Intelligence Failure Research Articles

Probing Uncertainty, Complexity, and Human Agency in Intelligence

Geopolitical dynamics associated with nuclear proliferation, the Arab Spring, the rapid rise of Chinese power, an oil-fueled Russian resurgence, and the post-Afghan and Iraq eras will demand significant changes in intelligence focus, processes, and resources. Nearly a decade after intelligence failures required a restructuring of the Intelligence Community with mandates for a scientific approach to intelligence analysis, current efforts continue to focus on overly deterministic individual analyst methods. We argue for a process-oriented approach to analysis resembling the collaborative scientific process successful in other professions that is built on shared theory and models. After demonstrating that events in the real world are path dependent and contingent on deterministic and random elements, we highlight the role of uncertainty in intelligence analysis with specific emphasis on intelligence failures. We then describe how human agency in an interconnected and interdependent system leads to a landscape of dancing strategies as agents dynamically modify their responses to events. Unfortunately, the consequences of the present deterministic intelligence mindset are significant time delays in adjusting to emerging adversaries leading to an increased susceptibility to intelligence failures. In contrast with the existing analyst-centric methods, we propose a risk management approach enhanced by outside collaboration on theory and models that embrace lessons from the twentieth-century science of uncertainty, human agency, and complexity.

Intelligence Failure Is More Than “Policy Oversell”

Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence. By Joshua Rovner. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011. 280 pp., $33.25 hardcover (ISBN-13: 978-0-801-44829-4). Joshua Rovner's Fixing the Facts focuses on the delicate relationship between intelligence officials and the elite decision maker or policymaker. He explores “intelligence failures” from the point of view of the “customer”—the policymaker. Rovner hypothesizes that the intelligence-policy-making relationship can fall into one of three “pathologies”: neglect, excessive harmony , or politicization . Neglect occurs when the policymaker uses intelligence incorrectly or ignores it. Existing research on this problem focuses on “noise in the system” and the difficulty of communicating intelligence to the policymaker. The second pathology, excessive harmony, arises when intelligence professionals do not challenge policy beliefs, and policymakers do not criticize intelligence conclusions. The cause for intelligence failure in this case is based on proximity—the intelligence professional and policymaker are too cozy to challenge each other. Rovner simply points out that the basic remedy is to keep one's distance personally and to insulate and protect organizations from undue political meddling. Rovner develops a novel characterization of intelligence politicization, which he labels policy oversell . However, instead of looking at the everyday individual- or organization-level factors at work in the first two “pathologies,” Rovner bases his theory of politicization on extraordinary “domestic” politics. Rovner argues that domestic political pressures cause politicians to manipulate intelligence to mobilize a critical constituency to support the politicians' controversial decisions. Rovner believes that, if a politician is willing to manipulate intelligence, rather than just ignore it if it does not comply with his or her previously held views, then the cause …

All Mistakes Are Not Equal: Intelligence Errors and National Security

Strategic situations create motivational biases that help to predict the type of errors intelligence communities are more likely to commit (Type I errors predict behavior never observed, while Type II errors fail to predict behavior later observed). When the dangers of inaction are low and the cost of action high, the intelligence community is more likely to fail to predict threats (Type II error). If the dangers of inaction are high and the costs of military action low, it is more likely to predict mistakenly threats never observed (Type I error). Studies of US and Israeli decision-making and analyses of two new experimental studies support this theory. The key is to recognize the incentives for error and to develop systems that, at worst, lead to intelligence errors (mistakes consistent with a state's national security needs) and not intelligence failures (errors contrary to national security requirements).

The Impact of Closed-mindedness on the Assessment of Threat: An Empirical Study

In the past decade official reports into intelligence failures have asserted that analysts are subject to the effects of everyday cognitive limitations. The present study examined the influence of an individual's inclination toward closedmindedness on a computer administered simulated intelligence analysis task. Results indicate that several components of closed-mindedness as measured by the need for cognitive closure scale [NFC] significantly predicted the assessed level of threat posed to and general attitude toward a visiting government delegation by a foreign nation's population. Most significantly higher scores on the NFC subscale ‘need for predictability’ were associated with higher scores on the initial assessed threat level. This effect remained after controlling for the amount of information accessed. The implications of these findings for the conduct of intelligence analysis are discussed.

