Intuitive Object Research Articles

Male or Female, We Will Create Them

The article examines the arguments for and against the practice of sex selection for non-medical reasons (e.g. parental preferences, family balancing, religious reasons) in the light of the new technology of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD). It distinguishes between arguments about the risks to the future child, the mother and society, on the one hand, and the inherent wrongness of the practice as an illegitimate interference in the natural course of reproduction, on the other. The article tries to show that at least in the well defined context of sex selection by PGD, when IVF was performed for independent medical reasons, there is no danger to either the child or the mother and hence that the practice should be permitted. Furthermore, the alleged dangers to society are demonstrated to be mostly illusory. On the one hand, the demographic danger is usually overstated and lacks historical support. On the other hand, the feminist claim that sex selection is necessarily discriminatory is found to be both theoretically and empirically groundless. The article’s conclusion is that despite widespread intuitive objection to the practice of sex selection, it can be justified in terms of parental autonomy and falls within the value of family planning. This liberal view does not, however, imply that having a child of the desired sex is the parents’ right, nor does it apply to sex selection in later phases of gestation (abortions and, obviously, infanticide).

5.8.1 CADM Compliance for Implementations in an Object‐Oriented Environment

AbstractThe C4ISR Core Architecture Data Model is defined using a relational database syntax. There are many reasons to consider implementing a C4ISR application in an object‐oriented database (OODB) environment, such as intuitive object representation, performance, and efficient support for a highly collaborative work environment.Clearly, the database schema in the object‐oriented (OO) implementation must comply with the CADM definitions, i.e., be CADM compliant, before implementing applications. This raises the question: “What constitutes CADM compliant?” This paper identifies initial CADM compliance requirements and related issues for OO implementation.

Victor Hugo’s Poetics

As any poetics must be, Hugo's is inseparable from a certain theory of inspiration, since of his inspiration affects a writer's techniques. (1) The poet finds inspiration surrounds him. His concern is with mysteries which rise to blind him ... every morning with sun, every evening with stars. (2) But Hugo goes far beyond contemplation and meditation upon spectacle of nature: the horizon darkens and contemplation becomes vision; (3) fact, as early as time of his first travels to see world, when he composed Le Rhin, his exercises imagination, and sometimes hallucination, face of foreshadow methods of a Rimbaud. The poet's task is not only to see world as a Baudelairean forest of symbols, (4) like seer who deciphers God's intentions book of universe. He must not merely let himself be penetrated by reality, he must penetrate it, and prolong it, so to speak, direction sketched out by God: the vast yearning for could be, such is a poet's perpetual obsession. could be nature, could be destiny. In short, poet must continue work of divine creation where ascertainable truth gives place to potential truth: what is it to look at ocean, compared with looking at possible! (5) It is this rivalry with God--the poet putting himself place of destiny (6)--this going beyond, which engenders beauty: in art, however lofty truth, beauty is still higher. (7) Prisoner as he is within boundaries of reality, poet can find his escape toward possible only through supernaturalism, the part of that is beyond our senses. (8) To reach it poet must use observation, imagination and intuition. (9) Here is a sensualistic theory of knowledge: is object of imagination, imagination being interiorization of world perceived by senses; mankind is object of observation, but mankind is still nature, observed man; supernaturalism is object of intuition. Intuition, or conjecture, makes poet kin to scientist, (10) with difference that latter's work remains to be perfected, whereas a poem is a final and perfect form. (11) Conjecture is, we might say, an extrapolation from given of senses, or, again, a conception of possible infinity inferred from a finite given: nature mirrored by soul is more abysmal than when seen directly ... This reflection ... is an augmentation of reality. (12) Infinity is only reality, be it called God or moral ideal or absolute, (13) or simply consciousness of is beyond man, a consciousness which itself makes him great (14) and is source of all poetry. Any esthetics which limits Beauty by certain definitions or by application of certain rules negates infinity and sterilizes imagination. This is case with French classicism. Even irregularity can be a part of true poetry; one of his drafts, under title The Infinite Art, Hugo sketches a theory of baroque: What makes charm or irregularity? apparently irregularity is unfinishedness, and unfinishedness there is infinity. Even ugliness or evil can be part of poetry: What we call evil we should call good if we could see beginning and end of it. Evil, whether or destiny, is a thing mysteriously begun by God which stretches beyond us into invisible ... Some apparent ugliness ... is really part of a supreme beauty. (15) The poet, therefore, eager to contemplate absolute, must cast away any preconceived esthetics. He must be sure not to let literary tradition interpose itself between him and nature. Not only must he not restrict his inspiration to beaten path, he bas to be more than original. For an original poet may still follow guides and models; order to create a beauty that can be called his own, it is then sufficient if he has personal traits of style: thus Virgil imitating Homer. …

