Israeli Supreme Court Research Articles

עקרון החוקיות: חזק על חלשים <br>The Principle of Legality: A Paper Principle

תקציר בעברית: המאמר עוסק בספרו החדש של בועז סנג'רו, ביקורת דיני העונשין הישראליים (2020). לאחר תיאור חשיבותו של הספר ותרומתו, המאמר מתמקד בעקרון החוקיות, אחד העקרונות המפורסמים ביותר בדיני העונשין. סנג'רו מתייחס לדרישותיו השונות של העיקרון: הדרישה שאיסורים יהיו רק בחוק או מכוחו, הדרישה לפומביות החוק, הדרישה שהחוק הפלילי יחול מכאן ואילך, הדרישה להגדרה ברורה ומפורטת של האיסור, והדרישה לפרשנות מצמצמת. המאמר דן בכל אחת מהדרישות באופן מפורט וביקורתי, תוך הרחבה על שתי הדרישות האחרונות, שלעתים קרובות אינן מתקיימות במשפט הישראלי. המאמר יסקור איסורים מרכזיים שרחוקים מלהיות בהירים, ופסיקה עליונה בולטת שרחוקה מפרשנות מצמצמת. המאמר מציע שהמשפט הפלילי הישראלי נאמן לעקרון החוקיות כמעט רק במקרים שבהם נאמנות כזו אינה כרוכה בפגיעה באינטרס הציבורי, וקורא לרפורמה מקפת בחלק הספציפי של חוק העונשין. English Abstract: This article revolves around Boaz Sangero's latest book, Critique of the Israeli Criminal Law (2020). After describing the book's importance and contribution, this article focuses on the famous principle of legality in the substantive criminal law. Sangero addresses the various requirements of the principle: the requirement that prohibitions will be set only by the legislator, the requirement that all laws are made public, the requirement that new laws apply prospectively, the requirement that prohibitions are elaborate and clear, and the requirement for narrow interpretation of criminal prohibitions. This article discusses each requirement critically, elaborating on the last two, which are often denied by the criminal law in Israel. It illustrates diverse central prohibitions, which are far from clear, alongside famous verdicts by the Israeli Supreme Court, which are far from narrow interpretation. This article suggests that the Israeli criminal law is faithful to the principle of legality only in cases in which such faithfulness does not come at the expense of the public interest in conviction.

The Changing Role of Judicial Review during Prolonged Emergencies: The Israeli Supreme Court during COVID-19

This paper explores the role of the Israeli Supreme Court in exercising judicial review of COVID-19 control measures. It argues that the Court exhibited changes in its review methods and an adaptation of its role (and its demands from the other branches of government) throughout this prolong crisis. At the first stage, the Court focused on protecting institutional democratic safeguards, while exercising judicial restraint and greater deference than usual in its substantive review of the content of COVID-19 measures. The second stage, as time has passed, was characterized by greater judicial intervention, and growing propensity to hold COVID-19 measures unconstitutional, based on a combination of stricter substantive judicial review and an increased demand for an evidentiary and scientific basis to justify infringement of rights. The Israeli case therefore demonstrates the question of the changing role of judicial review in general (and of evidence-based judicial review in particular) during prolonged emergencies.

Kafka After Kafka: Dialogical Engagement with His Works from the Holocaust to Postmodernism ed. by Iris Bruce and Mark H. Gelber

