Irish Republican Army Research Articles

Tiocfaidh ár Mná: Women in the Provisional Irish Republican Army

This article seeks to answer the question of who were the women of the Provisional IRA and to assess any demographic patterns of PIRA involvement. We use a multi-method approach to describe the many roles and functions of female members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army from 1970 to 1998. Drawing on a sample of 61 convicted or deceased PIRA members, we outline the shifting socio-demographic and operation profile of these women and how structural, tactical and strategic needs of PIRA accounted for those changes. Women in the Provisional IRA played crucial operational roles throughout the period both front-line and behind the scenes. From the outset of the conflict, women consistently took part in violent operations. We also provide a historical case study of Mairéad Farrell's PIRA career to provide further illustrations of these themes in greater detail.

Explaining Pathways to Armed Activism in the Provisional Irish Republican Army, 1969–1972

In this article three pathways into armed activism are identified among those who joined the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1972. The accounts of former volunteers generally suggest that for those who were already involved in the Republican movement before 1969, a trajectory of mobilization emerged because of the long-standing counterhegemonic consciousness present in their homes, which in turn strongly influenced them as committed Republican militants. For those who joined after 1969 and had previously been involved in other political activities, mobilization was a result of a particular transformative event that triggered the belief that armed struggle was the only approach capable of bringing change in the new sociopolitical situation of the time. For the majority, that is, those who joined after 1969 at a very young age without any previous involvement in organized networks of activism, it began as a more abruptly acquired sense of obligation to defend their own community and retaliate against the Northern Ireland establishment, the Loyalists, and the British army. Overall, the accounts of former volunteers generally suggest that Republican volunteers were fighting first and foremost to reclaim dignity, build honor, and instill a sense of pride in themselves and their community through armed activism. In these terms, the choice of joining the PIRA was justified not as a mere reproduction of an ideological alignment to the traditional Republican aim of achieving Irish reunification but as part of a recognition struggle. At an analytic level, this article illustrates the utility of a multimechanisms interpretative framework. And it contributes to broadening the empirical basis by presenting and analyzing a series of 25 semistructured interviews with former PIRA volunteers.

Guns First, Talks Later: Neoconservatives and the Northern Ireland Peace Process

The Northern Ireland peace process emerged from ‘behind the scenes’ when contacts between the British government and Sinn Féin were revealed in November 1993. On 31st August 1994, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) declared a ceasefire and in April 1998 the Good Friday Agreement achieved a power-sharing accommodation based on the moderate political parties. By 2003, the hardline Democratic Unionist Party was electorally dominant among unionists and Sinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA, among nationalists. Remarkably, in May 2007, the ‘hardline’ parties agreed to share power. The Northern Ireland peace process appears to represent an apparently successful case of two democratic governments—the British and Irish—negotiating with ‘the enemy’ to achieve a power-sharing accommodation. This success has led to various actors with competing political agendas claiming to have discovered ‘the lessons’ of Northern Ireland for other areas in conflict. The Labour government's ‘Orthodox’ interpretation suggests that it is always, or nearly always, a good idea to talk to the enemy. More recently, an ‘orthodox Neoconservative’ interpretation of the peace process has argued that Northern Ireland is the exception which proves the rule that it is almost never right to ‘talk to terrorists’ or ‘negotiate with evil’. These contrasting interpretations of the ‘Northern Ireland model’ are used by analysts and policy-makers to advocate talking or not talking to groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, the ‘Sunni’ militias in Iraq, Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The ‘orthodox Neoconservative’ interpretation of the peace process argues that the IRA were defeated, partly due to the efficacy of the ‘dirty war’, and in negotiating the peace process British governments did not compromise core values and democratic norms. This article argues that this account of the peace process is inaccurate and that the ‘lessons’ derived by Neoconservatives from the peace process are flawed.

