Director Of Intelligence Research Articles

Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War. By Robert M.Gates. Alfred A.Knopf, 2014. 618 pp.

Duty: Memoirs of Secretary at War. By Robert M. Gates. Alfred A. Knopf, 2014. 618 pp. Memoirs from public officials typically are most instructive in presenting one person's perspective on key events during time of service and less helpful in appreciating preexisting policy constraints as well as restrictions of electoral cycle. Because he served two consecutive presidents as secretary of defense, and is only defense secretary to serve two commanders in chief from different political parties, Robert M. Gates has an unusual opportunity to present that broader perspective. His insightful assessment of defense policy making under George W. Bush and Barack Obama informs scholarly understanding of key national security debates and policy choices in twenty-first century. The book title, Duty, captures overarching theme well: Gates was not keen to serve as defense secretary or to stay in office for four-and-a-half years (late 2006 to mid-2011), but he so because he wanted to work for who sacrifice so much for United States. The pressures of job often became overwhelming, especially in Washington--Gates writes that he did not enjoy being secretary of defense (p. 465), and he refers to his tenure as deployment to Washington combat zone (p. 468). During his daily, predawn run, each time Gates would pass Lincoln Memorial, he would ask, How you do it? (p. 220). For Gates, the only thing that kept [him] going was getting out of Pentagon and being around troops (p. 465). With United States at war throughout his tenure, Gates was an integral advisor to key decisions about sending increased to Iraq for Bush and to Afghanistan for Obama. Under Bush, Gates participated in and implemented key decisions about 2007 troop surge in Iraq, conflicts with Russia, Syria, and Iran, increasing support from North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies in Afghanistan, and managing Pentagon battles over hardware, intelligence, support for wounded soldiers, and more. Gates worked well with president professionally, but he writes that they were not close personally (p. 95), perhaps in part because of Gates's close ties with former President George H. W. Bush, whom he had served as director of Central Intelligence. Gates describes second President Bush as intellectually curious (p. 94) and a man of character, man of convictions, and man of action (p. 96). In Bush White House, he is critical mostly of communications staff, who he says focused on tactical, often partisan, public relations, but says he was able to rebuff requests and make decisions with president's support. Given ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, rumors that Gates might be asked to continue in new administration, whether Republican or Democrat, started in early 2008. Consistent with theme of his memoir, Gates writes that he not seek to stay but believed he had responsibility to do so, if asked. …

이스라엘의 안보환경과 국방정책

This paper is to analyze Israel``s security environment and defense policy. For the purpose of that, this paper searches for Israel``s history and changing security environment, Israel``s defence policy and military strategy, its implications and lessons for Korea, and conclusion. Israel borders Lebanon in the North, Syria in the Northeast, Jordan in the East, Egypt in the Southwest, and the Palestinian territories(or State of Palestine) comprising the West Bank and Gaza Strip on the east and southwest respectively. Jordan and Egypt are the only Arab countries to have made peace with Israel. Israel is a republic in Southwest Asia, on the Mediterranean Sea: established in 1948, in the former British mandate of Palestine, as a primarily Jewish state; 8 disputes with Arab neighbours (who did not recognize the state of Israel), erupted into full-scale wars in 1948, 1956, 1967 (the Six Day War), and 1973 (the Yom Kippur War). The Israel Defense Forces is the sole military wing of the Israeli security forces, and is headed by its Chief of General Staff, the Ramatkal, subordinate to the Cabinet. The Israel Defense Forces(founded during the 1948 Arab.Israeli War) is the military forces of the State of Israel, and consists of the army, air force and navy. The IDF also draws upon the resources of the Military Intelligence Directorate (Aman), which works with the Mossad and Shabak. The IDF has been involved in several major wars and border conflicts in its short history, making it one of the most battle-trained armed forces in the world. The IDF maintains approximately 176,500 active troops and an additional 445,000 reservists. The nation``s military relies heavily on high-tech weapons systems designed and manufactured in Israel as well as some foreign imports. Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons. Israel has about 400 nuclear bombs secretly, and Israel prefers not to discuss the nuclear issue at all. Israel is one of the best equipped militaries in the world and its weapons industry is responsible for many technological advancements in modern warfare. It should come as no surprise, then, that Israel has the capacity to strike its targets with extreme precision. Deterrence also means restoring the standing of the Israel Defence Forces. Israeli military doctrine and its offensive, defensive and deterrence strategies are identified as the most important subcomponents of the security policy. Military service is compulsory in Israel, with men serving three years and women two. Most Israelis are drafted into the military at the age of 18. Men serve three years and women two to three years. In particular, since military service is compulsory in Israel, many young people get a high-tech education unlike any other Although the regional security environment has deteriorated, Israel remains a strong state. Israeli society has displayed remarkable resilience in the past when faced with severe national security tests. Despite the impressionistic reports of a divided Israel, nowadays it is more united than ever, ready to continue to live by its sword. With the right leadership, Israel can make the right choices and weather the current crisis. We should learn many lessons and implication from major features of Israeli defense policy(①Self-reliant national defense posture, ②Reinforcement of military force that value quality over quantity, ③Maintenance of solid deterrence, ④Efficient management of integrated forces and constant reserve forces) and major features of Israeli military strategy(①Preemptive strike, ② Transferring the battlefield to the enemy’s territory, ③Promoting the quickest decisive victory). History may repeat itself if we do not learn our lessons from the sore past that we should be strong enough to repel aggression from any nation. The moment we forget, history will repeat itself. We always should keep in mind the universal lesson of history that we have to prepare for war if we really want peace.