Is Pyrrhonism Psychologically Possible?

In this paper I aim to address -- and also to better understand -- what is perhaps the most intuitive objection to Pyrrhonian skepticism, namely, that to completely suspend one's judgment is psychologically impossible. I propose to come to an understanding of Sextus's relation to this objection by trying to more clearly understand Sextus's claims about the Skeptic. I hope to show that it is at least possible for us to understand Sextus and his claims about the Skeptic without being driven to either (1) invoke restrictive interpretations of his claims or (2) adopt implausible hypotheses concerning his sincerity.

How to Develop Advertising Concepts and Demystify the Creative Process

An extraordinary point of view for something rather ordinary Students creating advertisements for first time seem to go through same catharsis. The first stage seems to be relentless pursuit of best pun, augmented with visual deemed wild and wacky, in futile attempt at being funny. Once words wild and wacky have been deleted from their vocabulary, realization that advertising is still in communications business seems to dawn on most students. The second stage usually comes in form of banal statement about product accompanied by even duller product shot. When asked what their ad is trying to say, you are inevitably referred to squiggles at bottom of page representing unwritten body copy. At this point students become cognizant of need to have concept before they can even begin to deliberate over their witty headlines. A concept is defined as a directly conceived or intuitive object of (Random House Websters College Dictionary, 1991). The notion of conceiving original thought brings average, linear thinking, regimented, book-learned student to abrupt halt. Unfortunately, traditional means of breaking through this level is trial and error. Professors and students wait patiently for that piece of provocative thinking, which demonstrates some semblance of talent. The problem with trial and error is level of frustration incurred. For every ad that even remotely possesses piece of original thinking, student endures humiliating process of creating great many vacuous ones. It's usually at this point student throws his hands up, quits, and becomes account executive. The School of Visual Arts taught students (of which I was one) technique that totally demystified creative process. The first step is making student understand that creativity is nothing more than taking something ordinary (a product) and looking at it from extraordinary point of view (an ad). With that definition, one only needs to strive to see things differently. To exemplify this point, lets take simple observation that the sky is blue and simply ask, what does that mean? Well, for one thing, it means it's not raining. It means sun is out. It means looking up. It means there's atmosphere. And it clearly means not in Syracuse, Obviously, last one is most interesting point of view of boring observation that sky is blue. If we break down this simplistic example, interesting dynamic is taking place. For one thing, nothing more than sheer common sense is being used to look at this ordinary thing from various points of view. The choice of you're not in Syracuse, N.Y. as being most interesting selection is visceral, not intellectual. This exercise can easily be elaborated ILLUSTRATION 1 it something that's dead alive leather is into creating ads for product. As example, let's say assignment is Lexol leather conditioner and preservative. The first step is to clearly and succinctly define what this product is and does. By paraphrasing description on bottle, we define Lexol as an oil preservative that can repair cracked leather. Working with black magic marker, on 17x22 sheet of white drawing paper, we put what product is and does in middle of page and circle it. When we apply same method of thinking as the sky is blue to Lexol, five tangents immediately come to mind, although obviously infinite number exist. The five tangents are: 1. Skin cream for leather 2. Leather protector 3. Makes old leather look new 4. Heals leather like 5. Leather moisturizer. Of these five tangents, I would ILLUSTRATION eals something that's dead viscerally choose heals leather like skin as most interesting. Once again, same tangential thinking is applied to this point of departure. …

