Intentional Cues Research Articles

Prefrontal cortical activation associated with prospective memory while walking around a real-world street environment

Rostral PFC (area 10) activation is common during prospective memory (PM) tasks. But it is not clear what mental processes these activations index. Three candidate explanations from cognitive neuroscience theory are: (i) monitoring of the environment; (ii) spontaneous intention retrieval; (iii) a combination of the two. These explanations make different predictions about the temporal and spatial patterns of activation that would be seen in rostral PFC in naturalistic settings. Accordingly, we plotted functional events in PFC using portable fNIRS while people were carrying out a PM task outside the lab and responding to cues when they were encountered, to decide between these explanations. Nineteen people were asked to walk around a street in London, U.K. and perform various tasks while also remembering to respond to prospective memory (PM) cues when they detected them. The prospective memory cues could be either social (involving greeting a person) or non-social (interacting with a parking meter) in nature. There were also a number of contrast conditions which allowed us to determine activation specifically related to the prospective memory components of the tasks. We found that maintaining both social and non-social intentions was associated with widespread activation within medial and right hemisphere rostral prefrontal cortex (BA 10), in agreement with numerous previous lab-based fMRI studies of prospective memory. In addition, increased activation was found within lateral prefrontal cortex (BA 45 and 46) when people were maintaining a social intention compared to a non-social one. The data were then subjected to a GLM-based method for automatic identification of functional events (AIDE), and the position of the participants at the time of the activation events were located on a map of the physical space. The results showed that the spatial and temporal distribution of these events was not random, but aggregated around areas in which the participants appeared to retrieve their future intentions (i.e., where they saw intentional cues), as well as where they executed them. Functional events were detected most frequently in BA 10 during the PM conditions compared to other regions and tasks. Mobile fNIRS can be used to measure higher cognitive functions of the prefrontal cortex in “real world” situations outside the laboratory in freely ambulant individuals. The addition of a “brain-first” approach to the data permits the experimenter to determine not only when haemodynamic changes occur, but also where the participant was when it happened. This can be extremely valuable when trying to link brain and cognition.

Sense of agency for mental actions: Insights from a belief-based action-effect paradigm

A substantial body of research has converged on the idea that the sense of agency arises from the integration of multiple sources of information. In this study, we investigated whether a measurable sense of agency can be detected for mental actions, without the contribution of motor components. We used a fake action-effect paradigm, where participants were led to think that a motor action or a particular thought could trigger a sound. Results showed that the sense of agency, when measured through explicit reports, was of comparable strength for motor and mental actions. The intentional binding effect, a phenomenon typically associated with the experience of agency, was also observed for both motor and mental actions. Taken together, our results provide novel insights into the specific role of intentional cues in instantiating a sense of agency, even in the absence of motor signals.

Examining the Independent and Joint Effects of Trustee Competence and Intention on Trust Development

Trust research identifies two fundamental trustee attributes as important for trust development, i.e., are intention and competence. In this paper, we examine the independent and joint impact of these two attributes on trust development. Results from an experiment and a field study suggest that trustors tend to prioritise cues about a trustee’s intentions over the trustee’s competence. For instance, we find that if trustors are unsure about a trustee’s intentions, then it does not matter whether the competence cues are positive or negative. Also, incompetent trustees with positive intention are more trusted than competent trustees lacking positive intention. The impact of intention cues is not affected by the lack of trustee competence. We discuss the implications of our findings for both theory and practice.

“What’s the Robo-Driver up to?” Requirements for Screen-based Awareness and Intent Communication in Autonomous Buses

Abstract Autonomous buses are expected to become a cornerstone of future mobility systems. Especially during their introduction, passengers may require reassurance about the vehicle’s awareness of the situation on the road and of its intended next actions to further acceptance. In order to investigate the need and requirements for information about the vehicle’s awareness and intent from the perspective of first-time users, we conducted two user studies in a state-of-the-art autonomous bus at public demonstration spaces. In the first study, participants underwent a demonstration ride with the bus and were then asked about their needs for awareness and intent communication. The second study took participants on a ‘simulated ride’ within a stationary bus, in which typical scenarios of the road ahead were presented, together with different awareness and intent cues. Our results suggest that, first, future autonomous bus passengers may be in need of such awareness and intent communication screens. Second, we found that awareness and intent communication may be of greater importance for the indication of potential hazard recognition than for indicating route directions. Third, due to their complementary strengths, none of the three compared types of visual communication (text, icon and augmented reality) should be used in isolation.

