Iranian Influence Research Articles

An Opportunity for a U.S.–Iran Paradigm Shift

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Marwan Bishara, “Guaging Arab Public Opinion,” Al Jazeera English, March 8, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/03/20123793355501965.html. 2. Supreme Leader's address to students on April 20, 2000, http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=3003. 3. Supreme Leader speech during his visit to Kermanshah in January 2012. http://basir-news.com/archives/4282. 4. “The Supreme Leader's View of Global Arrogance,” The Center for Preserving and Publishing the Works of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, September 10, 2009, http://english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1179&Itemid=13#Topp. 5. Mari Luomi, “Sectarian Identities or Geopolitics?”, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Working Papers 56, 2008: 9, kms2.isn.ethz.ch/…/08_Sectarian_Identities_or_Geopolitics.pdf. 6. Nour Malas, Hassan Hafidh, and Joel Millman, “Protests Emerge in Jordan, Bahrain,” The Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704709304576124623383327338.html. 7. Michael Slackman and Mark Landler, “Bahrain Turmoil PosesFresh Test for White House,” February 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18bahrain.html?pagewanted=all. 8. Barbara Slavin, “‘Strategically Lonely’ Iran Exploits Opportunities for Regional Influence,” Iran Task Force, The South Asia Center, Atlantic Council, 2011: 2, hawk.ethz.ch/…/032511_ACUS_Slavin_LonelyIran.pdf. 9. Danielle Pletka, Frederick W. Kagan, Ahmad K. Majidyar, Marisa Cochrane Sullivan, “Iranian influence in the Levant, Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan,” American Enterprise Institute, May 2012: 7, http://www.aei.org/papers/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/middle-east-and-north-africa/iranian-influence-in-the-levant-egypt-iraq-and-afghanistan/. 10. Peter Cave, “At Least 38 Killed in Iraq Attacks,” ABC News, April 20, 2012, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-04-19/at-least-30-killed-in-iraq-bombings/3961004. 11. Barbara Slavin, “Strategically Lonely,” p. 2. 12. Mark Perry and Alastair Crooke, “How Hezbollah defeated Israel: Part I—Winning the Intelligence War,” Asia Times, October 12, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ12Ak01.html. 13. “Fears Grow Over Arms Flow,” The Gulf, July 2012, http://www.thegulfonline.com/Articles.aspx?ArtID=4662. 14. Henry A. Ensher, “Iran–Syria Relations and the Arab Spring,” AEI Iran Tracker, July 12, 2011, http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/iran-syria-relations-and-arab-spring. 15. “Iran's Ahmadinejad Condemns ‘Massacre’ in Ally Syria,” Agence France Presse via Ahram Online, October 22, 2011, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/24818/World/Region/Irans-Ahmadinejad-condemns-massacre-in-ally-Syria.aspx. 16. “Ayatollah Khamenei's Message to Hajj Pilgrims,” The Center for Preserving and Publishing the Works of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, October 27, 2011, http://english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1553&Itemid=16. 17. Supreme Leader's speech to Government Officials on August 18, 2010, http://english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1354&Itemid=4. 18. U.S. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, speech at the Brookings Institute, Washington DC, November 22, 2011. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/11/20111122144640su0.8725789.html#ixzz231Vv3dOA. 19. Anothony H. Cordesman, “Iran, Oil, and the Strait of Hormuz,” The Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 26, 2007, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070326_iranoil_hormuz.pdf. 20. Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate, (New York: Random House: 2012), 105. 21. Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 265–66. 22. Hakimeh Saghaye-Biria, “United States Propaganda in Iran: 1951–1953,” Thesis for Master's of Mass Communication, University of Houston, 2002, p. 9–10, http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-04082009-100641/unrestricted/Hakimeh_Saghaye-Biria_Thesis.pdf. 23. Muhammas Sahimi, “The Hostage Crisis, 30 years On,” PBS Frontline, November 3, 2009, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/11/30-years-after-the-hostage-crisis.html 24. “1979: Exiled Ayatollah Khomeini Returns to Iran,” BBC News, On This Day, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/1/newsid_2521000/2521003.stm. 25. Barbera Slavin, “Obama Sent a Secret letter to Iraq's Top Shiite Cleric,” Foreign Policy, Augist 5, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/05/obama_sent_a_secret_letter_to_iraqs_top_shiite_cleric; Babak Rahimi, “Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the Democratization of post-Saddam Iraq,” Nathan Hale Foreign Policy Society, Working Papers Series, 5, http://www.foreignpolicysociety.org/workingpapers/WP6–Rahimi.pdf. 26. Gregory Wallace, “Romey: Nuclear Iran is ‘Number One National Security Threat,’” CNN, July 30, 2012, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/07/30/romney-nuclear-iran-is-number-one-national-security-threat/. 27. Hope Hodge, “Romney Adviser: Unacceptable that Obama Allows Iran to Enrich Uranium,” July 25, 2012, http://www.humanevents.com/2012/07/25/romney-adviser-unacceptable-that-obama-allows-uranium-enrichment-in-iran/. 28. Jamie M. Fly and Gary Schmitt, “The Case for Regime Change in Iran,” Foreign Affairs, January 17, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137038/jamie-m-fly-and-gary-schmitt/the-case-for-regime-change-in-iran. 29. Paul Lewis, “Iran Agrees to Allow Visit by UN Rights Inspector,” The New York Times, December 3, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/03/world/iran-agrees-to-allow-visit-by-un-rights-inspector.html. 30. Norma Percy, “U.S.–Iran: Dialogue of the Deaf?” BBC News, February 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7875129.stm. 31. Gareth Porter, “How Neocons Sabotaged Iran's Help on al-Qaeda,” Inter Press Service via Antiwar.com, February 23, 2006, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/porter.php?articleid=8590. 32. Thomas Erdbrink, “Khamenei: Iran Will Back ‘Any Nations, Any Groups’ Fighting Israel,” The Washington Post, February 3, 2012. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-says-it-launched-satellite/2012/02/03/gIQARNuDmQ_story.html. 33. “Hillary Clinton Admits the U.S. Government Created al-Qaeda,” Daily Paul, May 23, 2012, http://www.dailypaul.com/235730/hillary-clinton-admits-the-us-government-created-al-qaeda. 34. Egyptian Cleric Muhammad Hussein Yaaqub: MB Presidential Candidate Muhammad Mursi Told Me that the Shiites ‘Are More Dangerous to Islam than the Jews’” Memri News, June 13, 2012, http://www.memri.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3466.htm. 35. Rod Nordland, “Al-Qaeda Taking Deadly New Role in Syria's Conflict,” The New York Times, July 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/world/middleeast/al-qaeda-insinuating-its-way-into-syrias-conflict.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all. Additional informationNotes on contributorsHossein MousavianHossein Mousavian is a research scholar at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. From 1997 to 2005, he was the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran's National Security Council; from 2003 to 2005, he served as spokesman for Iran in its nuclear negotiations with the European Union. He is author of The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir published by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in June 2012