Production and Existence: Coleridge's Unification of Nature

This paper will examine the dualistic structure of Coleridge's epistemology, that is, his preoccupation with the concept of that which exceeds man's knowing power. This concept in Coleridge has little in common with the Kantian noumenon. In the Critique of Pure Reason the concept of the noumenon is employed to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition. Things in themselves, Kant writes, entitled noumena in order to show that this [sensible] knowledge cannot extend its domain over everything which the understanding thinks.' That we can think the possibility of things in themselves, on the other hand, is not to say that they exist but rather that all we can know about is appearances and our method of apprehending them. Taken in a positive sense, Kant says, the noumenon would be object of a non-sensible intuition. Yet since this intellectual does not belong to us, the noumenon can only be understood in a negative sense, in other words, as that which is not an object of sensible intuition.2 The concept of that which is not an object of sensible intuition is of great importance in Coleridge. It is important, however, not so much because it limits the significance of sensible intuition (though it certainly does that as well) as because the Coleridgean noumena are objects of religious faith and

Hare on utilitarianism and intuitive morality

InMoral Thinking R. M. Hare offers a very influential defense of utilitarianism against “intuitive” objections. Hare's argument is roughly that utilitarianism conflicts with defensible moral intuitions only in unusual cases and that, in such cases, even defensible moral intuitions are unreliable. This paper reconstructs Hare's arguments and argues that they presuppose the success of his problematic “proof” of utilitarianism. Contrary to what many have thought, Hare's negative defense of utilitarianism against intuitive objections is not separable from his “proof”. In the second part of the paper I argue that Hare does not succeed in defending utilitarianism against the objection that it is “too demanding”. The final section of the paper sketches a substantially revised version of Hare's reply to intuitive objections. So revised, the argument is independent of Hare's proof and affords a plausible answer to the objection that utilitarianism is “too demanding”.

Absolute Knowing and the Historicity of Spirit

Previous articleNext article No AccessAbsolute Knowing and the Historicity of SpiritJohn F. HoffmeyerJohn F. Hoffmeyer Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Religion Volume 72, Number 2Apr., 1992 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/488863 Views: 3Total views on this site Copyright 1992 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

On the identification of properties and propositional functions

The theory of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs) promises to play a significant foundational role in logic, philosophy, semantics, and psychology. There is now a growing recognition of this fact by research ers in these disciplines.' Nevertheless, formalizations of PRP theory run into some technical complexities in connection with the treatment of free and bound terms occurring in PRP-abstracts (see, e.g., Bealer, 1979, 1982, 1983; Zalta, 1980; Monnich, 1983). These complexities can be largely avoided by adopting the thesis that properties and propositional functions are identical (see, e.g., Aczel, 1980 and 1987; M6nnich, 1983; Turner, 1987; Chierchia and Turner, 1988). The purpose of this paper is to present some reasons against this thesis despite its short-term technical advantages.2 Philosophically, the propositional-function thesis seems unacceptable on at least two counts. First, it is highly counterintuitive. How im plausible that familiar sensible properties are functions the color of this ink, the aroma of coffee, the shape of your hand, the special painfulness of a burn or itchiness of a mosquito bite. No function is a color, a smell, a shape, or a feeling. Or consider the fact that navy blue is darker than yellow and that it covers the surface of my pen. No function is darker than another function, and no function covers the surface of my pen. To assert otherwise seems to be a category mistake.3 In addition to intuitive objections to the propositional-function thesis, a second philosophical objection is that the thesis threatens the prospect of certain explanations in epistemology, phenomenology, and philo sophical psychology. For example, how are we to explain what is going on in the interplay of sensation and cognition when a person sees that two objects have some sensible quality in common? Or how are we to explain why various shades of color can look so similar? At best, the identification of properties and propositional functions complicates our epistemology, phenomenology, and philosophical psychology in con nection with these and kindred phenomena. My aim, however, is not to dwell on such philosophical objections to the propositional-function thesis, serious as they are. Rather, my aim is to discuss four logical difficulties facing the thesis. (1) The first problem derives from the fact that functions are usually

