INF Treaty Research Articles

Five Years Without the INF Treaty: Lessons and Prospects

This article focuses on regional ground-launched missiles in the context of the Russia-U.S.-China strategic triangle. It studies the bilateral nature, limited scope, and asymmetric limits/ reductions of the INF Treaty; considers the military and symbolic significance of regional ground-launched missiles in comparison with their sea- and air-launched counterparts; and examines the reasons for the INF Treaty’s termination, future U.S. deployments, and Russian and Chinese responses. In conclusion it describes two possible U.S. deployment scenarios and analyzes possibilities for minimizing the unfolding arms race.

Five Years Without the INF Treaty: Lessons and Prospects

Raising the question of systemic arms control, especially between the United States and Russia, would look far-fetched today. However, tacit self-limitation on the number of deployed ground-based missiles seems achievable.

Regional Missile Defense Architecture of the US and Their Partners In the Western Pacifi Security

China has the largest arsenal of missiles with a range of less than 5,500 km. In 2019, the US withdrew from the INF Treaty and decided to deploy the same kind of missiles in East Asia. At the same time Washington plans to strengthen the theater missile defense architecture in the region. The purpose of the article is to determine the potential impact of missile defense strengthening by the US and their partners in East Asia on regional security. It is necessary to understand the prospects of the situation, given the presence of several hotbeds of potential conflict in the Western Pacific. A critical analysis of the expected actions of China and the US in the region, the role of regional missile defense systems in those scenarios, and both sides’ doctrines of non-nuclear missile use is provided. In certain situations, an enhanced theater missile defense could help the US and their partners to strengthen regional deterrence, but not in all situations. The analysis of both sides’ doctrinal provisions help to understand how strengthening the regional missile defense by the US and their partners can destabilize the situation. It is concluded that theater missile defense, unlike arms control measures, is not a reliable tool for ensuring regional stability.

The Renuclearization of Europe and The Limits of History

As NATO calibrates its response to increased Russian reliance on nuclear weapons for regional deterrence, references to the 1979 Dual Track decision as a blueprint for policies today have become in vogue. However, calls to compete to negotiate do not fully appreciate the risks of such a strategy for alliance cohesion. They also fail to acknowledge crucial factors that helped bring about the INF Treaty and that are absent today. A closer look at the origins of the INF Treaty reveals the important role of then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who seized an opportunity to push through their ambitious arms control agendas even against considerable resistance in Moscow as well as Washington and NATO capitals. Expectations that U.S. President Biden would have the political capital and Russian President Putin the willingness to conclude a similar agreement today are misplaced. Moreover, in the history of the Cold War, weapons deployments meant to counter adversary capabilities have more often remained unchecked than they were negotiated away. Rather than trying to match Russia’s non-strategic capabilities or limited nuclear options, NATO should seek to focus on its conventional deterrence and defense in ways that minimize firststrike incentives and hedge against uncertainties about America’s commitment to Europe after the 2024 elections.

Russia’s approach to arms control: caught between asymmetry and the desire for strategic stability

ABSTRACT This paper analyses Russia’s approach to strategic arms control with a particular focus on two central yet largely paradoxical principles: strategic stability and asymmetry. A rise in asymmetries in the capabilities of the United States and the Russian Federation, global shifts in power, and a proceeding deterioration of U.S.–Russia relations have marked the post-Cold War era, challenging traditional arms control regimes based on strategic stability understood in terms of parity in the nuclear arsenals of the two most potent nuclear powers. Somewhat counterintuitively, the developments in the military-technological sphere that undermine the very principle of parity concurrently incentivise Russia to invest in asymmetric solutions to counterbalance these tendencies and maintain strategic stability. By analysing the views of Russian military experts, the article takes a look at the INF Treaty, New START and hypersonic weapons to examine the past, present and future challenges to the U.S.–Russian arms control architecture. It arrives at the conclusion that Russia’s home-grown solution to its security conundrum is a perplexing mix of a desire for strategic stability-cum-parity in strategic arms control and a pragmatic emphasis on asymmetries while it tries to preserve its position, which is symptomatic of the paradoxical nature of strategy itself.

Crisis as practice: routinizing Russia – U.S. security rivalries

This article contributes to the debate on how an international crisis may contribute to ontological security. We argue that ontological security can paradoxically be achieved through escalating practices capable of provoking international crises. By merging ‘practices’, a fairly distinct theoretical perspective of International Relations, with ontological security, we seek to expand Jennifer Mitzen’s premise that “even dangerous routines provide ontological security” and consider practices as a source of attaining ontological security. To partake in the practical turn in ontological security studies, we borrow the concepts of Practice Turn in IR, habitus (disposition), and field (environment). After substantiating the connection between the two theories, we take the demise of the INF Treaty as an example of a crisis. We argue that the INF Treaty, as a field, has become a source of ontological threat to both the U.S. and Russia. Following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and Russia have constantly changed their habitus by developing key missile technologies and deteriorating bilateral relations. Accordingly, the changed habitus no longer conformed to the realities of the field, making its delegitimization by both sides self-evident.

