Electoral Institutions Research Articles

Bloc Voting for Electoral Accountability

How do citizens hold local politicians accountable? I argue that citizens, especially through neighborhood associations, can use bloc voting as a bottom-up, grassroots strategy to pressure politicians for public services. Politicians monitor polling station voting, and communities switch allegiance if politicians do not deliver. I measure the perceived and actual relationships between community characteristics, bloc voting, and water access—an essential resource prone to political manipulation. I analyze an original household survey and conjoint experiment merged with electoral data in rural Brazil, and qualitative interviews illustrate theoretical mechanisms. Bloc voting is more likely in communities with high trust and participation, and bloc voting improves water access for association members. However, this strategy is only worthwhile for communities that can demonstrate their vote at their polling station. In contrast to top-down explanations of bloc voting, I highlight the interaction of collective action and electoral institutions for accountability and public service provision.

How ballot access laws increase primary competition and decrease party unity

How do electoral institutions affect primary competition and legislative behavior? This paper examines the understudied electoral rule known as ballot access laws, advancing the novel theory that denying ballot access to minor candidates forces these outsiders into major parties. I find that in American states that adopt high ballot access thresholds experience higher rates of ideological heterogeneity and primary competition, and those that reduce their thresholds experience a reduction in heterogeneity and competition. Using an original dataset on state-level changes to ballot access thresholds from 1990 to 2018, I find that an increase in the number and type of primary competition leads to an increase in heterogeneity within both party caucuses. This paper adds to the literature on legislative behavior and electoral institutions, demonstrating institutions role in shaping electoral competition and the ideology of those represented in office.

Candidate Debates and Partisan Divisions Evidence From Malawi’s 2019 Presidential Elections

Candidate debates are increasingly organized during elections in democracies and electoral autocracies. How do debates impact partisan divisions and preferences in these contexts? One theoretical perspective suggests that debates should amplify these preferences and divisions, while another implies debates should attenuate them. This paper evaluates these expectations by studying presidential debates organized during Malawi’s May 2019 elections. With an experiment and national panel survey, the paper provides evidence consistent with attenuation: debate watchers were substantially more likely to vote across partisan lines (cross-party voting), became more favorable toward out-partisan candidates, and became less favorable toward co-partisans. Suggestive evidence on causal mechanisms shows that these effects were driven by policy persuasion and debates’ impact on perceptions of the candidates’ policies and qualities. Results advance debates about information processing, campaign effects, and voting behavior in new democracies and electoral autocracies, and have implications for electoral institutions’ impact on partisan divisions.

Trading votes: what drives MEP support for trade liberalisation?

ABSTRACT Which factors drive support of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) for trade liberalisation? The literature suggests that economic factors, ideology, and politicization shape MEP voting behaviour. Drawing on a new dataset encompassing all trade-related MEP votes (2009-2019), this study offers a quantitative assessment of the determinants of MEP support for trade liberalisation. It finds that ideological factors have the strongest and most persistent effect on MEP support for trade liberalisation. The economic competitiveness of MEPs’ home regions, in turn, has only a limited effect. Politicization, lastly, has an unclear effect on its own and mostly influences MEP voting behaviour through interactions with ideological and economic factors. The study offers the first comprehensive assessment of the determinants of MEP voting on trade liberalisation and contributes to political economy research on electoral institutions and trade, the European Parliament’s role in trade policy and the effects of politicization on policy-making.

Political Administration VS Political Competition Under Neo-Authoritarian Rule

The article discusses the replacement of political competition with political administration in order to maintain the power of the ruling political actors and ensure the tenure of the ruling regime under neo-authoritarian rule in a number of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The administration of all key arenas of the political sphere is implemented through special political technologies and informal practices of political corruption. A pseudo-multiparty system with a dominating ruling party is being constructed in the party-political arena. In the media arena, the most influential mass media are being “nationalized”. In the arena of personnel, through political nepotism, adherents of the ruling regime are placed in key political and administrative positions of public power. In the electoral arena, the institution of elections is transformed into a procedure for the formation of public authorities by manipulating the voting procedures. In the legislative arena, the ruling party provides political administration of legislative and parliamentary activities in general. In the judicial arena, through the administrative regulation of the judiciary personnel, the judicial system is integrated into a single system of neo-authoritarian rule aimed at providing judicial protection for the ruling regime from the discontent of the citizens and using courts for political purposes. To demonstrate the appearance of democratic legitimacy, all neo-authoritarian regimes imitate the work of the basic institutions of democracy.

