Intelligence Cooperation Research Articles

Primena Bečke konvencije o diplomatskim odnosima na odbrambenu (vojnu) diplomatiju

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations regulates the general framework for the implementation of diplomatic functions of State. Contemporary diplomacy is evolving in many areas that have not traditionally been in its focus, such as police and intelligence cooperation. The Republic of Serbia has also started appointing police and Security-Intelligence Agency representatives to diplomatic missions abroad. It is essential to monitor and study this practice from the standpoint of legal regulation. This matter is regulated by diplomatic and consular law, but also by national legislation and diplomatic practice. The experience and tradition of defense (military) diplomacy of the Republic of Serbia in adapting its functions to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, legal regulation and organizational and functional support to the defense attachés network, the procedures for selecting defense attachés, training and preparing them for the duty, as well as monitoring and directing them during the performance of the diplomatic service are indisputable at the national level. The tradition of military diplomacy has prevailed for more than 140 years, which indicates the level of diplomatic practice that leads to the conclusion that Serbia does have all the needed criteria for quality and functional implementation of the assigned tasks. The question is how these criteria are met in the newly formed network of diplomatic representations of the Police and the Security-Information Agency, bearing in mind the extremely negative experiences with economic representatives of the Republic of Serbia abroad. There is no doubt that their engagement is in line with international and national legislation, but the issue of the lack of diplomatic practice in organizational and functional terms remains a questionable one. Furthermore, there is the issue of their responsibilities within the diplomatic and consular missions and the harmonization of different professional cultures and ethics, as well as the preparation for performing their duties abroad. It is clear that all these problems cannot be solved in a short term, which is a relatively new organizational solution. Some time is needed to detect shortcomings in practice and generate the experience necessary to overcome them. The practice of organizing defense (military) diplomacy of the Republic of Serbia can certainly serve as a signpost for their resolution, while respecting the specificities arising from different responsibilities and professional ethics. By analyzing the specifics of the implementation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations in defense (military) diplomacy, analogies can be seen with the defining functions, while its legal and organizational experiences can serve as a guide to regulating the functions of Police and Security-Intelligence Agency representatives in the diplomatic service.

European Union and Transnational Terrorism. A Normative Analysis of Strategic Spillovers

There are two main categories of antiterrorism policies active and defensive. Active measures target the terrorists directly, and by weakening their ability to operate, are a sort of public good. On the other hand, defensive measures try to protect a potential target. Unilateral defensive measures can induce terrorists to substitute one target for another, in particular a foreign one. These positive and negative externalities of different antiterrorism measures raise the question of the best institutional setting for countries cooperation. This paper studies how in democratic countries public opinion and past intelligence proactive policies affect the efficiency of counterterrorism defensive policies according to different institutional scenarios regulating cooperation among countries. The aim of the paper is to study the consequences of four different scenarios on the choice of defensive policies: full decentralization, intelligence cooperation, unanimous political cooperation, such as the European Union for security policies, and full political union, the first best solution. The main result is that intelligence cooperation reduces the possibility of inefficient defensive policies more than unanimous political cooperation, a case of second best theory.

Criminalization as anxious and ineffective response to foreign fighters phenomenon in the Western Balkans

Despite not being a new phenomenon, nor an Islamic specificum, only recently when the West has increasingly become a potential target of returning foreign fighters from the Syrian theater has the international community reacted. The UN Security Council called on Member-states to, inter alia, immediately amend their national legislation to criminalize travelling abroad for terrorist purposes. However, as I identify in this article, contrary to majority of the Western countries, the Western Balkan countries opted to amend their legislation to criminalize travelling abroad to join conflict irrespective of its connection with terrorism, going well beyond the intended aim of the Security Council's resolutions. I argue that this broader criminal law approach is difficult to justify from either preventive or reactive perspectives. It is, in fact, an anxious and ineffective response to foreign fighters phenomenon. It is anxious because existing data shows that countries from the region have suffered fewer extremist attacks than the West. Notwithstanding, they still decided to introduce far more aggressive legislative changes, even though it only amplified securitizing moves performed by fighters' recruiters. I further demonstrate that the implementation of this new legislation has been ineffective particularly due to: (1) the challenge of securing court-strong evidence, especially those gathered through international intelligence cooperation; (2) its application mainly as an alternative when other terrorism-related offences cannot be proved; and (3) biased law application in countries that have returning fighters from both Middle East and Ukraine.