Hibakusha-Inspired Inquiry: Teaching Nuclear War and Non-Proliferation

In February 2019, two nations with the largest nuclear arsenals announced their withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Russia’s interference in U.S. elections and the invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated tensions between the U.S. and Russia. These actions bring renewed attention to nuclear nonproliferation efforts worldwide. In this troubling context, but finding inspiration from Hibakusha testimonies, we propose one way to teach nuclear war and nonproliferation.

Building a nuclear off-ramp following the war in Ukraine

ABSTRACT Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shattered peace in Europe, and highlighted the fundamental disagreements between Russia and NATO over the status of Ukraine and other former Soviet territories. Russia raised the stakes of this disagreement by attempting to conquer Ukraine, and threatening to use nuclear weapons if NATO intervened. NATO and the European Union must negotiate an end to the fighting and deny Russian victory over Ukraine. Once peace is achieved, European security architecture must be rebuilt. This requires improving political relations between Russia and an expanded NATO, establishing stable military-to-military relations at reduced force levels, and reliably reducing the threat of nuclear war. NATO should indicate that it is willing to remove US nuclear weapons from Europe in exchange for similar Russian reductions – and the rearward movement of Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces. Near-term agreement on such steps can reduce the short-term threat of nuclear war, while also setting the stage for negotiations on replacing the INF treaty with a new agreement banning intermediate and short-range offensive missiles in Europe. Both sides need to re-assert that nuclear arms are weapons of last resort and pledge never to employ them first in a conflict.

Основные шаги на пути к контролю за вооружениями в Европе

The purpose of this article is to analyze and prepare specific recommendations on key, but still unresolved, topical issues of arms control in Europe. The recommendations, in particular, include the further prevention of the deployment of new medium- and shorter-range missiles, non-strategic ("tactical") nuclear weapons, as well as the identification of prospects for limiting the conventional arms race and issues of means to prevent dangerous military incidents. In this regard, the article analyzes a promising set of measures for creating a mutual system of European security and resolving a number of key problems in this area through the prism of the issues of the INF Treaty, TNW and other international documents and treaties, suggests concrete steps and ways of effective implementation in this direction. The article used systematic, retrospective, comparative, hermeneutic methods of scientific research. The novelty of the approach lies in the fact that the article does this in the context of an analysis of the aggravation of the situation around Ukraine, its attempts to join NATO and Russian demands to the United States and NATO on the need for legally binding guarantees of mutual security made in November-December 2021. The six concrete steps proposed by the authors towards arms control in Europe, as well as a set of measures in the field of limitation and reduction of conventional weapons in Europe, consisting of twelve points, are also innovative. The authors focus on the need to reduce the number of non-strategic nuclear warheads and their placement, eliminate certain classes of non-strategic nuclear weapons, exchange information on the types and number of delivery systems of non-strategic nuclear warheads, formalize obligations not to dock non-strategic nuclear warheads with their delivery systems, as well as obligations not to exceed the aggregate limit on non-strategic and non-deployed strategic warheads, conduct periodic mutual on-site inspections. The authors see promising measures to create a flexible and constructive security architecture in the European region in the intensification of both diplomatic and military dialogue between Russia and NATO, in the formation of legally fixed measures to prevent the threat of mutual military clashes, in the resumption of joint work on cooperation in airspace and in marine areas, in the development of new procedures for de-escalation military incidents and conflicts. The practical and theoretical significance of the work lies in the systematic analysis of a set of important security measures on the European continent after a fundamental change in the world security system, including the termination of almost all international arms control agreements. This was especially relevant already at the beginning of 2022 in the situation of Russia conducting a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine and increasing the likelihood of a military nuclear conflict between Russia and NATO.