EVOLUTION OF THE INSTITUTE OF ELECTIONS IN THE STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE MODERN RUSSIAN STATE

The scientific article studies the evolution of the institution of elections in the structure of the organization and functioning of the modern Russian state. The authors analyze elections as an integral part of the political system of modern Russia. The issues of organizing and holding elections in Russia are considered, problems associated with a decrease in the interest and activity of citizens in the conduct of elections are fixed, which negatively affects the political agenda of the state. The article focuses on the latest changes in the legislation regarding elections in Russia, and also analyzes the consequences of the introduction of new rules for the organization and functioning of the modern Russian state. The authors conclude that the institution of elections in Russia continues to evolve, and this evolution is connected with the problems existing in society. Despite the problems that arise during the elections, this institution is a system-forming element of the modern Russian state. Elections play a key role in social processes due to the fact that they are the main political channel of communication between state power and society.

Prehistory of electoral sociology in pre-revolutionary Russia: an experience of interdisciplinary analysis

The article discusses the process of the emergence of socio-electoral research in pre-revolutionary Russia at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. Using an interdisciplinary approach, the authors make an attempt to link the emergence of scientific interest in understanding the phenomenon of electoral behaviour with the study of the institution of elections in related scientific disciplines – jurisprudence and political science. It is concluded that the practice of this kind of research led representatives of these sciences to formulate the problem of electoral choice, that was rather difficult to solve within the framework of traditional methodological directions. The appeal to sociological approaches of the theoretical and empirical levels made it possible to advance in the study of electoral issues and led researchers to the idea of separating its part into the area of special scientific research. The main stages of the formation of socio-electoral research are analysed: from the first attempts to study electoral behaviour in order to solve legal and political problems in the aspect of understanding the institution of elections to the emergence of the idea of creating a special sociological discipline, within which the phenomenon of electoral choice should be considered. The heuristic guesses of scientists of pre-revolutionary Russia are highlighted, that anticipated a number of research areas in the electoral sociology of the twentieth century. The methods of empirical electoral research, that were first tested in the practice of scientific and sociological work, are analysed. It is noted that neither the level of development of the institution of elections, nor the level of scientific methodology and methods of sociological research in pre-revolutionary Russia contributed to the formation of a special scientific discipline - electoral sociology, and subsequent political events in the country blocked this process for a long historical time.

Electoral Systems and Geographic Representation

AbstractWho gets represented in legislatures, and how does this depend on electoral institutions? Others have asked this question from the perspective of gender, race, and class. We focus on space, asking whether MPs disproportionately come from some places rather than others and how this depends on electoral rules. Using data on over 13,000 legislators in sixty-two democracies, we developed a new measure to determine whether the spatial distribution of MP birthplaces matched the spatial distribution of the citizens they represented. Contrary to received wisdom, single-member district systems do not have more geographically representative parliaments than multi-member district systems, while mixed-member systems perform significantly better than both. We attribute the higher spatial representativeness of mixed-member systems to the contamination effects in their single-member tier. We present evidence for this explanation from a within-country analysis of elections in Italy, the UK, and Germany.

Gender differences in politician persistence and incumbency advantage

I analyze the difference in the persistence of men and women after an electoral loss and in their incumbency advantage, using data from the Canadian Municipal Elections Database. I find strong deterrence and incumbency effects among both men and women, but no evidence of a significant gender heterogeneity. Men are 14.9 to 16.6 percentage points less likely to re-enter politics after an electoral loss, while women are 11.8 to 14.3 percentage points less likely to do so. Moreover, incumbent male candidates are 5.8 percentage points more likely to win the next election, while female candidates are 5.6 percentage points more likely to win again. The findings have important implications for program and policy development at the municipal and provincial levels, and assist in the understanding of the roles played by political and electoral institutions in shaping elections’ outcomes.

Partisipasi Lembaga Pemantau Dalam Pemilu Tahun 2019 Di Provinsi Sulawesi Utara

This research aims to find out how the participation of election monitoring institutions by looking at issues in monitoring. The research was conducted from March to October 2022. This research is located in North Sulawesi Province, to see the extent of the problems that exist in the monitoring process of general election institutions in 2019. The research took a qualitative descriptive method in order to provide a detailed description of the phenomenon, especially the participation of election monitors in the 2019 elections in North Sulawesi Province. This research focuses on how the participation of election monitors in the 2019 elections in North Sulawesi Province by looking at issues in monitoring. Data collection was carried out through observation, interviews, and documentation. The research used qualitative research data analysis techniques that are commonly used. The results showed that based on the aspects of Money Politics, Campaign, Quiet Period, Voting Day, Recapitulation Process, Election Accessibility Arrangements, and Voters List that they were able to carry out their duties as they should and still needed to maintain coordination in order to create a good form of communication.

