A wide range of interorganizational relationshipsfalls on the global market to multinational hierarchyspectrum, ranging from supplier relationships (Dyerand Chu, 2000) to multinational business groups(Colpan, Hikino, and Lincoln, 2010; Granovetter,1994). Concurrently, as firms increasingly deepenand widen their cross-border value chains, the struc-ture and content of their foreign location portfoliosbecome more critical to their global competitivepositions (Dunning, 1998). In pursuing foreigndirect investment (FDI) and establishing managerialcontrol across borders, multinational enterprise(MNE) managers have become progressively moreable to slice global value chain activities into finerpieces and allocate them across multiple locations.Global strategy studies these competitive cross-national dynamics and how ‘a firm’s competitiveposition in one national market is significantlyaffected by its competitive position in other nationalmarkets’ (Ghoshal, 1987: 425). Thus, decisions onthe location (where) and degree/form of control(how) (Buckley and Ghauri, 2004) are criticalsources of competitive advantage in managingMNEs. When firms decide to go international forvarious strategic objectives, they might choose tohave full managerial control and acquire a firm ordevelop a new wholly owned subsidiary, but alterna-tively they might engage in different degrees ofcooperation with other firms (Kogut and Singh,1988). Generally, firms get involved in interorgani-zational relationships abroad to minimize firm costs,create discriminating alignment between hostcountry uncertainties and firm control, and learnfrom its partners. The two articles that I discuss hereexplore interesting questions within interorganiza-tional networks.Contractor, Woodley, and Piepenbrink’s (2011)article distinguishes among three cross-nationalinterorganizational relationships: licensing agree-ments, non-equity relational contracting (e.g.,supply chain relationships), and equity joint ven-tures. Reuer
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