CANOPY WING: The U.S. War Plan That Gave the East Germans Goose Bumps

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Additional informationNotes on contributorsBenjamin B. FischerBenjamin B. Fischer, the former Chief Historian of the Central Intelligence Agency, is a specialist on Eastern European and Soviet affairs. A graduate of Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, and Columbia University, New York City, he served for nine years in the Agency's Directorate of Intelligence as an analyst of Soviet issues, fifteen years in the Directorate of Operations in the United States and abroad, and ten years on the History Staff of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, where he edited several of the Agency's classified publications on Cold War events, some of which have been partially or fully declassified.

Metodología dialógica e interdisciplina en la extensión universitaria. Reflexiones acerca de una experiencia

El trabajo es el resultado de nuestras reflexiones sobre la metodologíadialógica y la conformación de equipos interdisciplinarios en procesosde investigación-acción. Las mismas surgieron a partir de una experienciade extensión universitaria desarrollada en la Universidad Nacional de LaPlata, Argentina, en conjunto con la Comisión Provincial por la Memoria(CPM) y la Asociación de Trabajadores del Estado (ATE) de la Provincia deBuenos Aires. El proyecto buscaba el acceso, apropiación y resignificacióncolectiva de los documentos pertenecientes al archivo de la ex Direcciónde Inteligencia de la Policía de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (DIPBA) enposesión de la CPM. Es decir, un encuentro entre esos documentos que conteníanparte de la historia argentina de persecución, represión y prácticasde resistencias, y sus protagonistas. El trabajo busca identificar los nudosproblemáticos y las potencialidades de la experiencia, así como reconstruirla apuesta metodológica que se constituyó a partir de la disposición al diálogoy de la conformación de un nos-otros. En este proceso se analiza lapresencia de una perspectiva dialógica en la conceptualización de la nociónde extensión; en la opción metodológica por la investigación-acción participativay sus tensiones presentes en el campo; en la forma de pensar y actuar interdisciplinariamente construyendo un otro extensionista; y en ladecisión a partir de las necesidades situadas planteadas por los trabajadoresy las trabajadoras de incorporar específicamente el diálogo intergeneracionale intergénero. Una posición que nos permitió un diálogo entre sujetosparticipantes de la experiencia de extensión y la elaboración colectiva de losdenominados procesos de «re» (Vasilachis, 2007). Redefinición de la identidad,redefinición discursiva ante la mirada de los otros (la DIPBA) y unaredefinición de la memoria colectiva de los trabajadores y las trabajadorasdel sindicato a partir de una reconstrucción histórica colectiva. Por último,se plantean los obstáculos y elementos facilitadores que encontramos entodo el proceso, de modo de realizar un aporte que ilumine algunos aspectospara llevar adelante otras experiencias de extensión universitaria exitosas.

Counterterrorism, Dignity, and the Rule of Law

Counterterrorism, Dignity, and the Rule of Law

Forecasting Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns

Under what conditions do democratic regimes arise, and what forces shape whether those regimes survive or fail? This report describes the methods and results of a statistical analysis undertaken by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) for the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), an unclassified social-science research program funded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence. This analysis was designed to produce statistical models that could accomplish two goals at once: to identify countries most likely to transition to or from democracy in the next year or two with high accuracy, and, at the same time, to shed some light on the causes of those events.

