Human Law Research Articles

HUME: A Re-evaluation (review)

114. REVIEW HUME: A Re-evaluation, edited by Donald W. Livingston and James T. King. Fordham University Press, New York. Pp.421. $25.00 cloth, $8.50 paper. This volume contains, besides a useful introduction by Livingston and a name index, nineteen papers by eighteen authors, arranged into six sections. The description "a re-evaluation" rouses hopes that are satisfied in various ways. There are contributions covering the whole range of Hume's writings - epistemology, aesthetics, morals, politics and history - so that the volume provides a perspective broader than most studies by a single author. Some papers discuss neglected topics, and many oppose the common view of Hume as a precursor of twentieth-century phenomenalism and positivism. The two contributions on Hume's moral philosophy, James King's "The Place of the Language of Morals in Hume's Second Enquiry" and Ronald Glossop's "Hume, Stevenson, and Hare on Moral Language", illustrate this last theme. King stresses the differences between the Treatise , which, by its emphasis on the psychology of the passions, lends itself to phenomenalist interpretation, and the Enquiry which, King argues, presents morality as an historical institution revealed in the workings of moral language. Glossop's paper then takes up this theme, and contrasts Hume's account of this language with two contemporary views. He suggests that Hume understands the moral point of view to be objective and "disinterested", and explains this in the Enquiry by appealing to the public nature of language. He contrasts this favourably with Stevenson's account whereby moral terms express essentially individual perspectives. Glossop favours the opinion that Hume did not propose what Hare calls "Hume's Law" about the derivation of "ought" from "is", and then draws ammunition from his interpretation of 115. Hume to attack Hare's requirement that naturalist definitions of virtue contain no terms having, even covertly, "evaluative meaning". This same section also contains a fine paper by Peter Jones on Hume's aesthetics, in which, like King and Glossop, the stress is on the objective nature of aesthetic judgments explained by reference to the language game of aesthetic appraisal and its historically fashioned form of life. Throughout the volume, Hume the historian is to the fore. Sheldon Wolin's "Hume and Conservatism" and Constant Noble Stockton's "Economics and the Mechanism of Historical Progress in Hume's History" discuss his place in the history of political and historical thought, while articles by Craig Walton and Douglass Adair relate him to political thought in America before and after independence. More generally, the editors use the idea of time, and especially the past, as a link between three other papers, Donald Livingston's "Hume's Historical Theory of Meaning", Antony Flew's "Infinite Divisibility in Hume's Treatise" and James Noxon' s "Remembering and Imagining the Past". Part II of Treatise Book I is rarely discussed in detail; but it cannot be said that Flew finds any reason especially to revise the usual judgment of Hume here. (See, for example, J. R. Lucas, A Treatise on Time and Space, pp. 26-30). The merit of his paper lies in the clarity of his account, and in his tracing the origin of Hume's problems . Neither can it be said that Noxon finds new merits in Hume's attempts to distinguish memory and imagination. Noxon gives a cautious endorsement to Hume's causal theory of remembering, but questions the application of the same model to the acquisition of historical beliefs. He remarks on Hume's apparently inconsistent use of "impressions" and "ideas" in the passage (T108) where he speaks of the reader receiving impressions from the conversation and books of travellers and historians, and, referring to the claim that without the authority either of the memory or 116. senses our whole reasoning wou'd be chimerical and without foundation (T83) , says that "Hume's statements give no unequivocal answer to our question of whose impressions are being talked about" ... "the historian's or the eyewitnesses 's?" (p. 279) . In fact, Hume is here talking about the impressions of neither, but about our own impressions on reading or hearing historical narratives. As a result, Noxon does not properly grasp what Hume's...

On Hume's Is-Ought Thesis

On Hume's Is-Ought Thesis

David Hume (review)

