Intellectual Enterprises Research Articles

Enhancing innovation and intellectual property culture in manufacturing small and medium enterprises

Technological innovation is an important challenge faced by small and medium enterprises (SMEs). This study investigates the factors that influence the growth, performance, and development of intellectual property rights (IPRs) attitude of SMEs in India. The study is an attempt to highlight the extent of Intellectual Property Rights of Indian manufacturing as a whole and a survey analysis has been undertaken for 100 SMEs of manufacturing sector of Punjab in India to understand the level of IPRS by firms in post TRIPS period. Punjab is a progressive state of India with an average growth rate of 10%. Punjab has been ranked as one of the growing states of India. The present study uses growth rates for analyzing the status of IPRs at all India level. It also presents the sector-wise status of patents filed. Manufacturing SMES have been categorized on the basis of use into durable, non durable and essential goods. The results of the study highlight the low level of IPRs in India. Durable industries have filed most of the trademarks. Most of the copyrights and patents have been filed by essential goods. The results of the factors influencing Innovation in SMEs of Punjab manufacturing depict that: increased market share, improved production flexibility, staff employed in R and D, status of trademarks in last ten years and status of copyrights in last ten years and: improved environmental impact or health safety aspect explain 87.6% of the variation. Finally, the study recommends the factors for promoting IPR culture for SMEs of Punjab manufacturing. Factor analysis results highlight that two factors namely; i) Factor analysis results highlight that two factors namely; policy initiatives and organizational factor explain 62.85% of total variation. Key words: Intellectual property rights (IPRs), innovation, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), Punjab manufacturing.

Paige Reynolds, Modernism, Drama, and the Audience for Irish SpectacleModernism, Drama, and the Audience for Irish Spectacle. PaigeReynolds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. ix+257.

<i>Paige Reynolds,</i> Modernism, Drama, and the Audience for Irish Spectacle<i>Modernism, Drama, and the Audience for Irish Spectacle</i>. PaigeReynolds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. ix+257.

Comte and the fortunes of positivism

Comte’s immoderate fondness for big intellectual enterprises and monumental multi-volume publications seems to have had a strong influence on his biographers. In the 1930s, Henri Gouhier had devoted three volumes for describing only Comte’s formative years (La Jeunesse d’Auguste Comte et la formation du positivisme, 3 vols., Paris: Vrin, 1933–1941). Mary Pickering, a professor at San Jose State University, has worked 30 years to complete Comte’s biography. The first volume, published in 1993, had already impressed historians and philosophers with its accurate description of Comte’s foundation of his positive philosophy in the Cours de philosophie positive (1830–1842). With the volumes covering the periods 1842–1852 (vol. 2) and 1852–1857 (vol. 3), Pickering confirms her mastery of Comte’s life and thought. Her reconstruction of his intellectual trajectory is based on the solid ground of archival material and on a good acquaintance with Comte’s works. She manages to situate this eccentric and paranoiac individual in French history thanks to a thorough reconstruction of the tumultuous context of nineteenthcentury France, marked by political upheavals, socialist and feminist movements, secularization and religiosity. Pickering’s biographical narrative is organized around the central question raised by Comte’s intellectual trajectory: Is there a continuity or a radical break between what he used to designate as his «two careers»? Her task as a biographer was both facilitated and complicated by the exhibitionism of Comte’s private life. He systematically blurred the boundary between the private and the public spheres and claimed to derive many aspects of his doctrine from his personal life. She consequently had to distance herself from Comte’s self-representation and to face the challenge of describing how a philosopher of science eager for recognition by academic milieus became the high priest of a new religious cult. How an active

The irrational exuberant taxation of intellectual informational enterprises &amp;ndash; beyond Google

A further discussion of the problems in the international taxation of intellectual informational enterprises.