Together in the middle: Back-channel negotiation in the Irish peace process

This article examines the development of cooperative relationships in back-channel communication and their impact on intraparty negotiation. It draws on extensive newly available evidence on back-channel communication in the Irish peace process to expand the range of detailed case studies on a topic which is shrouded in secrecy and resistant to academic inquiry. The article analyses the operation of a secret back channel that linked the Irish Republican Army to the British government over a period of 20 years, drawing on unique material from the private papers of the intermediary, Brendan Duddy, and a range of other primary sources. The article finds that interaction through this back channel increased predictability and laid a foundation of extremely limited trust by providing information and increasing mutual understanding. Strong cooperative relationships developed at the intersection between the two sides, based to a great extent on strong interpersonal relationships and continuity in personnel. This in turn produced direct pressure for changes in the position of parties as negotiators acted as advocates of movement in intraparty negotiations. The article finds that this back channel was characterized by a short chain, the direct involvement of principals and the establishment of a single primary channel of communication and that these features combined with secrecy to generate the distinctive cooperative dynamics identified in this article. It concludes that the potential for the development of cooperative relationships is particularly strong in back-channel negotiation for two reasons; first, the joint project of secrecy creates an ongoing shared task that builds trust and mutual understanding regardless of progress in the negotiations. Secondly, as a shared project based on the explicit aim of bypassing spoilers, the process creates structural pressures for cooperation to manage internal opponents on both sides, pressures intensified by the secrecy of the process.

Setting a place at the table: ending insurgencies through the political process

This article argues that, under certain conditions, allowing insurgents into the political process – through elections or government posts – can be a useful tool in the peace process and can help end insurgencies. However, bringing insurgents into the political process is unlikely to end insurgencies on its own, particularly if insurgents, the government, or the population believes that force is still a viable means of defeating the opponent and changing the status quo. The article begins with a brief overview of the causes of insurgency and on conflict resolution for internal wars. The article then considers two examples of insurgents that have entered the political process – the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland and Hezbollah in Lebanon – and the differing degrees of success in transforming these insurgents to non-violent participants in the political process. It concludes by suggesting how insurgents can be brought into the political process as part of conflict resolution and the implications for Afghanistan.

Closing the gap: symbolic reparations and armed groups

AbstractThe question of whether non-state armed groups could and should provide reparations to their victims has been largely overlooked. This article explores this gap, with a particular focus on symbolic reparations, such as acknowledgement of the truth and apologies. It argues that, while the question is fraught with legal, conceptual, and practical difficulties, there are some circumstances in which armed groups are capable of providing measures of reparations to their victims. The article identifies the issue of attacks on informers as one potential area for armed groups to provide such measures, and demonstrates that in a few cases armed groups have already engaged in actions that could be seen as analogous to symbolic reparations. The article's main case study is provided by recent actions by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in relation to its past attacks against suspected informers.

Geographies of Conflict and Post-Conflict in Northern Ireland

The violent conflict in Northern Ireland that led to some 3700 deaths was tied to opposing ethno-sectarian groups and the state and the disputation between them over that country’s constitutional future. Republicans such as the Irish Republican Army used violence in order to ‘gain’ a united Ireland. Whereas loyalists such as the Ulster Volunteer Force and the British state utilised violence in order to maintain Northern Ireland’s constitutional link with the United Kingdom. Geographers writing on this conflict have, via various forms of spatial analysis studied the consequences of that violence with regard to territoriality, the construction of ideological space and the perpetuation of ethno-sectarian boundaries. In more recent times, the analysis of conflict and post-conflict Northern Ireland has evaluated the governance of a divided society, the role paramilitaries have played in embedding peace and also the paradoxical role of reproducing conflict by other non-violent means. Northern Ireland remains as a divided society but there is a prominent role for geographers who study such a complex place to add to wider international scholarship regarding resistance and domination, revanchism, discourse construction, post-conflict and the impact upon place and also the role of agency in both perpetuating and removing violence.