Updating Security and Defence Policy

Executive SummaryThreats to the security of the UK are evolving with the changing nature of conflict and balance of power in the world. They are multiple and fragmented, and domestic and online as well as overseas in nature: principally state-based threats such as posed by Russian activity; terrorism; cyber-attacks; and serious organised crime. To respond, the United Kingdom will need flexible capabilities aimed at fostering infrastructural and societal resilience as much as conventional defence. Above all, the UK needs to focus on maintaining, promoting, and defending the international rules-based order, as represented by the UN and NATO among other institutions.The UK possesses significant assets to these ends, including its continuing status as one of eight acknowledged nuclear powers – a status that it should not abandon unilaterally; permanent membership of the UN Security Council; membership of the ‘Five Eyes' intelligence community; and its internationally respected armed forces.But effort and resources are required to support these commitments, for example in helping to encourage other European states to spend more on defence; in contributing to UN peace-keeping operations or other collaborative overseas actions; and most of all in ensuring that army and navy manpower is rebuilt. Two per cent of GDP is no longer sufficient for the proper defence of the nation. Even allowing for the demands of other parts of government, the target for defence spending should be raised in the next review to 2.2 per cent.The principal focus will need to be on efficiency and redeployment of resources as the current equipment-heavy procurement cycle comes to an end. In particular, investment needs to continue to be rebalanced towards new capabilities such as drone technology, offensive and defensive cyber and intelligence manpower.But, to avoid any weakening of the country's security, priority should be given to negotiating a new agreement on security and intelligence cooperation with its European allies to replace the arrangements it had within the EU.

International cooperation by (European) security and intelligence services: reviewing the creation of a joint database in light of data protection guarantees

Key Points Increasing multinational cooperation between intelligence and security services, including the establishment of a joint database on (alleged) jihadists, raises legal concerns over the protection of personal data, in particular with respect to the allocation of responsibility among participating states, the geographic scope of fundamental data protection norms, and the applicable law. It is argued that states participating in multinational cooperative efforts may share responsibility, eg in relation to a shared database. However, for reasons of proximity, the host state of the server has heightened duties of care. It is also argued that where a participating state, in particular the host state, exercises virtual control (jurisdiction) over an individual person’s data, such a state has data protection obligations towards that person, regardless of the latter’s location. Participating states, and again in particular the host state, are under an obligation to put in place adequate control systems, including with a view to preventing the transfer of data that have been gathered by states in breach of data protection guarantees. If systemic failures in the multilateral system are identified, states are barred from transferring data to the system, unless they can obtain credible guarantees that data will be adequately protected. General principles of data protection law, derived from case law as well as general or sector-specific regulations, govern the processing and transfer of data in the context of multinational intelligence cooperation, including the management of a joint database. There is no reason not to apply them in the context of national security.

Cyber Intelligence Networks: A Typology

ABSTRACTIn this research, we identify different types of cyber intelligence networks and specify their unique characteristics. While existing research discusses intelligence cooperation in general terms or analyzes single case studies, we provide insight in the diversity of cyber intelligence networks in existence. Based on a qualitative study of cyber intelligence networks in the Netherlands, we identify four distinct types: centralized networks, business networks, operational networks, and local networks. These networks differ in terms of their history, activities, governance structure, communication frequency, goal consensus, member commitment, and perceived results. Based on the typology, we claim that the network type influences the challenges and outcomes of cyber intelligence cooperation. Next, we argue for an expanded focus on private sector engagement in these networks. Lastly, we advocate for incentivizing bottom-up cyber intelligence cooperation.