Andrew DiRosa, MPA ‘02, Section Chief (Acting) of the Executive Intelligence Section of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mr. DiRosa obtained a Master’s in Public Administration (MPA), with a focus on managing federal agencies, from The George Washington University in 2002. While at GWU, Andy served as editor of Policy Perspectives, and was awarded the Leadership Award and was inducted into the Pi Alpha Alpha public administration honor society. Andy obtained a BA from Old Dominion University (Norfolk, VA) in English and Political Science in 1987. While at ODU he was elected to two terms on the student senate.Presently, Andy is the assistant section chief of the Executive Intelligence Section in the FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence at FBI Headquarters. In this capacity he helps oversee daily operation of 24-hour units that prepare the daily intelligence briefing materials for the FBI Director, US Attorney General, and other senior executives. Andy has also worked in the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, as an intelligence analyst and supervisor, and in the FBI’s training division and office of public affairs, as managing editor of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, a widely read criminal justice journal. He authored book reviews and journal articles, including features on street gangs and the impact of the Second World War on US law enforcement. While in the Counterterrorism Division Andy served in an international intelligence cell at NATO headquarters in Brussels. Mr. DiRosa has also represented the FBI at bilateral intelligence exchanges with Canada and the United Kingdom. (Views expressed are those of Mr. DiRosa and do not necessarily reflect the views of the FBI.)

DIE ONTWIKKELING VAN 'N MILITÊRE INLIGTINGSVERMOË VIR DIE UNIEVERDEDIGINGSMAG, 1937-1943

Upon the establishment of the Union Defence Force in 1912, no provision was made for a military intelligence capability. During the First World War various so-called intelligence units were raised and a Military Intelligence function was established within the General Staff section. After the war, this function went into gradual decline. By 1937, a renewed interest in intelligence resulted in the part-time appointment of Lieutenant Colonel B.W.Thwaites as head of Military Intelligence. After the declaration of war in 1939, Military Intelligence experienced a rapid growth. Intelligence officers were trained as such and agents were recruited. The Military Intelligence organization was divided into two upon the appointment of a Director Intelligence (Civilian Security) and a Deputy Director Military Intelligence. After initial organizational problems, an Intelligence Clearance Bureau was established. The Intelligence Directorate was disbanded and only the Military Intelligence Sub-directorate continued to exist. An Intelligence Corps was developed for the Mobile Field Force (MFF), from a shadow structure named Section Ix within Military Intelligence. In 1943, Military Intelligence was upgraded to a full directorate and was responsible for information, intelligence, security and censorship.

Intelligence operations as terrorism: Emerging state terrorism in Botswana

Botswana is considered one of Africa’s credible democracies. Its economic performance and good governance over the years distinguished its statehood from its African counterparts. The stable political landscape backdating to independence also made it a regional security exception. However, the security landscape has changed over the last three years. Using a historical procedure, the article illustrates how the changing political landscape resulted in the creation of a securitized state controlled by intelligence agencies. It also employs a survey procedure—using interviews and other qualitative sources—to illustrate how incidents of incidents of intellectual repression, communication surveillance, extra judicial killings and politicized covert operations have changed the country. The article interrogates the magnitude of security threats as well as the competence of the intelligence security outfits. Having proven the existence of common denominators of state terrorism in Botswana, which point to emerging state terrorism, the study proceeds to make recommendations for structural and operational reform. Key words: Botswana, Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DIS), state-terrorism, extrajudicial killings, surveillance

The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11

Two years after the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. This act aspired to replace a sprawling agency‐oriented intelligence apparatus with an integrated, networked intelligence community. The act envisioned a director of national intelligence who would accomplish sweeping structural reforms, while at the same time maintaining and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence operations. This vision has not materialized. The director of national intelligence does not have the power to implement structural reforms. Schisms between the legislature and the executive also hamper reforms.

Dancing Girls of the Swat Valley

Dancing Girls of the Swat Valley

India, Pakistan and Dialogue under the Shadow of Terror

In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and the subsequent war on terror, the Afghanistan–Pakistan region has emerged as a safe sanctuary for various terror groups like Al-Qaeda, Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba. This article focuses upon the close linkages between the legacy of the anti-Soviet jihad inside Afghanistan in the 1980s and the insurgency that later began in the Indian-administered part of Jammu and Kashmir, which from its inception has been aided and abetted by the Pakistan army and its Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISI). Despite international pressure, the infrastructure of terrorism directed against India from Pakistan-controlled territory remains intact due to inaction of the Pakistan government for political and strategic reasons. So long as the symbiotic relationship between sections of the Pakistan government (particularly the army and the ISI) and the various anti-India terrorist groups remains intact, there will be no meaningful progress in any kind of bilateral dialogue between the estranged neighbours.

