Human Law Research Articles

Can’t Bottom-up Artificial Moral Agents Make Moral Judgements?


 
 
 This article examines if bottom-up artificial moral agents are capable of making genuine moral judgements, specifically in light of David Hume’s is-ought problem. The latter underscores the notion that evaluative assertions could never be derived from purely factual propositions. Bottom-up technologies, on the other hand, are those designed via evolutionary, developmental, or learning techniques. In this paper, the nature of these systems is looked into with the aim of preliminarily assessing if there are good reasons to suspect that, on the foundational level, their moral reasoning capabilities are prone to the no-ought-from-is thesis. The main hypothesis of the present work is that, by conceptually analysing the notion of bottom-up artificial moral agents, it would be revealed that their seeming moral judgements do not have proper philosophical basis. For one, the said kinds of artifacts arrive at the understanding of ethically-relevant ideas by means of culling data or facts from the environment. Thus, in relation to the is-ought problem, it may be argued that, even if bottom-up systems seem prima facie capable of generating apparent moral judgments, such are actually absent of good moral grounding, if not empty of any ethical value.
 
 

Transitivity and Humeanism about Laws

Humeanism about laws has been famously accused of the explanatory circularity by David Armstrong and Tim Maudlin, since the Humean laws hold in virtue of their instances and, at the same time, scientifically explain those very instances. Barry Loewer argued that the circularity challenge rests on an equivocation: in his view, once the metaphysical explanation is properly distinguished from the scientific explanation, the circularity vanishes. However, Marc Lange restored the circularity by appealing to his transitivity principle, which connects the two types of explanation. Lange’s transitivity principle has been widely discussed and criticised in the literature. In view of counterexamples, Lange refi ned both the principle, by taking into account the contrastive nature of explanation, and the requirement of prohibition on self-explanation. Recently, Michael Hicks has developed a new strategy for defending Humeanism about laws from the refined circularity challenge, critically appealing to the contrastive nature of both explanations and meta-explanations. We will argue that his strategy fails.

The problem of nomological harmony

AbstractOur universe features a harmonious match between laws and states: applying its laws to its states generates other states. This is a striking fact. Matters might have been otherwise. The universe might have been stillborn in a state unengaged by its laws. The problem of nomological harmony is that of explaining the noted striking fact. After introducing and developing this problem, we canvass candidate solutions and identify some of their virtues and vices. Candidate solutions invoke the likes of a designer, axiarchic meta‐laws, multiverses, essential causal powers, and Humean laws.

A new circularity in explanations by Humean laws of nature

A new circularity in explanations by Humean laws of nature

Ethical Perspective of the Future Development of Law

Law, by its very nature, is human and humane. The humanity of law means that law is a product of man and is intended for man. The humaneness of law, however, means that human dignity and well-being must be the fundamental basis of law. Law, therefore, does not exist without a sufficient ethical foundation. The establishment of a state governed by the rule of law, and a legal culture based on it requires a particularly strong anchoring of law in ethical values. The greatest threats to ethics and law are (1) ethical deficits in areas of society on which law (co-)depends, (2) extreme authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, and (3) autonomous artificial intelligence capable of turning away from humans or even turning against and overcoming humans. In the first two cases, the humaneness of law is critically reduced or even extinguished; in the last case, both the humaneness and the humanity of law are extinguished, which is the worst possible scenario. All these dangers must be recognized in time and adequately averted, and regular efforts must be made to preserve the ethical values and the values of the rule of law.

Acceptable objectives of empirical research in bioethics: a qualitative exploration of researchers’ views

BackgroundThis is the first qualitative study to investigate how researchers, who do empirical work in bioethics, relate to objectives of empirical research in bioethics (ERiB). We explore reasons that make some objectives more acceptable, while others are deemed less acceptable.MethodsUsing qualitative exploratory study design, we interviewed bioethics researchers, who were selected to represent different types of scholars working in the field. The interview data of 25 participants were analyzed in this paper using thematic analysis.ResultsFrom the eight objectives presented to the study participants, understanding the context of a bioethical issue and identifying ethical issues in practice received unanimous agreement. Participants also supported other objectives of ERiB but with varying degrees of agreement. The most contested objectives were striving to draw normative recommendations and developing and justifying moral principles. The is-ought gap was not considered an obstacle to ERiB, but rather a warning sign to critically reflect on the normative implications of empirical results.ConclusionsOur results show that the most contested objectives are also the more ambitious ones, whereas the least contested ones focus on producing empirical results. The potential of empirical research to be useful for bioethics was mostly based on the reasoning pattern that empirical data can provide a testing ground for elements of normative theory. Even though empirical research can inform many parts of bioethical inquiry, normative expertise is recommended to guide ERiB. The acceptability of ambitious objectives for ERiB boils down to finding firm ground for the integration of empirical facts in normative inquiry.

