Institutional Veto Points Research Articles

Partisan Governance and Minority Party Vetoes: Evidence from State Legislatures

It is often argued that bipartisan lawmaking depends on minority legislative parties controlling institutional veto points through divided government and/or supermajority pivots. Using a new dataset of state legislative rollcall votes on tax increases—an issue where states vary in whether they require majority or supermajority votes—I assess (1) whether minority control of veto points is necessary for bipartisan policymaking and (2) whether there are greater levels of partisan governance when the majority controls all veto points. I find that partisan governance is more likely when the majority controls all vetoes. However, bipartisan policymaking is still the most common outcome even when institutional conditions are seemingly ideal for partisan governance. Interviews with state policymakers uncover various noninstitutional reasons for bipartisanship regardless of veto control. My findings suggest that while institutional rules can compel bipartisanship, they are just one of many reasons why the minority party participates in lawmaking.

Intergovernmental veto points in crisis management: Italy and Spain facing the COVID-19 pandemic

Italy and Spain were the first countries affected by the shift of the pandemic epicentre from east to west. The rapid spread of the virus in allegedly similar social settings, the relatively high numbers of cases and casualties, and the adoption of drastic containment measures were similar in the two countries during the first wave of the pandemic. Both countries are enmeshed in an unstable political equilibrium at the centre, governed by recently established national political coalitions that have continuously been called into question and exposed to significant public debt. The two countries differ in the role of the executive vis-a-vis the legislative, and the tensions between central coordination and regional centrifugal forces. To improve the understanding of how the pandemic has influenced decision-making and crisis management, this article explains the relevance of institutional veto points, as well as differences between the two countries. There is room to match coordination, policy capacity and shared accountability through more collaborative governance.Points for practitionersGoverning a transboundary crisis that involves different governmental levels is about creating an effective coordination mechanism that clarifies responsibilities, avoiding those who may block decision-making processes (veto players) through being incentivized to do so due to the absence of adequate shared accountability systems. National and regional managers should realize that the separation of territorial powers not accompanied by political coordination jeopardizes policy capacity in both the short and long term.

Drivers of Carbon Price Adoption in Wealthy Democracies: International or Domestic Forces?

Is carbon price adoption in wealthy democracies driven more by international or domestic forces? Event history analyses reveal that carbon price adoption is more likely in countries with less fossil fuel energy use (and, by proxy, less powerful fossil fuel business-elite actors) and with less encumbered democratic institutions (i.e., fewer institutional veto points). These findings are triangulated through cross-sectional comparisons and case studies. In short, wealthy democracies enact carbon prices according to the degree to which domestic actors or costs constrain or enable enactment and implementation. The author argues that the global free-rider problem, posed by nonbinding international climate agreements and lack of enforcement, and fossil fuel business-elite power undermine the force of international values and norms. World society scholarship should attend more to (1) whether international participation incurs substantial local costs or powerful stakeholder opposition and (2) whether the benefits of such participation are more domestically or globally distributed.

Populism in Power and Democracy: Democratic Decay and Resilience in the Czech Republic (2013–2020)

Populism and technocracy reject vertical accountability and horizontal accountability. Populism and technocracy can combine to form ‘technocratic populism.’ The study assesses the extent to which democratic decay can be traced to the actions of technocratic populists as opposed to institutional factors, civil society, fragmentation and polarization. The main findings of this article are that technocratic populism has illiberal tendencies expressed best in its efforts at executive aggrandizement (cf. Bermeo, 2016). Without an effective bulwark against democratic erosion (cf. Bernhard, 2015), technocratic populism tends to undermine electoral competition (vertical accountability), judiciary independence, legislative oversight (horizontal accountability), and freedom of the press (diagonal accountability). The most effective checks on technocratic populist in power, this study finds, are the courts, free media, and civil society. This article highlights the mechanisms of democratic decay and democratic resilience beyond electoral politics. It indicates that a combination of institutional veto points and civil society agency is necessary to prevent democratic erosion (cf. Weyland, 2020). While active civil society can prevent democratic erosion, it cannot reverse it. Ultimately, the future of liberal democracy depends on the people’s willingness to defend it in the streets AND at the ballot box.

