they are true when one of the three cases (p¬q, ¬pq, and pq) is actual. These findings support MMT1, but not MMT2. In conclusion, the revised mental models theory may be unnecessary for disjunctions.

A Failure Mode Assessment Model Based on Neutrosophic Logic for Switched-Mode Power Supply Risk Analysis

Reducing the potential risks in the manufacturing process to improve the reliability of the switched-mode power supply (SMPS) is a critical issue for the users’ safety. This paper proposes a novel failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) model based on hybrid multiple criteria decision-making (MCDM), which adopts neutrosophic set theory into the proposed model. A developed neutrosophic Best Worst method (NBWM) is used to evaluate the weights of risk factors and determine their importance. Secondly, the neutrosophic Weight Aggregated Sum Product Assessments (NWASPAS) method is utilized to calculate the Risk Priority Number (RPN) of the failure modes. The proposed model improves the shortcomings of traditional FMEA and improves the practical applicability and effectiveness of the Best Worst method (BWM) and Weight Aggregated Sum Product Assessments (WASPAS) methods. In addition, this study uses neutrosophic logic to reflect the true judgments of experts in the assessment, which considers authenticity, deviation, and uncertainty to obtain more reliable information. Finally, an empirical case study from an SMPS company headquartered in Taiwan demonstrates the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed model. In addition, by comparing with two other FMEA models, the results show that the proposed model can more clearly reflect the true and effective risks in the assessment. The results can effectively help power supply manufacturers to assess risk factors and determine key failure modes.