Joint Staff Research Articles

Benin: Joint Staff Assessment of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

Benin: Joint Staff Assessment of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

Azerbaijan Republic: Joint Staff Assessment of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

Azerbaijan Republic: Joint Staff Assessment of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

Nepal: Joint Staff Assessment of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

Nepal: Joint Staff Assessment of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

Ghana: Joint Staff Assessment of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

Ghana: Joint Staff Assessment of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

5.6.4 Application of the C4ISR Architecture Framework: What Does It Really Mean?

AbstractIn 1997 the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Architecture Framework Version 2.0 was released as a guide for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in the development of system architectures. This Framework was developed under the auspices of the C4ISR Working Group consisting of representatives from the Joint Staff, the military services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other Defense agencies. The main motivation for the C4ISR Framework has been to ensure that architectures are interrelatable as well as comparable and integratable across Joint and multinational organizational boundaries. DoD, supported by recent government legislation, will pursue the development of more interoperable, integrated systems to meet the challenges posed now and in the future. Developed to focus on information technology, the C4ISR Framework is finding broad application in the DoD community. The C4ISR Framework serves as a consistent guideline on how architectures should be described by calling out a number of views serving operational, system, and technical interests. The need for consistency and guidance is clear. What is not clear however, is how this guidance will influence engineering activities being conducted on DoD programs. Application of the C4ISR Framework is very much in the pioneering stage. Experience is needed to set examples and teach lessons as with anything new. This paper offers some experience by developing an operational architecture view in an application to Air Defense.

Missile issues in South Asia

Naeem Ahmad Salik is a Brigadier in the Pakistan Army, currently serving as the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate at the Strategic Plans Division, Joint Staff Headquarters. He has taught in the Defense and Strategic Studies Department at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islmabad, and was a visiting fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center in 1995. He has published extensively on the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of India and Pakistan.

Does Russia need a general staff?

One of the major events of the first year of President Vladimir Putin's term was the open conflict between the Minister of Defense, Marshal Igor Sergeyev, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, General Anatoly Kvashnin. Kvashnin's public appeal for his own reform program challenged the preeminence of the Minister of Defense and raised serious questions about the direction of Russian military reform and its compatibility with civil control of the military. This essay examines that conflict and raises the broader problem of the organization of Russia's military high command. The question of Russia's need for a general staff is presented against the backdrop of Russian and Soviet experience with a general staff. The author considers alternative systems, especially the US Joint Staff, as a means of providing effective civilian control, and addresses the role of the General Staff in that organization. The essay concludes with a call for a major reform of the system of military control, lest Russia find herself in the twenty‐first century with a General Staff from the imperial era. The essay includes three relevant documents as appendices: Presidential Decree on Regulations on the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (1998); Presidential Decree on Regulations on the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (1998); and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States Department of Defense.

The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed vs. Ignorance and Sloth?