From Trans-Disciplinary Research to Trans-Domain Approaches

The concept of transdisciplinarity refers to the historically grown organization of science – an issue of sociology of science – and hence is not suitable for epistemological concerns. Instead, it is proposed to broaden the concept and speak of Trans-Domain Approaches (TDAs). Domains are fairly homogeneous knowledge fields that are clearly distinct from other such fields on scientific grounds. A TDA consists either (a) in a General Theory (GT) that connects, integrates and transcends a set of Domain-specific Theories (DTs); or (b) for practical purposes, in an action model that describes how practitioners can deal with DTs in concrete situations, for which no general rules are available. The Is-Ought problem, an important topic in research and in practice, serves as example for the use of TDA. It is shown that Is and Ought are separate domains. In a decision how to act, practitioners need to take both Is and Ought into account and relate them with each other. Further, TDAs can form a hierarchy, which means that the DTs can become GTs of subordinate TDAs. Finally, it is argued that one single universal TDA does not make sense; rather, the TDA will depend on the research topic and the author’s theoretical background.

Fine-tuning and Humean laws: fine-tuning as argument for a non-governing account of laws rather than for God or multiverse

Many physics parameters need to be precisely set in order for life to exist in our universe. Or so says the fine-tuning argument. That the actual values are just right for life, the argument concludes, is a fact in need of deep physical or metaphysical explanation. Perhaps, the story goes, the parameter values settings are a matter of divine design. Or perhaps they result from a selection effect given our place in the “multiverse”. However, a very different approach to the problem is possible. One may argue that the fine-tuning is an artefact of theorizing: it is explicable as the precise balancing act necessary for compact, systematic representation in science. Given such an explanation and drawing on earlier work from a number of sources, this essay shows how fine-tuning is best understood as evidence for a non-governing conception of laws rather than for design or multiverse.

Are we free to make the laws?

Humeans about laws maintain that laws of nature are nothing over and above the complete distribution of non-modal, categorical properties in spacetime. ‘Humean compatibilists’ argue that if Humeanism about laws is true, then agents in a deterministic world can do otherwise than they are lawfully determined to do because of the distinctive nature of Humean laws. More specifically, they reject a central premise of the Consequence argument by maintaining that deterministic laws of nature are ‘up to us’. In this paper, we present a new argument for Humean compatibilism. We argue that Humeans about laws indeed have resources for defending compatibilism that non-Humeans lack (though not for the reasons typically discussed in the literature). Moreover, we show that utilizing these resources does not lead to objectionable consequences. Humeans about laws should thus embrace Humean compatibilism.

Building certain knowledge based on the intentional-consequential gap in uncertain surroundings

Aim: Develop a methodological approach to reduce uncertainty of knowledge necessary for decision making in quick changing surroundings. Research methods: The research method is heuristic supported by the research programme in Lakatos’ sense, specially designed for these purposes based on the good paradigm of minimization the intentional consequential gap (ICG). Findings: The ICG is an interesting object related to the “is-ought problem” in Hume’s sense, representing the difference of resulting consequences and achievements of the intention after its realization. Any kind of minimization of the ICG may be recognized as a good paradigm in Kuhn’s sense suitable to build certain knowledge in the uncertain surroundings. So, it is the base of research programme in Lakatos’ sense which is a kind of filter for certain judgements about facts. It is crucial for decision making processes based on uncertain information and knowledge. In this paper a methodology of introduction the research programme based on the minimum ICG is presented.. Currently this method of inferring may be used for building the certain knowledge about rationality of decisions regarding dealing with COVID-19. Value of the paper: The paper presents an original method of setting the criterion of rationality of any social projects and some axiological evaluations of, among other things, prognoses and strategies.