Pakistan

Pakistan

Leader-Led Jihad in Pakistan: Lashkar-E-Taiba and the 2008 Mumbai Attack

This chapter examines leader-led Islamist militancy (a.k.a. “jihad”) in Pakistan. While it is often believed that Pakistan’s utilization of militants dates to the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, in fact Pakistan began doing so in the founding months of the state. Therefore, Pakistan’s militant groups have been active in and from Pakistan for decades and represent a long-standing facet of national power, whose deployment has been increasingly enabled by Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella. A comprehensive assessment of “leader-led” jihad in Pakistan is beyond the modest length of this present effort. The empirics of the Pakistan comprise a case of state-led jihad as a form of leader-led jihad. Most of the jihadi leaders and groups in Pakistan are themselves - to varying degrees - led, mobilized or supported by the Pakistani state. Ostensibly, the “leadership” lending strategic guidance and direction to Pakistan’s militant groups is Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI), and the Pakistan Army. These agencies may be more important than any given individual leader, who serves at the behest of these agencies, because these agencies provide important resources for arming, recruiting, training and ultimately conducting operations. This chapter will focus upon one of the most lethal and effective militant group operating from Pakistan: the Lashkar-e-Taiba or LeT. (LeT regrouped under the name of Jamaat-ul-Dawa when LeT was banned in 2002. For this reason, after 2002, I use the terms JuD and LeT interchangeably). Because LeT differs substantially from other groups operating in Pakistan, this chapter first briefly lays out the key features of the contemporary militant landscape in Pakistan. Next, this chapter provides key details about the organization and leadership. Third and most important, this chapter provides an account of what is perhaps LeT’s most audacious attack to date: the November 26, 2008 coordinated attack on numerous targets throughout Mumbai, which lasted some 60 hours and killed 172 people while receiving full media coverage on Indian and international media. The chapter concludes with a discussion the policy implications that emerge from this analysis.

The Bay of Pigs (review)

Reviewed by: The Bay of Pigs James Holeman Howard Jones . The Bay of Pigs. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Howard Jones's The Bay of Pigs (2008) provides a thought-provoking synthesis of a complex topic: the failed Central Intelligence Agency-sponsored invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro exiles in April 1961. Several works, including those by Peter Wyden, Peter Kornbluh, Haynes Johnson, and Trumbull Higgins, exhaustively cover the operational failures at the Bay of Pigs. Jones departs from those accounts by showcasing the Bay of Pigs fiasco as "the first United States sponsored regime change that relied on a combination of military force and assassination" (3). He maintains that three presidents, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson, all "found it critical to mesh assassination with military action" to topple Fidel Castro's regime between 1959 and 1965 (6). Jones links the development of Eisenhower administration planning to overthrow Castro between late 1959 and early 1961 with a CIA program to use mafia figures to assassinate Castro. Richard Bissell, CIA deputy director of plans, who oversaw both programs, believed that the director of central intelligence, Allen Dulles, and hence Eisenhower, authorized assassination indirectly through "circumlocutious" wording to maintain plausible deniability. The CIA assassination planning proceeded in tandem with infiltration planning and would theoretically facilitate the formation of a rebel force in the Escambray Mountains and lead to a popular anti-Castro uprising. Bissell and the CIA officer Sheffield Edwards agreed that the Mafia represented the perfect organization, in terms of motive and ability, for the assassination track, which Bissell and other CIA officers considered integral to the invasion planning. Bissell and [End Page 247] Edwards briefed Dulles and Cabell on the "gangster-type operation" in euphemistic terminology, which the director of central intelligence understood and approved. Jones asserts that Kennedy authorized continued paramilitary planning and CIA-Mafia plots to assassinate Castro. He concedes that the Kennedy aide Arthur Schlesinger claimed that Kennedy did not know about the assassination plots and that CIA officers believed that they had had permanent authorization to assassinate Castro since 1960. Nevertheless, Jones posits, on the basis of two conversations Bissell claimed to have had with Kennedy's national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, that Kennedy not only knew about the ongoing assassination operations against Castro but also authorized the CIA to establish an executive action capability to be used to frustrate the effectiveness of recalcitrant foreign leaders, with assassination as a last resort. Jones argues that Kennedy interpreted the failed assassination attempt on Castro on the eve of the Bay of Pigs invasion as a failed first step in the invasion plan. He claims that the president went forward with the operation, but the failed assassination attempt diminished the operation's chances for success and probably influenced Kennedy to reduce the preinvasion air strikes and cancel the D-Day airstrikes in an attempt to further conceal the U.S. role. The president continued to operate under the assumption that the invasion force could retreat into the mountains and conduct guerilla operations without realizing the impossibility of that option, given the swampy and isolated terrain at the Bay of Pigs. Jones finds Bissell responsible for not taking a more forceful position on the air strikes with the president and the secretary of state, but he lays the lion's share of the blame for the operation's failure on the lack of clearly defined planning responsibilities within the defense establishment. Jones stresses that the Kennedy administration and the CIA's internal inquiries into the operation's failure did not temper the crusade to remove Castro. Instead, the administration sought to impose greater control over the CIA and gravitated toward a direct U.S. military invasion of Cuba. Simultaneously, the CIA revived the Mafia plots to assassinate Castro. Relying on the testimony of the CIA officers Bissell, Sheffield Edwards, and Richard Helms, Jones claims that Robert Kennedy, and hence the president, knew about the CIA-Mafia plots. Jones concludes that denials of the administration's knowledge of ongoing plots to assassinate Castro, both before and after the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis, represented the efforts of administration loyalists to protect the president with...

