Abstract
Conceptualism, like any other philosophical doctrine of comparable scope, has both ontological and epistemological aspects. Ontologically, however, conceptualism does not differ significantly from certain forms of nominalism.1 At its root lies an epistemological thesis: All objects of sensory intuition are localized in space and time.2 In this paper, I wish to explore some of the consequences of this thesis.
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