1 Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, Spring 2010 From Colonialism to Neo-Colonialism: Nationalism, Islam, and the Cultural Framing of Conflicts in Afghanistan Nathaniel A. Davis* Afghanistan has endured frequent invasions by imperialist and neoimperialist powers. During the century and half, there have been five major incidents of Afghan resistance, if the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 is included. Their disturbing regularity ensured that each generation of Afghans relayed to the next vivid memories of foreign violence done to their country. This idealized historical Afghan resistance to foreign incursions. The British invasions in 1839 and 1878 sparked two rival sets of cultural conflict framing: that of civilization against tribal savagery, and Islamic piety versus infidel aggression. However an examination of contemporary British writing on the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars reveals that these conflicts were not as stridently polarized as they appear. Despite proliferating some of the ugliest Orientalist stereotypes and assertions, these sources highlight significant shifts in British imperialist thinking on Afghanistan and South Asia. They also suggest the emergence of a nascent Afghan nationalism in the late nineteenth century. Defining resistance to infidel aggressors in terms of Muslim identity enabled Afghans to repress sectarian, tribal, and ethnic divisions. This compelled Britain to accept the consolidation of a *Nathaniel Davis is a Delyte and Dorothy Morris fellow and History PhD student at Southern Illinois University Carbondale. A US Army veteran and linguist, trained in Serbian/Croatian, German, and Pashto. He earned his BA in Religion Excelsior University and his MA from American Military University (Charles Town, WV, 2009), his research interests are cultural exchange and politics in imperial contexts in Asia and the Middle East. 2 2 Amalendu Misra, “The Taliban, Radical Islam, and Afghanistan,” The Third World Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2002), 5. 3 Sana Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), 211-217. 4 John Alfred Gray, At the Court of the Amir of Afghanistan (London: Kegan Paul, 2002), 500. 5 Abdur Rahman, Life of Abdur Rahman, 179, 182. historically imagined Afghanistan, between 1880 and 1881, under Amir Abdur Rahman. The British appeared defeated, yet only 13 years later, in 1893, they imposed the Durand Line upon the Amir, gaining through negotiation what they nearly lost by force of arms: a weak and fractured Afghanistan which posed virtually threat to the security of British India. Despite the glaring injustice of this settlement, it highlights an important shift in imperial discourse, one which US policymakers ought to heed. The monographs of M. Hassan Kakar, Amin Saikal, Olivier Roy, and Sana Haroon outline the recent historiographical context and indicate a measure of consensus on at least one issue: the intractable problems of Afghanistan cannot be solved while non-Muslim troops continue to occupy Afghanistan. In 2002, one scholar suggested that by the time the Taliban had asserted control in Afghanistan, “nationalism had truly and fully dissipated.”2 However, while civic nationalism may seem to have dissolved in Afghanistan because of the Soviet and US invasions, it has only merely re-submerged into Islamic identities that have formed the backbone of Afghan national consciousness, waiting for an opportunity. In her work, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland, Sana Haroon has demonstrated the historical continuity of Islam as political powerhouse in the Pashtun tribal regions, its tremendous clout wielded by local religious leaders, such as mullahs, mirs, and muftis.3 Before the establishment of the Durand line, this meant that Pashtuns, when united, controlled all of Afghanistan as we know it today and more. British infidel aggression bolstered Afghan religious framing of the conflicts. British intervention in the Anglo-Afghan wars also exacerbated ethnic conflict, tracing a Pashtun veneer over Afghan nationalism during its early twentieth century development. Even this is ambiguous, as the language at court was Persian (Dari); Pashto was deprecated as “unfit” for the royal household.4 However, while Abdur Rahman spoke and wrote Persian, he reveals that he also spoke Pashto, and favored the language in battle, particularly in giving his men orders while in the presence of non-Pashto (Dari/Persian, English) speakers.5...
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