The Politics of Manufactured Crisis

It is a widely used assumption in the literature on political decision-making that leaders ‘choose their battles’ according to their interests. This strategic approach often results in seemingly ‘fake crises’; crises which are – as opposed to natural disasters – not exogenous in nature. These crises are exceptional in that they are avoidable and are the product of political entrepreneurs following deliberate agendas. In this paper, the logic of crisis manufacturing is illustrated by a case study of the ‘fiscal wars’ of 2011–2013. The case study shows how, given the right institutional environment, political entrepreneurs, even those outside the political mainstream, can use crisis manufacturing to their advantage. In order to exploit the institutional veto points related to fiscal policy in the U.S. constitutional system, various actors associated with the Republican Party and the Tea Party movement used a networked, coalition-based approach to reach these goals. Although their quest to instill a regime of fiscal conservatism was eventually unsuccessful, they did manage to raise their national profile and set the policy agenda for an extended period.

Health Reform in the Trump Era: Will Politics Unmake Policy?

Abstract Donald J. Trump’s unexpected victory in the 2016 presidential election cast a long shadow over the American welfare state. With continued Republican control of the House and Senate, Trump’s occupancy of the Oval Office removed a critical constraint on Republican efforts to dismantle key Democratic social policy achievements—both old and new. Despite the absence of these important institutional veto-points, the policies that were first identified and targeted by Republicans during the Trump era have proved to be more robust than many observers and policymakers initially believed. By applying the theoretical insights and methodological tools of American Political Development, this article explores how long-running policy processes have altered the political landscape in often underappreciated ways to narrow the prospects for large-scale policy reform. More specifically, this article examines the political dynamics of Medicare and the Affordable Care Act in the early days of the Trump administration. The pressures exerted on both programs by an unpredictable president and unified Republican control of Congress provides a unique opportunity to differentiate between and assess the prospects for policy sustainability and policy stability.

Political and institutional determinants of immigration policies

ABSTRACTThis paper investigates how the interplay of parties' preferences, political institutions and electoral competition affects the liberalisation of immigration policies. It joins a growing body of research that focuses on the role of domestic factors in shaping immigration policies. While several studies point to the important role of partisanship and the activation of public opinion, they fail to provide a clear mechanism that takes into account differences in parties' preferences as well as the institutional context they act in. By adding two crucial factors to the analysis, this paper presents a new framework for liberal change in the field of immigration politics. First, institutional veto points determine if left-of-centre parties can reform policies according to their preferences. Second, the degree of electoral competition and the politicisation of immigration issues affect how susceptible political parties are to the anti-immigrant sentiment in the population. A time-series cross-section analysis of 11 countries from 1980 to 2006 shows that left-of-centre governments are more likely to pass liberal reforms, but only if they are not facing an open veto point. Moreover, increased levels of electoral competition coupled with a politicisation of the immigration issue reduces the likelihood of liberal reforms.

German Exceptionalism? An Empirical Analysis of 20 Years of Law and Order Legislation

German law and order policies have been described as exceptional compared to other Western industrialized countries in that they seem to have been immune to a general trend toward increased toughness. However, recent studies have cast some doubt on this finding. The present article addresses this divergence and contributes to the literature in two respects. First, drawing on a new dataset on German federal legislation on law and order (1994‐2013), we show that a slight trend toward tougher legislation is visible although talking about a “punitive turn” would be largely exaggerated. Second, we find that the explanation of this pattern is to be found in the peculiarities of the German political system which seems to have constrained any attempts to implement tougher policies: strong institutional veto points have hindered far‐reaching proposals from being adopted and have pushed German law and order policies toward a middle way.Related Articles Butz, Adam, Michael P. Fix, and Joshua L. Mitchell. 2015. “.” Politics & Policy 43 (): 347‐377. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12116/abstract David, Charles‐Philippe. 2015. “.” Politics & Policy 43 (): 163‐195. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12106/abstract Jenkins‐Smith, Hank C., and Kerry G. Herron 2009. “.” Politics & Policy 37 (): 1095‐1129. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2009.00215.x/abstract Related MediaFilm clip on preventive detention in Germany by the “Deutsche Welle.” http://www.dw.com/popups/mediaplayer/contentId_15046630_mediaId_6519215Video report on preventive detention in Germany on dailymotion. http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2vbli7Editorial on the crime drop in the Western world. http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21582004-crime-plunging-rich-world-keep-it-down-governments-should-focus-prevention-notReport on the crime drop in the rich world. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21582041-rich-world-seeing-less-and-less-crime-even-face-high-unemployment-and-economic

