International Spread Of Disease Research Articles

Serologic Evidence of Measles IgM Antibodies among Children in Two IDP Camps in Kaduna State, Nigeria

Major risk factors for the spread of measles in displaced populations are: poor vaccination coverage, mass migration causing international spread of diseases and high density of refugee population in the camps. The aim of this study was to determine the serologic evidence of measles IgM antibodies among children in two IDP camps (Ungwan zawu and Hayin Nariya) situated in Kaduna South and Kaduna North. Sample population consisted of 192 consenting children in the two IDP camps. About four (4) milliliters of blood was collected, dispensed into plain containers, allowed to clot and spun at 3,000rpm for 10 minutes. The serum was separated into cryo tubes and stored at -200C. The frozen sera were thawed at room temperature for 45 minutes and screened for measles IgM antibodies using ELISA technique (EuroImmun Medizinische Labordiagnostika AG, Germany) according to manufacturer's instructions. Measles specific IgM antibodies was detected in 66 (34.4%) of the total 192 children in the two IDP camps studied. Males recorded higher percentage prevalence of 63.6% compared to females (36.4%). Measles IgM antibodies varied among the age grades, from 63.6% in children aged >5years to 3.0% in children aged <1year. attack (39.4%). From the questionnaires administered, all the participants were exposed to crowd, all the mothers were illiterates and farming was their major occupation. Inadequate vaccination, malnutrition and lack of awareness are thought to be the reason for the high IgM antibodies. Measles awareness, and high vaccination coverage in IDP camps is advocated.

Accelerating measles elimination in the Western Pacific Region during the calm between the storms

The 2018-19 global measles resurgence was the largest measles epidemic in over two decades and prompted calls for the declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. The enormous number of measles cases with global spread and ensuing deaths was characterised as “an extraordinary event that may constitute a public health risk to other countries through international spread of disease and may require an international coordinated response.”1 However, this momentous epidemic was soon overshadowed as the world wrestled with the immense threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Gestation and birth of panendemic

Words are born, compete with each other, and some die, showing the language dynamics and the influence of historical contexts1. During 2020, the meaning of the word pandemic has been discussed and a new meaning has emerged2,3. Traditionally in epidemiology, “pandemic” was used when in a relatively short time, there was a widespread geographical distribution of a disease, including some countries and continents4, which contrasts with the moment when the World Health Organization decided to decree it for the COVID-19 pandemic. In this case, the criteria indicated by the classic epidemiological definition were met several days before the pandemic was declared. Even an intermediate step was to declare Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) understood as: “an extraordinary event which ‘constitute[s] a public health risk to other States through international spread of disease and…potentially require[s] a coordinated international response”5. In this way, potential panic was controlled, and the word pandemic was left for circumstances that require the maximum attention of all States, for a joint response, given its very high potential for disease and death.

An approach to integrate population mobility patterns and sociocultural factors in communicable disease preparedness and response

Complex human movement patterns driven by a range of economic, health, social, and environmental factors influence communicable disease spread. Further, cross-border movement impacts disparate public health systems of neighboring countries, making an effective response to disease importation or exportation more challenging. Despite the array of quantitative techniques and social science approaches available to analyze movement patterns, there continues to be a dearth of methods within the applied public health setting to gather and use information about community-level mobility dynamics. Population Connectivity Across Borders (PopCAB) is a rapidly-deployable toolkit to characterize multisectoral movement patterns through community engagement using focus group discussions or key informant interviews, each with participatory mapping, and apply the results to tailor preparedness and response strategies. The Togo and Benin Ministries of Health (MOH), in collaboration with the Abidjan Lagos Corridor Organization and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, adapted and applied PopCAB to inform cross-border preparedness and response strategies for multinational Lassa fever outbreaks. Initially, the team implemented binational, national-level PopCAB activities in March 2017, highlighting details about a circular migration pathway across northern Togo, Benin, and Nigeria. After applying those results to respond to a cross-border Lassa fever outbreak in February 2018, the team designed an expanded PopCAB initiative in April 2018. In eight days, they trained 54 MOH staff who implemented 21 PopCAB focus group discussions in 14 cities with 224 community-level participants representing six stakeholder groups. Using the newly-identified 167 points of interest and 176 routes associated with a circular migration pathway across Togo, Benin, and Nigeria, the Togo and Benin MOH refined their cross-border information sharing and collaboration processes for Lassa fever and other communicable diseases, selected health facilities with increased community connectivity for enhanced training, and identified techniques to better integrate traditional healers in surveillance and community education strategies. They also integrated the final toolkit in national- and district-level public health preparedness plans. Integrating PopCAB in public health practice to better understand and accommodate population movement patterns can help countries mitigate the international spread of disease in support of improved global health security and International Health Regulations requirements.