Hovering Clouds of Arsenals across the Globe: Taking into Account Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

Nuclear politics is always a tricky business at international level. To understand the nuclear politics is not easy for the teachers, students, researchers and scholars of nuclear politics and global affairs. Arms Control doesn’t means to control or reduce the arsenals, it is sometimes to build arsenals to influence the opponent as two superpowers expanded their nuclear arsenals and raised the slogan of arms control. In this sense, the world witnessed hovering clouds of arsenals across the globe during the cold war era when USSR and USA plunged into conflict in Korean Peninsula, Cuban Missile Crisis and in European vicinity. Although numbers of agreements have been signed by powerful states to avoid nuclear tussles and they remained successful but the race between USSR and USA stimulated other countries to build nuclear arsenals. The bitter reality is that some countries achieved nuclear technology some trying to get like Iran. However, except nuclear issues there are several issues in global politics because now the world has become multipolar and more interestingly China is the emerging global power and influencing the states across the globe. On the other hand, number of treaties have lost their worth or been withdrawn such like INF Treaty and NEW START Treaty is going to expire in February 2026. The question is that what world leading powers learnt from history in sense ofnuclear tussles? Because INF has been terminated and New START is also going to be expired. What would be next? What will be the consequences of the termination of INF at first hand and New START Treaty if it would be terminated? This research attempts to find out these main questions through descriptive analytical research Methodology.

Стратегическая стабильность и китайский гамбит

During the last three years, the prospects of engaging China in the process of nuclear disarmament has moved to the forefront of the arms control agenda. In 2019–2020, it was made the top issue by the Donald Trump’s administration when it withdrew from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) and refused to prolong the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the New START). As for Beijing, it flatly rejected US demands to join arms control and this position was endorsed by Moscow. Thanks to the Joseph Biden’s administration coming to power in January 2021, the New START was extended by five years in February of the same year. In June, the summit of the presidents of Russia and the United States was held in Geneva, and in July, the official dialogue on strategic stability was launched. However, during the same summer, an unexpected event happened. Independent U. S. experts published information from commercial satellites, which revealed an ongoing construction of three large military bases in central areas of China with hundreds of new silo launchers for intercontinental missiles. Afterwards, the Pentagon confirmed this information and predicted that Chinese missiles buildup may reach the level of about 1000 or more nuclear warheads by the year 2030. This news was neither confirmed nor denied by the official Beijing. However, together with continuing Chinese deployment of strategic ballistic missile nuclear submarines, forthcoming introduction of heavy bombers, expanding early warning satellites and tests of antisatellite systems – these developments imply the fundamental shift in the global and regional strategic balances with profound political consequences. American response to China’s strategic buildup and Russian reaction to the U.S. military innovations may entail a next massive cycle of arms race and would cause a new stagnation at the negotiations of the two nuclear superpowers – all highly detrimental to international security. Nonetheless, there is still a chance of reinvigorated diplomatic effort at the U.S. – Russian and U.S. – Chinese tracks, which might lay the foundation of the future multilateral framework of strategic stability.

Analysis of the Reasons Why US and Russia Withdrew from the INF Treaty Successively Based on the Levels of Analysis

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) is a milestone in the history of arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, but there are continuous disputes during its existence. From February 2, 2019, the United States announced the suspension of its obligations under the INF Treaty and officially started the withdrawal process. On the same day, the Russian president also announced the suspension of implementation. The factors behind the successive withdrawal are complicated and are related to the development of the international arms control system in the future. This papermainly focuses on the analysis of the reasons for the withdrawal by comparing the two sides under the same perspective through the levels of analysis.

Analysis of the Reasons Why US and Russia Withdrew from the INF Treaty Successively Based on the Levels of Analysis

Analysis of the Reasons Why US and Russia Withdrew from the INF Treaty Successively Based on the Levels of Analysis

Analysis of the Reasons Why US and Russia Withdrew from the INF Treaty Successively Based on the Levels of Analysis

Analysis of the Reasons Why US and Russia Withdrew from the INF Treaty Successively Based on the Levels of Analysis

Arms Control as Wedge Strategy: How Arms Limitation Deals Divide Alliances

Abstract Strategic arms control is in crisis. The United States and Russia have retreated from agreements that formed the framework for post–Cold War arms cuts and strategic stability, such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The only strategic arms control agreement between the United States and Russia (i.e., New START) expires in 2026. The political forcefield that sustained the old framework has been altered by major technological revolutions and China's rise. Motives for strategic arms control are conventionally framed in terms of their potential to enhance stability by limiting certain weapons, avoiding costly arms races, or preserving military advantage. But states can also use strategic arms control to divide adversaries. Wedge strategy theory explains how arms control can do so by affecting adversaries' threat perceptions, their beliefs about the costs and benefits of formal commitments, and their degree of trust in one another. Three landmark strategic arms control negotiations (the Five-Power Treaty and the Four-Power Treaty at the Washington Naval Conference, the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) show how the wedge motive informed these negotiations and influenced great power relations. The wedge logic remains relevant today. For example, the United States may employ future arms control agreements to drive a wedge between China and Russia, and it must be cautious about arms control deals with North Korea that would negatively affect its relationship with South Korea.