Schlick and Husserl on the Foundations of Phenomenology

A recent article by M. M. Van de Pitte' reviews an old exchange between Edmund Husserl and Mortiz Schlick. Van de Pitte takes Husserl's side and is concerned to show that Schlick's criticisms of the possibility of grounding phenomenology on a special class of judgments, the so-called phenomenological propositions, are seriously wrongheaded. The brief but spirited exchange between Husserl and Schlick centered on a passage in the i9i8 (first) edition of Schlick's General Theory of Knowledge.' Schlick's remarks constitute a critical commentary on Husserl's idea of phenomenological intuition. He interpreted Husserl to be saying that phenomenological intuition is a special sort of intuition or an intuition of special sorts of objects, essences, that are not the objects of usual psychological intuition (awareness). To these comments, Husserl responded in the Foreword to the second volume, part two of the second edition of Logical Investigations published in i92i.' His response was largely rhetorical and highly acrimonious. Primarily, he denied Schlick's claim that phenomenological intuition is supposed to be a special kind of intuition, different from ordinary psychological states. When Schlick revised his General Theory of Knowledge in 1925, he omitted the entire passage that had disturbed Husserl, replacing it with a brief but more pointed paragraph4 which presented phenomenology as a

Mathematical Intuition and Husserl's Phenomenology

In this paper I shall discuss the role of the concept of intuition in mathematics from a somewhat special point of view. Much of the interest in the notion has derived from its place in Hilbert's program for the foundation of mathematics and, more recently, from some of Godel's views on the subject.1 However, I shall orient my discussion around some rather strong views that were advanced by another philosopher, Husserl. Husserl did not develop anything that could specifically be called a theory of mathematical intuition, but he did attempt to give a general theory of intuition which should have application in different domains of knowledge. In particular, in the Sixth Investigation of the Logical Investigations, and in Part II of Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl attempted to give an account of intuition (Anschauung) suitable to the kinds of abstract objects which are typical to mathematics and logic. For the most part, Husserl's investigations are concerned with what might be thought of as necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for mathematical knowledge, such as are provided by elementary observations on the grammar of formal languages, and on the consistency and definiteness of axiom systems.2 On the specific question of what constitutes evidence (Evidenz) for mathematical objects, or what it means to intuit or have representing content for mathematical objects, Husserl's own observations leave much to be desired. The problem is most acute in the case of the kinds of abstract objects for which it is not thought to be possible to find concrete, space-time instances. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that Husserl did not attempt to keep abreast of developments in the foundations of mathematics, so that his works on logic are not as well-informed as they might be. Husserl nonetheless did claim that there was intuition of abstract objects, that the evidence for objects of intuition could come in different degrees, with apodicticity and adequacy giving a maximal measure on evidence,

Interfacial tensions at lipid—water interfaces. comparison of equation-of-state predictions with direct experimental measurements

Studies of interfacial tensions in solid/liquid/vapor systems usually take as their starting point the equation derived by Young in 1805. However, both the derivation and the application of the equation of state have so far been limited to solid/liquid/vapor interfaces in 2-component, 3-phase systems. There are a number of solid/liquid/liquid systems where determination of vapor/solid interfaces would be of considerable interest. There appears to be no intuitive objection to the applicability of the equation of state at such interfaces, but it is possible, for example, that entropic effects at an oil-water interface could introduce errors which play little role at the more well-behaved solid/vapor interface. Accordingly, the application of the equation of state at lipid/water/oil interface has been investigated where interfacial tensions may be measured directly from deformation measurements and compared with indirect estimates from contact angle data and the equation of state. 10 references.

Prediction of two periods by simple autoregressive models with one lag

Three different methods are compared by their ability to predict two periods ahead in simple autoregressive models with one lag. In this study both artificial and historical time series are used. In spite of intuitive objections the usual least squares method performs relatively well. Moreover attention is paid to the estimation results, as they provide some links with other studies of the autoregressive model.