The British State and the Irish Rebellion of 1916: An Intelligence Failure Or a Failure of Response?

The teleological narrative that has dominated the handling of intelligence by the British state in the events that led up to the 1916 Irish Rebellion in Dublin has been characterised as a cocktail of incompetence and mendacity. Using new and existing archive material this article argues that both the cabinet in London and key members of the Irish Executive in Dublin were supplied with accurate and timely intelligence by the Admiralty's signals intelligence unit, the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police with respect to this event. Far from being a failure of intelligence here is evidence to show that there occurred a failure of response on behalf of key decision-makers. The warnings that were given by intelligence organisations were filtered through the existing policy preferences and assumptions. As a result of these factors accurate evaluations and sound judgement were not exercised by key officials, such as Sir Matthew Nathan, in Dublin Castle.

The “Special Means of Collection”: The Missing Link in the Surprise of the Yom Kippur War

Israeli narratives of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War highlight the army’s lack of preparedness in the wake of a successful surprise attack by Egypt and Syria on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, despite assumptions of Israel’s intelligence gathering capabilities. Using recently declassified government documents, this article reveals a communication breakdown among Israel’s leadership over the operational status of a top secret means of surveillance. This intelligence failure provides the missing link between Israel’s wealth of information and the decision to avoid mobilizing the country’s reserve army until it was too late.

CrimeFighter Investigator: Integrating synthesis and sense-making for criminal network investigation

Criminal network investigation involves a number of complex tasks and problems. Overall tasks include collection, processing, and analysis of information, in which analysis is the key to successful use of information since it transforms raw data into intelligence. Analysts have to deal with problems such as information volume and complexity which are typically resolved with more resources. This approach together with sequential thinking introduces compartmentalization, inhibits information sharing, and ultimately results in intelligence failure. We view analysis as an iterative and incremental process of creative synthesis and logic-based sense-making where all stakeholders participate and contribute. This paper presents a novel tool that supports a human-centered, target-centric model for criminal network investigation. The developed tool provides more comprehensive support for analysis tasks than existing tools and measures of performance indicate that the integration of synthesis and sense-making is feasible.

The Art of the Intelligence Autopsy

Although intelligence postmortems are a common practice in the aftermath of intelligence failure, little is known about how they are conducted. This article explores the methodology employed by Robert Jervis in intelligence postmortems that followed the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and the formulation of the 2002 Iraq national intelligence estimate that warned of the possibility that Iraq had restarted its nuclear program. The analysis reveals the challenges faced by scholars as they attempt to assess why analysts failed to offer accurate estimates and the way contemporary international relations theory can be applied to the realm of policy. The findings of the postmortems also shed light on areas where additional collaboration among scholars and analysts can advance the art of intelligence analysis.

Plans never go according to plan: An empirical analysis of challenges to plans during the 2009 Victoria bushfires

Abstract Uncertainty is a major challenge for emergency, disaster and public safety decision-makers when planning and preparing for disasters and when executing plans. This research explores unexpected challenges to the Victoria State disaster plan before and during the “Black Saturday” Australian bushfires of 7 February, 2009 that significantly contributed to the scale of the disaster in which 173 persons perished. The article adopts Barry Turner's sequence model of intelligence failure to frame the empirical analysis. The article is based on content analysis of publicly available data and information complimented with face to face interviews of public-sector and non-government organization (NGO) emergency and disaster managers in Victoria. The research found inadequacies in strategic planning and in the appreciation of the community risk scenario in the response of public-sector disaster managers to the heat wave in the days preceding the bushfires. It also found failures in warning, command and control due to loss of sense-making and information difficulties on “Black Saturday” itself. The article suggests strategies that disaster and emergency response managers, planners and local authorities may consider in bushfire preparedness and response planning.