Is Globalization Undermining Civilizational Identities? A Test of Huntington's Core State Assumptions among the Publics of Greater Asia and the Pacific

AbstractSamuel Huntington's influential clash of civilizations hypothesis (Huntington, 1993; Huntington, 1996) has been widely debated, but empirical tests of his ideas about core states remain limited at the micro-level. In this paper, we bring new evidence to bear, focusing on the ‘cauldron of civilizations’: Greater Asia and the Pacific. Using the AsiaBarometer, we examine the extent to which publics in the region identify with the core states of the supposedly most contentious civilizations in the region – the US, China, and Iran – and the factors that influence those perceptions. We give attention to the role of globalization and nationalism and whether both may be subsumed by religiosity as Huntington suggests. Our descriptive evidence affirms some of the tensions between the US, China, and Islamic-predominant Asia identified by Huntington as areas of potential conflict. At the same time, we find no evidence to suggest that attitudes toward core states are zero-sum; Asian publics often see rival powers as mutually good influences. Using multivariate analysis, we find that religiosity, as the clash paradigm surmises, boosts Iranian influence and undermines American influence in several predominantly Islamic states. We also find, contrary to Huntington, that overall exposure to foreign cultures leads to a more positive assessment of American influence among Chinese and Pakistanis, as well as American perceptions of China. When foreign exposure influences perceptions of Iran, the effect is modestly, but consistently, negative. Taken together, the findings raise questions about two key assumptions of the Huntington framework – civilizational identity formation and cultural resurgence – and suggest that alternative approaches in recent civilizations literature show greater empirical promise.