The Joint Staff knows why coordination does not occur. According to a Joint Staff memorandum, past it has been extremely difficult to achieve coordinated interdepartmental for two reasons: other agencies of US government do not understand systematic planning procedures, and each agency has its own approach to solving problems. The State Department, for example, values flexibility and its ability to respond to daily changes in a situation more than it values planning, while CIA is reluctant to coordinate for security reasons and former US Information Agency held Defense and CIA at arm's length for fear that it would be seen as a mere dispenser of propaganda. If we are to have coordination, memorandum warns, inhibitions of other governmental agencies must in some way be overcome. [1] Furthermore, Joint Staff has been aware of to coordination for a long time. The memorandum just quoted was written in 1961. This long-standing concern helps explain, no doubt, worry expressed when military contemplates future. A report on Army After Next (AAN) experimentation comments that the diversity of interagency, with each agency having its own culture, hierarchy, bias, misperceptions, and unique perspectives, makes unity of effort difficult. These problems, compounded by low technical and procedural interoperability, and absence of a common vision, create formidable obstacles to coordination. Both Joint Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020 make similar points about process, leading to a similar conclusion: coordination is hard to achieve. [2] The military is worried about what has become known as the interagency partly because of demands that a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) would place on process. If an RMA occurs in years to come, it will be led by advances in sensor, communication, and information processing technology that will allow our forces to see and attack enemy throughout depth and height of battlespace. That enemy will see our forces almost as well as we see theirs will require that we attack from dispersed or remote positions with stunning speed. Knowledge and speed will allow us to achieve the near simultaneous application of combat power against key elements within enemy's entire zone of operations. [3] The result will be disintegration of enemy's forces. Such disintegration is more likely to occur or to be more valuable strategically and politically if we can enter theater of operations before enemy has established himself fully or achieved his objectives. Such rapid strategic maneuver may result in strategic preclusion, denying enemy operational opportunity or objective he seeks. If we can demonstrate such a capability, we may even deter conflict. The stringent demands for coordination that an RMA will place on US government agencies is most obvious at strategic level. Preclusion will require decisionmaking that can coordinate a rapid response to emerging problems, as well as keep pace with developments in battlespace. Quick, flexible coordination will also be necessary at operational level. Rapid simultaneous engagement of enemy will not always result in simultaneous cessation of all hostilities. Disintegration may induce some of enemy's forces to surrender, but others will fight on in isolation as cohesive units, perhaps retreating to nearby urban areas, while others transition to guerrilla warfare. The military, therefore, will be conducting high-intensity operations in one spot, while in other places it mops up, provides humanitarian assistance, takes care of refugees, and implements transition to a legitimate civilian authority, in these latter cases working closely with other agencies. The trad itional sequential approach in which, in one general officer's words, [4] political hand off to military and you let military do it, and as soon as military thing is over, immediately turn it back to political guys is unlikely to work. …

First Operational Requirements Document (ORD) of the Millennium-Next Generation Aircraft Carrier (CVNX)

ABSTRACT The evolution of the formal requirements process with its multiple participants and iterative reviews for our largest system acquisition programs has been finding a new shape concurrently with the development of the Next Generation Aircraft Carrier (CVNX) as a new major ship acquisition program. The overwhelming complexity of designing an aircraft carrier, not attempted in decades, has been influenced by the layers of oversight and review, as well as the need for disparate organizations of unique perspectives to find common ground and establish, maintain and defend consensus. From the Joint Staff's new responsibilities in development and procurement decisions, to the Fleet user's definition of needs for future systems, all the while pre-occupied by today's challenges and frustrations, a comprehensive, systems approach is demanded in striving for success. The CVNX ORD is perhaps the first of its scope and process design that has come from concept to approval as these various organizational bodies and implementing instructions have been themselves in a state of flux. The CVNX process of developing the requirements for all parties to consider and making design trades which can adequately balance the range of stakeholders is offered for illustration of one method to organize and execute requirements development

Planning and Conducting Medical Support to Joint Operations

Operations are core business for all of us and the PJHQ medical cell is at the heart of this process. With the likelihood of a continuing UK presence in the Balkans for some time to come, the challenge of meeting this and any other new operational commitments will continue to demand a flexible and innovative approach from all concerned. These challenges together with the Joint and multinational aspects of the job make the PJHQ medical cell a demanding but rewarding place to work and provide a valuable Joint staff training opportunity for the RNMS.

A case study in early joint warfare: An analysis of the Wehrmacht's Crimean campaign of 1942

Military theorists and commentators believe that joint operations prove more effective in most circumstances of modern warfare than operations involving only one service or involving two or more services but without systematic integration or unified command. Many see Nazi Germany's armed forces, the Wehrmacht, as early pioneers of ‘jointness’. This essay demonstrates that the Wehrmacht did indeed understand the value of synchronising its land, sea and air forces and placing them under operational commanders who had at least a rudimentary understanding of the tactics, techniques, needs, capabilities and limitations of each of the services functioning in their combat zones. It also shows that the Wehrmacht's efforts in this direction produced the desired result of improved combat effectiveness. Yet it argues that the Wehrmacht lacked elements considered by today's theorists to be essential to the attainment of truly productive jointness ‐ a single tri‐service commander, a proper joint staff and an absence of inter‐service rivalry ‐ and that, as a result, it often suffered needless difficulties in combat.