A history of Republican public relations in Northern Ireland from “Bloody Sunday” to the “Good Friday Agreement”

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the public relations strategies of the IRA (Irish Republican Army) and their political wing Sinn Féin, throughout the historical period known as the Northern Ireland “Troubles”.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses semi‐structured élite interviews as its primary data. The study structures a historical account of the development of republican public relations around three main phases: the “propaganda of the deed” phase; the development of political public relations phase; and the peace process phase.FindingsMuch previous research traces a common trajectory for terrorist organisations, where they begin with large‐scale “propaganda of the deed” activities, and then move toward more typical PR activities when their “message” begins to be heard. The findings suggest that this is only partially true for the republican movement. Previous research also claims that peace settlements virtually never acknowledge the demands of terrorist groups. However, the findings indicate that the republican movement, via the use of skilful public relations techniques and disciplined internal organisational communication, pushed itself to the forefront and remained central in the efforts to develop a peace process.Research limitations/implicationsThe study draws on interview data with a small group (six) of republican strategists, all of whom where involved in some capacity in public relations activities. While it is not claimed that they represent the views of the whole republican movement on the issues discussed, they do arguably represent the views of a “dominant coalition”. Future research could usefully investigate the public relations of power sharing since the Good Friday Agreement.Originality/valuePrevious approaches to analysing the subject of public relations and terrorism have tended to regard it as an activity engaged in by psychopaths or criminals. This paper's starting‐point is to problematise this definition of “terrorism” and at the same time widen the application of the term to include State actors. In this regard, it is in opposition to much current Western media, governmental and academic usage of the term. This research also differs from most other studies of terrorism in the public relations literature, in that it uses élite interviews as its primary source of data.

Provisional IRA Attacks on the UDR in Fermanagh and South Tyrone: Implications for the Study of Political Violence and Terrorism

This article continues a discussion begun in the 1990s on the degree to which Provisional Irish Republican Army activities were sectarian. Henry Patterson's recent contribution raises issues that concern not only interpretations of the Irish conflict but also have implications for the more general study of the causes and consequences of political violence and terrorism. After addressing some of these issues, Patterson's contribution is placed more firmly into the framework of the previous discussion. Then follows a careful examination of Irish Republican Army attacks on the locally recruited security forces in Fermanagh and South Tyrone, from the 1950s to today.

Cost of violence and the peaceful way out: A comparison of the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists)

One of the ways to end protracted, violent, intrastate conflict is negotiated settlement where the rebel parties negotiate with the government and give up armed struggle. However, the most intriguing puzzle is: what influences the rebels to come to the negotiating table and opt for peace? The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) are recent examples of rebel groups that have renounced violence and transformed into mainstream political parties after waging insurgency for many years. These two cases present an opportunity to analyze factors that lead rebel parties to renounce violence. In this article, I argue that violent rebel groups settle for peaceful means owing to their perception of the high cost of violence that arises from pressures exerted by the military means of a state, by domestic groups, and by the international community. In both cases, when the state opened up political space to accommodate the rebel group, accumulated pressures influenced them to renounce violence. The study indicates how civil society, with solidarity from the global community, is able to defy the mobilization narrative of a rebel group and pressure them to renounce violence.

So Why Did the Guns Fall Silent? How Interplay, not Stalemate, Explains the Northern Ireland Peace Process

The precise rationale for, and timing of, the Northern Ireland peace process of the 1990s and beyond, which developed after more than two decades of conflict, has yet to be fully explained. It has been a common assumption that it arose from a stalemate involving the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the ‘regular’ pro‐state forces of the British Army and Royal Ulster Constabulary and the ‘irregular/ultra’ pro‐state loyalist paramilitary groups of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA). Under this interpretation, military/paramilitary deadlock led to ripeness for peace, amid reappraisals by all parties to the conflict of the utility of violence accompanied by reinterpretations of earlier political orthodoxies. The IRA could not remove the British sovereign claim to Northern Ireland; British forces could not militarily defeat the IRA and loyalists and republicans were engaged in a futile inter‐communal sectarian war. This stalemate thesis has obvious attraction in explaining why a seemingly intractable war finally subsided, but is less convincing when subject to empirical testing among republican and loyalist participants in the conflict. This article moves away from ‘top‐down’ generalist narratives of the onset of peace, which tend to argue the stalemate thesis, to assess ‘bottom‐up’ interpretations from the actual combatants as to why they ceased fighting. It suggests an asymmetry, rather than mutuality, of perception that there was ‘military’ cessation by the armed non‐state groups, with neither republican nor loyalist interpretations grounded in notions of stalemate. The article concludes by urging a wider consideration of the important and persistent interplay of the military and political in conflicts such as Northern Ireland.

