Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock (eds.), Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1991); Jack S. Levy., “Learning and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Mindfield”, International Organization, 48/2 (1994) pp.279–312. 2. Donald A. Sylvan and Steve Chan, Foreign Policy Decision Making: Perception, Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence (New York:Praeger 1984); Peter C. Ordeshook (ed.), Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press 1989); Dan Reiter , “Learning, Realism and Alliances: the Weight of the Shadow of the Past”, World Politics’. 46/ 4 (July 1994) pp. 490–526. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. William W. Jarosz and Joseph S. Nye, “The Shadow of the Past: Learning from History in National Security Decision Making”, in Philip E. Tetlock et al., Behavior, Society, and International Conflict (Oxford: OUP 1993) pp. 3,150. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Peter A. Hall, “Policy Paradigm, Social Learning and the State”, Comparative Politics 25 (April 1993). 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Sim B. Sitkin “Learning Through Failure: The Strategy of Small Losses”, Research in Organizational Behavior14 pp.231–66 (1992). 12. Lloyd S. Etheredge, Can Governments Learn? (Oxford:Pergamon Press 1985). 13. Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor , “Enduring Rivalries: The Early Years”, International Political Science Review, 17/2 (1996) pp.141–60. 14. Ibid. 15. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1993). 16. Ibid. 17. Zeev Maoz , National Choices and International Processes (Cambridge:CUPs 1990). 18. Ibid.pp. 468–76 19. Ibid. 20. Ronald J. Fisher, The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution (New York: Springer-Verlag 1990) pp.159–60. 21. The study does not examine the change in tendencies of situational variables. The link between failure/success and the situational variables has already been discussed in detail in Maoz’s book. This study makes use of aspects which were examined there as a basis for additional support for our assumptions. 22. In my opinion, there is no contradiction in attributing hostility or psychological-emotional aspects to a rational decision-maker in whom the process of rational attribution is carried out. Rationality in decision-making is primarily an instrumental cognitive approach, a kind of method for perceiving reality and solving problems, and it does not necessarily invalidate emotions of the decision-maker. 23. Michael Brecher in Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. Dewitt (eds.), Conflict Management in the Middle East (D.C. Heath 1987) pp.10–11. 24. Maoz (note 17). 25. The logic which supports three successes is as follows: One success can be perceived as coincidental or as luck, and does not as yet arouse confidence in the perception of the adversary; two successes are not coincidental but still border on fear and doubt; three successes reflect more confidence and bring the adversary closer in a perceptual sense. In no form of assessment is there a model which can tell us a priori that we must predict a certain number of successes, and therefore, the threshold which has been set represents a preliminary assumption the accuracy of which will become clear during the data analysis. 26. See for example Raymond A. Morrow and David D. Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology (Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications 1994); Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Cambridge: CUP 1979).