Trwałość przestrzennego zróżnicowania zachowań wyborczych w krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej = Durability of the spatial differentiation characterising voting behaviour in Central and Eastern European countries

The main objective of the work described here was to identify core phenomena and processes relating to post-1989 voting behavior in selected CEECs (Poland, Romania and Lithuania). Political and economic changes commencing some 30 years ago triggered the process of transformation of post-communist countries from an economy that was centrally planned and steered, towards one based around the market that was liberal and open to global processes. This transformation was accompanied by dynamic political and social phenomena, as culminating in the accessions of the majority of CEECs to NATO and the European Union. One of the very important consequences of the collapse of the communist system was the introduction of the democratic institution of free elections. Despite decades of unification under communism, differences in terms of political sympathies were still revealed, including with a spatial dimension. One such involved distinct differentiation in voting behavior between cities and rural areas. However, the latter areas were also characterized by visible internal differentiation. Variability occurred not only in space, but also temporally. While the change of influence of individual parties or political options from one election to another is a normal phenomenon, there are more durable changes of a generational character. The researched period proves readily dividable into two intervals, even as all the CEECs considered here are characterised by similar, if regionally differentiated, trends. Thus, in all states the post-1989 period can be divided up into a first (post-communist) part characterized by the dispute between the centre-right, mostly originating from the anti-communist opposition (dissident movements), and the groupings arising out of communist formations. The latter would come to power mainly via support from the inhabitants of rural areas. The second period is undoubtedly linked with the change of generations. People who matured under communism came to be replaced by those who grew up during perestroika and democracy.

Exit or Voice? Corruption Perceptions and Emigration

Existing research suggests that people concerned about corruption use elections to punish corrupt incumbents. I argue that when people grow concerned with corruption, they may turn to exit rather than voice, using emigration to escape corruption. Highly educated citizens in particular, who are most informed about corruption and hold valuable human capital, likely see exit as attractive in the face of persistent corruption. Using a wealth of micro-level data on potential emigration, I show that when people perceive widespread corruption, they are more likely to have taken concrete steps to emigrate. Advanced degree holders are much more likely to have prepared to emigrate in response to corruption. I also show that corruption-concerned potential emigrants choose less corrupt destination countries and are less likely to have faith, and participate, in electoral institutions. My argument and findings hold implications for the corruption literature and generate new questions about the relationship between emigration and accountability.

Environmental stress, majoritarianism, and social unrest in Europe

ABSTRACT As climate change continues to affect countries worldwide, scholars have begun considering the impact of environmental stress for political instability in industrialized countries. This paper analyzes the risk of social unrest in various European political systems in relation to the interaction of environmental stress and electoral institutions. We use a spatially and temporally disaggregated dataset to examine the possible relationships between environmental stress and social unrest in all European Union member countries from 2000 to 2020. We find that there are stark differences between the observed interaction of majoritarian electoral features and environmentally induced unrest in those European states with a history of Communist rule or climate vulnerability versus the rest of Europe. Overall, these results suggest that electoral systems play an important but heterogenous role in the understanding of climate change and political unrest.

Local Electoral Institutions and the Dynamic Motivations of Ethnic Party Candidate Nominations in South Africa

How do parties historically dominated by one group diversify their representatives? I argue that ethnic parties adjust their strategies according to the institutional rules in place and the demographics of relevant constituencies. I study South Africa, which has a Mixed-Member Proportional electoral system, where parties nominate Single Member District and Proportional Representation candidates. Using original data on the racial, ethnic, and career background of over 10,000 local candidates nominated by the historically white Democratic Alliance party, I find that the party engages in vote-based inclusion by nominating black candidates to predominantly black districts. And while the DA symbolically includes non-whites on its PR lists, white candidates dominate electable list positions. These findings provide a demonstration at the micro-level of why ethnic parties struggle to meaningfully diversify.

Electoral Incentives and Geographical Representation: Evidence from an Italian Electoral Reform

Candidate‐centered electoral systems create incentives for MPs to cultivate a personal vote among their constituents, which in turn should strengthen geographical representation. However, existing research has missed the theoretical distinction between the selection and incentives effects of electoral systems. Electoral rules influence who successfully runs for office (selection) and MPs' behavior once they have been elected (incentives). Focusing on the 2005 Italian electoral reform from a mixed to a proportional system, this article assesses the effects of the electoral system change on reelected MPs' attention to local issues in parliamentary questions and bills. The dual source of variation in electoral incentives (mixed system and reform) provides a unique opportunity to disentangle the impact of incentives and selection on MPs' behavior. Contrary to expectations, the results indicate that MPs formerly elected in single‐member districts (SMDs) did not significantly decrease their attention to local issues after the reform. This suggests that electoral incentives alone are not enough to modify significantly the behavior of MPs experiencing the institutional change and that selection effects should be taken more into account when considering the impact of electoral systems. By differentiating two mechanisms through which electoral rules influence legislators' behavior, this finding contributes new knowledge to the ongoing debate about the consequences of electoral institutions and reforms.