Resolution in type theory

In [8] J. A. Robinson introduced a complete refutation procedure called resolution for first order predicate calculus. Resolution is based on ideas in Herbrand's Theorem, and provides a very convenient framework in which to search for a proof of a wff believed to be a theorem. Moreover, it has proved possible to formulate many refinements of resolution which are still complete but are more efficient, at least in many contexts. However, when efficiency is a prime consideration, the restriction to first order logic is unfortunate, since many statements of mathematics (and other disciplines) can be expressed more simply and naturally in higher order logic than in first order logic. Also, the fact that in higher order logic (as in many-sorted first order logic) there is an explicit syntactic distinction between expressions which denote different types of intuitive objects is of great value where matching is involved, since one is automatically prevented from trying to make certain inappropriate matches. (One may contrast this with the situation in which mathematical statements are expressed in the symbolism of axiomatic set theory.).

Kant's Explanation of the Necessity of Geometrical Truths

Kant was an idealist. His idealism was in some ways, it is true, less extreme than that of Berkeley. He distinguished his own by calling it ‘transcendental’. It is less extreme than Berkeley's in two ways. First, Kant does not assert that everything which exists is essentially mental, as Berkeley does. Second, those things which he does hold to be essentially mental, he holds to be so in a weaker fashion. Nevertheless he was an idealist; he held that neither intuition nor thought could concern any object that was not essentially related to our minds. Since intuition and thought together provide knowledge, and since we can have no knowledge except through them, it follows that every object of which we have knowledge is essentially within our minds. Moreover, there is at least one respect in which his idealism is more extreme than that of Berkeley. He held that the objects of intuition were essentially within our minds, whereas Berkeley held only that they were essentially within some mind.

Kant's Explanation of the Necessity of Geometrical Truths

Kant was an idealist. His idealism was in some ways, it is true, less extreme than that of Berkeley. He distinguished his own by calling it ‘transcendental’. It is less extreme than Berkeley's in two ways. First, Kant does not assert that everything which exists is essentially mental, as Berkeley does. Second, those things which he does hold to be essentially mental, he holds to be so in a weaker fashion. Nevertheless he was an idealist; he held that neither intuition nor thought could concern any object that was not essentially related to our minds. Since intuition and thought together provide knowledge, and since we can have no knowledge except through them, it follows that every object of which we have knowledge is essentially within our minds. Moreover, there is at least one respect in which his idealism is more extreme than that of Berkeley. He held that the objects of intuition were essentially within our minds, whereas Berkeley held only that they were essentially within some mind.

Hintikka and a Strange Aristotelian Doctrine

II. n a brilliant paper,' Hintikka succeeded, apparently for the first time, in explaining in an entirely convincing manner the (prima facie strange) doctrine which we find in both Plato and Aristotle, viz., that knowledge (in the true sense of the word, which excludes such phrases as 'apparent knowledge,' let alone 'false knowledge,' as self-contradictory) can be had only of entities belonging to the realm of the changeless. Ultimately, Hintikka's explanation reads like this: because the Greeks were inclined to interpret knowledge (im '[Ir) as a kind of vision (intuition, Anschauung, witnessing), every assertion, regardless of the subject to which it might refer, implicitly contained for them a temporal index, a 'now,' this 'now' referring to the moment of the original vision by a particular speaker. We have learned to distinguish tenseless assertions (e.g., 'two is an even number'), in which what from the viewpoint of ordinary grammar is a present tense ('is'), is actually a timeless or omnipresent or tenseless tense, so that the whole assertion is tenseless, from tensed ones (e.g., 'Socrates walks'). But the Greeks were inclined to consider even tenseless assertions as being actually tensed. Therefore, to them, no knowledge of changeable entities was possible, as they might have changed since the moment when on the basis of an intuition somebody had asserted something about them. Thus, when I say 'Socrates sits,' somebody can refute me by saying 'Socrates walks' which obviously means that no such assertion can claim to be knowledge. In other words, all knowledge is ultimately intuitive (though the existence of discursive or dianoetic knowledge is admitted). But the objects of intuition are of two kinds, and so are the corresponding intuitions. Either these objects belong to the realm of the sensible and therefore changeable, and they are intuited by our senses. Or they are unchangeable, and they are intuited by some other mental faculty mostly called vok, i.e., intelligence; these objects themselves are