478 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY David Hume. By Nicholas Capaldi. (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1975. Pp. 241. $7.50) Professor Capaldi has taken Hume's profession in the Treatise to establish a new "science of man" very seriously indeed, and he intends to show us in this book how the "almost entirely new'" foundation of this science is thoroughly Newtonian. Hume, he tells us, was "the first philosopher to understand fully, to appreciate and to articulate the philosophical implications of Newtonian physics" (p. 50). Newtonian science is therefore the basis of Humean philosophy, and we should at once set aside the idea that this philosophy is in any way dependent on a preconceived theory of psychology. Even worse would be for us to accept the vulgar error that Hume failed to distinguish between psychology and logic. These are not the only myths Capaldi is intent on exploding, nor the only windmills at which he tilts. He tells us, among other things, that Hume should not be thought of as belonging to the Locke-Berkeley tradition; that Hume's theory of causation must not be regarded as having any connection with his theory of perception; that there is no problem of induction in Hume; that critics as distinguished as Popper and Passmore have been mistaken about Hume's explanation of "constant conjunction" (p. 124); that Hume was not a hedonist; that Hume was not concerned with the is-ought problem; that Hume does not deny the argument from design; and, finally, that we ought ourselves to be skeptical of Hume's alleged skepticism. Lest I give the impression that the book is a long series of refutations, let me give examples of the positive assertions: Hume should be seen as developing, albeit rather elaborately, a common sense theory of reality; Hume advances a naturalistic theory of ethics as well as of religion; Hume provides a scientific basis for the social sciences; and Hume provides a convincing psychology in his theory of the passions. The scope of this relatively short work is therefore rather extensive, and to achieve a tour de force of Hume's thought, Capaldi has organized his book tightly. After a brief glimpse at Hume's life, we are led, in successive chapters, to consider his view of philosophy, the Newtonian program of his work, the structure of the Treatise, the analysis of causation, his moral theory, the theory of the passions, and finally questions about his philosophy of religion and his alleged skepticism. Hume's first contact with Newtonian ideas was probably at Edinburgh University as an undergraduate; at any rate, by the time he comes to write the Treatise he is, according to Capaldi, self-consciously out to apply Newton's method to the "moral" subjects--ethics, psychology, and what we now call the social sciences. Hume begins by rejecting any kind of speculative metaphysics in the traditional, Aristotelian manner; he insists that philosophers, like physicists, must limit themselves to actual experience and concern themselves with experimentation along the lines laid down by Newton. The "Newtonian method" consists of six stages. The first is the identification and isolation of the objects of analysis. Hume's division of perception into ideas and impressions is his first move in applying the method. The second stage is experimentation; in Hume's case introspection and observation of human behavior provide this obligatory experimentation. The next stage consists of the working out of generalizations: Hume's theory of association corresponds to Newton's theory of the attraction of physical bodies. The fourth stage of the Newtonian program is to extend the theory to explain further phenomena: in Hume's case the theory of association is used as an explanatory principle throughout the Treatise. Finally, Newton's concern with momentum is reflected in Hume's theory of the transfer of vivacity, and both share a recognition of the inherent limitations of the reasoning faculty of man. Hume thus combines these procedures and principles of Newtonian science and applies them to philosophical investigation, placing this study on a new footing and dispelling the Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge(Oxford, 1888), p. xx. BOOK REVIEWS 479 them to philosophical investigation, placing...

Moral Theory and the Ought—Can Principle

Does 'ought' imply 'can'? Surely it does. For we do not hold a person to blame for not doing something he was unable to do.' On the other hand, surely it does not. For, if it did, the negation of a 'can'-statement would imply the negation of an 'ought'statement. And thus descriptive statements of the form 'A cannot do x' would imply normative statements of the form 'It is not the case that A ought to do x', in violation of Hume's law that descriptive statements do not imply normative statements.2 It looks, then, as though neither a negative answer (for the former reason) nor an affirmative answer (for the latter one)to our question is satisfactory. Let us try to find a way out of this antinomy. I begin by considering the latter part of the antinomy. A key point here is that, since 'ought' implies 'can', it follows that 'not-can' implies 'not-ought'. Now it might be argued that the difficulty is an illusory one, on the ground that

"Science and Values," by Joseph Grünfeld

"Science and Values," by Joseph Grünfeld

Science and Values Discussed at Moon-Sponsored Parley

Science and Values Discussed at Moon-Sponsored Parley

Academics Mull over Science and Values for the Bicentennial

Academics Mull over Science and Values for the Bicentennial

The "Is-Ought" Gap: Deduction or Justification?

The "Is-Ought" Gap: Deduction or Justification?

The Normative Status of Talcott Parsons' and David Easton's Analyses of the Support System

Le statut normatif du concept systémique de soutien politique chez Parsons et EastonOn peut concevoir un énoncé analytique, ou paradigme, comme un lien logique entre une proposition normative et une recherche empirique. Dans cette perspective, l'auteur analyse les énoncés théoriques systémiques formulés par Parsons et Easton concernant la notion de soutien politique afin d'éclairer les rapports logiques qu'ils entretiennent avec certains aspects normatifs du libéralisme classique. Il appert que les énoncés de Parsons, contrairement à ceux d'Easton, sont reliés aux concepts classiques d'égalité et de consentement. Cette différenciation théorique, qui a peu d'importance du point de vue de l'observateur d'un système politique, est capitale aux yeux du participant politique puisque c'est le rapport logique entre le paradigme et la proposition normative qui determine si les applications empiriques du paradigme seront jugées acceptables par le participant.