Turkey and America Face Iran

Rapidly unfolding events in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, provide Washington and Ankara both motivation and opportunity to cooperate over how best to blunt Iranian influence.

A RESPONSE TO PEZHMANN DAILAMI'S REVIEW OF FROM QAJAR TO PAHLAVI: IRAN, 1919–1930

In his review of From Qajar to Pahlavi: Iran, 1919–1930 (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2008) published in the November 2010 issue of IJMES, Pezhmann Dailami denigrates my book for relying on U.S. State Department archives instead of the usual British records, and claims that “Majd's story has an obvious purpose, and that is to justify the deep sense of vulnerability and the violent anti-Western paranoia of the Iranian regime.” First, given that the available British records have been used extensively in other studies, I saw no point in reproducing them yet again. Second, American records have not been used before and provide a fresh perspective. My book uses nearly 800 new documents, one for every five days of the period covered; to call it an attempt “to justify” the policies of the Islamic Republic is absurd. Moreover, Dailami claims, “Evidence that the 1921 coup was a British design is largely circumstantial. Of course, Reza was Britain's perfect man. He could resist the advances of Soviet Russia while remaining friendly to the old imperial power.” But Dailami then contradicts himself in the next paragraph when he writes, “In any case, that Reza got rid of the last remnants of British political influence in Iran does not appear to matter to anyone. It must be admitted that he did so under Soviet pressure.”

The “Omnibalancing” Proposition and Baghdad’s Foreign Policy: Reinterpreting Contemporary Iraq-Iran-Us Relations

Iranian influence and interference in the internal affairs of Iraq have become central US policy concerns since the election of a Shiite-majority political elite in 2005. Yet observers have rarely addressed the strategic pursuit of support from both the US and Iranian governments by the Iraqi leadership to defend against threats to its incumbency. In recent years, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has increasingly pursued engagement with Iranian representatives in an effort to counter domestic challenges and consolidate state resources. However, while the present Iraqi elite has attracted significant trade and foreign investment as well as reconstruction assistance from Tehran, it has been less successful in consolidating an Iranian-sponsored coalition to ensure victory in national elections.

Iran's Influence: A Religious-Political State and Society in its Region * By ELAHEH ROSTAMI-POVEY

Iran's Influence: A Religious-Political State and Society in its Region * By ELAHEH ROSTAMI-POVEY

Iran's long reach: Iran as a pivotal state in the Muslim world

Foreword Introduction Sources of Iranian Influence and Significance Agents of Change within Iran U.S. Policy toward Iran Index

A Tipping Point Realized? Nuclear Proliferation in the Persian Gulf and Middle East

The Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East are precariously perched on an uncertain nuclear threshold. Several regional states may be reconsidering their non-nuclear status. Iran's confrontation with the international community over its refusal to honour its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the overriding component states are viewing. Another element is Israel's nuclear program and its policy of preventing any regional state from threatening the Jewish state with nuclear weapons. Another complicating element in the strategic framework is a resurgent interest in nuclear energy. What is the security policy community to make of these dynamics in which proliferation, deterrence, extended deterrence, and conflict escalation are all interacting in a complex interstate bargaining framework? This article applies a series of competing theoretical explanations for nuclear proliferation and assesses the implications they offer for policy prescriptions. Stressing neo-realist insights, it is shown here that control of proliferation requires recognition that the Middle East security dilemma has been altered – probably permanently – by the American invasion of Iraq, the increased political influence of Iran, and the continued violent spiral in the Arab–Israeli dispute. These three factors have combined to create new internal political pressures on regional regimes while at the same time creating a new and disturbing regional distribution of power that is shaping the region's approach to nuclear issues. Dealing with these factors is crucial in developing policies that can mitigate the further spread of nuclear weapons in the region.