Breaking State-Centric Shackles in the WHO: Taiwan as a Catalyst for a New Global Health Order

After World War II, states recognizing that “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being” and “the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security”, decided to establish the World Health Organization (WHO), with the aim of promoting and protecting health for all. Mindful of the fact that disease neither recognizes nor respects borders, the revised International Health Regulations (IHR) in 2005 reiterates the goal of the universal application “for the protection of all people of the world from the international spread of disease.” The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), similarly, stands as an “evidence-based treaty that reaffirms the right of all people to the highest standard of health.” Such statements indicate an aspiration that the WHO’s normative work not just be about “a collection of nation states”, given the inherently global nature of public health affairs.Such aspiration embedded in global health governance introduces a paradox vis-à-vis the WHO’s state-centric institutional design, as evidenced and amplified by the COVID-19 crisis. The exclusion of Taiwan—which alerted the WHO of potential human-to-human transmission at the early stage and successfully guarded its people against the pandemic—is heatedly debated. Taiwan’s WHO participation presents a sharp contrast between its goal of health for all peoples, on one hand, and its outdated state-centric design and power politics, on the other. While scholars proposed the concept of “global health law” to reflect the erosion of sovereignty and encroachment of state powers due to globalization, the WHO continues to rest its institutional design on the assumption of states being the dominant actors of international (health) law, envisaging international health governance rather than global health governance. This state-centric view inevitably goes hand in hand with power struggles that undermine global health.Against this background, this paper aims to demonstrate how and why state-centric international health governance neither delivers its goal to “promote and protect the health of all peoples” nor accommodates the complexity of international politics, and to explore new venues allowing a pluralist membership structure that better serves the WHO’s promise. We proceed as follows. Part II analyzes challenges and constraints facing Taiwan’s participation in the WHO as a full member and as an observer under the existing institutional framework. Part III proposes an amendment to the WHO Constitution and maps a new contour of global health governance through the lens of the trans-governmental network. Part IV concludes.

A Critical Appraisal of the World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations (2005) in Times of Pandemic: It Is Time for Revision

The explicit objective of the WHO is “the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health”.5 To achieve this, the WHO is mandated to act as the directing and coordinating authority on international health work6 to furnish appropriate technical assistance and, in emergencies, necessary aid upon the request or acceptance of governments,7 and to stimulate and advance work to eradicate epidemic, endemic and other diseases.8 Within the WHO framework, the World Health Assembly (WHA) has been established as a decision-making body consisting of delegates from the WHO Member States.9 The WHA has the authority to adopt conventions and agreements with respect to any matter within the WHO’s competence.10 Moreover, the WHA has the authority to adopt regulations concerning sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the international spread of disease.11 The WHO’s most important regulatory basis is the “International Health Regulations” – a set of rules whose origins can be traced back to the first International Sanitary Conference in 1851, at which several European states convened in an attempt to fight cholera and the first Sanitary Regulations were drafted. [...]IHR (1969) had been drafted so that the WHO was dependent on each state itself reporting the outbreak of a disease – and frequently the states simply abstained from doing this. The review gained considerable momentum when the deadly SARS epidemic broke out in 2003,13 and in 2005, the WHA adopted the presently applicable IHR (2005).14 IHR (2005) figures amongst the international agreements that most states have signed up to.15 Its purpose is “to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade”.16 For our purposes, it is of particular importance that the WHO’s members have undertaken to notify the WHO of events that may constitute what is called a “public health emergency of international concern”.17 When compared with IHR (1969), the adoption of IHR (2005) represents a crucial expansion in the rules’ coverage from three predefined transmittable diseases to any event that could be considered a “public health emergency of international concern” – and, as a matter of principle, this includes any outbreak of a transmittable disease. On 30 January 2020, the WHO’s Director General declared the COVID-19 outbreak a “public health emergency of international concern” (ie an extraordinary event determined to constitute a public health risk to other states through the international spread of disease and to which a coordinated international response could potentially be required).21 This allowed the WHO to issue so-called “temporary recommendations” such as specific health measures to be implemented by the state or states where the disease has broken out.