Terrorism’s Evolution: Yesterday, Today, and Forever

In confronting the challenge of international terrorism, the fi rst step is to call things by their proper names, to see clearly and say plainly who the terrorists are, what goals they seek, and which governments support them. What the terrorist does is kill, maim, kidnap, and torture. His or her victims may be children in the schoolroom, innocent travelers on airplanes, businessmen returning home from work, political leaders. . . . The terrorist’s victims may have no particular political identity, or they may be political symbols, like Aldo Moro or, perhaps, Pope John Paul II. They may be kidnapped and held for ransom, maimed, or simply blown to bits. One defi ning characteristic of the terrorist is his choice of method; the terrorist chooses violence as the instrument of fi rst resort. William Joseph Casey, US Director of Central Intelligence

The Fujimori Judgment: A President's Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity as Indirect Perpetrator by Virtue of an Organized Power Apparatus

The Fujimori Judgment: A President's Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity as Indirect Perpetrator by Virtue of an Organized Power Apparatus

New Sources for the Study of Iraqi Intelligence during the Saddam Era

The US Department of Defense (DOD) has made available to scholars a significant collection of documents captured from the files of the Saddam-era Iraqi intelligence services. DOD is also studying ways in which further such documents can be released. These documents paint a picture in many ways reminiscent of the intelligence services of the totalitarian Soviet Union. These and forthcoming documents may enable important research on Iraq and on the role of intelligence services in totalitarian states. One newly available document gives the Iraqi General Military Intelligence Directorate's assessment of Iran on the eve of the Iran–Iraq War.

Autocracy, insecurity and pre-modernity in Botswana

The elevation of Lt-General Ian Khama to the presidency in April 2008 brought an escalating emphasis on security. A Directorate of Intelligence and Security was operationalised under the aegis of the President, and a spate of extra-judicial killings followed. Khama simultaneously asserted his control over the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), despite the fact that a pro-democratic faction – Barata Phathi – emerged victorious at the BDP congress in Kanye in July 2009. In an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, Khama aimed at 70 per cent of the vote in national elections in October 2009 but achieved just 53.4 per cent. Evidence emerged in early 2010 indicating that Sir Ketumile Masire had been in the pocket of the De Beers corporation throughout his presidency, 1980–98, and that his indebtedness and De Beers’ concerns over this had influenced the transition to Ian Khama. This suggested that diamond dependency and corruption were at the core of the autocracy and insecurity, and that together they characterised the debilitating pre-modernity in which the economy and society was trapped.

The Presidency of General Ian Khama: The Militarization of the Botswana 'Miracle'

Sincethesuccessionof Lieutenant-General Ian Khama to the presidency in April 2008, an escalation in the militarization and personalization of power in Botswana has taken place. Repressive agencies have been operationalized, military personnel have entered government in increased number, an informal coterie of advisers has come into being around Khama, and a spate of accusations of extra-judicial killings by state agents have been made. Governance and democracy are thus seriously undermined in what is conventionally represented as an African success, and this briefing details recent events which are threatening the rule of law, peace, and human rights in Botswana. The Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DIS) was established, in the words of the enabling act of 2006, to combat ‘any foreign influenced activity’ and ‘subversive activities from the country’s detractors’. Its officers could use firearms when ‘necessary and reasonably justifiable’. They had wide powers of arrest, seizure and detention without warrant. Their powers were undefined and threatening – Section 36, for example, provided that ‘when a person is guilty of an offence for which no specific penalty is provided . . . that person shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years’ (and, as it recently emerged, agents possessed immunity when operating). Its personnel are appointed on terms and conditions chosen by the President.1 It was also well funded, being initially expected to get the bulk of the P3 billion given to the Office of the President in early 2008.2 The existence and role of the DIS is closely identified with President Khama.