Island Accident Research Articles

Labor Productivity and Work Sampling: The Bottom Line

This paper describes the relationship between labor productivity and direct work as reported in work‐sampling studies. Seven data bases, collected primarily from nuclear‐power‐plant construction projects, are used. Investigations of a 30‐project data base show that direct work is better in the winter than during the rest of the year, is best during the start‐up and testing phase, and has improved since the Three Mile Island accident. It is concluded that these results are illogical. Using linear regression models, the paper shows that direct work is not related to productivity. This conclusion is based on three assumptions: Reducing wait time leads to increased direct‐work time, increased direct‐work time leads to better productivity, and better productivity is accompanied by less time spent waiting. Each assumption is tested, and the model statistics show very poor correlations and predictive capabilities. The most reliable data base, consisting of 46 data points, yielded an ra2 value of 0.00 and a stand...

Analysis of Ex-Core Neutron Detector Response during a Loss-of-Coolant Accident

In this paper the experimental response of ex-core neutron detectors during both actual and simulated loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) at a pressurized water reactor are analyzed to determine their cause. Various analytical techniques are used to reproduce the ex-core detector response during large-break LOCAs. These techniques include both discrete ordinates transport and point kernel calculations. The experiments analyzed include large-break LOCA experiments at the Loss of Fluid Test Facility and from the Three Mile Island accident. The results show that an adiabatic method is sufficiently accurate to reproduce the detector response. This response can be explained in terms of the combined effects of changes in shielding and multiplication that occur in a core during a LOCA.

Computer applications for control room operator support in nuclear power plants

Abstract The Three Mile Island accident which happened in 1979 made the nuclear power plant control room a major focus for the studies of human factors, human reliability, and man-machine interface technology. Since then, there has been a steady growth of computer-based operator support system development and implementation in the USA. The most notable ones are; the Safety Parameter Display System, signal validation for sensors, the digital feedwater control system, and expert systems. This paper describes these systems, the challenges of implementation, and the trend of introducing intelligent systems in the future, providing the technology basis for new light water reactor (LWR) designs.

Authors

Authors

The Three Mile Island Analysis Exercise

The Three Mile Island (TMI) accident represents the only full-scale integrated facility data for a severe nuclear power reactor accident. As a result of this accident, an extensive, worldwide effor...

Journalism's failure on nuclear power information

By means of a questionnaire the public's decision-making as to the acceptability of nuclear power for generating electricity was assessed in the United States. The public was asked to give their opinion about (1) the radiation expectancy from nuclear power industry compared to the natural radiation, (2) the Three Mile Island accident, and (3) how the risks of nuclear power compare with other common risks (non-nuclear). The outcome was related to the values as obtained from probabilistic risk assessment. The public opinion obviously shows an overreaction due to its misinformation via the basic public channels; a responsibility of journalism.

Implementing Externally Induced Innovations: A Comparison of Rule-Bound and Autonomous Approaches

This research analyzed how nuclear power plants implemented safety review innovations introduced by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission after the Three Mile Island accident. The findings suggested th...

Differential Paths to Political Activism: Comparisons of Four Mobilization Processes after the Three Mile Island Accident

Differential Paths to Political Activism: Comparisons of Four Mobilization Processes after the Three Mile Island Accident

IMPLEMENTING EXTERNALLY INDUCED INNOVATIONS: A COMPARISON OF RULE-BOUND AND AUTONOMOUS APPROACHES.

This research analyzed how nuclear power plants implemented safety review innovations introduced by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission after the Three Mile Island accident. The findings suggested th...

Differential Paths to Political Activism: Comparisons of Four Mobilization Processes After the Three Mile Island Accident

Differential Paths to Political Activism: Comparisons of Four Mobilization Processes After the Three Mile Island Accident

Chernobyl retrospective

On April 28, 1986 heavy radioactive fallout from an unknown source was reported from Sweden. Later, it was discovered that two days earlier, a nuclear power reactor at Chernobyl, in the Soviet Union, had exploded releasing an enormous cloud of effluent containing 40 million Ci of 131I, 3 million Ci of 137Cs, and 50 million Ci of xenon radioisotopes. This far exceeded the 15 Ci of 131I escape in the notorious Three Mile Island accident. Chernobyl reactor IV, of an antiquated design, was a graphite-moderated reactor which suffered a steam explosion when the operating staff attempted an experiment involving preservation of safety functions during a planned shutdown. Following the explosion, a fire started in the graphite core which required ten days to control. Thirty-one persons died, two in the initial explosion and 29 of various combinations of thermal and radiation burns, and gamma irradiation. Existing emergency plans were invoked involving treatment on the scene and evacuation of seriously injured patients to a special hospital in Moscow, as well as to nearby Kiev. Later, 135,000 residents of the immediate neighborhood were surveyed and evacuated after fallout radiation levels began to rise. Fallout patterns around Europe and the northern hemisphere were closely tracked. Consequences of the accident in human and monetary terms will require years of evaluation. Although the United States has no power reactors of the Chernobyl type, the country does have a radiation disaster management plan, often rehearsed at the state level. As a consequence of Chernobyl certain international agreements dealing with radiation disaster information and management have been forged.