Civil-military relations

There is no crisis in American civil-military relations if crisis means the kind of collision between civil and military authority that would breed a coup d'état or other manifestation of a breakdown of civilian control of the military, such as systematic and open disobedience of orders. But, to a remarkable degree, members of the Defense Task Force agreed that deep and pervasive difficulties plague American civil-military relations, that these problems merit attention and exploration, and that dramatic and possibly painful actions are required to resurrect the relationship between the armed forces and civil society that the Founders envisioned and that makes sense for a twenty-first-century democracy. The three core problems discussed at length were the politicization of the military, the growing divide between civil society and those who wear the uniform, and the centralization of military power in the Joint Staff and in the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

Reinventing Government: The Case of the Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DoD), the largest of federal government bureaucracies in both numbers and budgets has undergone sustained organizational reform since the National Security Act of 1947 and the Key West decision of 1948 which resolved questions about military service roles and mission, brought into existence a separate Department of the Air Force, and began a system of an American Joint Staff and civilian Defense Secretary (Forrestal, 1949; Caraley, 1966). The most important recent development was the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 which elevated the war-fighting Commanders-in-Chief (CINC) to positions of prominence, placed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff into the command line, and restricted the military services to the recruiting, training, equipping, and providing to the CINCs as required by regional war plans (Hartmann & Wendzel, 1990). The first major war to be fought using this new organizational structure and procedure was a clear success. But the Gulf War victory in 1991 masked the continuing trauma of massive downsizing, reduced budgets, and new responsibilities. In short, DoD was not allowed to savor that success and rest on its institutional laurels. It is axiomatic to observe that the U.S. defense establishment is confronted with an unstable external environment. The peaceful demise of the Soviet empire, the spread of ethnic, religious, nationalist, and economic instability, the budget constraints flowing from deficits and debt, the general move to third-party provisions, and the erosion of alliance solidarity constitute but a partial list. It is against this background that the Congress established the Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces and charged it also with suggesting alterations necessary for the post-Cold War period and into the 21st century. There is virtually no topic more sacroscant, more exquisitely sensitive, and more certain to cause bureaucratic conflict than to attempt to realign military service roles and missions - those broad and enduring purposes set by law and the tasks which flow from those purposes as assigned by the National Command Authority (i.e., the President and the Secretary of Defense). The last decade is littered with learned, long, and largely ignored studies. But perhaps this commission would be different. It would be the first conducted during the Clinton presidency and would dovetail with the bottom-up review he used to justify even sharper defense cuts than those undertaken by his predecessors (USGAO, 1995). The expectations were understandably high that this commission would recommend real changes in roles and missions. Perhaps even a call for combining the Army and Marine Corps into a single entity for forced entry would be heard. Or perhaps DoD would meld its four air forces into one. Or, perhaps even a recommendation of a unitary system without separate military services would be forthcoming. It was not to be. Those who hoped for major overhaul of roles and missions - and those who feared the same - were either disappointed or relieved. The commission identified no major new problem areas; decided that widely recognized problem areas were in fact nonexistent or grossly overestimated; and, essentially refused to take sides on most existing roles and missions disputes among the services. But it would be wrong to conclude that the commission lacked innovation or that substantive change may not ensue from its work. There are at least three significant aspects of the commission's work: * It is a clarion call for a continuation of the military reforms begun by the 1986 Reorganization Act. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, his staff, and his powers in planning and procurement are all to be enhanced toward the goal of true unified military operations. Thus, jointness is to seep down from the warfighting level of the ClNCs into the heretofore relatively sovereign realms of the military services in procurement, training, and development of doctrine. …

