Japan's Role Research Articles

Sino-American strategic relations: from partners to competitors

During the 1970s and 1980s, Beijing and Washington shared common strategic purposes. But these shared interests have narrowed in the 1990s. The Sino-American relationship now involves elements of limited cooperation and growing competition. While there is an important convergence of interests with respect to North Korea and the spread of nuclear weapons, the two governments increasingly diverge on a long list of strategic issues, including: Taiwan; Japan's regional security role; Iran and Iraq; the expansion of NATO; the strengthening of other US alliances; missile exports; theatre and national missile defences; and the US security role in the Asia-Pacific. This growing 'strategic competition' is likely to characterise Sino-American relations for most of the coming decade, irrespective of the new American administration that comes to office in 2001.

Population Aging and Japanese International Travel in the 21st Century

Given Japan's role as one of the world's leading touristgenerating countries and its relatively low overseas travel propensities, travel forecasters believe that significant potential remains for increases in Japanese overseas travel. Yet, Japan's demographic transition into the world's fastest aging country could spell an end to the postwar boom in Japanese overseas travel. This article extends the research on the economic determinants of travel demand to explore the effects of demographic change. The authors, using pooled cross-section time-series data (1968-1995), show that age and cohort membership are significant determinants of Japanese international travel demand. Given reasonable assumptions about future real wage growth, labor force participation, and currency exchange rates, they demonstrate that increasing numbers of Japanese will travel abroad in the 21st century, although at a much slower pace. They also demonstrate the benefit of analyzing travel propensities for men and women separately.

Learning from others. Japan's role in bringing psychology to China.

Recent research by Chinese and Japanese historians of psychology and education suggests that it was educational reformers' copying of Japan's education system in the 1st decade of the 20th century that provided the context for developing modern psychology in China. Psychology, although not well understood by those reformers, was thought to be useful in teacher training. In 1902 Japanese psychology teachers came to China and some textbooks were translated. Chinese students studying in Japan also brought back psychological knowledge in translations. However, the Chinese attraction to study in Japan declined after 1906. As the United States opened new universities and provided opportunities for Chinese students to study in U.S. schools, it became a more attractive option for later generations of Chinese, who saw psychology become established as a separate discipline.

Japan in Kosovo: lessons in the politics of 'complex engagement'

The Kosovo crisis of 1999 took place on the European continent and was dominated by US-led NATO actions aimed at assisting Kosovo in its struggle against what was considered to be ethnic cleansing by the Serbian government. While many observers may be unaware that the Japanese government had a role to play in the unfolding events, this article examines how and why that participation is important for an understanding of Tokyo's contemporary foreign policy orientation. To this end, the article assesses how Japanese participation in the international efforts aimed at restoring peace to the region were channelled through specific multilateral fora. In particular, it assesses the development of Japan's role as part of the United Nations, NATO and the G7/8 processes, and it examines the opportunities introduced by the cessation of NATO bombing raids after May 1999. The article also explains how this participation can be understood to illustrate an orientation towards 'complex engagement', as the Tokyo administration seeks to assert its international profile more actively in the pursuit of non-military objectives. This concept, which is developed throughout, will be shown to represent an underlying trend in the changing formulation of Japanese foreign policy. Its still tentative foundations rest upon a state-society cooperation used to eschew the pursuit of active military diplomacy in favour of a multi-layered, non-military orientation which rests upon the notion of human security.

Learning from others: Japan's role in bringing psychology to China.

Learning from others: Japan's role in bringing psychology to China.

Sino-American strategic relations: from partners to competitors

During the 1970s and 1980s, Beijing and Washington shared common strategic purposes. But these shared interests have narrowed in the 1990s. The Sino-American relationship now involves elements of limited cooperation and growing competition. While there is an important convergence of interests with respect to North Korea and the spread of nuclear weapons, the two governments increasingly diverge on a long list of strategic issues, including: Taiwan; Japan's regional security role; Iran and Iraq; the expansion of NATO; the strengthening of other US alliances; missile exports; theatre and national missile defences; and the US security role in the Asia-Pacific. This growing 'strategic competition' is likely to characterise Sino-American relations for most of the coming decade, irrespective of the new American administration that comes to office in 2001.

Japan's leadership role in East Asian security multilateralism: the Nakayama proposal and the logic of reassurance

Why, in July 1991, did Japan suddenly reverse years of opposition to regional security multilateralism in East Asia, and propose a multilateral security dialogue? This study argues that two factors largely account for the so-called Nakayama proposal. First, after the Gulf War and in the midst of Soviet collapse, Japan concluded that it would have to play a larger international security role. Second, Japan realized that as a consequence it would need to expand its efforts to reassure Asian countries mistrustful of Japanese military power as a result of historical experience. Japanese policy-makers thus came to conceive of a multilateral security dialogue as a means for reassuring Asian countries about its plan to send troops overseas to participate in United Nations peacekeeping. Secondary factors contributing to Japan's decision to promote security multilateralism include the declining Soviet threat, fear of American withdrawal, and competition from other countries with differing conceptions of what form security multilateralism should assume.