Reviewed by: Kafka After Kafka: Dialogical Engagement with His Works from the Holocaust to Postmodernism ed. by Iris Bruce and Mark H. Gelber Abigail Gillman Iris Bruce and Mark H. Gelber, eds., Kafka After Kafka: Dialogical Engagement with His Works fr om the Holocaust to Postmodernism. Studies in German Literature, Linguistics, and Culture. Rochester: Camden House, 2019. 231 pp. Kafka After Kafka contains eleven remarkably productive and thoughtful essays by a mix of well-known and younger Kafka scholars. The introduction opens by cataloguing the global artistic reception of Kafka, from the Japanese Kōbō Abe, to South Africa's Achmat Dangor, to dramatic works by Alan Bennett (Kafka's Dick) and Sally Clark (The Trial of Judith K.). The editors claim that much recent art inspired by Kafka is about "violence and humiliation" at the expense of the "modest, elegant, playful, ironic Kafka of real life" (3). Not so in these pages, where the "dialogical engagement" promised in the title prevails. The chapters open up fruitful new connections and perspectives, which yield original interpretations of works we thought we already knew. The volume began as a conference at Ben-Gurion University, and the section devoted to "Kafka in the Israeli Cultural Space"—an exciting new avenue of Kafka research—is a highlight. Like all the excellent volumes in this Camden House series, the book is carefully researched and well ommitted, with detailed footnotes and an index. A strength of the collection is the authors' recounting of postwar cultural and intellectual history. Caroline Jessen's essay on Werner Kraft's 1968 Franz Kafka: Durchdringung und Geheimnis recounts the career of this German Jewish man of letters. Like Scholem and Benjamin (whom he knew), Kraft viewed Kafka as a writer of parables, and so he sought to "wrest Kafka away from literature." Jessen calls the book "an itinerary of reading" (19) that takes the form of "interweaving of literary text and commentary" (20)—a style evocative of rabbinical writing but also of great works of retrieval motivated by loss, such as Benjamin's Passagenwerk. Amir Engel analyzes Hannah Arendt's lesser-known Kafka essay ("Franz Kafka: A Revaluation," in Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954)—one of the first she published in German after World War II. Arendt finds in Kafka a source of optimism: Even as The Trial and The Castle depict totalitarian societies, worlds of "made-up necessity," the two protagonists are "truth-tellers," who resist simply by asserting their humanity. [End Page 133] Two chapters make critical contributions to Kafka's contemporary reception in Israel. As an Israeli Arab writer, journalist, and television writer who writes in Hebrew (now living in the United States), Sayed Kashua is the quintessential insider/outsider. As Iris Bruce demonstrates, Kashua incorporates many of Kafka's themes, both in the novel Second Person Singular (the basis of the film A Borrowed Identity) and in "Herzl Disappears at Midnight," which features an Arab-Israeli, Gregor Samsa. Bruce proposes, "Kashua's postmodern metamorphoses are fluid, predictable, humorous, and ultimately have a didactic function" (126). Mark H. Gelber offers a new perspective on the trial to determine the fate of newly discovered Max Brod's Nachlass. Moving beyond the question of whether the Israeli Supreme Court's decision to award the collection to the Israeli National Library is just, Gelber wonders whether there is also "poetic justice" in retaining Kafka's manuscripts in the Jewish State rather than in Marbach. The question becomes an occasion to reassess Kafka's Zionism or, more exactly, the numerous aspects of Zionism with which Kafka did connect. Two chapters break new ground by opening up Kafka's influence on lyric poetry. Poet Tali Latowicki examines the Kafkan sensibilities of two challenging Hebrew poets, the modernist Ya'akov Steinberg and the postmodern Hezy Leskly, neither of whom is well known in translation. In this series of powerful close readings, Latowicki finds that the three writers "share the same suspicion toward 'natural' symbolic expression. They also share the same wish [ … ] to create an antilanguage, a language that is united with the concrete. As part of this utopian project, the writer himself must undergo a metamorphosis of some sort. He has to die in...

Critical coverage: How the media criticize supreme courts—Evidence from Israel

AbstractThis paper examines media criticism of the Israeli Supreme Court from 2002 to 2011 in two newspapers. We analyze the nature and patterns of press criticism in different contexts by 1) distinguishing between diffuse and specific criticism and 2) by analyzing criticism separately from political framing and the tone of the article. We find that the increase in diffuse criticism and political framing over time was often balanced with counter‐criticism, resulting in a neutral or even positive tone toward the Court. This complex picture enables a more sophisticated understanding of the nature and implications of criticism of supreme courts in the press.