Why Won't They Listen? Comparing Receptivity Toward Intelligence at Pearl Harbor and Midway

After surprise attacks and other intelligence failures, the complaint is often heard that if only decision-makers had listened more closely to the warnings they had received, disaster might have been avoided. But even though it is generally agreed that intelligence is of little use unless it is received and understood by policymakers, we actually know little about why some leaders are receptive toward intelligence, while others are not. This article argues that the willingness of decision-makers to listen to intelligence depends primarily on two factors: their belief in the seriousness of the issue or threat involved, and their trust in the utility of intelligence. It examines contrasting receptivity toward intelligence in the cases of Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway, and suggests that our current models of intelligence–policy relations need to be revised.

Analytic Tradecraft and the Intelligence Community: Enduring Value, Intermittent Emphasis

The emphasis and visibility afforded analytic tradecraft in the Intelligence Community's analytic production has fluctuated throughout its existence. The explanation for this intermittent emphasis on tradecraft may lie in changes in consumer preferences and collection means, the role played by individual tradecraft advocates, and the lack of an intelligence failure matching the severity of 9/11 and the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Both failures served as a forceful reminder that while strong analytic tradecraft does not guarantee ‘getting a judgment right’, it increases the likelihood that the assessments produced are transparent, relevant, and rigorous.

The British State and the Irish Rebellion of 1916: An Intelligence Failure or a Failure of Response?

The teleological narrative that has dominated the handling of intelligence by the British state in the events that led up to the 1916 Irish Rebellion in Dublin has been characterised as a cocktail of incompetence and mendacity. Using new and existing archive material this article argues that both the cabinet in London and key members of the Irish Executive in Dublin were supplied with accurate and timely intelligence by the Admiralty's signals intelligence unit, the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police with respect to this event. Far from being a failure of intelligence here is evidence to show that there occurred a failure of response on behalf of key decision-makers. The warnings that were given by intelligence organisations were filtered through the existing policy preferences and assumptions. As a result of these factors accurate evaluations and sound judgement were not exercised by key officials, such as Sir Matthew Nathan, in Dublin Castle.

Explaining the Iraq War: counterfactual theory, logic, and evidence

1. Comparative counterfactual analysis and the 2003 Iraq War 2. Leadership, political context(s) and the Iraq War 3. Democratic national security advisers 4. Domestic and congressional politics 5. American intelligence failures and miscalculations 6. Societal pressures and public opinion 7. International politics, global WMD consensus and UN power balancing 8. Hussein's mistakes, miscalculations and misperceptions 9. Summary and implications 10. Conclusion.

Red Team: How the Neoconservatives Helped Cause the Iraq Intelligence Failure

This article explains how flawed intelligence assessments of Iraq's aluminum tubes became ‘Exhibit A’ in the Bush administration's case for the Iraq War. The assessments seem to have begun as a consequence of a debate within the administration over US Iraq policy in early 2001. The neoconservatives wanted intelligence that would help them argue for regime-change. A WINPAC ‘Red Team’ analyst analyzed the tubes using the same methodology as 1976's infamous Team B panel, which skewed intelligence to support neoconservative policies. The Red Team analyst erroneously concluded the tubes were for a nuclear program thus countering assessments that they had a non-nuclear purpose. After the attacks of September 11 and President Bush's embrace of regime-change, the Red Team tubes assessment began to become the official position of the Intelligence Community. In September 2002, the President cited the assessment publicly, forcing the Intelligence Community to adopt it as the majority position in the Iraq NIE. ‘Exhibit A’ in the case for war was thus the product of a Red Team and, as such, was essentially propaganda masquerading as intelligence.

Failures in leadership: assessing organizational, strategic, and tactical intelligence failures prior to 11 September 2001

The events of 11 September 2001 still haunt many Americans. More troubling are the failures of the federal government and the intelligence community to prevent the attacks of that day. While there is much research and scholarship identifying those failures, the most popular of which is the 9/11 Commission Report, there is little research and information available regarding the failures of specific leaders in the government. The extant research regarding pre-9/11 intelligence failures mainly describes the organizational, strategic, and tactical intelligence failures as attributable to either a failure of imagination or a failure of information sharing, which are the two primary culprits according to the 9/11 Commission Report. There is little scholarship on the failures of leadership and how pre-9/11 political and intelligence community leadership failed to create a comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism, failed to appreciate the threat presented by Al-Qaeda by means of hijacking and failed to institute an organizational structure that provided for a prompt response to terror threats. This paper found that while organizational, strategic and institutional failures can be committed by individuals other than political or intelligence community leadership, the direct and indirect responsibility for all three kinds of failure belongs to leadership.