Multilateralism and Japan's Security Policy

Abstract For Japan, security still depends primarily on the US-Japan Defense Treaty, but in the post-Cold War era, Japanese leaders realize that reliance exclusively on the United States is insufficient. One line of pursuit of multilateral security has been to enhance Japan's role in UN peacekeeping. Noncombat elements of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are now serving in several countries along stabilized peacekeeping frontiers. These deployments are part of a larger strategy to obtain a new permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) so that its political role in world affairs becomes more commensurate with its economic clout. The other major approach focuses on the Asia-Pacific rim where Japan is a founding member of the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and is regularly involved with ASEAN post-ministerial and senior officials' meetings. All of these activities, though of limited utility in resolving ongoing international conflicts, have raised Japan's diplomatic profile in regional affairs and gradually led to growing acceptance of a Japanese security role in East Asia independent of, though congruent with, the United States. Of the current regional security dialogues, Northeast Asia is least articulated. KEDO could form the basis for a broader regional mechanism. However, the two countries that are potential flashpoints for Northeast Asia are not involved. North Korea is a KEDO recipient but not part of the decision making group. And, Taiwan has no representation in any official regional security forum. Informally, Japan, the ROK, and the United States are now meeting regularly to coordinate policy with respect to North Korea's nuclear power plants and its ballistic missile capabilities. Whether these efforts evolve into a broader-gauged regional security mechanism remains to be seen.

Paradigms Lost: Japan´s Asia Policy in a Time of Growing Chinese Power

China's rise is forcing a reassessment of Japan's post-Cold War Asia policy. After 1985, a variety of factors pushed Tokyo to pursue closer ties with its regional neighbours. Deepening economic ties with the region, frustration with the dominance of American power, and fear of a weakening U.S. commitment to the region all pushed Japan in a new direction. In the early 1990s, Tokyo sought to expand its leadership profile in the region, and played a central role in the creation and development of Asia's regional institutions. By the middle of the decade, however, Chinese - as well as North Korean - actions had dampened Japanese enthusiasm for an Asia-centred foreign policy. Still, lingering frustration with U.S. dominance will prevent a complete return to the American fold. Japan will continue to pursue close ties with its Asian neighbours, but balancing Chinese influence will assume an ever-larger place in Tokyo's strategy: Introduction As the Cold War ended, the eyes of the world were turned towards Japan. After nearly four decades of remarkable economic growth, Japan had become one of the world's richest nations. Despite its growing wealth, however, Tokyo had developed little political influence of its own. Throughout the Cold War, domestic political forces and the close alliance with the United States had constrained Japan's diplomatic options. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, expectations grew that Japan would cast off these restraints and slowly emerge as a major -- and more independent -- force on the world stage. The natural focus of Japan's expanding political profile, it was thought, would be East Asia. Japanese trade and investment in the region had been expanding dramatically since the mid-1980s; it was only natural that political influence would follow. To many in the United States, this trend was worrisome. American observers warned that the alliance would be difficult to manage and maintain, with Tokyo focusing increased energy on closer ties with its neighbours. [1] Within U.S. defence circles, there was growing concern that support for the alliance in Japan was eroding. Others predicted the emergence of a tripolar world, with competing regional superblocs centred on the United States, Germany, and Japan. [2] Nearly ten years later, these fears appear vastly overdrawn. Japan has not emerged as Asia's champion, although its political profile in world affairs continues to grow. Washington and Tokyo have taken impressive steps to strengthen their bilateral alliance, confounding analysts who had earlier predicted its demise. And although a united Europe -- and its currency, the Euro -- may ultimately present a threat to American economic pre-eminence, East Asia is anything but a unified bloc poised to compete for global supremacy. The apparent demise of Japan's Asian ambitions can be traced to a number of internal factors: the Japanese economy's extended period of stagnation, which weakened Tokyo's credibility in the region; the domestic political turmoil that followed the collapse of Liberal Democratic Party rule in 1993, which forced Japan to turn inward; and the absence of effective leadership and vision at the top. Strategic variables were also of critical importance to Japanese decision-making. In the course of a few short years, the optimism that characterized Japanese views of East Asia's future, and of Japan's role in it, faded significantly. As a series of events rocked the region in the mid-1990s -- ranging from the crisis surrounding North Korea's nuclear programme to China's military exercises in the Taiwan Strait -- Japanese leaders began to reassess the promise of strengthened ties with East Asia. Growing doubts about long-term Chinese intentions in particular have forced Japan to recalculate its nascent Asia strategy an d to place renewed emphasis on ties with the United States. These trends do not imply that Tokyo will simply return to the patterns of Japanese foreign policy during the Cold War, however. …

Japan's Role in the Asia Pacific

Japan's Role in the Asia Pacific

Japanese Policy and the East Asian Currency Crisis: Abject Defeat or Quiet Victory?