BOMBERS AND MAVERICKS

Magill magazine was an influential current affairs magazine which was first published in Dublin in October 1977. The magazine was owned by journalist Vincent Browne, who was also its first editor. Having worked in Belfast in the early 1970s Browne saw the conflict in Northern Ireland as one of the main concerns of the news agenda. This article examines Magill's coverage of Northern Ireland which was largely driven by an interest in exploring thinking within the Provisional Irish Republican Army. The magazine's coverage was comprehensive but narrow. Exclusive interviews with republican paramilitaries, who were banned from the broadcast airwaves, were a regular feature as was an interest in hard-line unionist leader, Rev. Ian Paisley. The magazine's journalism in this period has proven to be a valuable historical record of the emergence of the Irish peace process.

The troubles. Terroryzm w ulsetrze: po dwóch stronach barykady

Conflict in the Green Island has begun in the twelfth century, when Ireland came into the United Kingdom’s possession. It takes place between two antagonistic groups: Republicans (mostly native Catholics), and unionists, or loyalists (mostly the influx of Protestants). The dispute nowadays concerns the national identity of Northern Ireland. The Republicans opt for joining the territory of the Republic of Ireland, while unionists and loyalists want to stay with the Crown. Native inhabitants of the islands have been dominated politically, economically and educationally. They have fought time and again to achieve independence or unification with the Republic. Uprisings erupted (in 1641 – created anti-English, 1916 – Easter Rising, 1972 – Bloody Sunday), treaties were signed and the agreement (1973 – joint Stormont elections, the creation of the Council of Ireland, peace agreement in 1984, 1985 – an agreement and formation of the International Peace Conference (of the British – Irish relations), 1993 – the Downing Street Declaration, 1998 – Friday Agreement); despite the legislative obstacles (1652 – Act of occupation, 1691 – Treaty of Limerick, 1801 – Act of Union, 1922 – Special Powers Act, 1936 – Act of public order, direct rule, 2000 – Great Britain suspended the autonomy of Ireland). Republicans fought on the side of Irish Republican Army (IRA), which ceased its activities after the Agreement. Following the split, due to the signing of agreements, Republicans created Real IRA (RIRA), Provisional IRA (PIRA) and Continuity IRA (CIRA). Similar independent organizations are Irish Republican Army National – Liberation (INLA) and a fraction of the GHQ (INLA – GHQ). Some activists are still active in paramilitary capacities (eg. the 2009 RIRA attack). As well ascarry out criminal activities. Loyalists and Unionists were divided from the beginning (or rather never became united). Antagonistic attitudes towards the Republicans are shared by Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) and the Red Hand Defenders (RHD) Ulster Defence Association / Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA / UFF) and the Orange Volunteers. Most of them are still active. In addition to the fight against the Republicans, these groups are also fighting amongst themselves. They work in the underground, whichwell in the basement, results in criminal activities. The conflict in Northern Ireland continues and seems difficult to solve. The society remains divided and the British law so far offers no solution, although hopefully one will be found in the future. Let us hope that there is no solution.

Structural Integrity and Cohesion in Insurgent Organizations: Evidence from Protracted Conflicts in Ireland and Burma1

Why insurgent organizations stay together over time and why they maintain the fight under stress are questions of major concern for our understanding of war duration, conduct, and outcome. Structural integrity is the property of an organization remaining as a single intact entity, while cohesion refers to the creation and maintenance of cooperative effort toward the attainment of the organization’s goals. Although closely related, the conflation of structural integrity and cohesion is problematic. The body of the paper is a structured comparative analysis of two cases, the Irish Republican Army and the Karen National Union. First, this analysis demonstrates that cohesion and structural integrity are discrete concepts that each helps us to understand part of why, and how, insurgent organizations keep up the fight. Thus, despite much recent emphasis on “spoilers” in the conflict literature, understanding why armed organizations stay together or fragment is not enough. We also need to understand what makes insurgents perform effectively in the organization’s interest. Second, it points to some limitations of existing theories of structural integrity and cohesion in insurgent organizations and allows the author to conclude by suggesting some fruitful avenues for future research on these dynamics.

