K rivogorsky and Burton (2012) examine the association between dominant shareholders and firm performance for 1,533 firms from seven Continental European countries using ownership data from 2005 to 2007. The primary analysis in the paper tests the effects of four separate types of dominant owners (institutions, blockholders, banks, and individuals and families) on two measures of accounting performance (return on assets and return on shareholder funds) and a measure of firm value (market-to-book ratio). Supplemental tests examine cross-sectional differences in the effects of each type of dominant owner across individual countries. The main results indicate that banks and individual and family owners have a positive effect on firm performance, while institutions and blockholders have a negative effect on firm performance. The evidence from the within-country tests shows that the relation between particular shareholder types and firm performance varies across different jurisdictions, with dominant owners generally having a positive effect. Dominant shareholders have incentives and the ability to influence the firms in which they own a controlling interest. Dominant owners are motivated to utilize their control to monitor managerial actions because of their claims to the residual profits of the firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Dominant shareholders also have the ability to monitor managerial actions because of their access to inside information and their ability to control internal forces designed to curb managerial actions that are not consistent with maximization of firm value. Thus, monitoring by dominant owners can serve to address the classic agency conflicts between shareholders and investors (Jensen and Meckling 1976), thereby having a positive effect on firm value. In an international context, however, country-level institutions, laws, and other regulatory features can interfere with dominant shareholders’ typical incentives and ability to monitor managerial behavior. Depending on a country’s institutional environment, dominant shareholders could be motivated by a different set of factors, perhaps leading them to take advantage of their ownership status to extract personal benefits from the firm. This type of situation would result in a negative relation between dominant ownership and firm value. Given the potential for either
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