For the Joint Specialist: Five Steep Hills to Climb

Officers of the armed forces have been tendered a new and exciting career opportunity--that of becoming qualified and recognized as a Joint Specialty Officer. Those who choose to follow this route will be on the leading edge of a new wave. The opportunity has been fashioned by Congress. It is the product of long-festering congressional unhappiness about the state of joint affairs within the Department of Defense. Still beset by concerns over the outcome in Vietnam, Congress was irritated further by the Mayaguez incident of 1975 (1) and especially by the failure at Desert One during the Iranian hostage rescue attempt of 1980. The momentum for reform within Congress was given a mighty twin boost by the bombing of the Marine barracks at the Beirut airport on 23 October 1983--241 Marines were killed and scores more wounded--followed only two days later by Urgent Fury, the Grenadan campaign marked by serious problems of joint execution. In October 1985, the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee issued a report (2) which became the inspiration for subsequent hearings resulting ultimately in the now-famous Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. (3) That act represents an astounding and historic intervention by Congress in the organization and internal operation of the Department of Defense. Officers who contemplate following the new joint specialist path as a major career option should read the Senate staff report from cover to cover in order to understand the perspectives, motives, and objectives of Congress. The most zealous of such officers may also wish to study the transcripts of the hearings. The stilted language of the law itself does not convey the spirit and drive of its intent. The basic theme of the new legislation is to strengthen the joint establishment vis-a-vis the service departments. (4) The most important aspects are these: * The responsibilities and authorities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are greatly increased. He is now the chief joint military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the entire national security apparatus. He has clear control over the Joint Staff. * A four-star Vice Chairman has been provided to assist the Chairman. * Minutely detailed instructions are contained in the law regulating the selection, education, assignment, and promotion of the Joint Specialty Officers. (5) * The commanders of the unified commands (the CINCs) have been given increased authority over the service components of those commands and direct access to the programming and budgeting processes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. * The service departments have been reorganized to increase civilian control. With respect to the distribution of power within the national security apparatus, there is unmistakable presumption of zero-sum game in the package as a whole. That is, Congress seemed to believe that strengthening the joint establishment required the weakening of the services. This is both unfortunate and unnecessary as we shall see. What is required is the strengthening of both. Thus, Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs), and those who plan to become such, stand under the influence of this historic legislation, learning the ropes in respect to the organization, functions, and procedures of the reinforced and elevated joint establishment. In proceeding, it is wise to remember that it is the product, not the process, which counts and for which JSOs will be judged in the long run. The realization of the goals established in the new law and its implementing directives now passes to the hands and talents of a new generation. And full realization will take just that--generational change. Let us now turn to five selected opportunities for improvement and innovation in the joint arena, five steep hills to climb: * Raising the quality of joint military advice. …

ACHIEVEMENT TEST SCALING1

ETS Research Report SeriesVolume 1988, Issue 1 p. i-177 ArticleFree Access ACHIEVEMENT TEST SCALING1 Linda L. Cook, Linda L. CookSearch for more papers by this authorWilliam H. Angoff, William H. AngoffSearch for more papers by this authorAlicia P. Schmitt, Alicia P. SchmittSearch for more papers by this author Linda L. Cook, Linda L. CookSearch for more papers by this authorWilliam H. Angoff, William H. AngoffSearch for more papers by this authorAlicia P. Schmitt, Alicia P. SchmittSearch for more papers by this author First published: June 1988 https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2330-8516.1988.tb00290.xCitations: 1 †Final Report of Project/Job 201/44, sponsored by the Joint Staff Research and Development Committee. AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume1988, Issue1June 1988Pages i-177 ReferencesRelatedInformation