Iran and Instability in the Middle East

In the Middle East today, Iran is trying to upgrade its status to a dominant power by demonstrating an ability to penetrate and influence various regional theatres. Meanwhile, despite being the sole global power with considerable military presence in the region, America's strategic initiatives in the Middle East are frustrated by Iran's behaviour. This interaction is destabilizing the Middle East regional order. In this article I demonstrate that instability is mainly driven by the incompatibility ofthe two states' preferences, not their incongruence of capabilities. The regime in Tehran counters American encirclement by manipulating several foreign policy tools. Although its military capabilities are dwarfed by those ofthe United States, these tools still provide Iran with considerable ability to maneuver relatively freely despite international and regional constraints, enabling it to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States.The first tool is Iran's ambition to develop nuclear energy technology, largely within the confines of the international atomic safeguards for civilian technology, but enshrined in confrontational rhetoric. The second tool is Iran's hardened alliance with an increasingly isolated Syria. The third tool is Iran's support of Hezbollah in Lebanon. The fourth is Iran's leverage in Iraq through ties to S hute groups. Two potential tools that the Iranian regime can mobilize more effectively than it currently does are ties to groups in Afghanistan (such as the Hazara), and to Hamas in the occupied territories. Added to its considerable conventional military capability, Iran's advantages stem from the fact that the costs incurred for the manipulation of these tools have so far proven tolerable. In the interim it is willing to use them to destabilize a regional order that it sees as confining. These tools provide access to a wide theatre of operations, and their timed manipulation has proven Tehran's ability to exert formidable influence on other regional states as well as the US. In sum, Iran has been able to match or even overturn Washington's strategic initiatives and military interventions in the Middle East. Tehran would not have developed such resolve in isolation of the regional actors noted above. These state and substate actors are not passive recipients of Iranian influence efforts but have themselves been served through ties to Iran. Their interests coincide or overlap with Iran's own.To fully appreciate the effect of Iran's efforts to assume a higher regional status, we have to better understand the preferences of these regional actors. It is only after unpacking these two sets of preferences that we can better grasp the current sources of instability in the regional order. Embedding analysis in the logic of liberal international relations theory serves such an investigation.1 In studying Iran's behaviour and regional instability, emphasis shifts from focusing on the distribution of capabilities to unpacking the sources of prefer enees. Moreover, instead of asking only what policies should decision-makers (American or otherwise) pursue regarding Iran, we may be able to develop policies averting a regional confrontation between the US and Iran, as well as defuse a variety of potentially destabilizing regional issues.Two important factors are necessary for a full understanding of Iran's behaviour. The first is the nature of the Iranian regime itself. Unpacking Iran's domestic politics can help explain the timing and the reasons behind particular choices in foreign policy. The second factor is American policy in the Middle East. Along with the historic American presence in the Arabian Gulf states, placing US troops in Iraq meant replacing Iraq as a balancer to Iran; the costs of encirclement to Iran became too high to be ignored. What we are witnessing is Washington's regional standing being compromised by its under- appreciation of the role diplomacy can play in bringing Iran around. …

Taming the hegemonic power: SCIRI and the evolution of US policy in Iraq

This article discusses the historical development of the United States' special relationship with the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI also known as SIIC or ISCI), one of the Shi'ite religious parties of Iraq. It surveys SCIRI's ideological heritage from the 1980s onwards, with particular emphasis on SCIRI's long-standing principle of subordination to the supreme leaders of Iran through the concept of wilayat al-faqih. The article then goes on to discuss the modalities by which the United States came to choose the most pro-Iranian of the Iraqi political parties as its preferred partner in Iraq after 2003. SCIRI managed to achieve this status by playing on the superpower's predilection for an ethnosectarian reading of Iraqi politics, by emphasizing professionalism in all its dealings with Washington, by exploiting the United States' lack of knowledge about how power works in Shi'ism, and by playing down its links to Iran. As a result of these manoeuvres, the Bush administration has chosen to sideline the other Iraqi Shi'ite parties (which historically have far weaker ties to Iran), and has ended up with a partnership that in the long term will probably mean a marked strengthening of Iranian influence in Iraq.

