Does Russia need a general staff?

Abstract

One of the major events of the first year of President Vladimir Putin's term was the open conflict between the Minister of Defense, Marshal Igor Sergeyev, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, General Anatoly Kvashnin. Kvashnin's public appeal for his own reform program challenged the preeminence of the Minister of Defense and raised serious questions about the direction of Russian military reform and its compatibility with civil control of the military. This essay examines that conflict and raises the broader problem of the organization of Russia's military high command. The question of Russia's need for a general staff is presented against the backdrop of Russian and Soviet experience with a general staff. The author considers alternative systems, especially the US Joint Staff, as a means of providing effective civilian control, and addresses the role of the General Staff in that organization. The essay concludes with a call for a major reform of the system of military control, lest Russia find herself in the twenty‐first century with a General Staff from the imperial era. The essay includes three relevant documents as appendices: Presidential Decree on Regulations on the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (1998); Presidential Decree on Regulations on the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (1998); and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States Department of Defense.