Paradigms Lost: Japan´s Asia Policy in a Time of Growing Chinese Power

Abstract

China's rise is forcing a reassessment of Japan's post-Cold War Asia policy. After 1985, a variety of factors pushed Tokyo to pursue closer ties with its regional neighbours. Deepening economic ties with the region, frustration with the dominance of American power, and fear of a weakening U.S. commitment to the region all pushed Japan in a new direction. In the early 1990s, Tokyo sought to expand its leadership profile in the region, and played a central role in the creation and development of Asia's regional institutions. By the middle of the decade, however, Chinese - as well as North Korean - actions had dampened Japanese enthusiasm for an Asia-centred foreign policy. Still, lingering frustration with U.S. dominance will prevent a complete return to the American fold. Japan will continue to pursue close ties with its Asian neighbours, but balancing Chinese influence will assume an ever-larger place in Tokyo's strategy: Introduction As the Cold War ended, the eyes of the world were turned towards Japan. After nearly four decades of remarkable economic growth, Japan had become one of the world's richest nations. Despite its growing wealth, however, Tokyo had developed little political influence of its own. Throughout the Cold War, domestic political forces and the close alliance with the United States had constrained Japan's diplomatic options. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, expectations grew that Japan would cast off these restraints and slowly emerge as a major -- and more independent -- force on the world stage. The natural focus of Japan's expanding political profile, it was thought, would be East Asia. Japanese trade and investment in the region had been expanding dramatically since the mid-1980s; it was only natural that political influence would follow. To many in the United States, this trend was worrisome. American observers warned that the alliance would be difficult to manage and maintain, with Tokyo focusing increased energy on closer ties with its neighbours. [1] Within U.S. defence circles, there was growing concern that support for the alliance in Japan was eroding. Others predicted the emergence of a tripolar world, with competing regional superblocs centred on the United States, Germany, and Japan. [2] Nearly ten years later, these fears appear vastly overdrawn. Japan has not emerged as Asia's champion, although its political profile in world affairs continues to grow. Washington and Tokyo have taken impressive steps to strengthen their bilateral alliance, confounding analysts who had earlier predicted its demise. And although a united Europe -- and its currency, the Euro -- may ultimately present a threat to American economic pre-eminence, East Asia is anything but a unified bloc poised to compete for global supremacy. The apparent demise of Japan's Asian ambitions can be traced to a number of internal factors: the Japanese economy's extended period of stagnation, which weakened Tokyo's credibility in the region; the domestic political turmoil that followed the collapse of Liberal Democratic Party rule in 1993, which forced Japan to turn inward; and the absence of effective leadership and vision at the top. Strategic variables were also of critical importance to Japanese decision-making. In the course of a few short years, the optimism that characterized Japanese views of East Asia's future, and of Japan's role in it, faded significantly. As a series of events rocked the region in the mid-1990s -- ranging from the crisis surrounding North Korea's nuclear programme to China's military exercises in the Taiwan Strait -- Japanese leaders began to reassess the promise of strengthened ties with East Asia. Growing doubts about long-term Chinese intentions in particular have forced Japan to recalculate its nascent Asia strategy an d to place renewed emphasis on ties with the United States. These trends do not imply that Tokyo will simply return to the patterns of Japanese foreign policy during the Cold War, however. …