Taxing choices: international competition, domestic institutions and the transformation of corporate tax policy

ABSTRACTSince the 1980s, notable corporate tax base broadening and rate reductions have occurred throughout the rich democracies. Scholars agree that tax competition for mobile assets shapes this transformation. I address two questions in this article. First, what form has tax competition taken and, second, how have domestic institutions conditioned competition's impact? I build on past work and argue that tax competition is characterized by the (Stackelberg) leadership of the United States as opposed to alternative forms of competition. At the same time, domestic institutions, especially the degree to which the nation is a co-ordinated versus liberal market economy, are central determinants of the pace of reform. I test these propositions with models of 1982–2008 tax rate change in 18 capitalist democracies. I find that rising trade openness and capital mobility place downward pressures on tax rates, the United States' adoption of the neoliberal tax model engenders significant competitive responses from other nations, and that the institutions of co-ordinated economies slow the pace of neoliberal reforms. High public debt, left-leaning median voters and institutional veto points also significantly constrain tax policy change. I conclude with some reflections on tax policy in the wake of the global financial crisis and on neoliberalism and institutional change in advanced democratic capitalism.

Political Strategies for Health Reform in Turkey: Extending Veto Point Theory

—This qualitative case study uses primary interview data to investigate the political processes of how Turkey established a unified and universal health coverage system. The goal of providing health coverage to all citizens through a unified system has been adopted by many low- and middle-income countries, but few have achieved it; Turkey is a notable exception. We use institutional veto point theory to identify four institutional obstacles to a unified and universal coverage system in Turkey between 2003 and 2008: (1) the Ministry of Finance and Treasury, (2) the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, (3) the Office of the President, and (4) the Constitutional Court. Our analysis shows how Minister of Health Recep Akdağ and his team of advisors used political strategies to address and overcome opposition at each veto point. Where possible they avoided institutional veto points by using ministerial authority to adopt policies. When adoption required approval of others with veto power, they delayed putting forward legislation while working to facilitate institutional change to remove opposition; persuaded or made strategic compromises to gain support; or overpowered opposition by calling on the prime minister to intervene. Our findings propose an extension to institutional veto point theory by showing how the exercise of political strategies can overcome opposition at institutional veto points to facilitate policy adoption.

Oppose, Support, or Hedge? Distributional Effects, Regulatory Pressure, and Business Strategy in Environmental Politics

What explains the choice of corporate political strategy in environmental politics? Drawing on recent models of actor strategy formation in political economy, this article argues that basic material interests of firms are translated into strategies in the context of institutional environments. I advance a typological model that posits how distributional effects—positive versus negative—and perceived regulatory pressure—low versus high—interact in leading firms to adopt one of four ideal-type strategies: opposition, hedging, support, and non-participation. This article examines the model through the case of corporate strategies in the making of the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme. The article contributes to theory-building on business strategy in environmental politics by offering a probabilistic explanatory model, and it flags hedging strategies as an increasingly prevalent form of business behavior.