Novel Coronavirus COVID-19: Current Evidence and Evolving Strategies.

Novel Coronavirus COVID-19: Current Evidence and Evolving Strategies.

Coronaviruses and global health threats

Since the mid-nineteenth century, in the face of the cholera epidemics that devastated Europe, the health authorities of the affected countries identified the need to generate mechanisms that “ensure the maximum security against the international spread of diseases with a minimum interference with world traffic.” In November 1924, during the VII Pan American Sanitary Conference held in Havana, Cuba, the governments of 21 American republics signed and ratified the Pan American Sanitary Code to achieve the aforementioned goal, supported by the cooperation of governments, which encouraged the exchange of information, and strengthened public health actions and the adoption of measures used at entry points.

Діяльність Всесвітньої асамблеї охорони здоров’я ВООЗ у боротьбі з поширенням COVID-19

The article analyses the rights of the WHO World Health Assembly in adopting sanitary and quarantine requirements and other measures against the international spread of disease. The content of the WHO World Health Assembly Resolution «COVID-19 Response» and its impact on international cooperation in combating the spread of COVID-19 have been studied. The obligation of the States Parties of the 2005 International Health Regulations to notify and exchange information in case of unexpected or unusual events in the field of public health has been disclosed.

COVID 19 Pandemic: What is it Teaching?

When a disease occurring in unusually very large number with extensive geographic spread affecting an exceptionally high fraction of the population and also crossing the ocean barrier then it’s called as Pandemic. World has witnessed many such hard ships in form of Plague, Spanish Flu, Polio and Influenza. At such times it has sub-stantiated that health of the people of the nation is of paramount importance and human life is the most valuable asset of the country. From December 2019 there has been a buzz word, most searched word on internet and most prated word on various media platforms which is CORONA Virus so called COVID -19. Towards the end of 2019, World Health Organization (WHO) declared this newly mooted zoonotic viral pathogen as Public Health Emergency of International concern as it had created a world-wide outbreak. The term Public Health Emergency of International Concern is “an extraordinary event which constitute a public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease and potentially require a coordinated international re-sponse. 1The outbreak has showed no signs of slow-ing down despite much appreciated global contain-ment and quarantine efforts by various nations.2 Spanish Flu so called Mother of all pandemics had killed 50 million people all over the world in 1918-19 had scorned public health preparedness. Even after so many researches happening all over world, many unanswered queries have been repudiated regarding Spanish Flu. First being why there was two peaks of this flu pandemic, second why there was simultaneous infection of humans and swine during the outbreak and more important viral ge-nome and its pathogenicity. 3 Have we learnt any-thing from this ponderous drill remains unan-swered till date.

How the Petroleum Industry Can Learn From the Ebola Crisis of 2014

This article, written by Special Publications Editor Adam Wilson, contains highlights of paper SPE 177759, “How the Petroleum Industry Can Learn From the Ebola Crisis of 2014,” by Andre Willemse, International SOS, prepared for the 2015 Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Exhibition and Conference, Abu Dhabi, 9–12 November. The paper has not been peer reviewed. The Ebola crisis of 2014 was one of the worst infectious disease outbreaks in recent history. It also occurred in a region with endemic medical risks and poor medical infrastructure. These two factors make it an important learning exercise for the global petroleum community. This paper reviews the Ebola outbreak from the viewpoint of an onshore and offshore petroleum operator, providing insight into the real threats the outbreak presented by looking past the media hype and diving into the real organizational effects of the outbreak. Introduction West Africa experienced the most severe Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak ever recorded. The most-affected countries are Liberia (10,672 cases as of 16 August 2015), Sierra Leone (13,494 cases), and Guinea (3,786 cases). Other affected countries include Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal in Africa; and Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, although to a much lower level. Pictorial representation of the number of cases and deaths in affected countries as of 5 July 2015 is shown in Fig. 1. The World Health Organization on 6 August 2014 declared this Ebola outbreak in West Africa to be a public health emergency of international concern. Lessons Learned The West Africa Ebola outbreak has been the largest, longest, and most complex since the virus was discovered in 1976. It has had the highest number of cases and deaths ever reported for Ebola. A functional health system is a prerequisite for any coordinated preparedness for and response to any possible outbreak. The 2005 revision to the International Health Regulations (IHR) is a legally binding agreement whose purpose is “to prevent, protect against, control, and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade.” None of the most-affected countries were compliant with the IHR regulations, and this surely delayed the timely identification of the disease, the setting up of contact tracing and adequate surveillance measures, and the early implementation of infectious control measures in healthcare settings.