From `Is' To `Ought' via `Knowing'

Previous articleNext article No AccessDiscussionFrom `Is' To `Ought' via `Knowing'Edgar MorscherEdgar Morscher Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 83, Number 1Oct., 1972 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/291868 Views: 2Total views on this site Citations: 2Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1972 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Peter B. M. Vranas I OUGHT, THEREFORE I CAN, Philosophical Studies 136, no.22 (Jul 2007): 167–216.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9071-6Richard E. Crable Ethical codes, accountability, and argumentation, Quarterly Journal of Speech 64, no.11 (Jun 2009): 23–32.https://doi.org/10.1080/00335637809383409

Pain and Pain Behaviour

What is the connection between pain and pain behaviour? Is it logically necessary, or is it contingent? Or is it too complex to be classified in terms of this Humean dichotomy? Surely it is too complex, for if we say the relationship is a necessary one, we should, apparently, have to deny that there could be pain without pain behaviour, or pain behaviour without pain; yet stoicism and shamming pain occur. If we say that the relationship is not necessary and so contingent, we should have to say that the natural correlate or expression of pain might have been languor or jolly laughter, and, conversely, that wincing, grimacing, writhing, groaning, etc., might have been the natural correlate or expression of sensations quite different from pains. To avoid the first difficulty it could be said that necessary connections need not be invariant. To avoid the second, it might be pointed out that some contingent connections are less contingent than others, and that, in particular, causal relationships need not always be of the external, Humean kind. But even if these observations are correct they are difficult precisely because they attempt to soften and blur a distinction whose hardness and exhaustiveness is constitutive of its clarity and strength. If we modify Hume's law we may do so only after a careful examination of a case which forces us to do so.

The Is-Ought Question Reformulated and Answered

A recent collection of essays in ethics opens with the words: The central problem in moral philosophy is commonly known as the is-ought problem. How is what is the case related to what ought to be the case-statements of fact to moral judgments?' Given the truth of this contention, which nowadays appears to go uncontested, then it would seem that the ability of any ethical theory to deal with this central problem might be regarded as a strong argument in its support. My purpose in this paper is to show how the is-ought problem is interpreted and how it may be solved within the framework of ideal-observer theory.

Science and Values in Political "Science"

Science and Values in Political "Science"

Moore and "Is-Ought"

Contemporary ethical theory is marked by a certain set of questions that are often called meta-ethical. One of these meta-ethical questions relates to the possibility of defining the basic ethical terms of a particular theory. The historical basis for such a question, at least in the present century, is G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica. In particular, the notion of the naturalistic fallacy as developed by Moore in this book has great influence on present-day thinking about the possibility of defining basic terms. Yet there seem to be some basic misunderstandings about what Moore meant by the naturalistic fallacy. The purpose of the present paper is to investigate exactly what Moore meant by the naturalistic fallacy and also to look at one common interpretation of it-namely, the is-ought interpretation. Also the paper will compare the two to see if they are saying the same thing. Thus, there are three distinct sections to the paper: (1) the naturalistic fallacy according to Moore; (2) the is-ought problem; and (3) the relationship between Moore's views and the is-ought problem.

Hume's Law

Hume's Law Get access G. R. Grice, G. R. Grice Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar R. Edgley R. Edgley Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 44, Issue 1, 12 July 1970, Pages 89–120, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/44.1.89 Published: 30 July 2015

I. Fact and Value

What connexion is there between factual statements concerning God or man and moral judgments? That is the question which occasions this paper. Not long ago moral philosophers were wont to say that there is a logical gap between the two sorts of utterance to which I have just referred: that nothing follows in terms of moral value from a statement of fact, no ‘ought’ from any ‘is’. They recognised only one restriction on what may be said in terms of ‘ought’ by what has been said in terms of ‘is’, namely that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. It is manifest nonsense to say that anyone ought to do what he cannot do. But, this apart, they thought it possible without contradiction or anomaly to hold any conceivable factual belief and at the same time subscribe to any conceivable moral judgment. They would have held that it makes perfectly good sense to say, for example, ‘This is God’s will but it ought not to be done’ or ‘Men are not pigs but a good man will live like a pig’. Bizarre such judgments may be, they would have said, but nonsensical they are not. They conceived it to be their main business, as moral philosophers, to erect warning notices along the edge of the is-ought gap so that contemporary moralists would not fall headlong into it as so many of their predecessors, in less enlightened ages, had done.

Knowledge and Value in Plato

Knowledge and Value in Plato

Hume's Law and Hare's Rule

Hume's Law and Hare's Rule

Mr Strawson on the Notion of ‘Predicate’

dition is such a weak one that it does not make the conclusion trivial in any sense. (It is like concluding in the motor-car argument: if the relative situation of this car and the next one on the shop floor is irrelevant to their relative goodness, and they are exactly alike otherwise, then they are equally good.) The force of this conditional judgment is hardly less than that of V in our exact-likeness case. Lastly, we need not really spend sleepless nights on whether A and B can be relevantly alike. If they cannot, then Hare's principle of universalisability is empty of content. If they can, then more than one element in S can correspond to the same element in T, and the problem discussed here arises. A more formal statement of the proposition being proved here is: Either Hare's principle of universalisability is empty of content, or it conflicts with Hume's Law. I should emphasise that I am not arguing here against Hare's 'universal prescriptivism' which is certainly among the most fruitful approaches to ethical discussions. I am only objecting to combining this approach with a claim of strict adherence to Hume's celebrated 'law'. It does not worry me unduly to think that Hare's universal prescriptivism implies an 'existential naturalist' position, but it worries me to think that this implication is denied.

Knowledge and Value: Introductory Readings in Philosophy.

Knowledge and Value: Introductory Readings in Philosophy.