The Battle Over Oil Sands Access to Tidewater: A Political Risk Analysis of Pipeline Alternatives

Market access for Canada’s oil sands has been increasingly contested as proposals for new pipelines have become so controversial. This article develops a framework for political risk analysis and applies it to five pipeline proposals. The political risk to major infrastructure projects is a function of the number of institutional veto points; whether opposition groups have access to veto points; whether the project can take advantage of existing infrastructure; the salience of concentrated environmental risks; and the jurisdictional separation of risks and benefits. Each of the projects faces formidable political risks, but the risks vary in type and magnitude by project.

Eppur non si muove? Prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy after the 2009 European and 2010 regional elections

The results of the 2008 Italian general election aroused expectations for the undertaking of a much awaited reform of the political system. This article discusses the prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy after the 2009 and 2010 ‘mid-term’ elections in order to provide informed speculation of the foreseeable outcomes. It analyses the interplay between the preferences of parties and the change of power relations amongst and within them in the context of the extant institutional veto points. The article concludes that: (1) a consensual ‘grand reform’ negotiated between government and opposition is the least likely outcome; (2) a partisan reform carried out by the governmental forces is also unlikely because of deep divisions within the governmental majority; (3) the most likely outcome is no, or very limited, reform. From a normative (liberal-democratic) perspective, given the populist constitutional preferences of the most prominent political actor (Silvio Berlusconi), it also concludes that ‘no reform’ is not the worst outcome.

Competition, contest, and cooperation: The analytic framework of the issue market

Although party competition is widely regarded as an important part of a working democracy, it is rarely analysed in political science literature. This article discusses the basic properties of party competition, especially the patterns of interaction in contemporary party systems. Competition as a phenomenon at the macro level has to be carefully distinguished from contest and cooperation as the forms of interaction at the micro level. The article gives special attention to the creation of issue innovations. Contrary to existing approaches, I argue that not only responsiveness but also innovation are necessary to guarantee a workable democratic competition. Competition takes place on an issue market, where parties can discover voters’ demands. Combined with the concept of institutional veto points, the article presents hypotheses on how institutions shape the possibility for programmatic innovations.

Job security regulations in Western democracies: A fuzzy set analysis

This article uses fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to examine the determinants of job security regulations – here understood as restrictions on hiring and firing – in Western democracies. Unlike previous studies, the analysis reveals three different paths to high levels of job security regulations. The first path covers the Southern European state capitalist countries. In these countries, conflicts between forces pushing for liberal democracy and groups alienated from modernisation have led to high levels of statism and crowded out other societal actors. Job security regulations were enacted relatively early in order to provide social security by means available to the state. Due to fragmented welfare states, job security regulations have remained one of the most important pillars of the social protection regime. The second path covers the Continental European managed capitalist countries and is also characterised by high levels of statism. In these countries, repressive governments employed a stick-and-carrot strategy to weaken the labour movement and tie the loyalties of the individual to the state. After the Second World War, these countries developed corporatist intermediation systems and encompassing and generous welfare states. Finally, the third path covers the Nordic managed capitalist countries. This path is characterised by a high degree of non-market coordination, strong labour movements and few institutional veto points. In the Nordic managed capitalist countries, job security regulations traditionally have been subject to collective agreements. However, in the 1960s, labour movements succeeded in pushing through the public legislation of job security despite opposition from employers' associations. Methodologically, this article demonstrates that cross-national differences in the level of job security regulations can only be explained if the methods used allow for complex causality. In contrast, methods which focus on ‘net effects’ do not offer satisfactory explanations for the cross-national differences in the level of job security regulations.

Outside-In: The Effects of External Threat on State Centralization

Although centralization is thought to be a common response to external threats to the state, few theories develop the mechanisms by which domestic centralization occurs. Fewer still consistently demonstrate that centralization is indeed a common response to external threats in all states. This article therefore develops a comprehensive theory of domestic change in the shadow of external threat. Salient threats to the state create strong incentives for opposition forces to support the leader in power, even in non-democracies. The leadership then uses these favorable domestic political climates to decrease the number of institutional veto points that can stop future leader-driven policy changes. Collectively, this two-part theory provides a unified model of domestic behavioral change (also known as rally effects) and institutional centralization (defined by a declining number of veto players). In addition, by defining salient threats as challenges to homeland territory, the article provides some of the first domestic-level evidence that territorial disputes are fundamentally different from other types of international conflicts.

