Informal Sanctions Research Articles

Corruption, social judgment and culture: An experiment

Modern societies rely on both formal and social mechanisms to enforce social norms of behavior. Formal enforcement mechanisms rely on monetary or other tangible incentives while social enforcement mechanisms rely on some form of social judgment involving informal sanctions. We experimentally investigate the extent to which social observability and the possibility of social judgment affect individuals’ decisions to engage in corruption at the expense of others. We are also interested in the degree to which culture matters. We use a laboratory experiment with a sample of individuals who live in the U.S. but are also characterized by cultural heterogeneity due to the immigration of their ancestors to the U.S. We find that the possibility of social judgment reduces corruption only among individuals who identify culturally with countries characterized by low levels of corruption. Our findings suggest that the effectiveness of social enforcement mechanisms is at least partly dependent on the sociocultural norms prevailing in the target population.

Reducing crime through expungements

Expungement refers to the legal practice of having one's criminal record sealed. These legal devices lower the visibility of a person's criminal record, and thereby reduce the informal sanctions that may be imposed on him. This reduction is enjoyed by the ex-convict only if he does not become a repeat offender, because otherwise he re-obtains a criminal record. Thus, the value a person attaches to having his record expunged is inversely related to his criminal tendency. Therefore, by making expungements costly, the criminal justice system can sort out low criminal tendency individuals – who are unlikely to recidivate – from people who have high criminal tendencies. Moreover, the availability of expungements does not substantially affect a first time offender's incentive to commit crime, because one incurs a cost close to the reduction in informal sanctions that he enjoys by sealing his criminal record. On the other hand, expungements increase specific deterrence, because a person who has no visible record suffers informal sanctions if he is convicted a second time. Thus, perhaps counter-intuitively, allowing ex-convicts to seal their records at substantial costs reduces crime.

Creating an Efficient Culture of Cooperation

Throughout human history, informal sanctions by peers were ubiquitous and played a key role in the enforcement of social norms and the provision of public goods. However, a considerable body of evidence suggests that informal peer sanctions cause large collateral damage and efficiency costs. This raises the question whether peer sanctioning systems exist that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be preferred by the people. Here, we show that efficient peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges quickly if we introduce two relevant features of social life into the experiment: (i) subjects can migrate across groups with different sanctioning institutions and (ii) they have the chance to achieve consensus about normatively appropriate behavior. We also show that subjects universally reject peer sanctioning without a norm consensus opportunity – an institution that has hitherto dominated research in this field – in favor of our efficient peer sanctioning institution or an equally efficient institution where they delegate the power to sanction to an elected judge. Migration opportunities and normative consensus building are key to the quick emergence of an efficient culture of universal cooperation because the more prosocial subjects populate the two efficient institutions first, elect prosocial judges (if institutionally possible), and immediately establish a social norm of high cooperation. This norm appears to guide subjects' cooperation and punishment choices, including the virtually complete removal of antisocial punishment when judges make the sanctioning decision.

The Signal-Tuning Function of Liability Regimes

Fault-based liability regimes require an inquiry into the nature of the defendant’s conduct, whereas this type of inquiry is absent in strict liability regimes. Therefore, verdicts reached through fault-based liability regimes can convey superior information compared to verdicts reached through strict liability regimes. Further reflection reveals that this advantage is enjoyed by fault-based liability regimes only if the evidence related to the nature of defendants’ actions is such ciently informative. Otherwise, admitting such evidence can add noise to the information conveyed through verdicts. Therefore, liability regimes have a function of tuning signals conveyed on to third parties, which, in turn, causes deterrence effects by a¤ecting the informal sanctions imposed on defendants who are found liable. We construct a model wherein this function is formalized, and we identify the optimal liability regime and burden of proof as a function of various factors (e.g. the commonality of the harmful act, and the informativeness of the evidence).