The abiding impression of Japan's involvement in and response to the East Asian currency crisis is one of sorry failure. Japan stands accused of purveying a defective developmental state model of growth to the East Asian states--over-dependent for its functioning upon exports, inflows of capital, and lack of transparency in governance--and then proceeding to undermine this model due to its own domestic economic difficulties and neglect of the economic welfare of other countries in the region. In addition to triggering the onset of the crises, Japan is also believed to be culpable for prolonging them by providing inappropriate economic leadership in the region--represented most clearly by its failed proposal for the AMF and its reluctance to stimulate its domestic economy and act as the primary absorber of East Asian exports. As a consequence, Japan's position of economic dominance and nascent political leadership role in the region is seen to be under attack following the currency crises. This research paper, whilst agreeing that Japan has not necessarily provided effective crisis management or short term rescue packages for East Asia, attempts to re-evaluate some of the criticisms of Japan's role and argues that over the longer term Japan is continuing to exercise considerable covert economic leadership in the region. Examination of Japanese policy-makers' perceptions of the East Asian crisis reveals that they see the region as hit above all by currency crises which have transmuted into economic ones, but that the basic model of export and FDI-powered growth in the region is still fundamentally sound. Moreover, Japanese policy-makers contend that Japan is neither responsible for the occurrence of the crises, nor are the U.S.-prescribed solutions of the expansion of domestic demand in Japan likely to hold the key to the immediate restoration of growth in East Asia. Instead, they quietly lay the blame for the crises upon China for undercutting the competitiveness of East Asian exports and moving ahead of the NIES-4 in the regional production cycle. Hence, Japanese policy-makers have acted to support the IMF in its approach to eliminating speculative bubbles and restoring good financial management in the region, but have directed their own efforts to attempts to re-gear the existing developmental model through the extension of trade and financial credits, and the technology necessary to improve the competitiveness of East Asian exports and to enable these economies to move up the production chain. The paper then moves on to show how these policies have gradually begun to work in Japan's favor, as it has been able to restore a measure of confidence in Japanese economic leadership, to slow the onslaught of convergence theory on the East Asian developmental model, and to set its own agendas in multilateral approaches to the crises. Hence the final outcome of the economic crisis in East Asia may actually be the strengthening of the Japanese model of capitalism, the position of Japanese corporations, and developmental state model, rather than the defeat of these actors and concepts as many commentators have predicted.

JAPAN'S NEW SECURITY ROLES AND ROK-JAPAN RELATIONS

Abstract Enlargement of Japan's security role and strengthening of Japan-U.S. alliance are prompting expectations toward security cooperation between South Korea and Japan. Supporting such expectations are propitious developments such as the exchange of visits by President Kim Dae Jung and Prime Minister Obuichi Keizo in 1998 and 1999. Nevertheless, security cooperation between the two nations seems destined to be limited, if not doomed, due to psychological barriers still lingering on. Of course, the initiatives visualizing expansion of Japan's international security role can be interpreted in two ways: compelled reaction pulled by the American arm twisting to make mercantilist Japan pay more for international security, or voluntary initiative pushed by Japan's unspoken but die-hard ambition towards becoming a politico-military power more in proportion to its techno-economic capability. For South Korea, Japan's uncleared war liabilities such as the problem of war comfort women, increasing assertiveness o...

Japan's role in overcoming the Indonesian economic crisis

The prospects for economic recovery in Indonesia depend partly on economic improvement in the other countries of the Asia‐Pacific region, says Sujatmiko, Counsellor of the Indonesian Embassy in Tokyo. If Japan were successful in generating a strong domestic economic recovery, that would in turn help Asia's recovery. The Japanese government's quick and positive response to the financial crisis in Indonesia has been greatly appreciated, although not without its problems. Notably, other major powers have wanted to play a significant role in saving Asia, and some regional rivalry has surfaced. For Japan, Sujatmiko says, the biggest obstacle against taking a leading role has been its closest ally, the United States.

Japan's fiscal policy and the East Asian financial crisis

Japanese economic policy has been identified as one possible cause of the East Asian financial crisis that began in July 1997. In this article, Yoichi Okita, Professor of Economics at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, discusses Japan's role in the recovery of East Asian economies. Can and should Japan contribute to that recovery? To what extent is the recession in Japan an important cause of slow recovery in the region? Okita explores and develops the concept of economic policy coordination. Although changes in the Japanese economy were not the origin of the East Asian crisis, he says, prolonged stagnation in Japan is, nevertheless, a drag on the economies that are in trouble. However, one country's fiscal actions alone cannot solve the crisis; rather, all countries in the region should work together to redress the problem.