Revising Irish history: The Northern Ireland conflict and the war of ideas

Power-sharing government resumed in Northern Ireland on 8 May 2007 after a historic agreement was reached between the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein. Unionist Ian Paisley became First Minister and Sinn Fein’s Martin McGuinness, former Chief of Staff of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), became Deputy First Minister. The Provisional Republican movement has signed up to the decommissioning of weapons and policing in Northern Ireland; and hard-line Unionism has signed up to power-sharing and cross-border bodies. For the vast majority in Northern Ireland the conflict is over after almost a century of political turmoil and more than a generation of violent conflict. It is fitting, therefore, to examine the ‘war of ideas’ in the revisionist controversy that dominated Irish historiography throughout the period of this conflict. The purpose of this article is to offer an overview of this controversy. The writing on the Easter Rising of 1916 serves to illuminate the discussion and will aid in answering the issue of what the revisionist controversy is all about. In this article revisionism is defined as a re-examination of the ideological roots of current orthodoxy in response to the contemporary conflict in Northern Ireland. The article looks at how a variety of historians have reacted to this violent crisis, and how they concluded that revisionism was necessary: that is, how the deconstruction and re-evaluation of ideology and a new interpretation of history are crucial in understanding such crises of violence (and perhaps thereby defusing the tension). The article examines the nature and extent of this revisionist intellectual response. It recognizes that even though intellectuals are influenced by political conflicts, they do not necessarily follow political agendas.

Explaining the Altnaveigh Massacre

Explaining the Altnaveigh Massacre* Robert Lynch (bio) In the early hours of Saturday, 17 June 1922, during the closing stages of the Irish Republican Army's campaign against the newly established state of Northern Ireland, a party of about twenty Irish Republican Army (IRA) volunteers left their makeshift barracks in Dundalk, Co. Louth, and crossed over the border into south Armagh. Traveling swiftly across country, they proceeded to launch a series of devastating attacks on a small Presbyterian farming community in the townlands of Altnaveigh and Lisdrumliska, five miles from the new Irish border and about a mile to the west of Newry. During these attacks six people were shot dead, numerous others were injured, and over a dozen properties were bombed or burned out. Though there were only six fatalities, it is clear that the raids were designed to inflict an unprecedented amount of violence. A police report calculated that if all the attacks—the woundings, the acts of arson, the bombs thrown into windows or rigged to doors—had succeeded, the death toll could have reached as high as thirty. 1 At the subsequent funeral of the victims in Newry the Presbyterian minister declared: "We have been left with a bloody mile of roofless houses. . . . Even in war there is a certain limit to atrocity, a certain [End Page 184] code of honour is practiced by all but the vilest savage. In this [code] those who wrought Saturday's deed of shame have no share." 2 What proved most notable, however, about the "Altnaveigh Massacre," as these attacks have been dubbed, concerned not its perpetrators but rather its victims. Though varying widely in terms of age, gender, and class, all the victims shared one thing in common—their religion. Every victim of the attacks at Altnaveigh and Lisdrumliska, irrespective of the magnitude of his or her suffering, was Protestant. It is this raw sectarian edge to the killings, woundings, and burnings as much as their extent that has given the attacks their lasting notoriety. Along with the MacMahon murders of March 1922, when a gang of policemen shot dead six members of the Catholic MacMahon household in north Belfast, the Altnaveigh attacks rank as the most infamous atrocities carried out in Ulster during the extremely violent period that marked the birth of Northern Ireland between June 1920 and June 1922. The comparison with the MacMahon murders is understandable. 3 In both sets of murders it was not principally a case of how many were killed but of who they were. The similar death tolls in the two cases were relatively modest when compared to daily mortality rates in serious riots in Belfast at that time. 4 While the Belfast killings were viewed by members of the Northern Catholic minority as symptomatic of the evils of sectarian policing, the attacks at Altnaveigh three months later did much to reignite deeply held Protestant fears stretching back generations to the notorious massacres of 1641. Certainly, the attacks are remembered bitterly by Ulster Protestants, particularly the minority in south Armagh. Even today, despite the many murders and assassinations that the area has witnessed during the "Troubles" of the past forty years, the Altnaveigh Massacre is still given pride of place in local [End Page 185] commemorations. The dead are honored with plaques, banners, parades, and an annual church service attended by hundreds of Orangemen and "Specials" (part-time constables) that has continued uninterrupted since 1923. 5 The Altnaveigh attacks have been viewed by many Protestants as a deliberate, organized attempt at ethnic cleansing. Frederick Russell, president of the Newry chamber of commerce, speaking two days after the attacks, observed that the shootings were "very carefully planned and deliberately carried out, the object being to obliterate this little colony of Presbyterians in the district." 6 At the time many members of the IRA in south Armagh itself were appalled by the events. One of them, Patrick Casey, recalled: "I remember my feeling was one of horror when I heard the details. Nothing could justify this holocaust of unfortunate Protestants. Neither youth nor age was spared, and some of the killings took place in the presence of their families. Writing this, 35 years later...