Age-related changes in Bayesian belief updating during attentional deployment and motor intention.

Predicting upcoming events using past observations is a crucial component of an efficient allocation of attentional resources. Therefore, the deployment of attention is sensitive to different types of cues predicting upcoming events. Here we investigated probabilistic inference abilities in spatial and feature-based attentional, as well as in motor-intentional subsystems, focusing specifically on the age-related changes in these abilities. In two behavioral experiments, younger and older adults (20 younger and 20 older adults for each experiment) performed three versions of a cueing paradigm, where spatial, feature, or motor cues predicted the location, color, or motor response of a target stimulus. The percentage of cue validity (i.e., the probability of the cue being valid) changed over time, thereby creating a volatile environment. A Bayesian hierarchical model was used to estimate trial-wise beliefs concerning the cue validity from reaction times and to derive a subject-specific belief updating parameter ω in each task version. We also manipulated task difficulty: participants performed an easier version of the task in Experiment 1 and a more difficult versionin Experiment 2. Results from Experiment 1 suggested a preserved ability of older adults to use the three different cues to generate predictions. However, the increased task demands of Experiment 2 uncovered a difference in belief updating between the two age groups, indicating moderate evidence for a reduction of the ability to update predictions with motor intention cues in older adults. These results point at a distinction of attentional and motor-intentional subsystems, with age-related differences tackling especially the motor-intentional subsystem.

Multivariate pattern analysis of the human pSTS: A comparison of three prototypical localizers

The posterior extent of the human superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) is an important cortical region for detecting animacy, attributing agency to others, and decoding goal-directed behavior. Theoretical accounts attribute these cognitive skills to unique neural populations that have been difficult to identify empirically (Hein and Knight, 2008). The aim of this study is to evaluate the multivariate statistical structure of pSTS activation patterns when viewing different social cues. We identified a core conjunction region on pSTS from univariate responses with preference for point-light biological motion, faces and the attribution of social concepts to simple animated shapes. In a multivariate analysis, we characterized the similarity structure of the resulting activation patterns after controlling for variance in the activation profile elicited by form and motion features. We found strong antagonistic activation profiles between the social conditions and their localizer controls, a harbinger of why these canonical localizers are so effective, even in individual subjects. We also found unique patterns of similarity between the three core social conditions. Our findings are consistent with the Shultz et al. (2015) model of pSTS function in which separate neural populations exist for animacy detection from body parts versus for extracting intentional cues from movement.

The Least Costs Hypothesis: A rational analysis approach to the voluntary symbolic control of attention.

Here we propose a rational analysis account of voluntary symbolic attention control-the Least Costs Hypothesis (LCH)-that construes voluntary control as a decision between intentional cue use and unguided search. Consistent with the LCH, the present study showed that this decision is sensitive to variations in cue processing efficiency. In Experiment 1, observers demonstrated a robust preference for using "easy-to-process" arrow cues but not "hard-to-process" spatial word cues to satisfy an easy visual search goal; Experiment 2 showed that this preference persisted even when the temporal costs of cue processing were neutralized. Experiment 3 showed that observers reported this cue type preference outside the context of a speeded task, and Experiment 4 showed empirical measures of this bias to be relatively stable over the course of the task. Together with previous evidence suggesting that observers' decision between intentional cue use and unguided search is also influenced by variations in unguided search efficiency, these findings suggest that voluntary symbolic attention control is mediated by ongoing metacognitive evaluations of demand that are sensitive to perceived variations in the time, effort, and opportunity costs associated with each course of action. Thus, voluntary symbolic attention control is far more complex than previously held. (PsycINFO Database Record

Do pet dogs (Canis familiaris) follow ostensive and non-ostensive human gaze to distant space and to objects?

