Rape is probably the most academically researched, and constantly debated offense in the legal field. Jed Rubenfeld's 2013 provocative essay has ignited a scholarly debate, about the of rape by deception. His essay examined a major normative dissonance: notwithstanding its clear violation of sexual autonomy, sex obtained by fraud is usually not considered rape. Rubenfeld proposed to solve this dissonance by dismissing sexual autonomy as a normative basis for the criminalization of rape, and embracing self-possession instead, which excludes sex by fraud as rape. Academic responses acknowledged the above normative dissonance, and proposed other rationales to the offense of rape. As a matter of fact, the normative problem is much wider and deeper. This article takes the above dissonance a step further, to articulate another riddle. The normative dissonance at focus is highly abstract: while personal autonomy is deeply valued, and therefore firmly protected in certain criminal legal aspects, it is discarded in others. This article points out diverse scenarios in which personal autonomy is protected by criminal law; diverse contexts in which it is not legally protected; and diverse contexts in which it is even attacked by criminal law. Then, it further explores another more concrete dissonance, but still more abstract than the one analyzed in the riddle of fraudulent sex: The American legal regime rarely criminalizes lying and deceiving. This article reviews legal norms which criminalize lying and deceiving in certain contexts, while illustrating contexts in which lying and deceiving are legally acceptable. It then argues, that regardless of sexuality, lying and deceiving in intimate contexts can be abusive, wrongful and harmful. The latter forms harshly violate the important, intimate and emotional layers of personal autonomy, in the romance, family and friendship context. They are worthy of legal and scholarly attention; and neglecting them reflects a major normative dissonance. As long as personal autonomy is protected in certain contexts, and discarded in others, and as long as the criminal law generally rules out the criminalization of lying and deceiving, our normative dissonances will thrive in concrete contexts, such as the one of rape by fraud. The discourse of the rape offenses is vast, and lately that is also the case regarding fraudulent sex. The academic discourse about the protection of personal autonomy from fraud and deception in those matters is clear. However, there is very little discourse regarding the dissonances of personal autonomy's relationship with the criminal law, and almost no discourse about the criminal protection of personal autonomy in intimate yet non-sexual contexts.