The Strategic Importance of Central Asia: An American View

Undoubtedly Central Asia’s strategic importance in international affairs is growing. The rivalries among Russia, China, United States, Iran, India, and Pakistan not to mention the ever-changing pattern of relations among local states (five former Soviet republics and Afghanistan) make the region’s importance obviously clear. Central Asia’s strategic importance for Washington, Moscow, and Beijing varies with each nation’s perception of its strategic interests. Washington focuses primarily on Central Asia as an important theater in the war on terrorism. Additionally, it is viewed as a theater where America might counter a revived Russia or China, or a place to blunt any extension of Iranian influence. Moscow and Beijing view the region as a vital locale for defending critical domestic interests. This asymmetry of interest is a major factor in the competition among states for influence in the region.

Orthodoxy Versus Islam: Imperial Russian and Early Soviet Policy Toward Georgia’s Muslims

SUMMARY: Статья Г. Саникидзе посвящена анализу политики Российской империи и раннего Советского Союза по отношению к мусульманам в Грузии. Она представляет собой подробный обзор архивных коллекций, в которых отразилась история мусульманских сообществ на территории современной Грузии и правительственная политика по отношению к ним. Особое внимание Саникидзе уделяет фондам Центрального Архива Аджарской Автономной Республики в силу значимости этого пограничного региона для истории мусульман Закавказья. Автор также отмечает, что архивные коллекции в Батуми содержат богатый материал для исследования истории хаджа и мусульманских миграционных потоков. Он показывает значимость использования различного рода исторических источников, включая травелоги иностранных путешественников, а также этнографические данные для реконструкции истории мусульманства на территории нынешней Грузии. В статье показано, что мусульманские сообщества на территории Закавказья и в Тифлисе, в частности, отличались значительным разнообразием по происхождению, языку и религиозной культуре, что отразилось в источниках. Представляя краткий каталог этого разнообразия, Саникидзе отмечает особенности каждой субрелигиозной группы: суннитов, шиитов, вайнахов Панкисского ущелья.

Iran and the West: A Symposium

IRAN Yitzhak Nakash A merican advocates of military or other tough action against Iran have based their case on the argument that its hardline government's pursuit of a nuclear program constitutes a grave threat to peace and stability worldwide. In reality, the development of a nuclear program is mostly a matter of national pride. A U.S. military strike against Iran, even if executed successfully, would unite Iranians and further isolate America in the international arena. A sanctions regime, including a travel ban on Iranian officials, would yield few benefits and is not likely to stop Iran from developing its nuclear program. Sanctions did not prevent North Korea from testing a nuclear device in October 2006. What is required in Iran's case is a psychological breakthrough between Washington and Tehran, an engagement of Iranian leaders over a range of issues—and a new strategy of deterrence in the event Iran develops a bomb. A U.S. policy based on carrots and sticks would be more effective in managing Iran's growing power in the Middle East as well as its regional and nuclear ambitions. Iran today is very different from the embattled Islamic Republic of the early 1980s, with a widespread women's movement and a young generation of educated Iranians clamoring for reform and greater contacts with the West. The hard-liners in Tehran know that they will not benefit from a full-scale civil war in Iraq, which could destabilize the Persian Gulf and undermine Iran's interests in the region. Hence they may be receptive to a détente with America in exchange for a grand bargain. If there is to be a deal with the current regime, it will have to be made not only with the reformers , but also with the more powerful conservative politicians and clerics in Iran. This reality should not be obscured by the unfortunate denial of the Holocaust by Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or by his outrageous statements that Israel should be wiped off the map—rhetoric that allowed him to occupy center stage in the Middle East. Ahmadinejad is not a messianic madman. Nor is he a Shiite version of Saddam Hussein, who 48 n DISSENT / Winter 2007 launched two devastating wars in the Persian Gulf in the name of Arabism, or of Osama bin Laden, who declared jihad against America and the West in the name of Islam. Instead, he is a radical populist who has allied himself with a coalition of third world leaders, including Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, all of whom have capitalized on the general resentment against the world's strongest power in the non-Western world. Ahmadinejad's government may yet turn out to be the least religious in orientation that Iran has had since the start of the revolution . And should his socioeconomic policies fail to improve the living conditions of the poor classes in Iran, whose members voted for him overwhelmingly in 2005, he could lose office in the next elections. Washington and Tehran would need to acknowledge the mistakes of the past and begin a dialogue intended, on our side, to encourage Iran to play a positive role in the U.S. effort to bring stability to Iraq and the larger Middle East. The need for a dialogue has become all the more pressing because of the recent vote by the Iraqi Parliament to approve the creation of autonomous regions—which could worsen sectarian and ethnic conflicts in Iraq and lead to the creation of a predominantly Shiite region uniting the nine provinces of southern Iraq. I MAGINE THE IMPACT in Iran of a public announcement by the Bush administration that regime change is off the table, provided Iran accounts for its nuclear program, stops its support for terrorism, and acknowledges the right of all Middle Eastern states to exist in peace. Such an announcement, accompanied by an offer for improved political and economic relations and student exchanges with Iran, could put Ahmadinejad and the hard-line clerics on the defensive; enable the United States to build bridges to the reformers, the harbingers of any political change in Iran; and better contain Iran's influence in the Middle East...