Ecological Determinants of Situated Choice in Situational Action Theory

Objectives:This study extends theoretical arguments from situational action theory (SAT) by focusing on the enduring effects of neighborhood context on individual criminal involvement and presents the first direct multilevel assessment of SAT in non-Western contexts using neighborhood data.Methods:Survey data from a random sample of 1,435 adults in 41 neighborhoods in Russia and Ukraine are used to assess the interplay between individual criminal propensity and moral and deterrent qualities of neighborhood environments in their effects on individual offending.Results:The results demonstrate that variations in neighborhood moral rules directly influence criminal involvement, confirming SAT’s extended argument that this type of neighborhood-level predictor of offending matters and has an enduring effect on misconduct. Furthermore, consistent with SAT’s propositions, principal individual-level predictors such as personal criminal propensity and individual perceptions of neighborhood informal sanctioning exert expected significant effects on criminal involvement. Results for cross-level interaction effects are inconclusive.Conclusions:SAT, a multilevel theory of crime, shows promise in various sociocultural contexts such as Eastern European countries of Russia and Ukraine.

Community power over conservation regimes: techniques for neutralizing the illegal killing of large carnivores in Finland

Certain weaknesses in large carnivore conservation policies have led to a form of political dissent and resistance against dominant conservation regimes, manifested most clearly in the drastic decrease in the Finnish wolf population in 2014. The illegal hunting of large carnivores has been carried out by a particular social group with the support of community members, and hunting violators have been viewed as benefactors by many of their fellow citizens. In the attempt to understand how rural communities sustain alternative ways of regulating their worlds, and how community members negate shame and stigma on behalf of hunting violators, the neutralization techniques presented in the sociological literature by Sykes and Matza provide an effective tool. In collecting the data, we used non-active role playing with empathy-based fictional stories. We obtained a total of 231 narratives from a core group of hunting violators, within which we identified the use of the nine different techniques. These discourses express how a rural identity and way of life is defended and how rural protests against conservation policies are expressed under the pressure of modern conservation regimes. The results address the importance of acknowledging biosecurity issues in wolf territories, of placing a value on local knowledge, and of strengthening trust between the locals and the authorities in implementing responsive and deliberative governance; they also suggest how to formulate effective deterrents to illegal killing and increase compliance with conservation regimes by informal sanctions, based on collective moral judgments and the perceived legitimacy of rules.

The Certainty versus the Severity of Punishment, Escalating Punishment Schemes, and Stigmatization

There is a widely held presumption that the certainty of punishment (p) is a greater deterrent than the severity of punishment (s). This presumption is at odds with evidence from recent experimental work suggesting the contrary, and the implication of simple law enforcement models that risk-averse individuals must be deterred more by an increase in s than a comparable increase in p. This article demonstrates that this discrepancy may be the result of subtle differences in the effects being investigated. In particular, when repeat offenders are punished more severely than first time offenders, a change in p can have a greater effect than an increase in s on the aggregate offense level, even when each individual offender is more responsive to s than p. This is because an increase in p corresponds to moving some offenders from the first time offender category to the repeat offender category, which reduces the crime rate by causing a discrete increase in the sanctions that these individuals face. This effect is reversed when a first conviction results in stigma that more than off-sets the difference between the formal sanction for repeat offenders and first time offenders, because, then, the total sanction for repeat offenders is lower than the total sanction for first time offenders. In these cases, stigmatization can cause criminogenic effects. However, these negative effects are generally off-set by a second effect that emerges when stigmatization is present: an increase in p results in greater expected formal as well as informal sanctions, whereas an increase in s only affects the expected formal sanction. Finally, all results are derived by assuming that individuals are risk-neutral, implying that individuals need not be risk-seeking for deterrence to be more responsive to p than s, which is a point claimed in Becker (1968).

