The Renuclearization of Europe and The Limits of History

Abstract

As NATO calibrates its response to increased Russian reliance on nuclear weapons for regional deterrence, references to the 1979 Dual Track decision as a blueprint for policies today have become in vogue. However, calls to compete to negotiate do not fully appreciate the risks of such a strategy for alliance cohesion. They also fail to acknowledge crucial factors that helped bring about the INF Treaty and that are absent today. A closer look at the origins of the INF Treaty reveals the important role of then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who seized an opportunity to push through their ambitious arms control agendas even against considerable resistance in Moscow as well as Washington and NATO capitals. Expectations that U.S. President Biden would have the political capital and Russian President Putin the willingness to conclude a similar agreement today are misplaced. Moreover, in the history of the Cold War, weapons deployments meant to counter adversary capabilities have more often remained unchecked than they were negotiated away. Rather than trying to match Russia’s non-strategic capabilities or limited nuclear options, NATO should seek to focus on its conventional deterrence and defense in ways that minimize firststrike incentives and hedge against uncertainties about America’s commitment to Europe after the 2024 elections.