Dogs are renowned for being skilful at using human-given communicative cues such as pointing. Results are contradictory, however, when it comes to dogs' following human gaze, probably due to methodological discrepancies. Here we investigated whether dogs follow human gaze to one of two food locations better than into distant space even after comparable pre-training. In Experiments 1 and 2, the gazing direction of dogs was recorded in a gaze-following into distant space and in an object-choice task where no choice was allowed, in order to allow a direct comparison between tasks, varying the ostensive nature of the gazes. We found that dogs only followed repeated ostensive human gaze into distant space, whereas they followed all gaze cues in the object-choice task. Dogs followed human gaze better in the object-choice task than when there was no obvious target to look at. In Experiment 3, dogs were tested in another object-choice task and were allowed to approach a container. Ostensive cues facilitated the dogs’ following gaze with gaze as well as their choices: we found that dogs in the ostensive group chose the indicated container at chance level, whereas they avoided this container in the non-ostensive group. We propose that dogs may perceive the object-choice task as a competition over food and may interpret non-ostensive gaze as an intentional cue that indicates the experimenter's interest in the food location she has looked at. Whether ostensive cues simply mitigate the competitive perception of this situation or they alter how dogs interpret communicative gaze needs further investigation. Our findings also show that following gaze with one's gaze and actually choosing one of the two containers in an object-choice task need to be considered as different variables. The present study clarifies a number of questions related to gaze-following in dogs and adds to a growing body of evidence showing that human ostensive cues can strongly modify dog behaviour.

Humor and preschoolers’ trust: Sensitivity to changing intentions

This research demonstrates that preschoolers (a) avoid trusting informants with humorous intentions when learning novel information and (b) flexibly consider current intentions rather than initial intentions when determining who to trust. In Study 1 (N=61), 3- and 4-year-olds based their trust on intentions or intentional cues alone, trusting a sincere informant over a joker, even when no prior accuracy or inaccuracy was displayed. In Study 2 (N=32), 3- and 4-year-olds flexibly based their trust on the informants’ current intentions or intentional cues rather than their initial ones. Children trusted a sincere informant, who originally joked, over a joker, who was originally sincere. In Study 3 (N=89), 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds tracked changing intentions, and not just intentional cues, in determining who to trust. Children trusted an informant who joked during training trials but was sincere during test trials over an informant who was ignorant during training trials and was sincere during test trials. However, if the ignorant informant became knowledgeable and the joker continued to joke, the pattern reversed. This is the first study to show that preschoolers consider intentions to joke when learning information. This is also the first study to show that preschoolers do not see trust as stable but rather see it as a function of changing intentions.

Two-Year-Olds Distinguish Pretending and Joking.

Although children understand intentions to joke and pretend by 2 or 3years, it is unclear whether they distinguish these intentional acts. Using a normativity paradigm, this study found (N=72) 2-year-olds protest against jokes more than pretending, suggesting, for the first time, they distinguish these acts. Furthermore, toddlers protested more generally after pretend than literal or joke contexts but only if intentional cues were used. Additionally, children objected more to joking than pretending after pretend and literal contexts but not after joke contexts. Thus, toddlers distinguish the intentional nature of pretending and joking. Furthermore, a pretend intentional context establishes specific rules to be followed, whereas a joke intentional context allows an open space to perform various types of acts.

Children's picture interpretation: Appearance or intention?

Pictures are defined by their creator’s intentions and resemblance to their real world referents. Here we examine whether young children follow a realist route (e.g., focusing on how closely pictures resemble their referents) or intentional route (e.g., focusing on what a picture is intended to represent by its artist) when identifying a picture’s referent. In 3 experiments, we contrasted an artist’s intention with her picture’s appearance to investigate children’s use of appearance and intentional cues. In Experiment 1, children aged 3–4 and 5–6 years (N = 151) were presented with 4 trials of 3-object arrays (e.g., a pink duck, a blue duck, and a teddy). The experimenter photographed or drew 1 of the objects (e.g., blue duck), however, the subsequent picture depicted the referent in grayscale (black and white condition) or the color of its shape-matched object, for example, a pink duck (color change condition). Children were asked 3 questions regarding the identity of the pictures; responses were guided by intentional cues in the black and white condition, but appearance in the color change condition. Experiment 2 confirmed that appearance responses were not due to the artist’s changing knowledge state. Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiment 1 with adult participants. Together, these studies show that children and adults are neither strictly realist nor intentional route followers. They are realists until resemblance cues fail, at which point they defer to intentional cues.