Keeping Philosophy in Mind : Shadworth H. Hodgson's Articulation of the Boundaries of Philosophy and Science

INTRODUCTIONShadworth H. Hodgson's (1832-1912) contributions to Victorian intellectual discourse have faded from prominence over the past century. However, despite his current anonymity, Hodgson's case is important to an understanding of the historical split between philosophy and in late nineteenth-century Britain. In particular, his example illuminates the specific role played by developing concepts of the mind in a period of deep transition in the British intellectual community. His virtual disappearance from the record, I contend, is indicative also of the disappearance of his form of philosophy as a vital social project. His ideas, rather than being rejected, were instead largely neglected - they became lost as discussion moved elsewhere, both conceptually and institutionally. However, in the inaugural volume of Mind in 1876, Hodgson's ideas initially found a prominent place in a central dialogue over the position of philosophy with respect to science. There, and throughout his career, Hodgson engaged in the defense of an intellectual tradition he regarded as under threat from psychological science. Both his particular formulation of an ongoing role for philosophy and his own uneasy position in the intellectual environment of late Victorian Britain shed significant light on an under-examined issue of the period: the fraught relationship between philosophy and as competing enterprises engaged in the study of the human mind.Philosophy and science are easily construed as partnered intellectual complexes in modern Western society. However, closer scrutiny of the historical record shows that the two terms - whether as theoretical referents or actors' categories - have often reflected divergent priorities and that transitions from philosophical to terms have been contentious. In examining the birth of natural out of natural philosophy during the Enlightenment, the historian Andrew Cunningham has emphasized how the reordering of intellectual fields created new conflictive relationships between philosophy, science, and religion.1 He reminds us that the process of scientific secularization was but one of a set of constitutive shifts among these human activities, and that the earlier natural philosophy thus played by fundamentally different rules than its successor. A similar story can be told about the late nineteenth -century transition I am considering: in a nutshell, to borrow a phrase from Cunningham, men did not start doing mental until they stopped doing moral philosophy. However, this time, philosophy already stood in competition with existing scientific institutions, sparking a more severe contest for authority. As mental began to develop along the lines of the natural disciplines, Hodgson and others feared little would remain as a distinctive domain for philosophy as such, moral or otherwise. His efforts on the part of philosophy thus represent one front in an intellectual turf war - what recent scholars have called work, shoring up the institutional positions of different intellectual enterprises competing for authority in the world.2 Gieryn's formative analysis of boundary work was based on the contemporaneous example of John Tyndall's campaign to promote scientific over religious authority in Victorian Britain, but this was much more than a two-way struggle. The early career of Mind bears witness to a closely related, but less discussed, battle for influence between philosophy and science, in which the journal itself served as a critical object, a medium for enforcement of the distinctions between these two intellectual fields.3Thomas Dixon has recently surveyed the origins of this shift. Like Cunningham, Dixon emphasizes the constitutive differences in scope and orientation of the two intellectual enterprises, salient among them the secularization of the new human sciences.4 This process - begun tentatively by Thomas Brown and brought to fruition by Bain, Spencer, and Darwin - involved wholesale shifts in the scholarly linguistic complex, from a set of several mental categories rooted in Christian categories - affections, passions, sentiments, etc. …

Social Justice and Pedagogy

Social justice, predicated on the expansion of human rights, is by definition a critical and intellectual enterprise. Social critique, made possible by social justice paradigms, provides the basis for social action and social change and leads ultimately to the enhancement of social democracies. Such critical intellectual enterprises require that people constantly reevaluate not only their social institutions but also the terms they use to describe their very existence. Such reevaluation is best accomplished within the crucible of the academy.