The Unintended Negative Effect of Positive Complementarity

Abstract Ending impunity cannot be achieved by international criminal tribunals alone. Therefore, it is important that states will take a significant part in these efforts. The principle of complementarity is aimed to incentivize states to conduct domestic criminal proceedings against alleged perpetrators of international crimes. This article calls for a broader examination of the way in which the principle of complementarity incentivizes domestic actors. It argues that beyond the potential positive effect of complementarity on domestic criminal law, the shadow of the International Criminal Court creates a negative incentive for domestic courts to intervene in constitutional and administrative cases that examine general conduct of hostilities cases. The paper demonstrates this negative effect by examining a shift in the attitude of the Israeli Supreme Court in conduct of hostilities cases. In addition, the paper discusses the ways in which domestic courts attempt to regain their reputation following their increased deference in conduct of hostilities cases.

Israel and International Law: The Indigenous Concept in Supreme Court Rulings

In 2007, a majority of UN member states adopted a declaration regarding the rights of indigenous people. The declaration acknowledged a series of indigenous rights but failed to provide a concrete definition of who is indigenous. As a result, the term remained vague, open to interpretation and manipulation, and led to confusion and controversy. In Israel mean-while the indigenous concept found a foothold in public discourse. The Israeli Supreme Court (ISC) first encountered the concept when Negev Bedouin citizens claimed indigenous land rights. Two years later, the ISC applied the same concept in a series of judgments regarding the status of the permanent residents of East Jerusalem. The article examines the way the international indigenous discourse has penetrated ISC rulings and analyzes the phenomenon in light of the judicial activism discourse.

The Strategic Common Law Court of Aharon Barak and its Aftermath: On Judicially-Led Constitutional Revolutions and Democratic Backsliding

Abstract There is renewed scholarly interest in studying the dynamics of constitutional revolutions and the explanations for the rise of constitutional courts around the world. At the same time, there is growing discussion of democratic backsliding and concern that democracies are exhibiting extremism, weakening of opposition forces and constitutional courts, and violations of civil and political rights that are pertinent to vibrant democracies. Scholars try to study both phenomena and understand the relationship between them. Israel is an important case study for both agendas. This Article analyzes the jurisprudence of Aharon Barak, one of the greatest jurists of our time with a worldwide reputation for revolutionizing both Israeli constitutional law and comparative constitutional law. It explains the tactics and strategy used by Barak to revolutionize Israeli constitutional law on issues of reasonableness, proportionality, standing, justiciability, constitutional review, equality, and supra-constitutional law. It reveals how each revolution paved the way for the next. It offers explanations for the effectiveness of these judicially-led revolutions as well as possible bases for their legitimation. Barak was a common law judge and ultimately treated parliamentary sovereignty as a doctrine arising from common law and constrained by common law, though he never quite put it in these terms. The Article concludes with explanations for the political backlash experienced by the current Israeli Supreme Court that some have characterized as democratic backsliding. It argues that the Court contributes to the development of law as part of a dialog and interaction between the different branches of government. As the Court operates within these dynamics, it must understand and take into account the institutional, political, and social environments in which it operates to preserve legitimacy and achieve efficacy. Barak was a strategic player that laid foundations for an expansive judicial power, but his Court was very prudent in utilizing that power. His successors may have contributed unintentionally to the backlash against the Court by following Barak’s substantive jurisprudence, but not necessarily his prudent tactics and strategy.

Accounting for Those in the Hands of the Belligerent: Security Detainees, the Missing and the Dead in the Israeli–Hamas Conflict

Abstract Five Israeli nationals, two soldiers and three civilians, have gone missing since the 2014 Israeli–Hamas violent escalation, and they are currently held incommunicado by Palestinian armed groups in the Gaza Strip. In response, the Israeli Government revoked some entitlements from Hamas security detainees held in Israel. It also withholds bodies of Palestinian militants, killed while carrying out attacks against Israelis, refusing to hand them over to the families. The bodies are to be buried in Israel until Israeli nationals, or their remains, are repatriated by Hamas. In several instances where the authorities returned the remains to the next of kin, they imposed various restrictions on the funeral arrangements. The Israeli Supreme Court recently examined the Government’s practices, with some judges finding them unlawful. These developments call for the analysis of the matter under the law of armed conflict (LOAC), taking into account that other States involved in armed conflict encounter similar challenges. This article accordingly discusses some of the legal obligations arising when persons, or their remains, are believed to be in the hands of the belligerent party. It also considers the legality of certain measures taken to promote their repatriation.