Dilemmas of Japanese Defense

S INCE WORLD WAR II, Japan has been most indifferent of all advanced nations of world to problems of defense. On July 24, 1978, General Kurisu Hiroomi, who had been dismissed as Chairman of Japanese Joint Staff Council, declared that the Self-Defense Force is a castle built on sand. He predicted that government would do nothing to improve its capabilities. From early 1930s, Japan went way of militarism, and because of it met defeat in World War II. Immediately after defeat, Prince Higashikuni, Prime Minister, asked of nation that it declare its repentance. The result was a most extreme distaste for armaments, and view that Japan went to war because of armaments and would not have done so without them. Only a very small number of politicians and intellectuals objected when, in 1947, MacArthur draft of a new constitution was presented to Diet. Article Nine provided for renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.

Is Japan’s Defense Posture Adequate?

The Japanese National Defense Study Group has published two reports on Japan's defense, in 1976 and 1977, both under the leadership of Dr. Tsunoda Jun. The 1976 report dealt with basic principles, and the 1977 report with the application of those principles to Japan's present and future defense posture. The 1977 report emphasizes that the major threat to Japan's security comes from the Soviet Union, and discusses the pros and cons of various measures for dealing with this threat. The key to Japan's defense still remains the US-Japan security treaty, but changes in America's military posture present Japan with new problems, challenges, and alternative solutions. The report makes a cogent argument for improving Japan's defense both qualitatively and quantitatively. The reports are not official publications of the Japanese Defense Agency, although they do express the views of prominent former members of the Self-Defense Forces. At present, the membership of the Study Group consists of Hasegawa Saiji, President, Naigai News Company; Kitamura Kenichi, former Commander-in-Chief, Maritime SelfDefense Fleet; Muta Hirokuni, former Chairman, Joint Staff Council; Nakamura Ryuhei, former Chairman, Joint Defense Council; Nishimura Tomoharu, former Chief of Operations, Maritime Self-Defense Force; Shirakawa Motoharu, former Chairman, Joint Staff Council; Sugita Kazutsugu, former Chief of Staff, Ground Self-Defense Force; and Dr. Tsunoda Jun, a leading authority on defense problems. The following is an edited translation of selected passages from the 1977 report, which was prepared by Dr. Tsunoda and originally published under the title Kokuboron-Showa 52-Nen Ban (On National Defense-1977 Edition) by Naigai News Company. These excerpts are published here as illustrative of the views of an influential segment of Japanese opinion on problems of national defense.

An exchange between Dale R. Herspring and Henry Krisch

There is no crisis in American civil-military relations if crisis means the kind of collision between civil and military authority that would breed a coup d'état or other manifestation of a breakdown of civilian control of the military, such as systematic and open disobedience of orders. But, to a remarkable degree, members of the Defense Task Force agreed that deep and pervasive difficulties plague American civil-military relations, that these problems merit attention and exploration, and that dramatic and possibly painful actions are required to resurrect the relationship between the armed forces and civil society that the Founders envisioned and that makes sense for a twenty-first-century democracy. The three core problems discussed at length were the politicization of the military, the growing divide between civil society and those who wear the uniform, and the centralization of military power in the Joint Staff and in the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

The General Board Joint Staff Proposal of 1941

The General Board Joint Staff Proposal of 1941

Armed Forces Unification and the Pentagon Officer

THIS paper reports some of the demands that have been placed upon military officers who are developing defense policies within a partially unified defense establishment. Many of the published studies of unification are concerned with organizational issues such as the appropriate functions of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The present study, in contrast, examines the views that military officers have expressed about the particular requirements and the relative attractiveness of positions in joint, as compared with service, organizations. It discusses organizational distinctions to provide background for an understanding of officers' attitudes. The paper is based on information secured by the authors in July, 1954, in personal interviews and in responses to a self-administered questionnaire completed by a sample of approximately 550 officers assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and each of the three service headquarters.l