Sabotage! The Origins, Development and Impact of the IRA's Infrastructural Bombing Campaigns 1939–1997

At various moments in the twentieth century the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in its various incarnations have used the tactic of infrastructural bombing, notably in their 1939 attacks in England on electricity pylons and in the summer of 1971 in Northern Ireland on its electrical distribution network. In 1996 the British Security Service (MI5) foiled an attack by the IRA aimed at causing a total electrical blackout of the greater London area, a plan that would have seen major disruption in the capital for many weeks or months. Using recently declassified material this paper seeks to re-evaluate the impact of these IRA infrastructural sabotage campaigns that have until now either been ignored or judged to have been derisory or incongruous failures. This paper demonstrates the historical development of this tactic from both the IRA's perspective, and that of those who were tasked with hindering it, highlighting the devastating potential of such tactics in the future.

Symbolic Capital and the State’s Unconventional Weapon Against Insurgent Terrorism: Howard Barker’s Credentials of a Sympathizer

Due to the power differentials between insurgent terrorists and the state, the former typically challenge the latter’s authority, that is, its legitimacy, rather than its military power. Since terrorists and the state compete for the claim to justice and rightfulness, it is not surprising that many of their fights are carried out through language. At the center of Howard Barker’s Credentials of a Sympathizer is the quarrel between the British government and the Irish Republican Army over the status of the IRA captives as “criminals” or “political prisoners.” My paper examines how the IRA’s authority has been hijacked even before the language battle can begin. By mobilizing a range of “symbolic capital” such as upper-class manners and language, and by manipulating the complex meanings and connotations attached to different cultural artifacts, the British negotiator Gildersleeve sets up the British as civilized and refined, in contrast to their “violent and low-bred” adversary. By setting up the conference room as a space for “civilized” talks, and by aestheticizing their politics, the British manage to assert social authority, which is then subtly translated into political domination. The British and the IRA, in other words, are both actors consciously staging a show for a world audience. The British do so with their “upper-class” posture, the IRA with terrorism, dirty protest, and hunger strikes.

Misapplying lessons learned? Analysing the utility of British counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland, 1971–76

This article examines the British Army's deployment in support of the civil power in Northern Ireland. It argues that the core guiding principles of the British approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) – employing the minimum use of force, firm and timely action, and unity of control in civil–military relations – were misapplied by the Army in its haste to combat Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorism between 1971 and 1976. Moreover, it suggests that the Army's COIN strategy was unsuccessful in the 1970s because commanders adhered too closely to the customs, doctrine, and drill applied under very different circumstances in Aden between 1963 and 1967, generally regarded as a failure in Britain's post-war internal security operations. The article concludes with a discussion of the British government's decision to scale back the Army's role in favour of giving the Royal Ulster Constabulary primacy in counter-terrorist operations, a decision which led ultimately to success in combating IRA violence.

From Direct Rule to Motorman: Adjusting British Military Strategy for Northern Ireland in 1972

The British campaign in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s is often portrayed as consistent in its repressive character and its failure to successfully relate military means to political ends. This article argues that British military strategy was adaptable, alternating between defensive and offensive means depending on the changing political context. The low profile policy allowed the army to consolidate a firm basis for later offensive operations against the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). This proved successful because it contrasted with Republican violence and was contextualized within the government's willingness to negotiate and compromise when necessary.