Reynke Vosz de olde (Rostock, 1539) in context of the Middle Low German Reynke de Vos tradition in the 15th–16th century

The present article discusses the beast epic Reynke Vosz de olde (Rostock, 1539) in context of the Middle Low German Reynke de Vos tradition in the 15th–16th century. Emphasis falls on the comparison of the two particularly important Middle Low German editions of the widely-known epic against the socio-historical background in Northern Germany in the Late Middle Ages. This paper proposes to make a contribution to the field of research of the Middle Low German Reynke de Vos tradition in general but primarily examines the printed Reynke Vosz de olde edition from 1539. For this latter purpose the Reynke Vosz de olde text is compared with the 1498 pretext from the Poppy Printer, the Mohnkopf printing house, in a number of respects: typography and illustrations, construction of the book, division in books and chapters, versification, different tendencies in the commentary parts etc. The 1539 Reynke Vosz de olde edition is filtered for tendencies in textual innovations and structural changes as distinct to prototype text as well as motivation and intention cues for those. Further questions like the importance of the quotation analysis of the marginal gloss notes and of the critical question on the glossator’s identity will be highlighted and discussed.

The road to understanding is paved with the speaker’s intentions: Cues to the speaker’s attention and intentions affect pronoun comprehension

A series of experiments explore the effects of attention-directing cues on pronoun resolution, contrasting four specific hypotheses about the interpretation of ambiguous pronouns he and she: (1) it is driven by grammatical rules, (2) it is primarily a function of social processing of the speaker’s intention to communicate, (3) it is modulated by the listener’s own egocentric attention, and (4) it is primarily a function of learned probabilistic cues. Experiment 1 demonstrates that pronoun interpretation is guided by the well-known N1 (first-mention) bias, which is also modulated by both the speaker’s gaze and pointing gestures. Experiment 2 demonstrates that a low-level visual capture cue has no effect on pronoun interpretation, in contrast with the social cue of pointing. Experiment 3 uses a novel intentional cue: the same attention-capture flash as in Experiment 2, but with instructions that the cue is intentionally created by the speaker. This cue does modulate the N1 bias, demonstrating the importance of information about the speaker’s intentions to pronoun resolution. Taken in sum, these findings demonstrate that pronoun resolution is a process best categorized as driven by an appreciation of the speaker’s communicative intent, which may be subserved by a sensitivity to predictive cues in the environment.

Young childrenʼs understanding of intention and their use of intentional cues in making moral judgments

Young childrenʼs understanding of intention and their use of intentional cues in making moral judgments

Intention superiority effect on implicit memory of shopping lists: Activation and inhibition processes

Intentional memory is defined as the ability to remember to perform intentions in the future. Forming an intention such as “shopping” activates access to memories related to the products on the shopping list. As Intention Superiority Effect (ISE) studies show, these memories are more accessible in semantic and episodic memory, more activated over time and protected from competing representations. The inhibition of competing representations in intentional memory has been little examined so far. In this study we attempt to analyze changes in activation in the recall of products on a shopping list and competitors through implicit memory tasks. Sixty-five participants learned two shopping lists on a computer. Later, they were told to virtually buy one of them (prospective list) and not the other (neutral list). Prior to intentional task execution, they performed an implicit retrieval task in which we manipulated the appearance or not of cues from the intentional list and analyzed the influence of the items from the intentional list on items related to intentional and neutral lists. The main result of this study is that intention retrieval by intentional cues strengthens the activation of products related to the intentional list and/or inhibits competing products related to the neutral list. The inhibition is episodic rather than semantic in nature. The ISE requires the recall of the intention during the retention period through intentional cues for maintaining the intention. This seems to defend automatic recovery theories and not the intention persistence hypothesis. Also, the results are better explained by the directed forgetting paradigm rather than by the retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm.

Beyond event segmentation: Spatial- and social-cognitive processes in verb-to-action mapping.

