Electoral Incentives and Geographical Representation: Evidence from an Italian Electoral Reform

Abstract

Candidate‐centered electoral systems create incentives for MPs to cultivate a personal vote among their constituents, which in turn should strengthen geographical representation. However, existing research has missed the theoretical distinction between the selection and incentives effects of electoral systems. Electoral rules influence who successfully runs for office (selection) and MPs' behavior once they have been elected (incentives). Focusing on the 2005 Italian electoral reform from a mixed to a proportional system, this article assesses the effects of the electoral system change on reelected MPs' attention to local issues in parliamentary questions and bills. The dual source of variation in electoral incentives (mixed system and reform) provides a unique opportunity to disentangle the impact of incentives and selection on MPs' behavior. Contrary to expectations, the results indicate that MPs formerly elected in single‐member districts (SMDs) did not significantly decrease their attention to local issues after the reform. This suggests that electoral incentives alone are not enough to modify significantly the behavior of MPs experiencing the institutional change and that selection effects should be taken more into account when considering the impact of electoral systems. By differentiating two mechanisms through which electoral rules influence legislators' behavior, this finding contributes new knowledge to the ongoing debate about the consequences of electoral institutions and reforms.