Will Ebola change the game? Ten essential reforms before the next pandemic. The report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola

© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. The west African Ebola epidemic that began in 2013 exposed deep inadequacies in the national and international institutions responsible for protecting the public from the far-reaching human, social, economic, and political consequences of infectious disease outbreaks. The Ebola epidemic raised a crucial question: what reforms are needed to mend the fragile global system for outbreak prevention and response, rebuild confidence, and prevent future disasters? To address this question, the Harvard Global Health Institute and the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine jointly launched the Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola. Panel members from academia, think tanks, and civil society have collectively reviewed the worldwide response to the Ebola outbreak. After difficult and lengthy deliberation, we concluded that major reforms are both warranted and feasible. The Panel's conclusions off er a roadmap of ten interrelated recommendations across four thematic areas: 1 Preventing major disease outbreaks All countries need a minimum level of core capacity to detect, report, and respond rapidly to outbreaks. The shortage of such capacities in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone enabled Ebola to develop into a national, and worldwide, crisis. Recommendation 1: The global community must agree on a clear strategy to ensure that governments invest domestically in building such capacities and mobilise adequate external support to supplement eff orts in poorer countries. This plan must be supported by a transparent central system for tracking and monitoring the results of these resource flows. Additionally, all governments must agree to regular, independent, external assessment of their core capacities. Recommendation 2: WHO should promote early reporting of outbreaks by commending countries that rapidly and publicly share information, while publishing lists of countries that delay reporting. Funders should create economic incentives for early reporting by committing to disburse emergency funds rapidly to assist countries when outbreaks strike and compensating for economic losses that might result. Additionally, WHO must confront governments that implement trade and travel restrictions without scientific justification, while developing industry-wide cooperation frameworks to ensure private firms such as airlines and shipping companies continue to provide crucial services during emergencies. 2 Responding to major disease outbreaks When preventive measures do not succeed, outbreaks can cross borders and surpass national capacities. Ebola exposed WHO as unable to meet its responsibility for responding to such situations and alerting the global community. Recommendation 3: A dedicated centre for outbreak response with strong technical capacity, a protected budget, and clear lines of accountability should be created at WHO, governed by a separate Board. Recommendation 4: A transparent and politically protected WHO Standing Emergency Committee should be delegated with the responsibility for declaring public health emergencies. Recommendation 5: An independent UN Accountability Commission should be created to do systemwide assessments of worldwide responses to major disease outbreaks. 3 Research: production and sharing of data, knowledge, and technology Rapid knowledge production and dissemination are essential for outbreak prevention and response, but reliable systems for sharing epidemiological, genomic, and clinical data were not established during the Ebola outbreak. Recommendation 6: Governments, the scientific research community, industry, and non-governmental organisations must begin to develop a framework of norms and rules operating both during and between outbreaks to enable and accelerate research, govern the conduct of research, and ensure access to the benefits of research. Recommendation 7: Additionally, research funders should establish a worldwide research and development financing facility for outbreak-relevant drugs, vaccines, diagnostics, and non-pharmaceutical supplies (such as personal protective equipment) when commercial incentives are not appropriate.

Strengthening core public health capacity based on the implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005): Chinese lessons.

As an international legal instrument, the International Health Regulations (IHR) is internationally binding in 196 countries, especially in all the member states of the World Health Organization (WHO). The IHR aims to prevent, protect against, control, and respond to the international spread of disease and aims to cut out unnecessary interruptions to traffic and trade. To meet IHR requirements, countries need to improve capacity construction by developing, strengthening, and maintaining core response capacities for public health risk and Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). In addition, all the related core capacity requirements should be met before June 15, 2012. If not, then the deadline can be extended until 2016 upon request by countries. China has promoted the implementation of the IHR comprehensively, continuingly strengthening the core public health capacity and advancing in core public health emergency capacity building, points of entry capacity building, as well as risk prevention and control of biological events (infectious diseases, zoonotic diseases, and food safety), radiological, nuclear, and chemical events, and other catastrophic events. With significant progress in core capacity building, China has dealt with many public health emergencies successfully, ensuring that its core public health capacity has met the IHR requirements, which was reported to WHO in June 2014. This article describes the steps, measures, and related experiences in the implementation of IHR in China.