Challenges for women's participation in communal forests: Experience from Nicaragua's in digenous territories

This paper analyzes sex-differentiated use, decision-making and perceptions regarding communal forests in indigenous communities of Nicaragua's Atlantic coast. Methods include a survey, focus groups, participant observation and adaptive collaborative management processes over a two-year period. Results revealed that while a higher percentage of men than women participate in the harvest of eight forest products, women participate substantially in product sales and have some control over income. A majority of men and women believe that women participate in decision-making, but that participation was of low efficacy. Women face significant obstacles to effective participation in forest decision-making in the community: weak community organization, pressure by spouses, difficulty organizing among themselves and informal sanctions. Improving meaningful participation of women in decision-making requires addressing challenges and obstacles at multiple levels; obstacles at the communal level, where the future of the forests will be decided, cannot be overcome without attention to the household.

Gossip as Social Control: Informal Sanctions on Ethical Violations in Scientific Workplaces

Research on misconduct in science has largely focused on egregious violations such as fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism. Recent scholarship, however, calls for greater attention to forms of everyday misconduct and how scientists navigate ethical ambiguity when they are unable or unwilling to make formal accusations. Drawing on interview data from 251 physicists and biologists from both elite and non-elite universities and research institutes in the United States, United Kingdom, and India, we find that scientists are often reticent or unable to take formal action against many behaviors they perceive as unethical and irresponsible. As a result, they resort to informal gossip to warn colleagues of transgressors. Many express confidence that such pro-social gossip can serve as a means of social control by tarnishing the reputations of transgressors. Yet its effectiveness as a form of social control is limited, particularly when transgressors enjoy higher status than gossipers. We identify two types and three consequences of such gossip and assess the effectiveness of gossip as a means of social control. Finally, we consider the implications of our study for understanding and decreasing misconduct in science.

Environmental Policies Can Buttress Conservation Norms

ABSTRACTIn an attempt to solve large-scale environmental problems, government agencies often resort to formal sanctioning systems: market-based incentives or command-and-control regulations, to promote cooperation. The purpose of this study was to investigate how the presence of these formal sanctioning systems impacts informal sanctioning systems for environmental protection. Study 1 used an experimental game to explore the influence of market-based and regulatory programs on informal sanctioning in a laboratory setting. Study 2 was a quasi-experimental field survey that compared informal sanctioning among Massachusetts residents living in towns with voluntary, mandatory, and pay-as-you-throw recycling programs. Results showed that in the presence of a formal sanctioning system, individuals felt guiltier for not engaging in the cooperative behavior and expressed more disapproval for non-cooperators. Combined, these results show that environmental policies can buttress conservation norms.

Adult-onset offenders: Is a tailored theory warranted?

PurposeTo describe official adult-onset offenders, investigate their antisocial histories and test hypotheses about their origins. MethodsWe defined adult-onset offenders among 931 Dunedin Study members followed to age 38, using criminal-court conviction records. ResultsOfficial adult-onset offenders were 14% of men, and 32% of convicted men, but accounted for only 15% of convictions. As anticipated by developmental theories emphasizing early-life influences on crime, adult-onset offenders' histories of antisocial behavior spanned back to childhood. Relative to juvenile-offenders, during adolescence they had fewer delinquent peers and were more socially inhibited, which may have protected them from conviction. As anticipated by theories emphasizing the importance of situational influences on offending, adult-onset offenders, relative to non-offenders, during adulthood more often had schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and alcohol-dependence, had weaker social bonds, anticipated fewer informal sanctions, and self-reported more offenses. Contrary to some expectations, adult-onset offenders did not have high IQ or high socioeconomic-status families protecting them from juvenile conviction. ConclusionsA tailored theory for adult-onset offenders is unwarranted because few people begin crime de novo as adults. Official adult-onset offenders fall on a continuum of crime and its correlates, between official non-offenders and official juvenile-onset offenders. Existing theories can accommodate adult-onset offenders.