Loyalty and Secret Intelligence: Anglo‒Dutch Cooperation during World War II

Secrecy and informal organisation produce, sustain, and reinforce feelings of loyalty within intelligence and security services. This article demonstrates that loyalty is needed for cooperation between intelligence partners as well as within and between services. Under many circumstances, loyalty plays a larger role in the level of internal and external collaboration than formal work processes along hierarchical lines. These findings are empirically based on the case study of Anglo‒Dutch intelligence cooperation during World War II. By demonstrating that ‘loyalty’ critically affects the work of intelligence communities, this article contributes to current and future research that integrates history, intelligence studies, and research on emotions.

INTELLIEGENCE ANALYSIS IN THE FUNCTION OF IDENTIFYING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

The main subject of this paper is a theoretical description of intelligence, intelligence analysis and intelligence cooperation, and their significance and role in the detection of terrorist activities.Intelligence interest in modern times is associated with modern terrorism which in many ways differs from classical terrorism. This phenomenon contributes internationally to countries to begin to apply a different way of dealing with them. Starting from this, the aim of this paper is to highlight the linkage of intelligence with modern terrorism and its application in detecting terrorist activities that are increasingly common today.Starting from the complexity of this issue in the paper, at the very beginning it will be defined terrorism as a contemporary phenomenon, emphasizing the notion and significance of terrorism and its factors. A special part in the paper takes the intelligence, the intelligence process and the cycle and the intelligence analysis, as well as the application of intelligence in detecting terrorist activities. When talking about intelligence as a process of detecting and preventing terrorist activities, special attention is paid to the notion and meaning of intelligence, its activities and types, as well as the intelligence cycle. At the end of the paper, special emphasis is placed on the application of intelligence in identifying and detecting terrorist activities, especially, the significance of intelligence analysis in preventing and suppressing terrorist activities.

The Untold Story of Anglo-Soviet Intelligence Cooperation During WWII

The Untold Story of Anglo-Soviet Intelligence Cooperation During WWII

The price of alliance: Anglo-American intelligence cooperation and Imperial Japan’s criminal biological warfare programme, 1944–1947

ABSTRACT From 1932 to 1945, Imperial Japan secretly developed the largest state biological warfare (BW) programme of its time, which was unique in its use of biological weapons in warfare and in its inhumane experiments on captive Chinese civilians. After Japan’s surrender, US military intelligence teams searched for any evidence of BW activities, whilst sharing all it could find with its close partner, the UK. Despite the UK offering little intelligence material in return, it secured detailed US intelligence reports on Japanese BW war crimes, and colluded with the United States to keep these Japanese war crimes a secret.

Merging Pillars, Changing Cultures: NATO and the Future of Intelligence Cooperation Within the Alliance

On 21 October 2016, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) appointed its first Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security (ASG-I&S), Dr. Arndt Freiherr Freytag von Loringhoven...

Assessment of South Korea’s Countermeasure System and Activity for Overseas Hostage Terrorism: With Reference to the Kidnapping Incident in Afghanistan