Can Institutions Make Voters Care about Corruption?

Voters’ punishment of corrupt politicians at the ballot box is oftentimes modest, at best. Recent studies suggest that this minor electoral sanctioning is due to limited corruption information and to the relative weakness of integrity considerations in voting behavior. We demonstrate that anticorruption measures taken by elite institutions—in this case, the Israeli Supreme Court—in close proximity to an election can increase electoral sanctioning by enhancing the importance of integrity considerations, holding corruption information fixed. We use the variation in incumbent integrity across time and space to identify the effect of an exogenous anticorruption decision by the Supreme Court on voting (study 1). We further test this effect in a novel survey experiment, with mayoral performance satisfaction as the dependent variable (study 2). Both studies demonstrate that judicial bodies have the capacity to influence electoral behavior by enhancing the importance of integrity considerations, holding corruption information constant.

The diminishing status of international law in the decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court concerning the Occupied Territories

Abstract This article examines the attitude of the Supreme Court of Israel towards international law in the past decade, focusing on cases concerning the Occupied Territories. It compares the decisions of the past decade to those of the preceding decade, which were characterized as developing a “jurisprudence inspired by international law.” The article argues that the status of international law in decisions that regard the Occupied Territories has, overall, declined. While the international law of occupation still operates, officially, as the governing law in the Occupied Territories, the emphasis on compliance with the norms of international law in the Court’s decisions has decreased. Instead of relying on international law, the Court has increased its reliance on Israeli administrative law, and, in recent years, on Israeli constitutional law. As a result, the distinction between the Occupied Territories and Israel is blurred. The article argues that this shift is consistent with a deliberate eradication of the distinction between Israel and the Occupied Territories by the legislator and the government. While the article does not argue that the Court intentionally supports this eradication, it does argue that it facilitates it.

Can the Court normalize the exception in non-emergency cases? Palestinian cases before the Israeli Supreme Court

Abstract The leading legal literature published after 9/11 recognizes the exception only in emergency. These writings follow the concept that “necessity knows no law” and, as Manin puts it, “security is the only acceptable principle” which justifies arbitrary coercion in liberal theory. Although Carl Schmitt criticized such liberal legal writing, including Hobbes’s sovereign, in that it does not recognize the power of the political identity, Schmitt’s sovereign also appears to decide on the exception only in “extreme emergency.” Accordingly, the judiciary’s political role is marginalized as the court always arrives too late, due to the urgent need to respond immediately. Based on this literature, court decisions always fall within the realm of legality, especially in non-emergency cases. In this article, I argue that the exception also appears in non-emergency cases and that the judiciary plays a serious role in normalizing the exception when the government acts without any legislative authorization. I further argue that these judicial decisions tell us about the very essence of the state’s political identity as it is linked to the authorities’ understanding of the state’s sovereignty. The case study that I examine is Israeli Supreme Court decisions that deal with cases brought by Palestinian citizens of Israel concerning territoriality claims, such as the right of property and the right to live in specific places with basic services. These cases were decided after the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty in 1992, which is considered to be part of the “constitutional revolution” in Israeli legal discourse.

The Israeli judiciary-centered constitutionalism

Abstract The article argues that over the years a series of gradual developments has taken place in the judicial review policies of Israel’s Supreme Court, whereby the Court expanded its ad hoc discretion in determining the constitutional limits that apply to primary legislation. Israeli constitutionalism has become judiciary-centered. The article suggests that judicial discretion that the Israeli Supreme Court tends to exercise in constitutional matters is of two types: substantive judicial discretion, which concerns the interpretation or application of the law; and adjudicative discretion, which includes both the discretion to deny in limine petitions in which the Court does not deem it necessary to grant relief according to considerations such as standing or delay; and the Court’s discretion in the manner of the hearing. The article suggests three illuminations of Israeli judiciary-centered constitutionalism: expenditure of the justices’ awareness of their discretion; the decline of the rules structuring judicial discretion; and a re-rise of the justices’ recognition of legitimacy of adjudicative discretion due to the expansion of substantive judicial discretion.