The Intimate, the Familial, and the Local in Transnational Histories of Gender

Elizabeth Buettner. Empire Families: Britons and Late Imperial India. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. vi + 310 pp.; ill. ISBN 0-19-924907-5 (cl). Philippa Levine, ed. Gender and Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. vi + 306 pp. ISBN 0-19-924951-2 (cl). Ann Laura Stoler. Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. ix + 335 pp.; ill. ISBN 0-520-23110-4 (cl); ISBN 0-520-23111-2 (pb). The three works by Elizabeth Buettner, Philippa Levine, and Ann Laura Stoler represent somewhat different intellectual enterprises. Buetter's Empire Families is a monographic study of family life and practices in late British India that is based upon painstaking consultation of a vast array of sources. Levine's edited volume surveys critical problems in gender throughout the British empire from the eighteenth century on; its contributor list reads like an international Who's Who of leading scholars in that field. With the exception of the first chapter and epilogue, Stoler's Carnal Knowledge is principally a revisiting of her greatest hits. Despite differences, however, the publication of these and numerous other titles on intersections between gender and colonialism invites brief reflection upon the stages through which the relatively recent field (or fields) of women, gender, and colonial histories has passed as well as upon possible future trajectories. It should be made clear at the outset that I approach these works as well as the larger fund of scholarship that they represent from the dual perspective of someone trained primarily as a North African historian and secondarily as a scholar of the French Empire. Roughly two decades ago, feminist historians began posing questions about how women experienced empire as well as how their actions, activities, and words produced critical shifts in the workings of colonial societies worldwide. Formulating big questions, feminist scholars reinvigorated what had become by then a rather marginalized, male-dominated scholarly enterprise. In 1986, Claudia Knapman's White Women in Fiji, 1835–1930: The Ruin of Empire? appeared, followed the next year by Helen Callaway's Gender, [End Page 174] Culture and Empire: European Women in Colonial Nigeria, and in 1992, the essays edited by Nupur Chaudhuri and Margaret Strobel, Western Women and Imperialism: Complicity and Resistance.1 This newly awakened interest in white women in overseas colonies had, in many cases, been inspired by slightly earlier area studies scholarship by those trained primarily in African, Asian, or Middle Eastern histories, languages, and cultures; the focus there was very much upon "indigenous" women—for example, Strobel's work on women of Mombasa.2 The shift to European women began by initially contesting the notion that white women's permanent or temporary presence in overseas possessions triggered the loss of empire; these earlier studies were mainly devoted to women and empire (as opposed to gender and empire), and employed an ethnohistorical approach to plot out women's quotidian lives in diverse colonial settings. Attention to Western women's myriad activities as memsahibs, settlers, travelers, missionaries, or teachers—as resisters and challengers to, or mere accommodaters in, imperial hierarchies—forced or moved gender into imperial studies and, conversely, internationalized women and gender studies, previously somewhat Euro-American in focus. As Jane Haggis and others noted at the time, the central issue of the relentless institutionalization of race, class, and violence, enshrined in colonial legal systems, was, at times, insufficiently theorized.3 Still, these works inspired a rapidly expanding corpus of research that made it possible to rethink binary constructs as well as the dominant core–periphery model of colonial encounters, and to comprehend that empire and nation were fashioned from intersecting, deeply gendered historical processes. Classic notions of unidirectional and univalent mère-patrie–colony relations were discarded for perspectives that probed the ambiguous, untidy, unstable, and contingent in reciprocal flows between colonial societies and metropoles—and...

Presse et corps policiers : complicité et conflit

The literature abounds with studies showing the cultural gap and the hostility that exists between journalists and the police. During the 19th century in the United States, however, a complicity eminently profitable for both was rapidly established between constables and reporters for the first penny newspapers. The confrontations and mass rallies of the 60' s saw the role of journalists change to become no longer the servile and docile distributors of a particular image of crime, the criminal and police work. Journalists suddenly found themselves on the side of the “criminals”, facing the truncheons of militant police. In Montreal, a public relations service was subsequently created to restore the positive image of the police and try to reestablish the control of information. Since the newspapers were more commercial than intellectual enterprises, complicity, both official and unofficial, was quickly reestablished, giving rise to a rather doubtful relationship between journalists and the police. It was about ten years after the October crisis, when the majority of journalists identified more with the protesters than with the repressive forces, that the Quebec Police decided to restore media/police relationships to their former state. A communications service was created, which, in little more than ten years, enabled the police authorities to exercise an almost total control over information; only what served the strategy of the police was to be published. For the R.C.M.P., the honeymoon came to an end with the creation of the Keable and McDonald Commissions. In 1977, there were five policemen attached to the public relations service of the R.C.M.P. in Montreal. In 1986, a single officer remains and no longer even bears the title of official communications or public relations officer. Everywhere in Quebec, journalists seem to have traded their ability to inform for their daily ration of diverse facts, and it is still the disturbing image of crime and criminals that they blithely publish, making the media true instruments of social control.

The 2003 Wilkins Lecture: Dr Wilkins's boy wonders

In the second half of the seventeenth century in England, a procession of great figures emerged to become the founding figures of modern science (what was then called natural philosophy). Today it is the originality of these ‘men of genius‘ that we are inclined to celebrate. Yet the most innovative aspect of the period's scientific activities was a whole series of collaborative intellectual enterprises, which were unlike any that came before them in their capacity to mobilize and organize original ideas and their technical application.