2007년 7월 19일 아프가니스탄에서 한국인 봉사단 23명이 납치되어, 2명이 피살되었고 43일 만에 21명이 석방된 충격적인 사건이 발생하였다. 아프가니스탄 피랍사건 당시 비록 2명이 살해당하였으나, 한국 정부는 범정부적 석방노력을 통 해 생존한 21명을 무사히 석방시켜 국제사회에서 인질협상의 성공사례로 평가되기도 한다. 그러나 테러방지법의 부재로 인한 미흡한 대테러 체계 및 여행금지국 늑장 지정, 인질협상 전략 부족, 테러단체와 직접협상, 석방금 지급 논란 등의 문제점이 나타났다. 향후 한국 정부는 해외 인질테러에 대한 실효성 있는 인질협상과 대테 러 활동을 강화하기 위해서 다음과 같은 발전방향을 추진해야할 것이다. 첫째, 한국 정부는 2016년 3월 제정된 테러방지법에 근거하여 국가 대테러 정책을 종합적으로 수립하고 테러공격의 탐지·경보·예방, 국내외 테러정보의 수집·분석·배포, 대테러 활동역량 강화 및 주요국 정보기관과의 테러정보 협력을 증진시켜야한다. 해외 테러위험지역에 진출한 교민·기업·여행객 보호대책을 실질적으로 뒷받침하기 위한 재외국민보호법 마련 및 전담기구를 보강할 필요가 있다. 둘째, 테러조직과의 직접 협상불가라는 원칙을 밝히고, 상황에 따라 국제적인 원칙을 훼손하지 않는 범위에서 유연성을 발휘하여 협상에 임해야한다. 셋째, 정부의 대테러 전담부서의 확충과 공조체제를 강화해야한다. 넷째, 아프가니스탄 인질사태와 유사한 재외국민 피랍사태가 발생할 경우, 상황에 따라 해외에서 인질을 구출할 군사작전 전담부대의 운용을 검토할 필요가 있다. 마지막으로 국제 테러방지 네트워크 구축과 다차원적 대테러 국제협력 강화 를 위해 주요국들과의 양자 협력채널 구축, 테러위험지역 국가들과 전략적 협의 채널 마련 및 유엔 등 범세계적·포괄적 대테러 협력에 적극 참여해야 할 것이다.On July 19, 2007, 23 South Korean volunteers were kidnapped in Afghanistan, two were killed and another 21 people were released in 43 days. Even though there were two people were killed in Afghanistan, the South Korean government released 21 survivors through whole government efforts to release the hostages, which is regarded as a successful case of hostage negotiation in the international community. However, there were problems such as lack of anti-terrorism law resulted in insufficiency of counterterrorism system and late issue of the travel ban nation, lack of hostage negotiation strategy, direct negotiations with terrorist organizations, and controversy over ransom payment. In the future, the Korean government should pursue the following development direction to strengthen effective hostage negotiations and counterterrorism activities against hostage terrorism abroad. First, Korean government will establish comprehensive anti-terrorism policies based on the Act on Anti-Terrorism enacted in March 2016, and will take measures to detect, alert, and prevent terrorist attacks, collect and analyze domestic and international terrorist intelligence, and strengthen counterterrorism activities. It should promote terrorism intelligence cooperation with intelligence agencies of major countries. It is necessary to reinforce the laws for the protection of overseas residents, and to establish dedicated organizations to support the protection measures for migrants, enterprises and tourists who have entered the danger zone of foreign terrorism. Second, it should clarify the principle that it can not negotiate directly with the terrorist organization in the future, and it should be flexible in the extent that the international principle is not damaged according to the situation. Third, the government should strengthen the cooperation and expansion of dedicated departments for counterterrorism. Fourth, it is necessary to examine the operation of a dedicated military operation unit to rescue the hostages abroad in case of an abduction of overseas Koreans similar to the hostage situation in Afghanistan. Finally, in order to build an international terrorism prevention network and strengthen international cooperation on multidimensional counterterrorism, it should be actively involved in establishing bilateral cooperation channels with major countries, establishing a strategic consultation channel with countries in risk areas of terrorism, and involving the UN and other global and comprehensive counterterrorism cooperation.

The Untold Story of Anglo-Soviet Intelligence Cooperation During WWII

The Untold Story of Anglo-Soviet Intelligence Cooperation During WWII

Digital Surveillance, Meta Data and Foreign Intelligence Cooperation: Unpacking the International Right to Privacy

Anti-terrorism measures have led to increasing digital interception of private communications and to mass surveillance, the extent of which had been unseen until recently. When a few years ago the discussion started about how to deal with this phenomenon, the call for a new legal instrument quickly erupted. However, this the article demonstrates that this is not a blind spot of international law. Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees the right to privacy and the protection against unlawful interference with correspondence. The Human Rights Committee which is entrusted with the interpretation of the Covenant has taken recent cyber-related developments as an opportunity to unpack the right to privacy in the context of its state reporting procedure. The article by Anja Seibert-Fohr describes and systematizes the Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with respect to the protection of privacy against digital surveillance, meta data retention and foreign intelligence cooperation and outlines the respective legal standards. The author demonstrates that the Covenant provides the necessary legal ground to confront new technological challenges without ignoring the exigencies of the altering security situation. Safeguard procedures play a central role in this undertaking. The Committee, having identified various shortcomings in national legal frameworks, has specified the necessary safeguards to effectively protect the right to privacy against arbitrary interference. It has also clarified the territorial scope of protection under the Covenant which is not limited to domestic measures but also extents to transnational surveillance and digital intelligence sharing. The Committee thus has specified the meaning of Article 17 and laid important groundwork for the consideration of cyber-related issues. The author concludes with an outlook, describing new issues which the Committee will need to consider in the future, and makes general recommendations for the future conceptualization of the right to privacy in the digital age more generally.