What’s with Formalism? An Empirical Study of Various Predictors and Profiles of Supreme Court Rhetoric

This paper identifies the concomitants of legal formalism in Israeli Supreme Court decisions by analyzing 2086 opinions from 1950-2013. The paper is the first to present an empirical, multi-faceted approach to formalism, that examines patterns of legal rhetoric in relation to the nature of the case and the type of decision. Our findings suggest that reliance on legal rules still remains the most common expression of legal reasoning, although judicial rhetoric is constantly changing, and fluctuates in time and in relation to fields of law, as well as in reference to other textual elements. The deviation from formalist rhetoric in terms of references to judicial discretion, and rationales based on policy were more prevalent in public law cases handled by the High Court of Justice and in criminal appeals than in civil cases. In addition, we found an intricate interplay between the various aspects of formalism. It is the emphasis on formalisms, rather than a single binary view of formalism or its lack, and on a large number of predictors gleaned from a variety of empirical approaches, that is the unique contribution of this study.

Interview with Omar Shakir

In late November 2019, the Israeli Supreme Court upheld the Ministry of Interior's order to deport Human Rights Watch (HRW) director for Israel and Palestine, Omar Shakir. The court based its decision on a 2017 amendment to Israel's 1952 Entry into Israel Law enabling the government to refuse entry to foreigners who allegedly advocate for the boycott of Israel. The same law was invoked to deny entry to U.S. congresswomen Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar in the summer of 2019. The campaign against Shakir began almost immediately after he was hired by HRW in 2016, and the court's decision marked the culmination of a multi-year battle against the deportation order. In this interview, JPS Editorial Committee member, Rutgers University professor, and author Noura Erakat discusses the details of his case with Shakir in an exchange that also examines the implications of the case for human rights advocacy, in general, and for Palestinians, in particular. The interview was edited for length and clarity.

Developing High‐Quality Data Infrastructure for Legal Analytics: Introducing the Israeli Supreme Court Database

Driving discovery in the study of law and legal institutions often requires infrastructure in the form of databases and other tools. The challenge is how to build the infrastructure. For obvious reasons, transplanting coding rules and variables from one dataset to the next is perilous; specialized knowledge of local conditions is necessary before one piece of datum is collected. Also required is adherence to a universal set of principles that distinguish high‐quality infrastructure; namely, that the tool is capable of addressing real‐world problems, accessible, reproducible and reliable, sustainable and updatable, and foundational. These principles guided construction of the Israeli Supreme Court Database, new and original infrastructure encoding information from all panel cases opened between 2010 and 2018 in the Israeli Supreme Court.

Israel's Bilateral Agreements with Source Countries of Migrant Workers: What is Covered, What is Ignored and Why?

The article explores the variety of matters that bilateral labor agreements (BLAs) could and should regulate for the protection of migrant workers, and then asks what led Israel, in the BLAs that it signed with source countries of migrant workers, to put such emphasis on protecting migrants during their recruitment (and especially to unsure non-payment of excessive recruitment fees) yet show so little concern in protecting them while in Israel and on their way back home. Three distinct theses are presented as possible explanations to this ostensible discrepancy: the care thesis (Israeli civil servants sincerely cared for the special hardships that recruitment fees inflicted on migrant workers on their way to Israel); the pressure thesis (the American State Department and the Israeli Supreme Court compelled Israel to address recruitment fees via BLAs), and the control thesis (Israeli Ministry of Interior realized that excessive recruitment fee payments curtail its power over migrant workers – as Courts are reluctant to confirm deportation of migrants who did not cover the cost of the recruitment fees that they paid – hence acted to eliminate such payments). Based on these three theses, the article also explores what could potentially motivate Israel to expand its future BLAs, in a way that they would not only protect migrants on their way to Israel, but also while they are in the country and on their way back home.

