IntroductionTime is ubiquitous to human experience and shapes our everyday life (Zakay, 2012). It is, therefore, no wonder that the psychology of time is seminal topic of psychological science, and although it entered a phase of decline and even moribund neglect, the past several decades have seen a prominent renaissance of interest (Hancock & Block, 2012, p. 267).In particular, prominent recent research avenue is related to various aspects of time processing, specifically, how timing is affected by a cognitive load (e.g., Block, Hancock, & Zakay, 2010; Brown, 2006, 2008, 2010; Brown, Collier, & Night, 2013; Dutke, 2005; Ogden, Salominaite, Jones, & Fisk, 2011).It is well known that in retrospective paradigm (remembered duration), participants are unaware of upcoming judgments about the length of intervals, thus, in such temporal processing, memory processes seem to be involved as higher load leads to longer timerelated judgments. However, in a prospective paradigm (experienced duration), participants are aware of the fact that a duration estimation has to be made, therefore, attentional resources seem to be involved as higher load leads to shorter time-related judgments (Block & Zakay, 1996; Block et al., 2010; Grondin, 2008).With an aim to understand human timing capabilities, a plethora of explanatory realms has occurred. Some suppose that duration of time is coded as an intrinsic property of non-dedicated neural activity (Irvy & Schlerf, 2008). However, the majority assume an existence of some kind of an clock represented by a dedicated (modular) neural mechanism and by the involvement of a network of various neural areas, such as basal ganglia, presupplementary and supplementary motor areas, cerebellum and prefrontal cortex (Allman, Teki, Griffiths, & Meck, 2014; Grondin, 2010; Irvy & Schlerf, 2008).One of the most prominent prospective theories of the internal clock, SET (Scalar expectancy theory), postulated by Church, Gibbon, and Meck in 1984, supposes the existence of three fundamental processes - clock, memory, and decision. Specifically, at the onset of the to-be-timed interval, a pacemaker emits pulses at a relatively constant rate. These pulses are accumulated, transferred into the working memory store and compared to those in the reference memory. Based on this comparison, a decision is made, producing an estimate of elapsed time (Allman et al., 2014; Church, 1984; Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984; Zakay & Block, 1995).However, as it was stressed, e.g., by Brown (2008) and Block et al. (2010), SET arose from the animal timing research with lack of cognitive perspective, thus, regarding nascent findings, there exist attempts to connect basic assumptions of SET with prominent cognitive theories and processes, such as attention. In accordance, Block and Zakay (1995) have developed the augmented version of the SET called an attentional-gate model (AGM). Their modification is based on the addition of the attention gate component. This component is situated between pacemaker and accumulator (cognitive counter). Such model is graphically depicted in Figure 1 (see version A of the model).Metaphorically speaking, in a low temporal relevance situation, the gate mediating the flow of pulses narrows due to the reduction of resources allocated to timing. In particular, if less amount of attention is directed to time (fewer resources are allocated to time due to focusing simultaneously on the nontemporal task), the gate opens narrowly, allowing to pass a smaller amount of pulses. Consequently, the smaller amount of pulses is accumulated and compared (and vice versa). This situation leads to distorted duration judgments. Specifically, depending on the task, under-estimation, under-reproduction, but over-production of intervals occur. This is phenomenologically reflected in the proverb: 'Time flies when you are having fun' (Block & Zakay, 1996; Block & Zakay, 2008; Block et al. …