Intelligence cooperation and new trends in space technology: do the ties still bind?

ABSTRACTFor the first time since the 1970s, Canberra cannot assume the joint facilities will continue to underpin the Australia–US alliance. Intelligence cooperation via outer space, described as the ‘strategic essence’ of this relationship, is poised for transformation. New technologies are being developed for satellite communication, with laser systems capable of bypassing ground control stations outside US territory. As a result, the one indispensable role for Australia in US national security—hosting infrastructure to relay intelligence about nuclear and missile activity—could become irrelevant in the years ahead. With questions raised about the Trump administration’s commitment to security partners and the risk of US disengagement from Asia, these findings have implications for Australian alliance diplomacy. If intelligence ties bind these countries together at present, Canberra can expect some risk of loosening in the future and will need to think carefully about the development of national intelligence resources over the long term.

Scale development for the inter-firm market orientation concept

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to develop and validate a scale for inter-firm market orientation (IMO) based on an original conceptualization by Elg (2008). Building on the MARKOR scale, the IMO scale is introduced to better understand the market orientation efforts that occur within business relationships.Design/methodology/approachAfter establishing a conceptualization of IMO, an initial list of scale items is developed by adapting the original MARKOR scale. Several phases of qualitative pre-tests have been conducted with both academic experts and several manufacturer and reseller partner executives to assess the applicability and clarity of the measurement instrument. Using a quantitative survey design, the measurement instrument has been validated by relationship partner managers from both manufacturer and reseller companies.FindingsThe results of the analysis reveal that IMO is a second-order formative construct consisting of two first-order reflective constructs termed joint intelligence cooperation and joint customer responsiveness.Practical implicationsThe operationalization of IMO suggests to manufacturers and their partners that the market intelligence cooperation efforts between them should be more focused on intelligence about the end users and less on general market trends. Further, the customer responsiveness efforts between the partners tend to be more reactive in nature, unlike the proactive stance in intra-firm market orientation.Originality/valueThe paper extends the notion of focal firms’ market orientation to IMO, which exists between partners in business relationships, and does so by developing a conceptualization and measurement instrument for IMO. This newly developed construct and scale can be used in future research to explore in greater depth the interplay between IMO and firm performance.

AIDING AND ASSISTING: THE MENTAL ELEMENT UNDER ARTICLE 16 OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY

AbstractArticle 16 of the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility provides that a State that aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the recipient State is internationally responsible, where certain conditions are fulfilled. This article clarifies one of those conditions, namely the difficult and contested issue of what degree of knowledge or intent engages the responsibility of an assisting State under Article 16. The article focuses particularly on assistance in armed conflict and counterterrorism situations, which increasingly feature some form of operational or intelligence cooperation between States.

الآثار الاقتصادية لسياسات مکافحة الإرهاب . ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY

الآثار الاقتصادية لسياسات مکافحة الإرهاب . ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY

Research on the Structure Model of Competitive Technical Intelligence Cooperation Performance from Resource -Capacity Perspective

On the basis of analyzing the status quo about Competitive Technical Intelligence (CTI) cooperation, from the resource-based theory, core capacity theory and dynamic capacity theory, analyzing the path to get advantage resource and strength the competition ability of R&D alliance, according to the CTI working process, in order to the information flow and value chain as the main line, CTI cooperation performance model from resource-capacity perspective is given, and dimensions of ascending ability and value creation of CTI cooperation performance are interpreted and analyzed.

Analysis of Competitive Intelligence Cooperation’s Performance of Strategic Alliance Based on SCP Pattern

Analysis of Competitive Intelligence Cooperation’s Performance of Strategic Alliance Based on SCP Pattern