The Schmitelsen Court: The Question of Legitimacy

AbstractIn recent years, a new creature has emerged on the institutional landscape: The Schmitelsen Court. This court is the end-product of a combination of the positions presented by Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt in their famous debate over the institutional identity of the guardian of the constitution during the Weimar years. The Schmitelsen guardian is a court thus fulfilling Kelsen’s vision of the constitutional court as the guardian of the constitution. Nevertheless, it possesses the mission, the means to achieve it, and the source of legitimacy that Schmitt envisioned for the president as the guardian of the constitution. In this Article, I focus on the Schmitelsen Court’s source of legitimacy that differs greatly from the traditional source of judicial legitimacy that Kelsen envisioned for the guardian. Whereas Kelsen viewed legal expertise as the guardian’s source of legitimacy, Schmitt viewed public support as filling this role. After analyzing these two positions, I explain why it is vital for the Schmitelsen Court to harness public support as its source of legitimacy. I proceed by examining how the Schmitelsen Court model manifests itself in three case studies. In the US, Alexander Hamilton—in The Federalist No. 78—raised the notion of the guardian of the constitution long before Schmitt and Kelsen. He designated the judiciary as the guardian and ascribed its source of legitimacy to expertise. After describing how in recent decades the US Supreme Court adopted the Schmitelsen understanding of judicial legitimacy, I turn to examine the Israeli Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights. The relevance of these latter two courts stems not only from their adoption of the Schmitelsen Court’s understanding of judicial legitimacy, but also from the strong influence of the Weimar lessons on their evolution into Schmitelsen guardians.

Introduction to Adalah Petition to Israel's High Court of Justice

Introduction to Adalah Petition to Israel's High Court of Justice Ilan Troen and Natan Aridan In order to ensure a useful and appropriate range of views regarding the "Basic Law: Israel—The Nation-State of the Jewish People," we sought to present the perspective of an important segment of the Arab population in Israel that objected to this legislation through an appeal to Israel's Supreme Court (High Court of Justice). However, we were unable to obtain an essay in parallel to those submitted in this special section by individual scholars. Nevertheless, on the advice of the leadership of Adalah—The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, we were directed to a legal petition they submitted to the Supreme Court to nullify the law in which they played a major role in composing. While the Court ultimately denied their appeal, this document stands as an articulate and deeply informed position fundamentally critical of the legislation. The brief is replete with legal reasoning based on precedents in Israeli courts as well as those of other countries as well as legal scholarship within and beyond Israel. That made for a document which is more than ten times as extensive as the abbreviated version found here. We commend to readers who wish to invest themselves in a more comprehensive examination of the opposition to this Basic Law to read the brief itself. Adalah has provided an English translation that is found on its website: https://www.adalah.org/uploads/uploads/Jewish_Nation_State_Law_Petition_English_Final_October_2018.pdf Adalah has also provided a brief summary that can be found through its website: https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/9569 We have removed in our abbreviated version the legal scholarly apparatus, largely in the form of extensive footNotes. We have selected key passages that we trust convey the gist of the argument against the legislation. We apologize for the shortcomings in the selections. Caught between the limitation of space available in the journal and the need to present as best we can a diversity of views, we nevertheless hope to have provided a needed service to our readers. [End Page 228] Copyright © 2020 Ben-Gurion University of the Negev and Ben-Gurion Research Institute for the Study of Israel and Zionism

פרוצדורה ומהות בתובענות ייצוגיות בעילת מחיר מופרז: כלים שלובים להרתעה אופטימלית <br>Procedure and Substance in Excessive Pricing Class Actions: A Combined Approach for Realizing Optimal Deterrence