Reducing Crime Through Expungements

Expungements reduce the visibility of a person's criminal record, and thereby reduce the informal sanctions that may be imposed on him. This reduction is enjoyed by the ex-convict only if he does not become a repeat offender, because otherwise he re-obtains a criminal record. Thus, the value a person attaches to having his record expunged is inversely related to his criminal tendency. Therefore, by making expungements costly, the criminal justice system can sort out low criminal tendency individuals -- who are unlikely to recidivate -- from people who have high criminal tendencies. Moreover, the availability of expungements does not substantially affect a first time offender's incentive to commit crime, because one incurs a cost close to the reduction in informal sanctions that he enjoys by sealing his criminal record. On the other hand, expungements increase specific deterrence, because a person who has no visible record suffers informal sanctions if he is convicted a second time. Thus, perhaps counter-intuitively, allowing ex-convicts to seal their records at substantial costs reduces crime.

Selecting among Acquitted Defendants: Procedural Choice versus Selective Compensation

We consider two means for implementing the informational benefits of the Scottish verdict (a three-outcome verdict) in a two-outcome legal system. Leipold proposed allowing defendants to choose to be tried under the two-outcome or the three-outcome verdict. In equilibrium, all defendants choose the three-outcome verdict, which requires a wholesale shift of the legal system (something unlikely to occur in, for example, the U.S.). Alternatively, we consider selective compensation of acquitted defendants by the jury for those believed to deserve compensation. This results in reduced informal sanctions for those selected defendants and may also lead to enhanced accountability of prosecutors.

Informal Sanctions on Prosecutors and Defendants and the Disposition of Criminal Cases

We model the strategic interaction between a prosecutor and a defendant when non-strategic outside observers rationally use the case disposition (plea bargain, dropped case, acquittal, or conviction) to impose informal sanctions on both parties. Outside observers recognize that error in the legal process (as well as hidden information) means they may misclassify defendants and thereby impose sanctions erroneously. We show that: (1) changes in the level of the formal sanction affect the level of informal sanctions imposed and (2) increases in the informal sanction rates imposed on prosecutors result in changes in the level of informal sanctions imposed on defendants. We also extend the model to allow for a three-outcome verdict (not guilty, not proven, and guilty), sometimes referred to as the "Scottish" verdict. We find that the Scottish verdict is justice-improving in that it benefits innocent defendants, outside observers, and prosecutors in comparison with the standard (two-outcome) verdict. (JEL K4, D8)

Informal Sanctions on Prosecutors and Defendants and the Disposition of Criminal Cases

We model the strategic interaction between a prosecutor and a defendant when non-strategic outside observers rationally use the case disposition (plea bargain, dropped case, acquittal, or conviction) to impose informal sanctions on both parties. Outside observers recognize that error in the legal process (as well as hidden information) means they may misclassify defendants and thereby impose sanctions erroneously. We show that: (1) changes in the level of the formal sanction affect the level of informal sanctions imposed and (2) increases in the informal sanction rates imposed on prosecutors result in changes in the level of informal sanctions imposed on defendants. We also extend the model to allow for a three-outcome verdict (not guilty, not proven, and guilty), sometimes referred to as the verdict. We find that the Scottish verdict is justice-improving in that it benefits innocent defendants, outside observers, and prosecutors in comparison with the standard (two-outcome) verdict. (JEL K4, D8)

An Enhanced Fear Appeal Rhetorical Framework: Leveraging Threats to the Human Asset Through Sanctioning Rhetoric

Fear appeals, which are used widely in information security campaigns, have become common tools in motivating individual compliance with information security policies and procedures. However, empirical assessments of the effectiveness of fear appeals have yielded mixed results, leading IS security scholars and practitioners to question the validity of the conventional fear appeal framework and the manner in which fear appeal behavioral modeling theories, such as protection motivation theory (PMT), have been applied to the study of information security phenomena. We contend that the conventional fear appeal rhetorical framework is inadequate when used in the context of information security threat warnings and that its primary behavioral modeling theory, PMT, has been misspecified in the extant information security research. Based on these arguments, we propose an enhanced fear appeal rhetorical framework that leverages sanctioning rhetoric as a secondary vector of threats to the human asset, thereby adding the dimension of personal relevance, which is critically absent from previous fear appeal frameworks and PMT-grounded security studies. Following a hypothetical scenario research approach involving the employees of a Finnish city government, we validate the efficacy of the enhanced fear appeal framework and determine that informal sanction rhetoric effectively enhances conventional fear appeals, thus providing a significant positive influence on compliance intentions.