Care of the Subject: Feminism and Critiques of GIS

(2002). Care of the Subject: Feminism and Critiques of GIS. Gender, Place & Culture: Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 291-299.

Environmental Sociology and the Sociology of Natural Resources: Institutional Histories and Intellectual Legacies

While environmental sociology and the sociology of natural resources nominally focus on the same subject matters, in practice the literatures in the two subdisciplines have tended to be quite separate intellectual enterprises. Environmental sociology and the sociology of natural resources have different origins, their practitioners tend to have distinctive institutional locations, their problematics are different, and their theoretical tendencies differ considerably. I provide an overview of the divergent courses that have been taken within these two areas of inquiry, with stress on their institutional histories and intellectual legacies.

What Is Science Studies for and Who Cares?

We are, self-evidently, at a moment of aggressive public attack (some call it debate) on science studies. Just as the wars against political correctness managed to deflect attention from the real problems as an entrenched community appealed to democratic virtues while defending privilege, so now well-funded and powerful forces are claiming to be oppressed by the likes of Bruno Latour, Andrew Ross, and Katherine Hayles and are attempting to trash-in the name of reason, truth, objectivity, justice, and the first amendment-people who raise awkward questions. Conferences of the National Association of Scholars (NAS) (in November 1994) and of the New York Academy of Sciences (NYAS) (May 1995) are symptomatic of an aggression that touches-perhaps dangerously, perhaps only with a rather sad and silly paranoia-on some of the most important issues of our time. While support for all serious intellectual enterprises is being more than threatened by newly empowered anti-intellectual political forces, these organizations are behaving as though the threat to science is really coming from some of the few intellectuals who have taken the trouble to think seriously about it. The excess and silliness of the response may seem the mere pettishness of spoiled researchers used to big-time funding and might well induce in us both complacency and a tendency to enjoy tweaking for its own sake; but complacency or teasing are the last things we need at the moment. Questions about the relations between society and science are among the most important of our time. We need, rather, to be thinking about how our healthy instincts to be oppositional might be channeled in more productive directions.

Meanings of sex difference in the Middle Ages: medicine, science, and culture (review)

150 Reviews manuscript material precisely because the printed edition is self-evidently a distortion of the medieval text' (p. 93); when he agrees with Cerquiglini that an edition ecranique would be useful, given the vast amount of detailed information incorporating the visual into a 'literary' view of manuscript texts (pp. 90, 95); when he speaks in such terms, Busby tenders his credentials as a new philologist (lower case) in his own right. For he is actively participating in the process of re-evaluating the relationship between authors, scribes, and editors which lies at the core of the current debate. Here, then, is the nebulous synthesis which this volume aims to achieve. On the whole, this book is hardly seminal, but it is historically interesting in the dubious validity it confers on the 'New Philology'. Bemadette A. Masters Department of French Studies University of Sydney Cadden, Joan, Meanings of sex difference in the Middle Ages: medicine, science, and culture, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993; cloth; pp. xii, 310; 7 illustrations; R.R.P. A U S $ 120.00. There is nothing oblique about this superb study. The medieval medical world was itself directly interested in the differences between women and men and, by examining how questions such as 'Which sex enjoys intercourse more?', 'What dispositions and behaviours distinguish a male from a female?', 'How can you have a son?', 'How can you distinguish a male from a female embryo?' were investigated and answered in the Middle Ages, Cadden explains what meaning sex difference had for those who asked and attempted to answer such questions. This study differs from Foucault's The history of sexuality in that he was not concerned with sex difference as such but predominantly with the history of male sexuality. Of course, in this regard Foucault is like many of the medieval authors treated by Cadden. Writers on anatomy dealt primarily with men's anatomy, and she acknowledges that men as subjects were conceptually central, primary and standard, and women marginal. But such conceptual dependence, once recognized, does not trivialize the investigation of sex difference and gender, but becomes itself a subject of investigation. More importantly, Cadden's work is also distinguished from Reviews 151 Thomas Laqueur's Making sex: body and gender from the Greeks to Freud. Laqueur argues that, until the eighteenth century, male and female were thought of as different manifestations of a single sexual substratum. Though there is much that supports his position, his 'one sex' model, Cadden thinks, cannot account for all the sources. Indeed the sort of ingenious reductivism aimed at by Laqueur is something she deliberately avoids, and she constantly points up the ways in which this history is one of diversity. Her anti-reductivist treatment of the sources enables her to draw without prejudice on the whole range of medieval opinions and arguments, making her book both fascinating simply as reportage, and authoritative as scholarship. What can be gleaned from the sources about 'the significance of the sense of the feminine and the masculine conveyed by medical and scientific sources' is wide for several reasons. First, because the relationships between medicine, natural philosophy, Christian theology and doctrine, secular social concerns, and other dimensions of the medieval world was, as Cadden shows, so conceptually dynamic. Partly this is because science was less isolated than it is today from other intellectual enterprises, and intellectual enterprises themselves were less isolated from the rest of the social world. But, secondly, the sources themselves derive from socially varied backgrounds. Though much of the study naturally concentrates on the Latin texts of learned m e n such as Albertus Magnus and the medical professor Bernard of Gordon, Hildegard of Bingen is also treated at length, and even the 'women of Salerno'. It is not surprising to learn that in the medieval world, as elsewhere, women were thought of as reproductively, physically, and intellectually weaker, more prone to disease and more susceptible to pleasure than men. But Cadden's is a fascinating study of how the sciences and proto sciences of the Middle Ages provided the mechanics of such ideas. Catherine Kovesi Killerby College of Arts and Sciences University of Notre Dame, Australia ...