Explicando falhas de inteligência governamental: fatores histórico-institucionais, cognitivos e políticos

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar dilemas de efetividade na atividade de Inteligência Governamental. Explorando a literatura sobre falhas de inteligência e surpresa estratégica, avançamos em um campo pouco explorado pelos Estudos de Inteligência no Brasil: os aspectos cognitivos dos analistas de inteligência e as relações entre a comunidade política e a comunidade de inteligência. Primeiramente discorremos sobre os desafios de se avaliar a Inteligência Governamental como política pública, em especial no que se refere à dimensão da efetividade. Na segunda sessão abordamos os principais vieses cognitivos e heurísticas possíveis de ocorrer durante a análise de inteligência. A terceira sessão trata das tensões relacionais características entre a esfera política e a comunidade de inteligência e como essa relação afeta no resultado final da atividade de inteligência. Nas considerações finais apontamos para os limites e possibilidades das reformas organizacionais e procedimentais no que se refere à efetividade dos sistemas de inteligência.

Intelligence Failures: What Are They Really and What Do We Do about Them?

Intelligence failures occur for more reasons than just sloppy tradecraft and are often attributable to decision-makers as well as to the intelligence community. Before exploring the subjective nature of intelligence failures, this article first discusses three foundational concepts underlying them: process vs. product, fact vs. judgment, and prediction. It then outlines major components of intelligence failures: accuracy, surprise, and the role of decision-makers, particularly unrealistic expectations and the use or non-use of intelligence. The article concludes with a discussion of what the intelligence community and decision-makers can do to deal with these three components.

Sparrow Mission: A US Intelligence Failure during World War II

The article presents an intelligence case gone bad during the Second World War, when the United States decided to drop a three-man OSS group into Hungary. Hungary, a close ally of Germany, after seeing that the war was not going to end with an Axis victory, wished to seek contact with the Western Allies in order to try to find a way out of its precarious situation. The study, based mainly on archival research, shows the evolution of the Sparrow Mission, whose goals are still unclear today. Both the preparations and the timing of the mission seem to indicate that the plan had some influence on the German decision of occupying Hungary in March 1944, and such a German move helped the Normandy landing of the Allies a few months later.

Confronting the Intelligence Fiasco of the Yom KippurWar

At the center of Israel’s most traumatic event, the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, stands an intelligence failure. Since the early 1990s, when senior intelligence officers who were involved in this fiasco started writing their memoirs, this event has become a source of major controversy in Israeli historiography. In response to the 2011 publication of the memoirs of the Mossad chief in 1973, Zvi Zamir, this article traces, describes and analyzes three aspects of this controversy: the personal and institutional responsibility for Israel’s lack of preparation at the outbreak of the war as well as the causes of the intelligence failure and the consequences it had on the Israeli Defense Force’s ability to confront the Arab attack.

The politics of hard knowledge: uncertainty, intelligence failures, and the ‘last minute genocide’ of Srebrenica

AbstractQuestions of uncertainty and responsibility have been central to the political and legal investigations of the failed UN/Dutch peacekeeping mission in Srebrenica. The official Dutch NIOD report on the peacekeeping mission has reconstructed the fall of Srebrenica as a surprise attack and as an ‘intelligence failure’. The report and its understanding of tactical uncertainty has led to a call for more intelligence in UN operations. I argue that the report builds its claims on a problematic epistemology of intelligence studies drawing upon a politics of ‘hard knowledge’. A similar epistemology can be identified in the proceedings of the war crimes tribunal in The Hague (ICTY) in the legal approach of criminal intent for the violence in Srebrenica. Although it is recognised that the political responsibility to prevent genocide and the juridical responsibility to punish those who have committed crimes have different implications for what can be called relevant foreknowledge or criminal intent, both the juridical and the political approaches close off paths for the mobilisation of histories that are more sensitive to the productive workings of language and images and thus to their bearing on possible futures.