Sensory intuition and the dogma of localization

Conceptualism, like any other philosophical doctrine of comparable scope, has both ontological and epistemological aspects. Ontologically, however, conceptualism does not differ significantly from certain forms of nominalism.1 At its root lies an epistemological thesis: All objects of sensory intuition are localized in space and time.2 In this paper, I wish to explore some of the consequences of this thesis.

Richard Price and Edmund Burke: The Duty to Participate in Government

Richard Price argued for democratic institutions on the ground that each individual has a moral responsibility for the good government of his community. This assumption that political responsibilities are moral responsibilities was in turn derived from the belief that each individual has a continuous duty to create in his own personality and in his relations with his fellow men the conditions of the virtuous life. Popular political responsibility was thus defended by the extension of a rigorous moral athleticism into the sphere of social arrangements. The dominating feature of this demand for comprehensive reform and reconstruction is the attempt to construe the moral life as a process in which the individual struggles to recreate himself in the light of his most mature conceptions. These conceptions, Price maintained, are determined rationally, and that they are so is presented in two different ways. Either as in the case of the principles of moral judgment they are held to be the objects of a rational intuition; or as in the defence of democratic institutions they are derived from an abstract construction of the demands of moral personality.

The Distinction, physiologically and psychologically considered, between Perception, Memory; Sensation, and Intellect

Perception we define to be the intellectual and presentative consciousness of objects of any kind, internal or external, and the primary gateway of knowledge. In every perception the object is a most prominent feature. It is in the invariable presence of the object in perception, and its absence from memory and imagination, that we behold the striking difference which there is between it and the latter; and it is on this distinction the universal assurance is grounded that what we perceive is different from what we remember or imagine. In every perception there is an intellectual and a sensational element, and memory proper is the persistence of the intellectual element after the sensational element has disappeared from consciousness, or after the peripheral nerves have ceased to excite the sense-centre. In no instance have we been able, by any amount of effort, to make an act of memory or imagination seem a perception; yet Hume divided perceptions into two classes, as distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less lively he named thoughts and ideas; the more lively, impressions. Professor Bain seems to take the same view of the question. In reference to the recalling of past feelings, he says:—“The renewed feeling occupies the very same parts, and in the same manner, as the original feeling, and no other parts, nor in any other manner that can be assigned.” It is the opinion of some, then, that memory and imagination only differ from perception in being less lively. The latter is a vivid picture, the former are faint reproductions of it. We fail to see that this is precisely the case. In every perception there is an object present, and cognized as distinct from the consciousness of it—in special instances, as even distinct from the perceiver altogether. When we gaze at a picture, the picture is regarded as one thing, the knowing of it as another; whereas when we only think of the picture, we do not recognize any object as really distinct from thought itself. An imagined external object is still detected to be a mental object. “A representation considered as an object is logically, not really, different from a representation considered as an act. Here object and act are merely the same indivisible mode of mind viewed in two different relations… The same may be said of image and imagination.” “Imagination, regarded as a product, may be defined, the consciousness of an image in the mind resembling and representing an object of intuition.” Though we do not exactly hold with these opinions, we quote them in order to show what view is taken by some psychologists in reference to the distinction between presentative and representative consciousness, or between knowing a thing immediately in perception, and knowing it mediately through an image of the mind's collecting. How is it possible, when contemplating a mountain which one is on the point of ascending—albeit the mountain is to us, as immediately known, in a sense-centre—to regard it as identical, except in vivacity, with the recollection which we afterwards have of it? Perception is, so to speak, a bi-une fact, a synthesis of cognition and object, whereas memory and imagination are not bi-une, for the object is not present in them, in the same manner, at least, as it is in perception. But let us now proceed to adduce facts and deductions confirmatory of this view of the question.