Achieving compliance with the International Health Regulations by overseas territories of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) came into force for all Member States of the World Health Organization (WHO) in June 2007 and the deadline for achieving compliance was June 2012. The purpose of the IHR is to prevent, protect against, control – and provide a public health response to – international spread of disease. The territory of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and that of several other Member States, such as China, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United States of America, include overseas territories, which cover a total population of approximately 15 million people. Member States have a responsibility to ensure that all parts of their territory comply with the IHR. Since WHO has not provided specific guidance on compliance in the special circumstances of the overseas territories of Member States, compliance by these territories is an issue for self-assessment by Member States themselves. To date, no reports have been published on the assessment of IHR compliance in countries with overseas territories. We describe a gap analysis done in the United Kingdom to assess IHR compliance of its overseas territories. The findings and conclusions are broadly applicable to other countries with overseas territories which may have yet to assess their compliance with the IHR. Such assessments are needed to ensure compliance across all parts of a Member States’ territory and to increase global health security.

1831: the map that launched the idea of global health.

Today we take for granted the idea of global health, of disease as an international event. Increasingly, we assume as well that the international spread of disease can be traced to human travel patterns as well as to recurring environmental conditions. Perversely, the idea of ‘global health’ and its inverse, global disease, owes little to the three-dimensional imaging of the planet and almost everything to the two-dimensional plane of the map. Here the idea of global disease is traced from its beginnings in the 18th century to its 19th-century introduction in maps of the first cholera pandemic. This global perspective, and the responsibilities it promoted among civil officials, can be seen in modern studies of cancer, influenza and other conditions with both environmental foundations and international presence.

The spread of pathogens through trade in aquatic animals and their products

It is well known that the transboundary spread of infectious diseases is aided by trade in live animals and the consequences can be severe if, as a result, a pathogen broadens its host range to new species. Trade in aquatic animal species is increasing, and aquaculture is also expanding to meet the growing human population's demands for animal protein. Moreover, it is clear that aquaculture has created potential new pathways by which pathogens and diseases may be introduced or spread to new areas. The risk of pathogen transfer is generally considered greater for the movement of live aquatic animals than for the movement of processed and dead products. The currently available health standards support the concept of minimising the risk of disease and pathogen incursion while, at the same time, avoiding unjustifiable or unnecessary impediments to trade. Nevertheless, the international spread of diseases through the movement of animals still occurs, despite these standards. Consequently, this paper considers the evidence linking international trade in aquatic animals and aquatic animal-derived products with the transmission and spread of diseases. The authors provide examples of pathogen transfer leading to disease spread and considerthe situation of emerging diseases, as well as the need for a holistic approach to deal with risk-based threats at their source.

Prevention, not panic—epidemics and trade sanctions

Why should trade have anything to do with infectious-disease surveillance? Why not just set up a global surveillance system with low-orbiting satellites and computers everywhere and be done with it? Why should the International Health Regulations have as their purpose: “to ensure the maximum security against the international spread of disease with a minimum interference with world traffic”? Why not leave public-health problems to public-health people?

Vaccine Requirements and Recommendations for International Travelers

The incidence of infectious diseases preventable by vaccines is generally higher in foreign countries than in the United States. Thus, an increased risk of acquiring these diseases exists for US citizens traveling abroad. In addition, the importation of these infectious disease agents into the United States from both returning citizens and other international travelers is an ever-present threat. The increasing documentation of the importations of measles into the United States (p 2129) is a reflection of these problems. Requirements and recommendations for use of vaccines for travelers leaving the United States are based in part on their increased risk to these diseases during their foreign travel, but the primary purpose of international requirements is to prevent the international spread of diseases. This is the rationale behind the formulation of the International Health Regulations (IHR) pertaining to vaccination certificate requirements. 1 Unfortunately, many countries, including some that are signatories of and