Suspension of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty prior to its withdrawal: the content of custom

The United States suspended the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) ‘in accordance with customary international law’. However, State practice prior to the International Law Commission's codification of the law of treaties did not contribute to clarifying the extent of a right to suspend and the proper conditions for its exercise under customary international law. The few instances regarding suspension due to a serious breach did not demonstrate how the treaties in question were suspended but were a mere reference to a right of suspension in diplomatic or political documents. Against that backdrop, this article seeks to delineate what customary rules the United States believed it was observing and to clarify to what extent those rules are identical to or different from the codified rules on suspension in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Convention). Because the codified procedural safeguards or the mechanism of acquiescence under Article 65 of the Convention were considered as the progressive development of international law, it appears possible to suspend the INF Treaty unilaterally outside the Convention and under the customary rules by which the United States is bound. The INF Treaty was suspended by the United States and by Russia in sequence. That Russian suspension appears to have been an exceptio non adimpleti contractus to prevent the asymmetric execution of the INF Treaty that had been previously suspended by the United States.

End of the INF Treaty: Are We Entering a New Cold War Era?

This article analyzes possible consequences of the abolition of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed between the US and the USSR in 1987 and banning developing, testing and deploying intermediate-range missiles. The article argues that termination of the treaty would result in a conventional and especially a nuclear arms race as during the Cold War, and might trigger scrapping further agreements, although common sense in both parties enabled extending of the New START Treaty for 5 years. The new environment, with regional and global crises and massive armament by the global powers, including missile defense systems and hypersonic missiles, would endanger possible cooperation.

Compliance issues and the future of arms control

ABSTRACT Arms control has increasingly become threatened by compliance issues. Viewed individually, these issues might be expected and should not be cause for alarm. However, the list of agreements with unresolved issues has grown too long to ignore. The US State Department’s 2021 arms-control-compliance report calls attention to this problem. Recent casualties include the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, and the 1992 Open Skies Treaty. Although the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty has been renewed, even the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is under stress because of the view, shared by many states, that there has been a failure to implement its key nuclear-disarmament obligation. Many are advocating a move to less formal arms-control arrangements that are politically but not legally binding. However, these bring their own set of compliance problems—in particular, lack of effective verification regimes and dispute-resolution mechanisms. The current approach to compliance issues is failing. These issues need more urgent, high-level attention if the world is to avoid this threat to international peace and security.

Offensive Weapons and the Future of Arms Control

With a focus on the strategic competition between the United States and Russia, this paper explores the prospects for the future of arms control under an intensifying nuclear security dilemma. The end of stability-enhancing agreements such as the INF Treaty and Open Skies has accelerated the arms race. What is the future of New START and are we likely to see any extension beyond 2021? The relationship between arms control and strategic stability is part of this evaluation, particularly with respect to how states view the concept framed within their national security interests. The provocative role that offensive – deterrence by denial – capabilities play in contributing to strategic instability is central to this study. This work looks particularly at new systems designed for asymmetric advantage, including those that can defeat strategic defences, such as longer-range cruise missiles and hypersonic vehicles. Under conditions of modernizations and upgrades to nuclear arsenals, including the entanglement of conventional and nuclear systems that can threaten a first strike, this work considers how a dialogue on limiting dangerous systems could be initiated between the US and Russia. Could New START be revised – or a new treaty established – to limit advances in cruise missile technology, hypersonics, missile defences, and tactical nuclear weapons?

Voices of Nagasaki after 75 Years

ABSTRACT Soon after the second atomic bombing in 1945, hibakusha in Nagasaki saw the dawn of the Cold War, along with the Soviet Union’s possession of atomic bombs. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 created a real fear of nuclear war capable of destroying all of humanity. The Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 were a good sign of hope. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed in 1987, also succeeded in reducing nuclear warheads in the 1990s. However, we have also seen nuclear deterrence strategies of the nuclear powers firmly established. The Cold War ended in 1989, but its nuclear deterrence policies have persisted. Unfortunately, the NPT regime has gradually begun to weaken since 2010. Hibakusha and nongovernmental organizations such as the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons have stood firmly in strong solidarity and in 2017, succeeded in establishing the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which entered into force on 22 January 2021. Even now, hibakusha continue to suffer lifelong radiation-induced cancers and leukemia. Hibakusha must face a new stage in the abolition of nuclear weapons under a dangerous divide between NPT supporters and TPNW promoters. To overcome this divide, we need to increase the power of civil society around the world.