Party Goals, Institutional Veto Points and the Discourse on Political Corruption: The Evolution of the German Party Funding Regime

This article aims to integrate existing theories on parties and political systems with the literature on party funding. On an empirical level, it asks why the German system of party funding developed in the way that it did. Germany combines a system of high transparency levels for political parties with generous state funding. Taking actor‐centred institutionalism as a starting point, three variables are identified which explain the evolution of party funding regimes: the number of veto points available to opposition parties, parties’ dominant goals during decisions on reforms of funding regulation, and the public discourse on political corruption. Reforms of party funding regimes are assumed to become more probable (1) the more institutional veto points even opposition parties have at their disposal, (2) the lesser the influence of vote‐seeking strategies among parties, and (3) the more intense the societal discourse on political corruption. These hypotheses find support from the German case and may therefore be able to explain the convergence of western European party funding regimes around state subventions and transparency obligations.

アメリカ対外政策の継続と民主制度

The United States responded to the end of the Cold War by promoting trade with regimes that adopted market-oriented reforms but investing in weapons development to maintain superiority over non-democratizing military powers. This policy was sustained in Congress in spite of majority Party changes, divided government, and economic swings. This article constructs a framework that incorporates Presidential agenda setting, partisan debates over control of the agenda, and ideological overlap between the parties to identify the lawmakers behind this policy. This framework builds on Tsebelis’ veto player theory, which includes both institutional veto points and partisan veto players, and predicts voting patterns that differ from Krehbiel's pivotal politics model (focusing exclusively on institutional veto points), Cox and McCubbins’ partisan agenda model (examining only partisan veto players), or the two presidency thesis (emphasizing Presidential agenda setting). The framework is then applied to understand Congressional foreign policy voting patterns. An analysis of Congressional bills and resolutions on China trade, defense spending, and missile defense spending shows voting patterns that are in line with the predictions from this framework, rather than existing models and suggests that stable support for the above policy comes from a bipartisan, pro-business, and President-supportive group of lawmakers.

Who said politicians cannot be conservative? Comparing reform capacity in the Czech and Hungarian telecom administrations

Hungary outpaced the Czech Republic in reforms of the telecom sector during the first decade of transition. In the Czech Republic, prices remained low, competition limited and the state maintained ownership of the incumbent operator. Hungary, in contrast, experienced extensive privatization, liberalization of prices and some deregulation. This outcome challenges the assumption that institutional veto points (frameworks that constrain or enable political agents) manipulated by conservative bureaucrats hindered the initiatives of reform minded politicians in Hungary, while allowing reforms to occur in the also reforming Czech Republic. It is shown that the Czech telecom administration had only a few possibilities to block policy decisions through veto points. The slow reform process was rather a result of a conscious political strategy of maintaining control and accommodating a conservative constituency in context of a relatively sound economic environment. In Hungary, bureaucrats acting as agents of change pushed though the reforms despite opposition from politicians. This insight challenges the traditional picture of civil servants in post-communist systems as inherently conservative and anti-reform.

Veto Points, Veto Players, and International Trade Policy

Much of the literature on foreign economic policy focuses on the preferences of societal groups to explain policy decisions. Here, however, the author emphasizes the effects of domestic political institutions that intervene between policy demands and policy decisions. The comparative politics literature on social welfare policy argues that states with more veto points and/or veto players are less able to alter preexisting policies. The author applies this argument to trade policy and tests whether veto points and players affect the ability of states to change tariffs and nontariff barriers in response to changing economic conditions. The sample is a cross-national time-series collection of 23 countries. The results offer support for the argument. Large numbers of institutional veto points are associated with smaller percentage changes in both tariffs and nontariff barriers. These relationships hold even after controlling for the effects of international institutions and for domestic pressures to change tariff and nontariff-barrier levels.