Legislative Quotas and the Gender Gap in Campaign Finance: The Case of the 2014 and 2018 Legislative Elections in Colombia

ABSTRACTEarlier empirical research on party list proportional representation systems shows that women spend less on campaigns than men, particularly when quotas are applied. An analysis of the candidate campaign expenses for the 2014 and 2018 Colombian Lower Chamber elections provides a novel test of this gender gap and its underlying causes. The research design leverages Colombia’s unique context of electoral institutions, with interdistrict variation in terms of quota rules, and the availability of detailed information on campaign spending and funding. The regression models show that the gender gap in campaign spending is limited to districts with quota rules and disappears among incumbents and candidates listed first on the ballot. As for funding, women candidates are most disadvantaged with regard to personal funds and corporate donations but attract as many individual donations as men do.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE MONGOLIAN PARTY SYSTEM, 1992–2020

Since its democratization in 1990 (see Fish 2001; Fritz 2002; Fritz 2008; Fish and Seeberg 2017; Aagaard Seeberg 2018), Mongolia has held eight elections (1992–2020) to its unicameral parliament – the Great State Khural. Previously, Mongolia’s electoral system has attracted only scant attention in comprehensive comparative studies of electoral institutions (Maškarinec 2017; Maškarinec 2019a; Jacob and Schenke 2020) and of politics generally (Croissant 2007; Reilly 2007; Croissant and Schächter 2010; Croissant and Völkel 2012), although Mongolia is one of the few countries (if not the only one) of post-communist Asia which experienced successful long-term democratization and consolidation (Fish 2001; Fritz 2002; Schneider and Schmitter 2004; Soni 2013). The success of these processes was not precluded even though the country lacked the many prerequisites which are normally considered favourable for democratization (see Fish 1998).

The Dynamics of Hidden Partisanship and Crossover Voting in Semi-Closed Primaries

AbstractAmong US states with party registration, many allow the unaffiliated to choose either the Democratic or Republican primary. States with these semi-closed rules thus provide an option to voters with greater choice than registering with a single political party. Using the synthetic control method, I find that the introduction of semi-closed primaries is associated with growth in unaffiliated registration. However, the likelihood of unaffiliated registration is not even across the electorate in semi-closed states. I show that it is most common where a voter’s party is not competitive and the access unaffiliated registration provides to the strong party’s primary is valuable. Consistent with this instrumental motive, unaffiliated voters in semi-closed states use their freedom of choice to vote in the primary of the stronger party in the electorate. This leads to significant crossover voting among unaffiliated voters who do not identify with that party such as Democrats in red states or Republicans in blue states. These findings show the unintended consequences of electoral institutions and find primary crossover voting is more common under some circumstances than others.

The Cost of Voting and the Cost of Votes

In new democracies, political parties often use clientelist strategies to mobilize voters during elections. In this article, we show that political machines systematically use vote buying to target voters with low costs of voting. We employ a geocoded survey of 3,192 respondents collected immediately after the municipal elections of 2016 in South Africa. We combine the survey data with administrative data on the geographical location of more than 22,600 polling stations. Our identification strategy exploits discontinuities in distances to vote generated by voting district boundaries in South Africa. This allows us to proxy the cost of voting with distance to the polling station and estimate the causal effect of the cost of voting on parties’ use of vote buying. The results have important implications for core assumptions concerning parties’ targeting strategies and for how electoral institutions shape the linkage strategies parties use to mobilize political support.

Election type and the logic of pre-election violence: Evidence from Zimbabwe

Election violence is often conceptualized as a form of coercive campaigning, but the literature has not fully explored how electoral institutions shape incentives for competition and violence. We argue that the logic of subnational electoral competition – and with it incentives for violence – differs in presidential and legislative elections. In presidential elections, national-level considerations dominate incentives for violence. Presidential elections are usually decided by winning a majority of votes in a single, national district, incentivizing parties to demobilize voters with violence in strongholds. In contrast, election violence is subject to district-level incentives in legislative elections. District-level incentives imply that parties focus on winning the majority of districts, and therefore center violent campaigning on the most competitive districts. We test our argument with georeferenced, constituency-level data from Zimbabwe, a case that fits our scope conditions of holding competitive elections, violence by the incumbent, and majoritarian electoral rule. We find that most violence takes place in strongholds in presidential elections, especially in opposition strongholds. In contrast, competitive constituencies are targeted in legislative contests.