The present article investigates spatial- and social-cognitive processes in toddlers' mapping of concepts to real-world events. In 2 studies we explore how event segmentation might lay the groundwork for extracting actions from the event stream and conceptually mapping novel verbs to these actions. In Study 1, toddlers demonstrated the ability to segment a novel multiaction event by selecting a single action for behavioral reenactment when prompted. In Study 2, a single action embedded in the event sequence was specified as the referent for a novel verb through cues to support intentional inference. As in Study 1, toddlers spontaneously segmented the sequence. In addition, they mapped a novel label to the embedded action specified by the novel label and intentional cues. These data are consistent with current thinking that suggests a convergence of spatial and social cognition in verb learning. In the present research, toddlers built upon event segmentation skills and used intentional inference when mapping verbs to actions embedded in the motion stream.

The role of gaze direction and mutual exclusivity in guiding 24-month-olds' word mappings

In these studies, we examined how a default assumption about word meaning, the mutual exclusivity assumption and an intentional cue, gaze direction, interacted to guide 24-month-olds' object-word mappings. In Expt 1, when the experimenter's gaze was consistent with the mutual exclusivity assumption, novel word mappings were facilitated. When the experimenter's eye-gaze was in conflict with the mutual exclusivity cue, children demonstrated a tendency to rely on the mutual exclusivity assumption rather than follow the experimenter's gaze to map the label to the object. In Expt 2, children relied on the experimenter's gaze direction to successfully map both a first label to a novel object and a second label to a familiar object. Moreover, infants mapped second labels to familiar objects to the same degree that they mapped first labels to novel objects. These findings are discussed with regard to children's use of convergent and divergent cues in indirect word mapping contexts.

Using a bad tool with good intention: Young children’s imitation of adults’ questionable choices

We present three studies exploring 2- to 4-year-olds’ imitation on witnessing a model whose questionable tool use choices suggested her untrustworthiness. In Study 1, children observed the model accidentally select a physically optimal tool for a task and then intentionally reject it for one that was functionally nonaffordant. When asked to perform the task for her, children at all ages ignored the model’s intentional cues and selected the optimal tool. Study 2 found that when the model’s nonaffordant tool choice was emphasized by claims about its design, 3-year-olds increased imitation. They also imitated, as did 2-year-olds, when the model selected a suboptimal rather than nonaffordant tool. The 4-year-olds consistently avoided imitation. Study 3 replicated these findings with new tools and participants. Additional measures indicated that knowledge about artifact design predicted children’s tendency to ignore the model. These results shed light on developmental trends in the social and cognitive functions of imitation.

Intention formation induces episodic inhibition of distracting stimuli

In two experiments we show that (a) distracting stimuli are inhibited after intention formation, (b) this inhibition is episodic rather than semantic in nature, and (c) inhibition of distracting stimuli is terminated once intentions are completed. In both experiments participants were asked to form an intention to press the space bar in response to six cues (i.e. intention cues). After intention formation we measured accessibility of intention cues, of words that are semantically related to the intention cues (i.e. related cues) and of semantically unrelated words (i.e. control cues). In Experiment 1, we obtained slower responses towards related cues compared with both intention cues and control cues in a recognition task, but not in a lexical decision task. In Experiment 2, we showed that inhibition of related cues is terminated after intention completion. Together these results are consistent with theorizing that inhibition of distracting (i.e. related) stimuli is functional for completing previously formed intentions, and give insight in the nature of inhibitory processes during goal pursuit.

Children With Autism Illuminate the Role of Social Intention in Word Learning

To what extent do children with autism (AD) versus typically developing children (TD) rely on attentional and intentional cues to learn words? Four experiments compared 17 AD children (M age=5.08 years) with 17 language- and 17 mental-age-matched TD children (M ages=2.57 and 3.12 years, respectively) on nonverbal enactment and word-learning tasks. Results revealed variability in all groups, but particularly within the AD group. Performance on intention tasks was the most powerful predictor of vocabulary in the AD group but not in the TD groups. These findings suggest that word learning cannot be explained exclusively by either attentional or intentional processes, and they provide evidence of a special role for intentional understanding in the vocabulary development of AD children.