The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics

Hezbollah emerged in 1982 as a manifestation of Iran's influence and a response to Israel's massive invasion of Lebanon. Hezbollah (cooperating with Syria) won legitimacy by resisting Israel's occupation, but it also offered Shias a credible ideology and an array of institutions. The party is now deeply embedded in Lebanese politics. After Israel's unilateral withdrawal in 2000, Hezbollah continued to assert its “national resistance” role, but this claim has been openly challenged, especially after the 2006 war. Since then, the government and the opposition have been at a dangerous impasse, with compromise elusive and the dangers of new violence growing.

Iranian influence in Iraq

Iran has been pursuing a sophisticated and shifting strategy of subversion in Iraq since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003. However, the nature of its activities and objectives, as well as its response to efforts to stabilise Iraq, has sparked considerable debate. Iran supports a wide range of proxies, some of which are in direct competition with one another. It is clear that Iran's leaders want the Iraqi state to remain weak.

The Iraq War and Iranian Power

By deposing Saddam Hussein, the United States radically altered the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. Since the early 1940s, power had been dispersed among Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United States...

Uncertain Future: A Strategic Review of the Middle East and Implications for the United States

America's tendency to focus solely on military threat reduction increasingly erodes U.S. relationships with Middle East nations. As consequences of recent conflicts continue to reverberate, Iran's influence appears to be increasing and there is growing Sunni fear of an emboldened Shia populace. This article offers a broad review of important trends in the Middle East and North Africa over the next five to seven years, identifies emerging strategic challenges, and offers a way forward for the United States. America's foreign policies must be shaped to rely on soft power first and the use of military force only when absolutely necessary.