A Preface to American Political Theory.

American political theory needs to be rescued from the undeserved status of a subordinate subfield of political theory, contends Donald Lutz. And so in A Preface to American Political Theory he sets out to emancipate American political theorists from empiricism and inappropriate European theories and methodologies. He argues for clarification of the core of American political theory and its attendant methodologies to distinguish it from other intellectual enterprises. The way to achieve that, according to Lutz, is to establish a foundation for the systematic study of American behaviour, institutions and ideas; to provide a general introduction to the study of American political theory; and to illustrate how textual analysis, history, empirical research and analytic philosophy are all part of the scheme. Designed for students and scholars in many disciplines, including political science, history and legal studies, this book is not intended to address central continuing issues. Rather, it aims to provide an effective entree into the study of American political theory. The book sets out to arm readers with the intellectual tools to engage in systematic study and to make them aware of the pitfalls they will inevitably encounter.

Stephen Jay Gould on intelligence

In the Mismeasure of Man (1981) Stephen Jay Gould provides a typically readable history of one of our most vexatious intellectual enterprises: the scientific study of intelligence. Gould is successful, as always, in rendering the relevant scientific debates accessible to general readers. What Gould does less well is to carry through his attack on prior attempts to understand natural intelligence scientifically: attempting to muster all possible arguments against such science, he conjures up a variety of impossible arguments as well. One such argument urges that Gould's predecessors are not to be taken seriously because they are racists and have let their racism influence their scientific practice. Gould has no difficulty in demonstrating the influence of racism; where he goes astray is in his dismissal of such prior work as simply unscientific because the racist conclusions preceded the collection of data. Advancing hypotheses prior to experimentation is how all of science proceeds, and is no mark of inferior work. And no science is immune to influences — racist or otherwise — from the culture in which it is embedded, as Gould elsewhere readily acknowledges. Another failed argument claims that all of the factor analysts studying intelligence have committed the intellectual sin of reifying the factors uncovered in IQ tests — concluding that the factors are real solely on the basis of how a factor analysis summarizes IQ data. Gould concludes that factor analysis is worthless for the study of intelligence. However: (1) contrary to what Gould suggests, the factor analysts themselves warned against concluding that the factors “discovered” are physiologically real merely on the basis of a factor analysis; and (2) factor analysis nevertheless remains a strong candidate technique for developing causal models worth investigating subsequently by other means.

Political Philosophy and World History: The Examples of Hegel and Kant

The object of this paper is threefold. First, the purpose is to look closely at the connection between the intellectual enterprises of political philosophy and the philosophy of history. Secondly, the purpose is to outline and criticize the connection as seen by Kant and Hegel. Thirdly, the purpose is to draw some preliminary conclusions about the advantages and disadvantages of underpinning a political philosophy with a view of history. In drawing these conclusions I should like to explore my belief that although it may be possible to undertake the philosophy of history with little direct regard for political philosophy contrariwise it would be mistaken, if not foolish, to present a political philosophy without taking into account problems raised by the philosophy of history.

