The need to resolve conflict between groups exists in numerous forms within and among organizations. However, the relationship between a representative and his constituency are seen to affect the ease with which this is done. The present study focuses on spokesmen or representatives as they attempt to reach an agreement that would be mutually acceptable to the parties involved. In a laboratory experiment, mode of representative selection (election by the team versus random selection) and the nature of accountability (no, continuous, or end of negotiation session review by constituents) were manipulated to assess their impact on bargaining difficulty. Consistent with previous research these two variables were found to interact, yet the specific results were unanticipated. Elected representatives did not appear to be systematically influenced by the various levels of accountability. In contrast, randomly selected spokesmen facing no review showed the fewest deadlocks, tended to reach agreement at a faster rate, and reported least pressure, frustration, and difficulty. Selected spokesmen facing either continuous or end accountability tended to react similarly and experienced the most difficulty in the study. The notion of a representative's mandate and the emerging literature on social facilitation were used to interpret the results. Ancillary data provided by subjects on their group (team) member interactions were found to be related to felt commitment to a team's position. This further emphasized the importance of intragroup processes to intergroup conflict resolution.