The Road to the Kyoto Conference: An Assessment of the Japanese Two-Dimensional Negotiation

AbstractThis article analyzes Japan's dual role in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. It argues that the successful conclusion to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol can be partly attributed to Japan's dual role as negotiator and mediator. As the host of the Kyoto Conference, Japan undertook the mediator's role prior to and during the conference negotiation process. At the same time, as a participant to the conference, Japan took a negotiator's role to meet its own interests in the negotiations. Despite its initial position as a self-interested negotiator like any other country, Japan ended up in a different position than expected because of its broader role as mediator. By reviewing Japanese efforts to bring the protocol negotiations to a successful conclusion, the article examines the dynamics of the two dimensions of mediation and negotiation in international treaty-making.

Japan's Role in the Cambodian Peace Process: Diplomacy, Manpower, and Finance

Research Article| June 01 1998 Japan's Role in the Cambodian Peace Process: Diplomacy, Manpower, and Finance Yasuhiro Takeda Yasuhiro Takeda Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (1998) 38 (6): 553–568. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645839 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Yasuhiro Takeda; Japan's Role in the Cambodian Peace Process: Diplomacy, Manpower, and Finance. Asian Survey 1 June 1998; 38 (6): 553–568. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2645839 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1998 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The Korean financial crisis: Causes, impact on FDI, and implications for Central Asia

Through the Asian financial crisis, many key international economic issues have come to the forefront the stability of the international financial system under the IMF, “Asian values”, the universal validity of the Asian Economic Development Model, China's leadership in the regional world economy, Japan's role in the region, and the immunity of Greater China from the current financial crisis. Currently, most Asian countries seem eager to redress structural problems involving the government sector, banking, and corporate governance. In the process of this full scale restructuring, Korea must reevaluate its economic relationship with Central Asia. This paper argues that Korean financial crisis stems basically from the system failure. Furthermore, since a small open economy carries with it intrinsic vulnerabilities, the government should be more careful in securing optimal foreign exchange, opening capital markets based on the economy's absorption capacity. In this respect, the banking industry should be run based on the profitability of capital. Once banking industries are distorted by the practice of government‐led policy loans, it is more difficult to correct those customized distortions. The banking industry should play a larger role as the “brain of the economy”, sensing abnormalities of the economy. Moreover, in today's increasingly interdependent global economic system, no single country can solve its problems without close coordination of its policy with the outside world. An early warning system to signal financial instability would help developing economies in modernizing and strengthening their domestic financial institutions and would also work as a supplement to the IMF standby fund. Also, human resource management has proven too important to be neglected. Central Asia could derive lessons from the above Asian “failure”, not the Asian “miracle”, to avoid inappropriate policies and to deepen its economic development.

Japan's Role in the Cambodian Peace Process: Diplomacy, Manpower, and Finance

Japan's Role in the Cambodian Peace Process: Diplomacy, Manpower, and Finance

Globalization, Agriculture, and Rural Social Change in Japan

Increasingly, globalization is being used to conceptualize ongoing transformations in agrofood production systems. One focus is to understand how globalization expresses itself at the local level. In this paper I contribute to the examination of this issue by analyzing how Japan's agrarian sector is being altered as a consequence of increased activity on the part of transnational corporations. By doing so, I address the question of whether Japan's national agricultural production system is being globalized, despite its comparatively unique agrarian history and Japan's role in the global agrofood trading system as a major food importing, rather than an exporting, nation. The evidence presented demonstrates that transnational firms are beginning to expand their presence in Japanese agricultural commodity production. As these are transnational firms, and as the result of this process is to force Japanese agriculture to compete against foreign agricultures for its ‘home’ market, it is argued that this process indicates that Japanese agriculture is being globalized, although in a manner that does reflect an adaptation to local conditions.

Beyond self‐defense: Japan's elusive security role under the new guidelines for US‐Japan defense cooperation

During the Cold War, Japan's foreign policy was greatly influenced by the strategic policy of the United States. Since the Cold War's end, US strategic policy has changed significantly, which in turn has led to Japan's re‐evaluation of its own security policy. This can be clearly seen in the adoption of the 1997 Guidelines for US‐Japan Defense Cooperation. While the guidelines are designed to realize an expanded Japanese role in bilateral cooperation to promote regional peace and stability, domestic and regional support of the bilateral alliance as a stabilizing force in the Asia‐Pacific remains elusive. This paper examines the new guidelines and contentious issues their adoption has raised regarding Japan's expanded security role in the Asia‐Pacific region.