Third Party Liability for Hezbollah Attacks against Israel

After an Israeli soldier was abducted in the south of the country in late June, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) began Operation “Summer Rain” in Gaza in order to secure the safe return of the soldier. On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah forces captured two Israeli soldiers in Northern Israel and killed three more, triggering Operation “Just Reward”, which ended with the fragile cease-fire agreed upon under the terms outlined in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. The conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah had the potential of plunging the whole region in a wider war; as a matter of fact, it seems that Iran and Syria were fighting a proxy war against Israel. Hezbollah alone does not have the technological capabilities of hitting Haifa or Nazareth with their own Katjusha-type missiles, which essentially are not much more than slightly modified World War II weapons, yet Hezbollah struck deep inside Israel. On the last day of the war alone, with the cease-fire already in sight, 246 rockets were fired into Israel. Moreover, it appears that Israel was not hit only by Katjushot but also by other missiles with a longer range. Given their arsenal and longstanding support for Hezbollah, the assumption that Iran and Syria have actually delivered missiles or missile technology to Hezbollah is anything but farfetched. News reports during the conflict indicated that Hezbollah used Syrian 220mm-missiles against Israel and that weapons have been delivered to the Hezbollah from Iran, oftenviaSyria. Hezbollah's arsenal includes Iranian-made Zilzal-2 missiles with a range of 210 km, Russian-designed AT-5 anti-tank weapons which were produced in Iran, as well as Russian-made Kornet-E laser-guided weapons and Metis-M anti-armor weapons, both supplied by Syria. Most notorious was the use of Iranian Fajr-3 missiles against Israeli cities. Thousands of these missiles had already been provided to Hezbollah before the fighting began. The rockets that hit the town of Afula, south of Haifa, on 28 July 2006, and which was referred to by Hezbollah as Khaibar-1, likely were the first Iranian-made Fajr-5 missiles ever used by Hezbollah. Despite the destruction of the infrastructure in Lebanon during Operation “Just Reward”, Hezbollah continued to receive weapons. But Syrian and Iranian influence goes back a long time. Today's Hezbollah is the result of an Iranian-nurtured program that lasted for two decades and transformed a local guerilla group into a full-fledged army. Today, Hezbollah's military wing is no longer a group of partisans but an army comprising between 6,000 and 8,000 regular members, not counting reserves, divided into battalions of 250 men, as well as special forces. Not only was it the late Ayatollah Khomeni who provided the initiative for the foundation of Hezbollah, Iran continues to trains Hezbollah fighters and supports Hezbollah's army with weapons, such as the C-802 land-to-sea-missile that was used against the Israeli Naval Ship “Hanit” during the recent conflict.

On the Formation of the National Identity of the Talishis in Azerbaijan Republic

Since the ancient times, the territory of the present-day Azerbaijan Republic has been within the boundaries of the Iranian cultural world, as a part of various Iranian state formations. The Iranian traditions dominated here until the early 19th century. Following the inclusion of that territory into the Russian Empire, Russia more or less openly adopted a policy aimed at extricating that region out from under the influence of Iran. By doing so, the Russian authorities directly or indirectly contributed to the emergence and proliferation of a new, Turkic identity, which in contrast to the old, confession-based, one was rooted in secular values, such as, in particular, the common language. Consequently, already during that period, many representatives of the Iranian-speaking peoples living inside the future Azerbaijan Republic either began concealing their Iranian origins or were gradually assimilated. These assimilation processes were especially speedy for the so-called Muslim Tats (self-designation, Pars) and the Kurds. Another Iranian-speaking people the Talishis-even though were subjected to some extent of assimilation, have retained their identity. In terms of ethnic self-expression, Talishis today are the most active Iranian-speaking minority in the Republic of Azerbaijan. Presently, there are compact groups of the Talishi population in the south-western regions of the Azerbaijan Republic: Lenkoran (Pers. Lankoran, in Talishi Lankon), Lerik, Masally, Astara, and Yardymly. However, in modern times, many Talishis also live in urban areas, predominately in the cities of Baku, Sumgait, etc. Another part of Talishis live in the Talish district in Iran. Talishis of the Azerbaijan Republic are mostly Shi'ites (with the exception of the inhabitants of some 25 mountainous villages), while Iranian Talishis are for the most part Sunnis.

The Four Sources of Law in Zoroastrian and Islamic Jurisprudence

AbstractIt is "only our lack of familiarity with Sasanian law," von Grunebaum opined (1970: 37), "that prevents us from uncovering its traces in the fiqh". And Joseph Schacht argued that Sasanian law did have an influence on Islamic law. But neither Schacht nor any other modern scholar has provided persuasive evidence for such influence. In this article I argue that the influence of Sasanian legal theory on Islamic legal theory in the formative period was minimal, at best. It is true that, like Islamic law, Sasanian law was based on four sources: (1) The Awesta or holy book of the Zoroastrians; (2) oral law; (3) the consensus of the sages; and (4) the judicial practice of the courts (kardag). However, the possibility of Iranian influence on early Islamic jurisprudence is limited by historical, cultural, geographical and chronological factors, and the evidence of the sources suggests that Sasanian legal thinking was distinctive from that of the Sunni usulis.