ABSTRACT 1990–1991 saw a distinct change in Danish foreign policy in general and towards the Baltic countries in particular, shifting from a quiescent policy of non-recognition of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries to active support for Baltic independence. Drawing on declassified documents, this article argues that although the shift was made possible by Soviet decline and by US approval and support for the new Danish position, it was ultimately driven by the idea prevalent in Danish foreign policy thinking that it would further Denmark’s long-term indirect security interests. By contributing to restoring the independence of three small democratic states on the other side of the Baltic Sea, Denmark could promote a more stable – and to Denmark less threatening – Baltic Sea area. Alternative hypotheses for the shift in policy: that the Danish desire to adopt the Baltic cause was a way to perform a useful service to the US; or that it was driven by ‘pure’ humanitarian motives, and/or by consideration for international and domestic prestige are examined and rejected.