Nuclear Power and Technological Authoritarianism

When the lid blew off the Chernobyl No. 4 nuclear reactor on April 26, 1986, it released the largest quantity of radioactive material ever in one technological accident. The estimated 28 megacuries of escaping gases dwarfed the less than one megacurie released in the 1957 Windscale (U.K.) accident and the 17 curies from t.he l 979 Three Mi le Island (U.S.) accident. One hundred thirty-thousand people within a 30 kilometer radius were evacuated, and 300-400 million people in l.') nations were put at risk of radiation exposure. Present forecasts of additional cancer deaths attributable to the Chernobyl accident range from 5,000 to 75.000 (Byrne and Rich, 1987: 4).

The Shoreham saga

Twenty years of technical, regulatory, political, and economic obstacles to the construction and activation of the Long Island Lighting Company's nuclear plant at Shoreham, New York, are described. The original plans for the Shoreham plant and the decision to upgrade the reactor rating from 540 MW to 820 MW are examined, as are the ensuing community opposition and regulatory problems. The additional problems created by regulatory changes in the wake of the Three Mile Island accident and the stepped-up community opposition are described. The political issue underlying the Shoreham controversy are also examined.

Mental health effects of the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor restart.

Controversy over potential mental health effects of the Three Mile Island Unit-1 restart led the authors to examine prospectively the pattern of psychiatric symptoms in a sample of Three Mile Island area mothers of young children. Symptom levels after restart were elevated over previous levels; a sizable subcohort of the sample reported relatively serious degrees of postrestart distress. History of diagnosable major depression and generalized anxiety following the Three Mile Island accident, plus symptoms and beliefs about personal risk prior to the restart, best predicted postrestart symptoms.

Nuclear Power and Technological Authoritarianism

When the lid blew off the Chernobyl No. 4 nuclear reactor on April 26, 1986, it released the largest quantity of radioactive material ever in one technological accident. The estimated 28 megacuries of escaping gases dwarfed the less than one megacurie released in the 1957 Windscale (U.K.) accident and the 17 curies from t.he l 979 Three Mi le Island (U.S.) accident. One hundred thirty-thousand people within a 30 kilometer radius were evacuated, and 300-400 million people in l.') nations were put at risk of radiation exposure. Present forecasts of additional cancer deaths attributable to the Chernobyl accident range from 5,000 to 75.000 (Byrne and Rich, 1987: 4).

The Three Mile Island Accident: Diagnosis and Prognosis

"The Three Mile Island Accident: Diagnosis and Prognosis." Nuclear Science and Engineering, 96(3), p. 262

Evacuation planning for Lilco's Shoreham plant: Lack of an approved emergency evacuation strategy may prevent full operation of a $5 billion nuclear power plant on long Island's north shore

The role of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents in fostering a demand for evacuation plans for areas surrounding nuclear reactors is discussed. The controversy over evacuation planning for the Shoreham plant is described, and the political and practical factors involved are examined.

Effect of Pressurizer Sizing on the Turbine Trip Transient

Following the Three Mile Island accident, a number of suggestions were offered for improving the safety of nuclear power plants. Many of these approaches involve increased dependence on complex and sophisticated safety systems and control technologies. An alternative approach to increased safety is explored; this approach involves the maximization of inherent safety features and minimization of safety and control system action. Specifically, the effects of changing pressurizer size and surge line configuration are examined to determine if the operation of the power-operated relief valve (PORV) could be eliminated during a turbine trip transient in a pressurized water reactor. The study is accomplished using the RETRAN-02 thermal-hydraulic analysis code. The results show that the opening of the PORV could be eliminated if the pressurizer size was doubled and the PORV setpoint increased slightly.

Radiation Accidents and the Role of the Physician: A Post-Chernobyl Perspective

No longer can it be said that no one has died from radiation in a nuclear power plant. Until the Chernobyl accident, the nuclear power industry had an enviable health record compared with that of oil-fed or coal-fired power plants that generate electricity. However, the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident in 1979 was a warning shot across the bow of the nuclear industry. This April, a direct hit occurred at Chernobyl. What have we learned in the seven years between these accidents? What have we done to improve the management and reduce the risk of a radiation accident at a nuclear power plant? What efforts have we made to educate ourselves and the public about the likelihood of nuclear incidents and accidents, and to minimize their health effects? Has activist sentiment against nuclear power perhaps been so strident that nuclear advocates have been coerced into defensively denying that any health

Radiation accidents and the role of the physician: a post-Chernobyl perspective

No longer can it be said that no one has died from radiation in a nuclear power plant. Until the Chernobyl accident, the nuclear power industry had an enviable health record compared with that of oil-fed or coal-fired power plants that generate electricity. However, the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident in 1979 was a warning shot across the bow of the nuclear industry. This April, a direct hit occurred at Chernobyl. What have we learned in the seven years between these accidents? What have we done to improve the management and reduce the risk of a radiation accident at a nuclear power plant? What efforts have we made to educate ourselves and the public about the likelihood of nuclear incidents and accidents, and to minimize their health effects? Has activist sentiment against nuclear power perhaps been so strident that nuclear advocates have been coerced into defensively denying that any health