Dialectics of Coherence: Toward An Integrative Theory

In Philosophy in a New Key Susanne Langer writes of the great generative ideas that periodically arise to transform our intellectual enterprises by changing the very terms in which we frame our questions and conceive our purposes. When one of these concepts bursts into consciousness, we cannot at first view it critically, because it is the nature of a key change to possess us with its compelling new vision of the world. For some time afterwards we are absorbed in exploiting the energizing, fertilizing power of the new idea, which seems limitless in its implications and applications. Only later, as a paradigm matures, can we begin to refine and correct its key concept and to achieve the critical distance necessary to recognize its bounds. We are approaching this moment in composition, which has taken process as its generative theme for over a decade. By keying composition studies to writers' thought processes and the relations between cognition and language, this theme has restored to the field what was lost with the decline of rhetoric: a genuinely rich, humanly significant, and inexhaustible object of inquiry. In the next stage of our development as a discipline, we need to take up a more critical attitude toward process theory, to probe its limits and to articulate and address some of the conceptual problems it leaves unresolved. I would like to make a contribution to that work in this essay. My starting point is the difficulty of handling textual issues-for example, matters of style or discourse form-within the process framework. That framework has no principled way to account for the role of texts in discourse events because it was constituted initially by a contrastive opposition between composing (dynamic process) and texts (inert product). Texts were therefore rejected as proper objects of inquiry in composition. I suggest we might resolve this problem and work toward a more comprehensive theory of discourse by developing concepts on the principle of integrating text and process at all levels of analysis.

Historical Note: On Validity Measurement of Hannibal’s Crossing the ALPS

All human intellectual enterprises that have empirical content face the problem of validity of their constructs. Many argue that history cannot evaluate validity since the pristine events have vanished. Hannibal’s crossing the Alps is one such historical event cast in doubt by ambiguous descriptions of past and present scientific historians. However, this brief note presents three historians’ verification of Hannibal’s crossing in terms of the forms of validity conventional in psychology.

Stages in the Empirical Programme of Relativism

Modern philosophy of science has allowed an extra dimensiontime into descriptions of the nature of scientific knowledge. Theories are now seen as linked to each other, and tQ observations, not by fixed bonds of logic and correspondence, but by a network, each link of which takes time to be established as consensus emerges and each link of which is potentially revisable given time.' Many contributors to this new model intend only to make philosophy of science compatible with history while maintaining an epistemological demarcation between science and other intellectual enterprises. One school, however, inspired in particular by Wittgenstein and more lately by the phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists, embraces an explicit relativism in which the natural world has a small or non-existent role in the construction of scientific knowledge.2 Relativist or not, the new philosophy leaves room for historical and sociological analysis of the processes which lead to the acceptance, or otherwise, of new scientific knowledge. One set of such analyses is gathered in this issue of Social Studies of Science. The studies reported here emerge out of the relativist approach, the approach which has given rise to some of the most vigorous social analyses. Studies of modern science in this genre have been reported since at least 1975 but the reports have been either un-

Problems of Literary History

In most situations and in relation to many intellectual enterprises whether or not we go in for philosophical reflection is a matter of taste and inclination. We may employ such concepts as those of, say, choice or (as in: He chose foolishly, or The Russian language is difficult) without asking such questions as: What is choice? Do men really choose? Do cries of brutes count as language? And so on. Plainly, much can be said about historical treatment of literature much is indeed said, and said well, by Hallett Smith and Buckley without raising any questions of philosophical analysis. But what M. Poulet has to say is expressed in a certain philosophical idiom and from within a certain philosophical tradition; and essays by Robertson and Weimann quite explicitly put certain philosophical positions. Whether or not they need to do so in order to encompass problems that interest them is, I think, very doubtful. For example, there is question how we are to understand cultural structures. Certainly this is a question for literary historian who wishes to say something about some monument of past, Iliad or Pope's On Countess of Burlington Cutting Paper. It seems to me most implausible to maintain that the key to any [my italics] helpful understanding of earlier