תקציר בעברית: המאמר מראה כיצד יש להפעיל כלים פרוצדורליים ומהותיים על מנת ליישם, במסגרת תובענה ייצוגית, את האיסור על בעל מונופולין לגבות מחיר מופרז. הוא מבקר את עמדת היועץ המשפטי לממשלה (להלן: היועץ) שהוגשה במסגרת בקשת רשות הערעור של החברה המרכזית למשקאות קלים בפרשת גפניאל בבית המשפט העליון. בפרט, המאמר מראה כי עילת המחיר המופרז אינה חריגה בהשוואה לעילות אחרות בחוק התחרות, לא מבחינת מטרותיה ולא מבחינת הדרך הראויה ליישומה, מורכבות היישום שלה, והשלכותיה. אופן היישום הראוי של העילה הוא באמצעות רובד כלכלי, המשווה בין המחיר שגבה המונופול לבין המחיר התחרותי, ורובד משפטי, שבו על בית המשפט להכריע אם הפער בין המחיר שנגבה למחיר התחרותי הוא מופרז. המאמר מראה כי אין זה ראוי להלביש מושג שסתום נוסף, הגינות, על גבי מושג השסתום של מופרזות המחיר. עוד הוא מראה כי אחת הטעויות של היועץ היא שמחד גיסא הוא מציע לאמץ את האיסור, אך מאידך גיסא הוא מאמץ את כל טענות מתנגדי האיסור, שאותן המאמר מפריך. טעות נוספת של היועץ היא שהוא מניח, ללא ביסוס, כי העלות החברתית של טעות של בית המשפט לרעת המונופול גדולה מהעלות החברתית של טעות של בית המשפט לרעת הצרכנים. במקום זאת, המאמר מציע כי בית המשפט יאזן, במקרה נתון, בין החששות משני סוגי הטעויות באמצעות חלוקת הנטלים ורף ההוכחה בשלבים השונים של ההליך, באמצעות נתח השוק, הפער מהמחיר התחרותי ומשך ההפרה. המאמר מפריך את גישת היועץ שלפיה יש להוציא קטגוריות שלמות של מקרים מגדר האיסור, ומראה שאין לגישה זו אחיזה בחוק או בפסיקה האירופית. המאמר מצביע על היחס הראוי בין עמדת רשות התחרות לבין הדין החל על אכיפה פרטית של האיסור.. English Abstract: This article explains how substance and procedure should be combined to implement, in the context of class actions, the antitrust prohibition on excessive pricing by monopolistic firms. The article demonstrates the similarity between this prohibition and other antitrust prohibitions, both with respect to their objectives and with respect to their implementation. The article criticizes the amicus curie brief submitted by the Israeli Attorney General to the Israeli Supreme Court in the appeal over the District Court’s decision to certify a class action against the supplier of Coca Cola in Israel (the Gafniel decision). Implementation of the prohibition on excessive pricing should use a two prong test: the first prong consists of economic analysis that compares the price charged by the monopolistic firm with the competitive price, and the second prong consists of legal analysis, in which the court decides whether the difference between the price charged and the competitive price is excessive. The article shows that adding an additional vague test of “unfairness” of the price, is unwarranted. The article further claims that an erroneous certification of a class action against a monopolistic firm does not necessarily create a larger social loss, compared to erroneously denying a justified certification motion. Instead, the article proposes that the court should balance, in any given lawsuit, the relevant error costs by allocating the burden of proof and setting a proper standard of proof in each of the separate stages of the class action proceedings. Such balancing can be applied by using the dominant firm’s market share, the difference between the price charged and the competitive price, and the duration of the alleged violation. The article criticizes the Advocate General’s de facto claim that a whole set of categories of cases should be exempt from the prohibition, and shows that this claim is inconsistent with the Law in Israel and in the EU. The article further elaborates on the appropriate relationship between public enforcement by the Israeli Competition Authority and the private enforcement in class actions.

הלכת א.ש.י.ר. בחלוף עשרים שנה -בחינה אמפירית <br>A.Sh.I.R. Celebrates Twenty: An Empirical Study