Normative Principles are Synthetic A Priori

AbstractI argue for the claim that there are instances of a priori justified belief – in particular, justified belief in moral principles – that are not analytic, i.e., that cannot be explained solely by the understanding we have of their propositions. §1–2 provides the background necessary for understanding this claim: in particular, it distinguishes between two ways a proposition can be analytic, Basis and Constitutive, and provides the general form of a moral principle. §§3–5 consider whether Hume's Law, properly interpreted, can be established by Moore's Open Question Argument, and concludes that it cannot: while Moore's argument – appropriately modified – is effective against the idea that moral judgments are either (i) reductively analyzable or (ii) Constitutive-analytic, a different argument is needed to show that they are not (iii) Basis-analytic. Such an argument is supplied in §6. §§7–8 conclude by considering how these considerations bear on recent discussions of “alternative normative concepts”, on the epistemology of intuitions, and on the differences between disagreement in moral domains and in other a priori domains such as logic and mathematics.

The is-ought gap and the substitution criterion

Ever since its formulation by Hume, the idea of an inferential barrier between non-ethical (“is”) propositions and ethical (“ought”) propositions (also known as Hume’s is-ought thesis) has received much philosophical attention. Prior’s Paradox appears to demonstrate that the ban on “is”-“ought” inferences is violated in every possible instance, from which it follows that Hume’s is-ought thesis must be false. In this article, I will formulate a logically rigorous version of Hume’s is-ought thesis, introduce Prior-style counterexamples, and suggest how they might demonstrate the falsity of Hume’s is-ought thesis, identify the substitution criterion, and develop at length the unrestricted and restricted versions of this criterion as it is applied by Pigden and Schurz. Thereafter, I will outline Schurz’s defence of the is-ought gap in accordance with his interpretation of the substitution criterion, before introducing a more sophisticated version of Prior-style objections, proposing a possible response from Pigden, identifying the costs of Pigden’s response and counter proposing a response on behalf of Schurz through an extension of his approach, and offering concluding remarks.

On the (in)significance of Hume’s Law

On the (in)significance of Hume’s Law

There Is No Distinctively Semantic Circularity Objection to Humean Laws

AbstractHumeans identify the laws of nature with universal generalizations that systematize rather than govern the particular matters of fact. Humeanism is frequently accused of circularity: laws explain their instances, but Humean laws are, in turn, grounded by those instances. Unfortunately, this argument trades on controversial assumptions about grounding and explanation that Humeans routinely reject. However, recently an ostensibly semantic circularity objection has been offered, which seeks to avoid reading such assumptions into the Humean view. This paper argues that the new semantic version tacitly relies on the familiar metaphysical one and, therefore, it ultimately brings nothing new to the table.

Hume’s Law as Another Philosophical Problem for Autonomous Weapons Systems

ABSTRACT This article contends that certain types of Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) are susceptible to Hume’s Law. Hume’s Law highlights the seeming impossibility of deriving moral judgments, if not all evaluative ones, from purely factual premises. If autonomous weapons make use of factual data from their environments to carry out specific actions, then justifying their ethical decisions may prove to be intractable in light of the said problem. In this article, Hume’s original formulation of the no-ought-from-is thesis is evaluated in relation to the dominant views regarding it (viz., moral non-descriptivism and moral descriptivism). Citing the objections raised against these views, it is claimed that, if there is no clear-cut solution to Hume’s is-ought problem that presently exists, then the task of grounding the moral judgements of AWS would still be left unaccounted for.

Explicative-Existencial Justificacion of Human Rights Analysis of Robert Alexy's Argument in Context of Is-Ought Problem

This paper analyzes Robert Alexy's explicative-existential justification of human rights. According to the author, there are two problems connected with this concept. It cannot establish human rights universally and explain why we should accept them. In the paper, these questions are addressed in the context of the Is-Ought problem. Alexy's approach is compared with other theories that strive for human rights justification (basic needs approach, capability approach, and the foundationalism of Alan Gewirth). The author finds that in this respect all other theories have similar disadvantages. The inability to adequately elucidate the transition from Is to Ought is a general problem in moral philosophy, and therefore cannot diminish the position of Alexy's justification in this context. Although his approach does not really meet certain absolute requirements for good justification, if we evaluate it in relation to other available alternatives, we have to acknowledge its significant place in the philosophy of human rights. Even with Alexy's theory, however, the problem persists that it establishes rights of human persons rather than rights of human beings. It is therefore not able to fulfill some of its universalist aspirations.