Heterogeneity and cooperation: The role of capability and valuation on public goods provision

We experimentally investigate the effects of two different sources of heterogeneity – capability and valuation – on the provision of public goods when punishment is possible or not. We find that compared to homogeneous groups, asymmetric valuations for the public good have negative effects on cooperation and its enforcement through informal sanctions. Asymmetric capabilities in providing the public good, in contrast, have a positive and stabilizing effect on voluntary contributions. The main reason for these results is the different externalities contributions have on the other group members’ payoffs affecting individuals’ willingness to cooperate. We thus provide evidence that it is not the asymmetric nature of groups per se that facilitates or impedes collective action, but that it is rather the nature of asymmetry that determines the degree of cooperation and the level of public good provision.

Codifying collegiality: recent developments in data sharing policy in the life sciences.

Over the last decade, there have been significant changes in data sharing policies and in the data sharing environment faced by life science researchers. Using data from a 2013 survey of over 1600 life science researchers, we analyze the effects of sharing policies of funding agencies and journals. We also examine the effects of new sharing infrastructure and tools (i.e., third party repositories and online supplements). We find that recently enacted data sharing policies and new sharing infrastructure and tools have had a sizable effect on encouraging data sharing. In particular, third party repositories and online supplements as well as data sharing requirements of funding agencies, particularly the NIH and the National Human Genome Research Institute, were perceived by scientists to have had a large effect on facilitating data sharing. In addition, we found a high degree of compliance with these new policies, although noncompliance resulted in few formal or informal sanctions. Despite the overall effectiveness of data sharing policies, some significant gaps remain: about one third of grant reviewers placed no weight on data sharing plans in their reviews, and a similar percentage ignored the requirements of material transfer agreements. These patterns suggest that although most of these new policies have been effective, there is still room for policy improvement.

State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods

We investigate the endogenous formation of sanctioning institutions supposed to improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. Our paper parallels Markussen et al. (Rev Econ Stud 81:301–324, 2014) in that our experimental subjects vote over formal versus informal sanctions, but it goes beyond that paper by endogenizing the formal sanction scheme. We find that self-determined formal sanctions schemes are popular and efficient when they carry no up-front cost, but as in Markussen et al. informal sanctions are more popular and efficient than formal sanctions when adopting the latter entails such a cost. Practice improves the performance of sanction schemes: they become more targeted and deterrent with learning. Voters’ characteristics, including their tendency to engage in perverse informal sanctioning, help to predict individual voting.

The role of social norms and informal sanctions in catch‐and‐release angling

AbstractThis study focuses on norms and informal sanctions of catch‐and‐release angling and their implications for fishery management. A Web‐based questionnaire of Atlantic salmon, Salmo salar L., anglers in the Lakselva River, Norway, yielded 656 answers (response rate 68 %). Anglers were segmented into four subgroups: catch and release, keeper, something else, trophy angler. In all groups, the reward (positive feeling) was high and punishment was low for releasing a large salmon as expressed by the intensity of self‐sanctions. All groups saw keeping a large salmon mostly as a rewarding experience, although the C&R and trophy segments reported less rewards and more ‘punishment’ for keeping. There is evidence for both a medium strength C&R norm and a weak keep norm in this fishery, receiving different ascriptions between angler groups. The results help understand angler group conflicts and explain how angling behaviour is formed, thereby helping management agencies achieving angler satisfaction.