Mr Strawson on the Notion of ‘Predicate’

Abstract

dition is such a weak one that it does not make the conclusion trivial in any sense. (It is like concluding in the motor-car argument: if the relative situation of this car and the next one on the shop floor is irrelevant to their relative goodness, and they are exactly alike otherwise, then they are equally good.) The force of this conditional judgment is hardly less than that of V in our exact-likeness case. Lastly, we need not really spend sleepless nights on whether A and B can be relevantly alike. If they cannot, then Hare's principle of universalisability is empty of content. If they can, then more than one element in S can correspond to the same element in T, and the problem discussed here arises. A more formal statement of the proposition being proved here is: Either Hare's principle of universalisability is empty of content, or it conflicts with Hume's Law. I should emphasise that I am not arguing here against Hare's 'universal prescriptivism' which is certainly among the most fruitful approaches to ethical discussions. I am only objecting to combining this approach with a claim of strict adherence to Hume's celebrated 'law'. It does not worry me unduly to think that Hare's universal prescriptivism implies an 'existential naturalist' position, but it worries me to think that this implication is denied.