Non-Humean Laws and Scientific Practice

Laws of nature have various roles in scientific practice. It is widely agreed that an adequate theory of lawhood ought to align with the roles that scientists assign to the laws. But philosophers disagree over whether Humean laws or non-Humean laws are better at filling these roles. In this paper, I provide an argument for settling this dispute. I consider (epistemically) possible situations in which scientists receive conclusive evidence that—according to the non-Humean—falsifies their beliefs about the laws, but which—according to the Humean—does not falsify their beliefs about the laws. I argue that, in these possible scenarios, all law-related aspects of scientific practice would remain unchanged. In other words, scientists would treat the regularities “preferred” by the Humean as the laws of nature. On this basis, I conclude that non-Humean laws fail to align with scientific practice.

До питання про предмет адміністративного права у вітчизняній та європейських правових доктринах в умовах трансформаційних змін

У статті розглянуто предмет адміністративного права у вітчизняній та європейських правових доктри-нах в умовах трансформаційних змін. Зазначено, що вітчизняне адміністративне право, як і багато інших галузей права, піддалося серйозним трансформаціям, адже інтенсивна динаміка розвитку суспільних відно-син в умовах європеїзації та глобалізації дає імпуль-си для правової матерії, які спрямовані на розвиток і вдосконалення, а також виявлення нових, інновацій-них підходів до формування сучасної правової док-трини адміністративного права України. Акцентова-но на мобільності поняття «публічна адміністрація», яка змінює предмет адміністративного права, а також неможливості сформувати визначення цій галузі пра-ва. Наголошено, що визначення адміністративного права можливе тільки на основі аналізу реальних суспільних відносин, які регулюються нормами чинно-го законодавства, крізь призму їхнього правозастосу-вання та механізмів судового та позасудового захисту в разі їх порушення. Зроблено висновок, що вітчизня-на модель сучасного адміністративного права у частині визначення його предмета повністю відповідає тенден-ціям розвитку адміністративного права європейських країн відкритого типу. На формування його предмета в державах-членах Ради Європи (ЄС) вплинули дуа-лізм публічної адміністрації (поєднання управлінської складової частини із сервісною), гуманізація права загалом й адміністративного права зокрема, підвище-на увага до механізмів судового захисту прав людини (діяльності адміністративних судів), глобалізація, що проявляється в побудові мережевої адміністрації на основі договірних відносин; європейська інтеграція з третіми країнами, європеїзація (вплив ідей, принци-пів, підходів, що характерні для європейського адміні-стративного права та європейських країн).

The oldest solution to the circularity problem for Humeanism about the laws of nature

According to Humeanism about the laws, the laws of nature are nothing over and above certain kinds of regularities about particular facts (the “Humean mosaic”). Humeanism has often been accused of circularity: according to scientific practice laws often explain their instances, but on the Humean view they also reduce to the mosaic, which includes those instances. In this paper I formulate the circularity problem in a way that avoids a number of controversial assumptions routinely taken for granted in the literature, and against which many extant responses are therefore ineffective. I then propose a solution that denies the alleged Humean commitment that laws are explained by their instances. The solution satisfies three desiderata that other solutions don’t: it provides independent motivation against the idea that Humean laws are explained by their instances; it specifies the sense in which Humean laws are nonetheless “nothing over and above” their instances; and it gives an alternative account of what does explain the laws, if not their instances. This solution, I will argue, is not only the simplest but also the oldest one: it appeals only to tools and theses whose first appearance predates the earliest statements of the circularity problem itself.

Humean laws, circularity, and contrastivity

A well-known objection to Humean accounts of laws (e.g. BSA, Lewis in Australas J Philos 61:343–377, 1983, Philosophical papers vol. II, Oxford University Press, 1986) charges them with circularity (Armstrong in What is a law of nature? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p. 102; Maudlin in The metaphysics within physics, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p. 172). While the view has it that particular facts explain the natural laws, natural laws are often relied upon in order to explain particular facts. Thus, the Humean is committed to circular explanations—or so goes the argument. In this paper, I review two ways of dealing with the circularity objection against Humean views of laws. Then, by introducing a contrastive treatment of explanations, I put forward a new one, which, if it does not end up dethroning its competitors, I am hoping is still worth exploring.