תקציר בעברית: בשנת 1998 ניתן פסק דינו של בית המשפט העליון בעניין א.ש.י.ר., בו נקבע כי דיני הקניין הרוחני אינם יוצרים, באופן עקרוני, הסדר שלילי, כך שניתן לעיתים לזכות בסעד מכוח דיני עשיית עושר ולא במשפט בגין חיקוי תוצר רוחני גם כאשר לא מתקיימת הפרה של זכות קניין רוחני ספציפית. פסק הדין תואר כפסק דין דרמטי, ועורר ביקורת רבה. בפרט, הובע חשש כי ההלכה שנקבעה בו תוביל להרחבה בלתי מוצדקת של זכויות הקניין הרוחני ותיצור אפקט מצנן בתחום החדשנות. מאז מתן פסק הדין נשמעו קריאות רבות לביטול ההלכה, לרבות מצד היועץ המשפטי לממשלה בעמדה שהוגשה לאחרונה לבית המשפט העליון. מחקר זה מבקש להעריך באופן אמפירי את השלכותיה של הלכת א.ש.י.ר., באמצעות בחינה דו שלבית, כמותית ואיכותית. בשלב הראשון נבחנו כלל ההחלטות של בתי המשפט המחוזיים ובית המשפט העליון שניתנו במהלך עשרים השנים שחלפו מאז בהם הועלתה טענה לעשיית עושר ולא במשפט בהקשר של תוצרים רוחניים. בשלב השני בוצע ניתוח איכותי של המקרים דמויי א.ש.י.ר, בהם ניתן סעד מכח עשיית עושר ולא משפט, בהעדר זכות קניין רוחני ספציפית. הממצאים העיקריים העולים מבדיקה זו הם כי בניגוד לתחזיות הקודרות, הלכת א.ש.י.ר., באופן בו יושמה על ידי בתי המשפט, לא גרמה לרעידת אדמה בתחום הקניין הרוחני. מתוך מאות פסקי דין והחלטות שעסקו בקניין רוחני ועשיית עושר ולא במשפט, מסתבר כי המקרים דמויי הם מועטים מאוד, וניתן לסווגם לכמה קטגוריות בולטות, שבהן קיים או היה קיים קושי ממשי בדיני הקניין הרוחני, ונדרש גישור בינם לבין המציאות. החשש לפריצת גבולות, שהעסיק את המבקרים, התממש לכל היותר במקרים ספורים. לעומת זאת, ובמקביל, נעשה לאחרונה שימוש מפתיע בדיני עשיית עושר ולא במשפט דווקא כאמצעי להגבלת זכויותיו של בעל הקניין הרוחני ולעידוד התחרות. ממצאים אלה מצביעים על כך שהלכת א.ש.י.ר מהווה בעיקר מכשיר לכיול הדין ולמילוי פערים בהקשרים בהם נדרשים גמישות או גישור בין החוק לבין המציאות הדינאמית, ואינה פוגעת פגיעה קשה באיזונים שנקבעו על ידי המחוקק בתחום הקניין הרוחני. הדבר מחייב הערכה מחודשת של הקריאות לביטול ההלכה. English Abstract: In 1998, in the landmark case of A.SH.I.R., the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the law of unjust enrichment applies alongside intellectual property law. Thus, a plaintiff can seek recovery against an imitator based on unjust enrichment even in the absence of a valid intellectual property claim. The judgement was described as a dramatic development in Israeli private law and triggered much controversy. One of the major concerns was that the ruling would result in an unjustified, indirect, expansion of intellectual property rights, beyond their recognized statutory limitations, and would yield a chilling effect in the field of innovation. Accordingly, there were numerous proposals to overrule the decision, including in a recent Attorney General position submitted to the Supreme Court. This study seeks to empirically evaluate the implications of A.SH.I.R., after the lapse of twenty years from the original decision. We first perform a quantitative analysis, and examine all Supreme Court and District Courts’ decisions rendered during the twenty years period, where an unjust enrichment claim was raised with respect to imitation of intellectual products. We then proceed to a qualitative analysis, focusing on A.SH.I.R.-like cases, where the unjust enrichment claim was upheld, despite the absence of intellectual property protection. We find that, contrary to the gloomy predictions, the A.SH.I.R. case, as applied by the courts, did not cause an upheaval in the field of intellectual property. Out of more than four-hundred decisions concerning intellectual property and unjust enrichment, the number of decisions where the unjust enrichment claim was upheld despite the absence of a specific IP right is very low. Moreover, these cases can be classified into several distinct categories, where there was a noticeable shortcoming in the Israeli intellectual property landscape. The major concern voiced by the critics, that courts would unduly expand the boundaries of intellectual property protection through unjust enrichment, was only observed in two or three cases. On the other hand, the law of unjust enrichment was recently used by one court in a ‘reverse’ manner, as a means to restrict intellectual property rights and promote competition. We discuss these findings against the notions of certainty, flexibility, and unintended consequences, and conclude that they necessitate a reevaluation of the calls to overrule the A.SH.I.R. decision.